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The production of new passenger trains can be characterised as a strategic decision, 
followed by a manufacturing stage. Typically, competing proposals are developed 
and refined, often over several years, until one emerges as the winner. The winning 
proposition will be manufactured and delivered into service some years later to carry 
passengers for 30 years or more.  
However, there is a problem: evidence shows UK passenger trains getting heavier 
over time. Heavy trains increase fuel consumption and emissions, increase track 
damage and maintenance costs, and these impacts could last for the train’s life and 
beyond. To address global challenges, like climate change, strategic decisions that 
produce outcomes like this need to be understood and improved.   
To understand this phenomenon, I apply Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to Strategic 
Decision-Making. Using ANT, sometimes described as the sociology of translation, I 
theorise that different propositions of trains are articulated until one, typically, is 
selected as the winner to be translated and become a realised train. In this 
translation process I focus upon the development and articulation of propositions up 
to the point where a winner is selected. I propose that this occurs within a valuable 
‘place’ that I describe as a ‘decision-laboratory’ – a site of active development 
where various actors can interact, experiment, model, measure, and speculate about 
the desired new trains. 
My research finds that UK passenger trains have indeed got heavier over time, 
although this is not inevitable. Applying ANT to an historical analysis of the 
railways I show that the collection of resources that have acted as a train and the 
railways are more fluid than their iron and steel appearance might imply. A diverse 
material-semiotic configuration of entities can act as a train. Different configurations 
will have different attributes, including some that are heavier than others. Two recent 
strategic decisions – Thameslink and Crossrail – are investigated using ANT to 
understand how each decision-laboratory mobilised human and non-human actors to 
articulate propositions of the desired new trains. The realised trains, translated from 
the earlier winning propositions, are now in service and have been widely recognised 
for their lightweight designs.  
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To understand problematic outcomes, such as heavy trains, I propose three 
challenges common to all strategic decisions. The first (treachery of models) refers 
to the unbridgeable gap between experiments and reality – between propositions of 
trains and their translated realised forms. The second (performativity of trains) notes 
the socio-technical nature of trains, which means that, for example, people can 
compensate for inadequacies in the trains produced. The third (society in the making) 
reflects the difficulty of producing a train with a 30-year life while society can 
change around it.  
I propose that improving strategic decision-making, and the outcomes that later 
emerge, can be achieved by improving the effectiveness of decision-laboratories. 
First, the decision-laboratory needs clear and prioritised objectives. Second, the 
decision-laboratory should be recognised as an active site of production, rather than 
a neutral, passive, and sterile place. Finally, the decision-laboratory should foster the 
exploratory side of its character and recognise the value of unplanned innovation. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The trials of producing new trains 
On Monday 5th October 1829 a “trial of strength between terrifying monsters, 
hissing, spluttering, breathing fire and dropping red hot cinders” (Marshall, 1930, p. 
1063) began at Rainhill near Liverpool. It was described as one of the strangest and 
momentous of all competitions, with crowds that came in wonder to see an 
“inanimate thing move itself on level ground” (ibid. p. 1063).   
Three years earlier, an Act of Parliament had given approval to the opening of a 
“cheap and expeditious Communication between the two large trading Towns of 
Liverpool and Manchester” (His Majesty’s Government, 1826, p. 1385). Transport 
of goods and people between the Port of Liverpool and the factories of East 
Lancashire used canals and roads, which were viewed as expensive and of poor 
quality, respectively. Construction began on the railway in June 1826, and by 1829 
was well advanced. However, the Directors of the new Liverpool and Manchester 
Railway (L&MR) Company faced a problem that they needed to resolve. They were 
unclear on the nature of the motive power that they should use for their railway. The 
Act gave authority for a locomotive or moveable engine to operate on the railway so 
long as it consumed its own smoke, with a threat of conviction if these new monsters 
emitted large volumes of smoke in a harmful or polluting manner.  
By 1829, nearly every place where there was a mine had some sort of railway, with 
approximately 25 significant developments (Marshall, 1930, p. 1065) also supported 
by Acts of Parliament. Locomotion was provided in four different ways on these 
railways: horses; gravity; stationary engines with ropes; and locomotives. Horses 
could not deliver the desired speeds or scale of operation required for the L&MR. 
Gravity was not an option in this geography. This left the choice (the strategic 
decision) between stationary (fixed) and locomotive (moving) engines. The 
stationary engine was advanced and reliable compared to its locomotive cousin 
“wheezing, leaking at every pore, and often breaking down” (Marshall, 1930, p. 
1065). The locomotive also had the disadvantage of running on rails that were not 
intended to carry the weight of the engine and its load. Locomotives were still in 
their infancy, with about 50 built in England, and only 26 doing useful work, 
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including six on the Stockton and Darlington Railway (S&DR), the world’s first 
public railway using locomotives.  
To help with their decision, the Directors of the L&MR had arranged a visit to the 
S&DR in 1828. Following this, in early 1829, two leading engineers were 
commissioned to visit various collieries and report on the merits of locomotive and 
stationary engines. They were asked to consider the best “moving power” (Walker et 
al., 1831) to be used on the new railway. The primary objective of the study was to 
determine comparative costs for the two alternatives – stationary and locomotive 
engines. The engineers used their studies and meetings to model the L&MR across 
the two alternatives for power.  
Their modelling calculated the cost of moving 4,000 tonnes over thirty miles (the 
approximate distance between Liverpool and Manchester) for 312 days of the year.  
This produced a “rate per ton per mile…0.2787 of a penny” (Walker et al., 1831, p. 
17) for the locomotive and a less expensive figure of 0.2134 of a penny per ton per 
mile for the stationary engine. However, the capital needed for the stationary engine 
was modelled as £100,862 1s 0d (c. £11Bn1 in 2019 money), compared to a lower 
capital requirement of £90,963 14s 3d (c. £10Bn in 2019 money) for the locomotive. 
The engineers’ report acknowledged that annual expense modelling had not included 
any estimate of wear on the railway, resulting from the additional weight of 
locomotives over stationary engines. This would depend upon the type of locomotive 
and its weight.  
Both power options could accommodate the public, but the choice of stationary 
engines was viewed as intrinsically safer, because it did not involve high pressure 
engines operating near to people. However, the breakdown of a stationary engine 
potentially introduced a single point of failure that could disrupt an entire line, 
whereas a broken locomotive may only disrupt that single service, if it could be 
passed safely.  
The engineers’ report leaned towards fixed engines, but it was not clear cut. 
Stationary engines were more stable and could provide the ability to move large 
amounts of goods and people from the start of operations. By contrast, locomotives 
 
1 Bank of England Inflation Calculator: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-
policy/inflation/inflation-calculator 
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were less reliable, but could be introduced more gradually in proportion to the 
demand for transport. Choosing between the two remained a challenge for the 
L&MR Directors. They decided to test the potential of locomotive engines by 
offering a prize of £500 (Figure 1.1). This was to be awarded for a locomotive that 
improved on those currently operating, subject to certain stipulations and conditions 
created by the Directors and their advisors. 
 
Figure 1.1 Advertisement for the Trials in the Liverpool Mercury, 1 May 1829. 
Source: Railway Museum, https://www.railwaymuseum.org.uk/objects-and-stories/stephensons-rocket-rainhill-
and-rise-locomotive  
Eight stipulations and conditions were given (Walker et al., 1831, p. 103) and these 
are summarised below, with some original usage, such as “Engine-man,” presented 
without updating to modern conventions:  
1. The Engine must “consume its own smoke.”  
2. If the Engine weighed six tons then it must be capable of drawing a train of 
carriages of 26 tons at 10 miles per hour, with steam pressure not exceeding 
50 lbs per square inch. 
3. There must be two safety valves, one of which must be completely out of the 
reach of the “Engine-man.”  
4. The Engine and Boiler must rest on six wheels and the height, from the 
ground to the top of the chimney, “must not exceed fifteen feet.” 
5. The weight of the “Machine” including water for the boiler must not exceed 
six tons and lighter was preferred. 
6. A mercury gauge was required to show steam pressure. 
7. The Engine must be delivered for trial at Liverpool before October 1, 1829.  
8. The price of the winning Engine was not to exceed £550 when delivered.  
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Additionally, it was noted that the distance within rails was four feet eight and a half 
inches. A distance that would later become known as standard gauge, or Stephenson 
gauge after George Stephenson, who built the Stockton & Darlington Railway and 
its locomotives.  
The first day of competition began on Tuesday, 6 October 1829. A starting post at 
Rainhill ran to a second post 1/8th of a mile away, where one of the judges stood. 
The next post, and another judge, were 1 ½ miles further, with the final post a further 
1/8th mile ahead, where the engines would stop and return to the start. The public 
“were not idle spectators” (Walker et al., 1831, p. 101) with a grandstand erected for 
several thousand people.  
A weighbridge on site weighed the five competing locomotives and a weight to be 
hauled was calculated based on three times each locomotive’s weight. As an 
example, the weight of Rocket, was 4 ¼ tons which gave a proportionate load of 12 
¾ tons. This load included Rocket’s tender car carrying fuel and water, as well as 
two carriages loaded with stone to make the total 12 ¾ tons. For Rocket this 
represented a total “mass in motion” (Walker et al., 1831, p. 105) of 17 tons.  
Preparatory runs by the Rocket and Novelty locomotives were made on Tuesday 6 
October 1829, but no record of fuel consumption or other factors were recorded. A 
dispute emerged regarding the method of assigning a load to Novelty. This stemmed 
from the different designs of Novelty and Perseverance compared to Rocket and Sans 
Pareil. The latter pair hauled a tender car behind to carry coal and water, whereas the 
former had no tender car, with coal and water carried on the locomotive. The 
different designs of Rocket and Novelty are shown in Figure 1.2 below.  
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Figure 1.2 Rocket and Novelty locomotives 
Rocket (left). Novelty (right)  
Source: Railway Museum, https://www.railwaymuseum.org.uk/objects-and-stories/stephensons-rocket-rainhill-and-rise-locomotive  
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The calculation of proportionate load had included (and assumed) a tender car, but 
this needed adapting. On October 6th, the judges issued a new list of conditions in 
response to this dispute, with a copy shown below (Marshall, 1930, p. 1089).  
 
Figure 1.3 Rainhill Trials. New Conditions issued 6 October 1829 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Page 7 
It was confirmed that the tender car was to be considered as part of the proportionate 
load to be hauled, and engines that carry their own fuel and water were to be allowed 
a proportionate deduction from their allocated load.  
The water and fuel in the locomotive were included in the total weight that was 
measured by the weighing machine. The amount of water and fuel was at the engine 
owner’s discretion but needed to be enough for a journey equal to 35 miles, the 
approximate distance between Liverpool and Manchester. The measuring posts were 
1 ¾ mile from start to finish, including 1/8 mile at each end to accelerate and brake, 
with 1 ½ miles for full speed running. This meant that 10 trips each way totalled 35 
miles, with 30 miles at full speed. The average speed could not be less than ten miles 
an hour for the Trialists to take part. The time of each trip was to be recorded, as was 
the time to prepare and depart for the next journey.  
On Thursday 8th October 1829, Robert Stephenson’s Rocket twice completed the 10 
trips and required distance. In the first of these “experiments” [emphasis added] 
(Walker et al., 1831, p. 110) 30 miles were travelled in two hours 14 minutes 8 
seconds, at an average speed of 13.4 mph. The second experiment saw the 30 miles 
completed in two hours six minutes 49 seconds at an average speed of 14.2 mph. The 
quantity of fuel consumed over these 70-mile tests was 1085 lbs. of coke, which, for 
a 17-ton total load, gave a figure of 0.91 lbs per ton per mile. The quantity of water 
used for the 70 miles was 580 imperial gallons.  
On Saturday 10th October, Novelty was weighed at 3.1 tons. As Novelty carried its 
own water and coal on the locomotive, an alternative method was used to assign its 
load. After much discussion, a method was developed that defined the weight of 
Novelty, including its fuel and water, as 3.85 tons. The load allocated was to be 6.85 
tons, in the form of two carriages loaded with stone, making the total mass in motion 
10.7 tons, compared to the 17 tons of Rocket’s trial. Novelty began its first run, 
reaching an average speed above 15 mph, but on the return leg a pump burst and put 
an end to the trial. The pump was later repaired, and Novelty made several trips 
hauling a coach of people at 28 mph, but this was not part of the experiments. 
However, it was agreed that Novelty should be allowed another trial.  
On Tuesday, the Sans Pareil was weighed at 4.75 tons. One of the conditions issued 
by the Directors was that if any Engine weighed more than 4.5 tons, then it must 
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have six wheels (Marshall, 1930, p. 1067) and, since the Sans Pareil was not on six 
wheels, the Judges considered that it was not entitled to compete. The owner of the 
locomotive argued that the weighing machine was wrong, and, after discussion, it 
was agreed that the locomotive could run to see how it performed. The tender car 
with water and fuel weighed 3.3 tons and it was allocated three cars loaded with 
stones weighing 10.95 tons, making the total mass in motion 19.1 tons. On its eighth 
trip the Sans Pareil had a pump failure, but its 27 ½ miles at been achieved at a rate 
of 13 ¾ mph, with 274 imperial gallons of water consumed and 2.3 lbs. of coke per 
ton per mile for the whole mass moved.  
October 11th was to be the day of the prize award. The Novelty began its second run, 
but a technical fault on the first return leg concluded its involvement and it was 
withdrawn. The owner of the Sans Pareil requested another trial but was refused by 
the judges because it was above weight and of a construction that they could not 
recommend. The Perseverance locomotive was unable to move at more than 5-6 
mph, which may have been attributable to an accident on the way to the course. It 
was withdrawn. The Cycloped also was withdrawn without recording trial runs. The 
Rocket was agreed by all to be the winner. It had completed the ordeal and fulfilled 
every condition. Robert Stephenson made two additional trips without the additional 
loads at a speed of 35 mph.  
The Rocket subsequently operated on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway until 
1836, when it was sold and worked on the Brampton railway hauling coal from 
Midgeholme Colliery in Cumbria until 1844. Improved designs based upon Rocket 
formed the basis of L&MR operations, with Robert Stephenson's Northumbrian 
carrying the Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, at the opening ceremony on 15 
September 1830. This day was marred by the tragic death of William Huskisson MP, 
struck by Rocket travelling in the opposite direction from Manchester to Liverpool.  
 
 
Approximately 180 years later, and more than 200 miles from Rainhill, two railway 
competitions are underway with the same aim: to find the best new trains to run 
services on their railway. Like the Rainhill Trials, a competition with a significant 
prize is on offer to the winner, in the form of a large contract awarded for the 
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provision of new trains. There are no hissing and spitting monsters on show for 
gathered crowds, but the ordeal, spanning many years, would provide a trial for all 
involved. This is not a choice between locomotives and stationary engines, but those 
‘in charge’ (the Department for Transport, Transport for London) are keen to choose 
the best trains from a group of competitors. This is not a newly developed railway, 
but the new trains do need to work with changes and enhancements being made to 
the current railway infrastructure.  
The history of the Thameslink and Crossrail trials is difficult to pin down, with some 
proposals dating back to the 1970s for Crossrail and 1980s for Thameslink. British 
Rail, the nationalised railway operator, investigated options in the 1980s and tried to 
persuade politicians and others to provide necessary funding. When British Rail was 
abolished by the privatisation process, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), a non-
departmental public body, took on the role, until it too was abolished in 2004. 
Subsequently, the Department for Transport stepped forward to play a key role in the 
procurements for both Thameslink and Crossrail. With Crossrail the DfT was joined 
by Transport for London (TfL), the local government body responsible for transport 
in London. These two entities are very visibly involved, but there are others with an 
interest in the new trains and improvements to the railway. 
This is not like the Liverpool & Manchester Railway, which had a Board consisting 
of merchants, bankers, engineers, and politicians. Instead, the parties interested in 
Crossrail and Thameslink are more dispersed. Local businesses are actively funding 
Crossrail through business rates and other mechanisms. Specialist engineering 
organisations act as advisers to the project sponsors, and form partnerships to 
respond to the call. Financing for the new trains involves public and private sources 
and institutions. Politicians whose constituencies align with the routes of the 
railways are brought into the strategic decision. The geography of where the trains 
are built, and not just where they operate, brings in representatives from further 
afield.  
A network of actors develops further as the competition is announced through 
various channels, including publication (Figure 1.4 below) in the Official Journal of 
the European Union (OJEU) in 2008 for Thameslink and 2010 for Crossrail. The 
contracting entity is named as the DfT for Thameslink and TfL for Crossrail.  
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Figure 1.4 Notice of the Crossrail Trains competition, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, 
November 2010 
This OJEU notice describes the challenge and sets out early stipulations and 
conditions. Interested parties must answer a range of questions that will determine if 
they can be part of these developing networks and participate in subsequent stages of 
the competitions. Five companies pass this stage of the trials for Thameslink and 
four for Crossrail. The trials continue and the companies are provided with a more 
detailed set of requirements and conditions.  
For Thameslink, a Train Technical Specification (TTS) has been created, containing 
more than 500 unique identifiers that describe various aspects of the desired future 
trains. For example, the TTS describes the length of the trains (maximum of 243m: 
TTS 5.1.3), the expected design life (not less than 35 years: TTS 9.1.1), and even the 
capacity of the windscreen wash system (3 days between top-ups: TTS 6.7.2). 
Thameslink participants are also given a Train Infrastructure Interface Specification 
(TIIS), with more than 250 unique identifiers describing interfaces between the train 
and the infrastructure on which it will operate. The TIIS was produced by Network 
Rail, the UK public sector organisation responsible for rail infrastructure. Network 
Rail also produced a Train Control Specification (TCS), containing more than 150 
unique identifiers to describe aspects of the control systems that will signal and 
regulate the new trains on the busy network.  
Crossrail also produced a Train Technical Specification (TTS) to “embody 
[emphasis added] those technical features considered necessary” (Schedule B1, p5). 
The Crossrail TTS contains more than 750 unique identifiers of the desired future 
trains. For example, TTS 3.2.1.4 requires a maximum operating speed of 145kph on 
tangent level track in open air whilst travelling into a headwind of 50kph and at all 
loading conditions. Like Thameslink, the Crossrail trains are to have a design life of 
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35 years (TTS 3.47.1.1). The gangways between carriages are to be wide enough to 
allow at least two 95th percentile adult UK male passengers to pass each other (TTS 
3.26.1.2). The driver’s cab must contain two coat hooks (TTS 3.40.3.1) among other 
features.  
Like at Rainhill the experiments taking place require competitors to demonstrate the 
capabilities of their different proposals of trains. A scoring system is provided that 
describes how the proposed trains will be scored and ranked. There is no weighing 
machine, like at Rainhill, but there are plenty of measurement tools and techniques 
that are brought into the trials by Officials and provided to Participants. The 
experiments do not provide a grandstand for the audience, but they draw a lot of 
public attention at times. Both Thameslink and Crossrail competitions are delayed 
significantly, because of external events, including a General Election and a Global 
Financial Crisis. These events act upon the strategic decisions and contribute to 
updated rules that are reissued to competitors as the competition progresses. Some 
competitors withdraw during the process, but those that remain continue to 
demonstrate their proposals of trains in line with the revised stipulations and 
conditions.  
Finally, the experiments conclude, and a winning train is selected. This train exists in 
“around 7,000 pages” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011, p. 63) and 
so it cannot give celebratory rides to passengers, like Rocket at the end of the 
Rainhill Trials. These more recent Trials have run for three years – from the 
Invitation To Tender (ITT) through to selection of a winner. The ordeal is over, for 
now, and the winners can celebrate.  
Siemens were selected as preferred bidder for Thameslink in June 2011. The first 
Class 700 Thameslink trains entered service February 2016 and all trains were 
operational by June 2018. Bombardier were selected for Crossrail in February 2014. 
The first Class 345 Crossrail trains entered service June 2017, with the full service 
expected to be operational by 2021.  
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The description above borrows stylistically, but not theoretically, from Michel 
Foucault’s book (1991), Discipline and Punish, in which Foucault juxtaposed the 
treatment of a convicted criminal in 1757, and the punishment of crimes in a jail 
some 80 years later. Foucault used this to raise questions about justice, discipline, 
punishment, and more. The events that I describe above are separated by 180 years, 
but the activities have a similar goal – to select new trains for railways. There are 
hissing and spitting monsters performing in front of a grandstand in 1829; and 
proposals of trains, contained within 7,000-page documents, performing in 
procurement competitions in the early 21st century. Both the historic and recent cases 
ultimately produce new trains that go on to deliver a railway service and carry 
passengers. The Rocket went on to operate successfully on the Liverpool and 
Manchester Railway for six years, followed by eight more years on a railway in 
Cumbria, England. The new trains for Thameslink and Crossrail first entered service 
in 2016, and 2017, respectively, and they are expected to have an operational life of 
more than 30 years.  
The purpose of this introduction is to begin to describe the type of events that 
are going to be explored in the rest of this thesis. Events such as this are 
considered here as strategic decisions and the goal is to understand how we can 
make ‘better’ strategic decisions. They are described as ‘strategic decisions’ to 
differentiate them from operational decisions, which typically occur more 
frequently and would be expected to be less important, or critical. The research 
will develop insight into strategic decisions, to help understand why they go 
wrong and how this can be improved.  
When we talk about making better or improved strategic decisions then the word 
‘better’ or ‘improved’ needs much more elaboration. In the case of the strategic 
decision at Rainhill, we know that Rocket went on to operate as part of the world’s 
first inter-city passenger railway between Liverpool and Manchester. Improved 
designs based upon Rocket continued to operate on the L&MR for 15 years, before 
the railway merged to form a larger operation. After Rocket’s success at the Rainhill 
Trials an enormous growth took place in the railways across Britain and the world, 
as part of the industrial revolution. The Rocket can now be viewed in a museum and 
has taken its place in history. By many measures Rocket, and the Ranhill Trials, can 
be described as an outstanding success. There is a strong case to be made that Rocket 
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was indeed the best competitor at Rainhill, and the Trials did produce the best 
outcome.  
It is too early to say how the new Thameslink and Crossrail trains will be judged, as 
they are still relatively new into service. A key driver for these new trains is to 
respond to capacity issues and to support the rapid movement of large amounts of 
people to and from London. The new trains will be judged by their ability to support 
this goal, but their success, or otherwise, will also be influenced by other factors, 
such as costs, passenger experience, and more. This research has a focus upon one 
attribute of the new trains: their weight. The reason for this focus will be discussed 
shortly, in section 1.3. However, for now it is sufficient to say that strategic 
decisions that produce excessively heavy trains can, in turn, produce excess 
emissions of greenhouse gases, and other pollutants for the 30+ year operational life 
of the trains and beyond.  
This research will contribute to the practice of strategic decision-making and theory 
development. Actor-Network Theory (ANT), described in detail in Chapter 2, has 
provided a valuable perspective to understand agency and action in the strategic 
decisions that produce new trains. A contribution to literature is made by applying 
ANT to Strategic Decision-Making in new and novel ways.  
Before developing the research further, it is important to locate myself, as the 
Researcher, within this work.  
1.2 Personal statement – locating myself in this research 
In the 1990s, while working for a global consulting business, I used to keep a 
scrapbook of newspaper and magazine clippings of things that I thought were 
interesting and could be relevant to my clients. The clippings included articles about 
the disposal of the Brent Spar oil rig in the North Sea by Shell (The Financial Times, 
1995), the protests at the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999, the challenges 
to Nike regarding practices in their extended supply chains (Hertz, 2001; Klein, 
2001), and more. For my part I saw a common thread in these articles – that they 
reflected changing expectations of business in society. This was of interest to me, 
and I wanted to contribute in some way. Since then, I have followed the broad 
sustainability and corporate responsibility agenda ever since, and I am personally 
invested in the research contained in this thesis.  
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Through my consulting work and research in the late 1990s and early 2000s I saw 
increased use in business circles of phrases, such as corporate social responsibility 
and sustainability. Some corporations began to recognise, or at least talk about, a 
triple bottom line (Elkington, 1997) of economic, social and environmental 
responsibilities. I made my first contribution to research in this domain (King, 2001) 
by combining my interest in the emerging concept of sustainability with my 
consulting work, which often involved detailed financial analysis from an investor’s 
perspective. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) had launched in 1999, using 
a methodology that assessed the social, environmental, and economic performance of 
large companies listed on the stock exchanges of the world. Companies with the 
highest scores using the DJSI method were ranked as ‘sustainability leaders’ across 
various industrial sectors. My research (King, 2001) found that these sustainability 
leaders delivered superior returns for their shareholders compared to peers. It seemed 
that delivering against social, environmental, and economic objectives could be 
achieved, although it was undoubtedly complex.  
There were increasing signs of activity and engagement in the business community. 
Sustainability reports were published, in line with emerging standards, and audited 
by independent external agents. Eco-efficiency schemes (Holliday, Schmidheiny and 
Watts, 2002) were good places for companies to start on their sustainability journey, 
as these initiatives could reduce waste and save money. Some CEOs talked about 
climbing mount sustainability (Anderson, 1999) and the radical transformation of old 
linear business models to 21st century cyclical models. There were many positive 
signs if you knew where to look. However, the gap between a growing discourse 
about sustainability and outcomes could still prove frustrating. Global challenges, 
such as climate change, were being discussed more by governments and 
corporations, but there was not the same level of action on the ground and in the 
numbers, with CO2 levels continuing to increase. For me this frustration reached a 
peak around 2006, when I saw a chart from the UK rail sector, where I had worked 
with clients since 2003.   
1.3 A frustrating starting point: are UK trains getting heavier? 
The motivation and focus for this research began with a chart (Figure 1.5 below) 
produced by Rail Research UK, a partnership between Britain’s rail industry and UK 
universities. This chart showed UK trains getting heavier over time.  
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Figure 1.5 A chart from Rail Research UK showing trains getting heavier in the UK 
Source: Rail Research UK presentation by Prof. Roderick A. Smith.  
This chart was incredibly frustrating for someone keen to see progress on 
sustainability and action to address climate change. Heavier trains would be expected 
to increase fuel consumption and produce excess emissions of greenhouse gases and 
other pollutants. In terms of an environmental outcome, this would appear to be a 
failure, or at the very least, ‘suboptimal’. From an economic perspective, heavier 
trains should increase damage to the track, impacting maintenance costs and the 
competitiveness of rail relative to other modes of travel. And these impacts might be 
with us for the 30-year operational life of the train and beyond.  
This chart was the frustrating starting point for this research and so the remainder of 
this section will briefly explore the trains shown on this chart to help the reader 
understand and visualise these objects of interest. There are only 11 data points on 
this chart – five UK trains and six Japanese trains. Each will each be briefly 
described with reference back to its relevance to Figure 1.5 i.e., the year of 
introduction and the mass per seat of the train. Although these are all trains, the 
purpose of the following text is to begin to make the case that there are many 
ways to configure trains, and different configurations will have different 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Page 16 
attributes. This thesis will show that a train is a more fluid concept than it 
might appear. Various configurations and collections of resources can act as a 
train. Some configurations will have attributes of increased weight compared to 
their peers. ANT is used to understand the strategic decisions that can produce 
such outcomes.  
The five British trains shown in Figure 1.5 are a similar type of high-speed service, 
operating long-distance routes. For example, the Pendolino travels at a maximum 
speed of 125 mph and was introduced in 2002 on the West Coast of Britain operating 
between cities, such as London, Liverpool, and Glasgow. The Pendolino replaced the 
Mark III Electric train, also shown on the chart, which had operated the route since 
1975. Although they are similar types of trains, there are also important differences 
within this group. For example, the Voyager diesel trains operate a long-distance 
service that is typically across the country, rather than between cities, for example 
running from Manchester to Totnes in Devon, in the south west of England. Diesel-
powered trains, such as the Voyager, can travel potentially anywhere on the rail 
network, whereas electric-powered trains are constrained to the 38% of the network 
that is electrified in 2019 (Office of Rail and Road, 2019b, p. 1). The Voyager diesel 
trains have a shorter formation of five carriages, which provide 256 seats on a 118m 
long train compared to a 9-car Pendolino that is 216m long with 487 seats. The train 
operators must balance how they configure their trains, with the inefficiency of 
empty coaches on one side and overcrowding and lack of seats on the other. 
Three of the five trains use electric power for traction and the other two use diesel 
power. Diesel-powered trains have onboard diesel motors and carry their own diesel 
fuel, which adds to weight. The electrically powered trains have onboard motors, and 
a device called a pantograph, which rises from the train roof to draw power from 
electrified overhead lines. On some parts of the UK network (for example, London 
Underground and Merseyrail) an electrified third rail is used to provide power to 
onboard electric motors. Three of the five are locomotive-hauled trains (Mark 3 
electric, HST diesel, and Mark 4 Electric), which have power cars at each end 
pulling a rake of unpowered coaches. The power cars are significantly heavier than 
the coaches and carry no passengers. The Pendolino and Voyager trains are Multiple 
Unit formations (electric and diesel-powered respectively) with motors distributed 
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across the different cars making up the train. Since there is no dedicated locomotive 
power car this means that every carriage also has some seats for passengers.  
The configuration of additional services onboard will influence the availability of 
seating and the weight of the train. For example, kitchen facilities allow for onboard 
dining and can improve the passenger experience, which is especially important for 
longer distance services. First class seating reduces the number of seats compared to 
standard class seating configuration, as will the availability and type of toilet 
facilities and other onboard services.  
The Pendolino and Voyager are both able to tilt as they travel at high speeds around 
curving parts of the UK network, which includes sections that were first built during 
the 19th century. Straight lines and flat gradients are not always possible when 
railway had to navigate hills and rivers, as well as powerful landlords, politicians, 
and other interested parties. Tilting technology allows a train to travel at high speeds 
on track with curves and bends, but the tilting train must ensure it avoids hitting 
bridges and other parts of the network and landscape. The railway loading gauge 
defines the maximum height and width for railway vehicles and their loads to ensure 
safe travel across the network. The UK’s loading gauge acts upon and shapes the 
trains shown in this chart to ensure their safe passage across the network.  
This brief introduction has provided some insight into the diverse shape and form 
that trains can take. This is influenced by the type of service they provide, the 
geographies in which they operate, and various other forces and actions. The 
following diagrams show each of the five trains from Figure 1.5 with a visual 
representation of the length, weight, and number of seats for a typical train 
formation.  
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  0 65 76 76 76 76 17 48 48 0 
Seats 482 
          
Length 219.6m 17.8m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 17.8m 
Figure 1.6 HST diesel with length, weight, and seat profile 
Source: image of HST trainset with Class 43 diesel loco. (Marsden, 2014, p. 30)  
HST Train 
The HST train is a locomotive-hauled train, consisting of two 
Class 43 diesel power cars at each end of a set of Mark 3 
coaches. The diesel engines use an onboard supply of diesel fuel. 
The Power Cars carry no passengers and weigh significantly 
more than the coaches. The low seat count of 17, shown below 
for one coach, reflects a kitchen facility for onboard dining. First 
class carriages have 48 seats next to the dining car. 
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  0 76 70 76 76 76 76 18 48 48 0 
Seats 564 
           
Length 242.7m 17.8m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 17.8m 
Figure 1.7 Mk III Electric with length, weight, and seat profile 
Source: image of Mk III Electric (Fox and Webster, 2001, p. 78) 
Mark 3 electric train 
The Mark 3 electric train is a locomotive-hauled train consisting 
of two Class 87 electric Power Cars at each end of a set of Mark 
3 coaches. The electric engines draw power from the overhead 
AC lines. The Power Cars carry no passengers and weigh 
significantly more than the coaches. The low seat count of 18, 
for one coach shown below, reflects a kitchen facility for 
onboard dining.  
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  0 76 76 76 76 68 30 41 42 46 0 
Seats 531 
           
Length 249.4m 19.4m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 23.0m 17.8m 
Figure 1.8 Mk IV Electric with length, weight, and seat profile 
Source: image of Mk IV Electric (Fox and Webster, 2001, p. 80) 
Mark 4 electric train 
The Mark 4 electric is a locomotive-hauled train consisting of a 
Class 91 electric power car at one end and a Driving Van Trailer 
(DVT) control car at the other, with a set of Mark 4 coaches. The 
power car has an electric engine that draws power from overhead 
AC lines and weighs significantly more than the coaches. The 
Power Car and DVT carry no passengers. The low seat count of 
30 in one coach reflects kitchen facilities for onboard dining.  
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  42 68 68 52 26 
Seats 256 
     
Length 118.4m 23.7m 23.7m 23.7m 23.7m 23.7m 
Figure 1.9 Class 221 Voyager diesel tilt with length, weight, and seat profile 
Source: image of Class 221 Voyager diesel title (Marsden, 2014, p. 149) 
Voyager diesel tilting train 
The Voyager diesel train is a Diesel Multiple Unit (DMU) with 
diesel motors distributed across the train and an onboard supply 
of diesel fuel. A five-car formation reflects the operation of the 
service across long-distances to more rural parts of the country. 
Driving motors at each end reduce the passenger seats available 
compared to intermediate motors in the middle cars. The low 
seat count of 26 in one coach is for first class seating in a driving 
motor car.  
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  18 39 55 76 76 76 48 64 46 
Seats 487 
         
Length 216.9m 24.8m 23.9m 23.9m 23.9m 23.9m 23.9m 23.9m 23.9m 24.8m 
Figure 1.10 Pendolino class 390 electric tilt with length, weight, and seat profile 
Source: Class 390 image (Marsden, 2014, p. 225) 
Pendolino electric tilting train 
The Pendolino electric train is an Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) 
with electric motors distributed across the train. The train draws 
power from overhead AC lines. The train can tilt, which changes 
the profile of the train and allows it to travel at high speeds 
around bends. The low seat count of 18 in one coach reflects first 
class seating with kitchen facilities. 
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In addition to the five British trains, Figure 1.5 also plotted the weight per seat of 
some Japanese trains for comparison over the same period. The Japanese trains were 
the Series 0, Series 100, Series 300, Series 500, Series 700, and Series N700. These 
trains operate on the Shinkansen line designed solely for high-speed services, with 
the latest N700 train capable of a maximum speed of 300 km/h. By contrast the UK 
trains have a maximum speed of 200 km/h and share the infrastructure with stopping 
passenger services and freight traffic. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (High Speed 1) 
is currently the only dedicated high speed route in the UK, where trains can run at 
speeds up to 300 km/h.  
This research is not performing an international study of train weight and there will 
be no exploration of the weight of UK trains compared to trains in various other 
countries. However, the Japanese trains are part of the original chart (Figure 1.5) 
which prompted this research and so it is appropriate to explore them briefly. The 
following pages provide photographs, brief commentary and analysis of their seat 
and weight attributes. Although this analysis will be limited in extent, it provides 
further support to the different ways in which trains can be configured and still act as 
trains – with different attributes resulting from these different configurations. 
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Figure 1.11 Shinkansen Series 0 and Series 100 rolling stock 
Source of pictures: Series 0 By ナダテ (Nadate) - Own work, CC BY 3.0, Series 100 By © DAJF / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0 
Shinkansen Series 0 and Series 100 trains 
The Series 0 first entered service in 1964 as the first generation 
to operate the Shinkansen high speed line. It remained in service 
until 2008. The train could reach a maximum speed of 210 km/h 
(130 mph) initially, which increased to 220 km/h from 1986. 
They were originally introduced as 12-car sets but later 
lengthened to 16 cars. At 400 metres long the 16-car train had 
1,340 seats and weighed 970 tonnes, which is 724 kg / seat.  
 
The Series 100 entered service in 1985 and could reach a 
maximum speed of 220 km/h (137 mph). It remained in service 
until 2012. They operated in different formations and lengths, 
but the 16-car trainset was 402 metres long, had 1,321 seats and 
weighed 925 tonnes. This gives a figure of 700 kg / seat.  
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Figure 1.12 Shinkansen Series 300 and Series 500 rolling stock 
Source of pictures: Series 300 By Mitsuki-2368 - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, Series 500 By Mitsuki-2368 - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0 
Shinkansen Series 300 and Series 500 trains 
The Series 300 entered service in 1992 and replaced the 100 
series. It remained in service until 2012. The train could reach a 
maximum speed of 270 km/h (170 mph). It operated as 16-car 
sets and was 402 metres long, with 1,323 seats and weighed 710 
tonnes. This gives a figure of 537 kg / seat.  
 
 
The Series 500 entered service in 1997 and is still in service in 
the year 2020. The train could reach a maximum speed of 300 
km/h (186 mph). The 16-car trainset was 404 metres long, had 
1,324 seats and weighed 520 tonnes – a reduction of 17 tonnes 
on the Series 300. This gives a figure of 520 kg / seat.  
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Figure 1.13 Shinkansen Series 700 and Series N700 rolling stock 
Source of pictures: Series 700 By Scfema - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, Series N700 by Mitsuki-2368 - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0 
Shinkansen Series 700 and Series N700 trains 
The Series 700 first entered service in 1999. It is still in service 
in the year 2020. The train can reach a maximum speed of 285 
km/h (177 mph). It operates as 8 or 16-car sets and the 16-car set 
is 405 metres long, with 1,323 seats and weighs 708 tonnes. This 
gives a figure of 535 kg / seat.  
 
 
The Series N700 entered service in 2007 and could reach a 
maximum speed of 300 km/h (186 mph). It is still in service in 
the year 2020. The 16-car trainset was 405 metres long, has 
1,323 seats and weighs 715 tonnes. This gives a figure of 540 kg 
/ seat.  
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Unlike the mix of power sources for the UK trains, all Shinkansen trains shown here 
are Electric Multiple Units (EMUs), with electrically powered motors distributed 
across most of the cars. Shinkansen trains with 16 cars can obviously carry more 
people than, for example, a Pendolino with nine cars, and so simple comparisons 
using metrics, such as kg per seat need to be treated with caution. Chapter 4 will 
explore Figure 1.5 and the weight of UK trains in more detail, however, for the 
purpose of this introduction it is worth noting that if we normalise train weight 
relative to train length then this shows the same results as Figure 1.5. The chart 
below (Figure 1.14) shows Japanese trains (blue line with square markers) getting 
lighter over time, whereas the UK trains (red line with circle markers) have got 
heavier per metre of train length.  
 
Figure 1.14 Weight relative to train length for tbe UK and Japanese trains 
The reduction in weight per seat (Figure 1.5) and weight per metre of train length 
(Figure 1.14) supports a view that the “history of the Shinkansen is the history of 
light-weighting” (Wright, 2009) and this has been achieved as maximum speed and 
power have also increased.  
If we ignore weight briefly and look only at the provision of seats per metre of train 
length, then we see the results in Table 1.1 below.  
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Table 1.1 Comparison of the number of seats and train length for certain UK and Japanese Trains 
Train Seats Train length Seats / m 
HST diesel 482 220m 2.19 
Mk III Electric 564 243m 2.32 
Mk IV Electric  531 249m 2.13 
Pendolino 487 217m 2.25 
Voyager - diesel tilt 256 118m 2.16 
Series 0 1340 400m 3.35 
Series 100 1321 402m 3.29 
Series 300 1323 402m 3.29 
Series 500 1324 404m 3.28 
Series 700 1323 405m 3.27 
Series N700 1323 405m 3.27 
The Shinkansen trains have more seats per metre, even though the UK and Japanese 
trains run on the same standard gauge track, with a width of 1435 mm between the 
inside rails of the track. Track gauge may be the same, however, the Shinkansen 
carriages are 3.3m wide, whereas UK trains, like the Pendolino, are 2.7m wide. 
Differences such as this reflect the fact that the Shinkansen trains run on a dedicated 
high-speed line, whereas the UK trains are acted upon by UK loading gauge and 
infrastructure, with a history dating back to the 19th century, and they are required to 
share this infrastructure with stopping services and freight traffic.  
This research is not going to complete an in-depth international comparison and the 
Japanese trains will not be investigated further in any detail. However, the Japanese 
trains do play a role in the following analysis, and the story that will be developed in 
this thesis. They provide evidence that the inevitability of weight increase should 
be treated sceptically. The Japanese trains have reduced their weight per seat 
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(Figure 1.5), even though new trains are likely to have added modern features, such 
as air conditioning, electric doors, improved accessibility, and so on. Like for like 
comparisons should be treated warily, but so should any feeling of inevitability 
regarding train weight.  
During the complex and lengthy action that produced the trains shown in Figure 1.5, 
it is highly unlikely that anyone said: ‘Make sure they are heavy.’ But this has 
happened. This research wants to understand how this could have happened, 
and how this could be improved in the future. Actor-Network Theory will be 
used to provide a richer understanding of how strategic decisions can produce 
such outcomes. 
1.4 A summary of the thesis 
This thesis uses ANT to argue, firstly, that there are many ways to configure trains 
and an outcome of heavy trains is one of many possibilities. Secondly, strategic 
decision-making should be understood as a collective action, involving a diverse 
collection of actors. For example, Alstom manufactured the Pendolino train, but the 
tunnels and curving tracks of UK rail infrastructure also act upon its final shape and 
attributes. The third element of this thesis argues that during a strategic decision, a 
valuable ‘place’ is often created that is described metaphorically as a decision-
laboratory. This place centred around the Rainhill Trials for the strategic decision 
that selected Rocket. For the Thameslink and Crossrail strategic decisions this place 
is more nebulous but is dispersed around the procurement processes. These decision-
laboratories bring actors together in an active and collective process to develop 
propositions – propositions of new trains in this case. The fourth element of this 
thesis affirms that the winning proposition is the most articulate within the 
modelled environment of the decision-laboratory. The wining proposal of a train 
is not the best train, it is the best proposition within the decision-laboratory. The 
effectiveness of the laboratory will be discovered later, when the proposition is 
translated into its realised form. In the case of Rocket the Rainhill experiments using 
a modelled Liverpool & Manchester Railway produced a successful outcome. The 
new Thameslink and Crossrail trains are still early in their service and it remains to 
be seen whether those decision-laboratories were effective or not. The final element 
of the thesis argues that, given the importance of these places, described as 
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decision-laboratories, then they should be a focus for improving strategic 
decision-making.  
The concluding thesis is: if we can improve decision-laboratories, then we can 
improve strategic decisions and associated outcomes.  
1.5 Thesis organisation 
Two theory-building chapters follow this introduction.  
The first part of theory-building (Chapter 2) reviews the literature to develop a 
theoretical approach to understand the phenomenon of heavy trains. Three bodies of 
literature were accessed to understand different aspects related to this research. The 
Decision-Making literature was used to understand decisions and, specifically, 
strategic decisions. The Social Issues in Management literature was used to 
understand how organisations respond to and act upon environmental issues, such as 
climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Actor-Network Theory was the final 
body of literature accessed and became the primary theoretical lens to understand 
how trains act and different configurations of a train will have different attributes.  
Chapter 3 is the second part of theory-building and it explains the story of this 
research, how it developed over time, and the approaches employed to arrive at the 
final approach. This chapter describes research approaches that were explored but 
could not be pursued for reasons that are explained. The final approach learnt from 
and built upon these lessons.  
Chapter 4 focuses upon the outcome of heavy trains. Figure 1.5 was the frustrating 
starting point for this research, but the source data for this chart was not available. 
Also, there were only five British trains represented on the chart, which is an 
extremely limited dataset on which to base research. Therefore, Chapter 4 develops a 
detailed analysis of the weight per seat of UK rolling stock. This provides a platform 
for the following two chapters, which use ANT to understand the strategic 
decisions that produce new trains.  
Chapter 5 builds an historical analysis of the railways in Britain and applies Actor-
Network Theory to understand how the railways and new trains have been produced 
and configured over time. The primary purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that trains and railways are fluid configurations of resources that have changed 
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over time and will continue to change. This chapter covers a period that starts before 
the Ranhill Trials of 1829 through to recent trains operating on the current railway in 
2020. 
Chapter 6 focuses upon two recent strategic decisions to produce new trains – 
Thameslink and Crossrail. Actor-Network Theory is used to understand the 
strategic decisions that produced these new trains. The trains for Thameslink and 
Crossrail are operational on the UK railway and so the outcome of the strategic 
decisions can be assessed, specifically in terms of the weight attribute of the new 
trains. 
Chapter 7 reflects upon the application of ANT to Strategic Decision-Making and the 
value that can be gained to understand this complex social process using this 
theoretical approach. This theoretical approach, and the analysis in Chapters 4, 
5, and 6, are then used to understand how strategic decision-making can 
produce heavy trains as shown in Figure 1.5 that prompted this research. 
Challenges for all strategic decision-making – not just the production of new trains – 
are developed, with ideas for improving this critically important social activity. 
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2 Literature Review and Theory Development 
To help understand the phenomenon of heavy trains, and how this outcome could 
have happened, three bodies of literature were accessed. They each brought different 
perspectives to understand the research problem.  
The first literature, broadly defined as Social Issues in Management (SIM), draws 
mostly from management and business studies. This literature was accessed to 
understand how the organisations involved in this action manage environmental and 
social responsibilities. Modern trains are manufactured by global corporations, such 
as Bombardier, Siemens, and others. Public organisations may not have a profit 
imperative but there are still requirements to justify use of funds and avoid 
unnecessary costs.  
The second body of literature focused specifically upon decision-making. This 
draws from management studies and the cognitive and behavioural sciences and has 
a focus upon decision-making within organisations. This body of work helped to 
develop insights about decisions and specifically strategic decisions, such as the 
production of new trains.  
The third body of literature is Actor-Network Theory (ANT). This literature was 
initially introduced because it evolved from Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
and trains are a form of technology. As the literature review progressed, my focus 
moved towards Actor-Network Theory as the main theoretical lens because it 
provided a valuable perspective to understand action, as explained later in this 
chapter. A theoretical model, which draws heavily from the ANT literature, was 
created for the research, and is described in section 2.4.  
Each of these three literatures has contributed towards this thesis. However, the 
main contribution to literature and theory that is made here is through the 
novel application of ANT to Strategic Decision-Making. As will be explored 
shortly in this Chapter’s review of the strategic decision-making literature, strategic 
decisions are ambiguous in terms of who and what is involved, when they begin and 
end, and how their outcomes are assessed. The weight of trains produced by strategic 
decisions are central to this research because excessively heavy trains are expected to 
produce excess greenhouse gas emissions, as will be discussed in more detail in 
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Chapter 4. Strategic decisions to procure new trains are analysed by applying ANT 
and its network-based view of action as a ‘toolkit’ to understand how an outcome of 
heavy trains could have been produced.  
The format of the following sections is to first present an overview of key 
developments and themes within each literature, before then reviewing how this 
helps to understand strategic decisions and the production of heavy trains.  
2.1 Social Issues in Management (SIM) 
This literature is based upon a premise that “business and society are intricately 
connected” (Wood, 1991b, p. 384). It was accessed because organisations are 
involved in the strategic decisions to produce new trains, and this research is 
interested in how organisations respond to social issues, such as climate change. This 
literature became a secondary focus as ANT emerged as the main theoretical lens to 
understand strategic decision-making. What follows is an overview of the key 
themes in the literature and its development over time, before summarising its 
relevance to this research.  
2.1.1 Key themes and development over time 
The SIM literature revolves around different conceptions of the purpose of the firm 
and a longstanding debate regarding the role of business in society. This is reflected 
in various concepts such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Drucker, 1984; 
Frederick, 1994; Moir, 2001; Muller, 2006; Freeman and Moutchnik, 2013), 
Sustainability (Anderson, 1999; Berns et al., 2009), and the triple bottom line 
(Elkington, 1997; McDonough and Braungart, 2002).  
The modern SIM literature is often said to start with the work of Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means (1932), a lawyer and an economist. Written during the Great 
Depression, this important work analysed the corporation – the “dominant institution 
of the modern world” (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 313). At this time, owners 
(principals) were becoming increasingly distant and removed from managers 
(agents) running organisations. This principal-agent problem, with a history dating 
back to Adam Smith, essentially asks whose interests should be primarily served by 
a firm and its managers. Berle and Means argued that this separation meant that 
firms were increasingly being run for the benefit of managers, at the expense of 
shareholders and other parties that had an interest in these large organisations. To 
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address this, they proposed that an independent body – a “purely neutral 
technocracy” (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 312) – could weigh up competing interests 
and demands and determine appropriate organisational action. This solution did not 
gain any traction, but the idea that business had “social responsibilities that transcend 
obligations to owners of stockholders” (Bowen, 1953, p. 4) did take root.  
The most famous advocate against this idea was Milton Friedman, who believed this 
would “undermine the very foundation of our free society” (Friedman, 1962, p. 133) 
and harm the vital economic role of business within society. From this perspective, 
the “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits…[while following] 
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom” (Friedman, 1970, p. 121). Business was seen purely as an economic and 
wealth maximising entity, with managers who do not have the skills or remit to 
allocate company funds to social issues. 
In line with Friedman’s thinking, a theory of the firm gained increasing acceptance, 
which saw the corporation as a “nexus for contracting relationships among 
individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 310). Within the organisation a 
multitude of complex relationships come together, and conflicting objectives are 
resolved. Employees give their labour in return for pay, suppliers provide goods and 
services, and so on. This theory recognised that an agent’s (manager’s) interests can 
diverge from an owner’s, and when this happens it can be managed through efforts 
to re-align those incentives, or by implementing controls and procedures to monitor 
managerial behaviour. Board oversight and share options schemes are modern day 
responses to align executive incentives with the economic objectives of investors. 
This theory of the firm, as a nexus of contracts, recognises claims upon the firm from 
employees and communities, but this is seen as a contractual relationship. The value 
of this construct is questionable, however, when many business relationships with 
“‘communities’ can be so vague” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 85) that they 
cannot really be described as a contract.  
Claims upon the firm that are more general and dispersed also highlight the 
limitations of this contractual theory. For example, problems of the commons 
(Hardin, 1968), such as climate change, pollution and congestion, do not present 
obvious economic opportunity for business. An economic view of the firm would 
argue this is not the responsibility of organisations, rather public policy intervention 
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is needed, such as legal regulation, liability, ethical codes, and more. Taxes, such as 
a carbon tax, are often preferred by economists, so that the price signal can still be 
used to drive incentives and behaviour. However, an example can illustrate the 
limitations of this line of thinking in practice. At a high-profile speech at Stanford 
University in 1997, the CEO of BP, John Browne, stated that climate change should 
be “taken seriously by the society of which we are part [emphasis added]” 
(Browne, 1997). This apparent recognition of the importance of climate change, and 
BP’s responsibilities, was a landmark moment, in many ways akin to the tobacco 
companies recognising their responsibility for the impact of their products. However, 
BP’s financial accounts for 2017 – some 20 years after John Browne’s speech – 
show that Crude Oil, Oil Products and natural gas accounted for at least 94% of the 
company’s sales (BP, 2017, p. 142). This could be viewed as a sign of greenwash, 
but in the same 2017 annual report, BP called for carbon pricing to be implemented 
by governments, because this “provides the right incentives for everyone” (BP, 2017, 
p. 50) to reduce emissions. This call for carbon pricing aligns with an economic view 
of the firm that recognises the limited ability of organisations to respond to such 
complex social issues. Responsibility for such societal outcomes is placed in the 
hands of politicians and regulators, who must define the rules and context in which 
organisations operate. Issues like climate change may indeed require governments to 
act, but organisations, and the people within them, would recognise the risks of 
inaction if they ignore their responsibility with respect to societal issues like climate 
change.  
The concept of responsibility has played a key role within the SIM literature. It is 
argued that society grants legitimacy (Davis, 1973) to corporations – often described 
as a license to operate – and this license can be removed, if an implicit trust is 
breached. Moral and ethical issues can suddenly expose corporate practices, which 
may be legally correct, but do not stand scrutiny under public gaze. This societal-
level responsibility is applicable to all organisations. Below this societal 
responsibility a principle of public responsibility (Preston and Post, 1981) means 
that organisations are responsible for “outcomes related to their primary and 
secondary areas of involvement with society” (Wood, 1991a, p. 697). Below this 
organisational responsibility there is a principle of managerial discretion (Wood, 
1991b, p. 696), which states that individuals cannot avoid their responsibility by 
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reference to organisational rules and procedures. Managers are not removed from 
societal norms and responsibilities when they work within an organisation.  
The SIM literature is managerial in nature, and recognises that it is often managers 
that are required to resolve genuine organisational dilemmas (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003, p. 280), when competing expectations and responsibilities of the organisation 
do not align. Managers are aware of the economic needs of the organisation, but they 
are not simply profit maximising agents, rather they try to balance competing needs 
and interests. When faced with complex situations, managers do not seek optimal 
economic outcomes, rather they achieve results that are somehow good enough. The 
organisation may help and guide managers in this balancing process, by providing 
“principles and guidelines for managing trade-offs” (Margolis and Walsh, 2003, pp. 
282–284), such as codes of conduct. Although this organisational support can help to 
guide behaviour and decision-making, it remains open to managerial interpretation.  
In response to the complex reality of modern organisations a stakeholder theory of 
the firm came to prominence, which sought to “broaden management's vision of its 
roles and responsibilities beyond the profit maximization function” (Mitchell, Agle 
and Wood, 1997, p. 855). Stakeholder theory claimed that, in practice, there are 
many groups that play a vital role in the success of the business enterprise. In his 
important work, Freeman defined (1984, p. 25) a stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives.” 
This theory is managerial in nature, because it recognises the centrality of managers 
as “the only group of stakeholders with direct control over the decision-making 
apparatus of the firm” (Hill and Jones, 1992, p. 134). However, managers are in a 
relationship with stakeholders, and it is this stakeholder-manager relationship 
that explains action. This begins to blur our understanding of action and moves it 
beyond organisational boundaries. Business and other groups within society are 
“interwoven rather than distinct entities” (Wood, 1991a, p. 695), with action 
resulting from interactions across this network. Not all stakeholders in this network 
are equal in their ability to influence companies to act in socially responsible ways 
(Campbell, 2007).  
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2.1.2 Relevance to this research 
I think it is clear from the SIM literature that organisations involved in the 
production of trains are responsible for the associated impacts of products they have 
manufactured, helped to produce, or bring about. Heavy trains, that consume excess 
energy and emit greenhouse gases and other pollutants, are the responsibility of the 
organisations involved in producing them. This responsibility exists at different 
levels of analysis. At the societal level, these organisations have a responsibility 
because they are part of society, and climate change is a societal issue. At the 
organisational level, they have direct responsibility for the impact of the products 
and services they produce. At the individual level, managerial discretion means that 
individual managers cannot avoid personal responsibility by reference to 
organisational policies and procedures.  
However, despite these responsibilities, heavy trains still happened. This could 
suggest that these theoretical responsibilities do not really exist, or they are so 
weakly applied in practice, that organisations can effectively ignore them. An 
alternative explanation is that trains produce many outcomes for society. Excess 
weight and emissions are a negative outcome, but the same trains move a lot of 
people at speed around the county and may produce relatively less emissions than 
alternative modes of transport. Additionally, trains provide employment, connect 
people with employment opportunities, and deliver many other positive and negative 
outcomes.  
An economic view of the firm, recognising the limits of organisations, might argue 
that if we want lightweight trains, then we need to provide the right economic 
incentives, such as carbon taxes, so that it is in organisations’ economic interest to 
achieve this. If there is an economic incentive to reduce weight, then managers 
would be expected to allocate resource and effort towards this outcome. This line of 
reasoning would bring legislators and rule setters into sight as an important cause of 
heavy trains, through their inaction. In the case of procurement competitions this 
would be the organisations running the competition, such as DfT.  
In response to this economic view of the firm, the SIM literature does not advocate 
simplistically that organisations should achieve social goals, such as reducing 
unnecessary emissions, when it means engaging in loss-making activities. However, 
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this literature does argue that organisations and their managers have real 
responsibilities, which cannot be dismissed by reference to the financial accounts or 
the inaction of legislators. The managerial nature of the SIM literature recognises an 
active role for managers to develop a response that resolves trade-offs across 
complex demands and external pressures. The organisational boundary does not 
mean that organisations are “unitary actors” (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 456) when 
they are faced with complex demands and expectations. Stakeholder theory 
introduces an expanded view of action that goes beyond organisational 
boundaries. Stakeholder theory still recognises the critical role of managers, but the 
ability of stakeholders to influence organisations is explicitly recognised. 
Stakeholders’ ability to influence is related to the power, legitimacy and urgency 
(Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997) that exists across the network of relationships with 
the organisation and other stakeholders.  
Issues such as climate change do not have a specific stakeholder but are, in theory, 
society’s problem, which can make them diffuse and vague. The government can 
represent society and the climate through public policy interventions, regulatory 
structures, carbon taxes or similar measures. NGOs and similar organisations may 
also give climate change a voice and greater representation, but these organisations 
are rarely involved directly in the production of trains. A stakeholder view of heavy 
trains could posit that stakeholders with an interest in the energy use and emissions 
of trains had less power, legitimacy, and urgency than other competing demands. 
This will be considered within the analysis in Chapter 6 to understand how energy 
and the climate is represented in the strategic decisions to produce new trains.  
To conclude, central to the SIM literature is a debate about the purpose of 
corporations within society: who they should serve, and what outcomes they should 
produce. On one side, it is the responsibility of public policy to set the rules, and the 
responsibility of private firms to focus upon maximising profits. On the other side of 
this argument is a recognition that, in practice, this situation is more complicated. It 
is often managers within organisations who must determine how they respond to 
various “social ills” (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) within society, of which their 
organisations are a part. The production of trains involves private and public 
organisations, with competing demands placed upon all to balance cost, quality, 
reliability, and many other factors. Stakeholder theory introduces a relational view 
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 39 
of action that moves beyond organisational boundaries and recognises the 
interconnectedness of external stakeholders, organisations, and managers. This will 
be developed further in the Actor-Network Theory review later in this chapter.  
2.2 Strategic Decision-Making (SDM) 
This literature was accessed because the action to produce new trains is described in 
this research as a strategic decision, to differentiate it from operational and everyday 
decisions. The following provides an overview of the key themes in the literature and 
its development over time, before summarising its relevance to this research.  
2.2.1 Key themes and development over time 
Defining what a decision is, when it is made, and who makes it have all, at times, 
“turned out to be problematic” (March, Simon and Guetzkow, 1993, p. 3). However, 
a distinction can be made between the decision process, and some critical point when 
a decision is made. Within an organisation a decision is a “specific commitment to 
action” (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976, p. 246) and usually involves a 
commitment of organisational resources. Compared to operational or more everyday 
decision-making the literature recognises that strategic decisions are “important, in 
terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set” 
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976, p. 246).  
The decision-making literature recognises an expected way of making decisions that 
has varied across history and societies. In other historical and cultural contexts it has 
been expected and acceptable that “decision-makers consulted oracles and prayed for 
revelations” (March, Simon and Guetzkow, 1993, p. 17). Central to modern 
decision-making is a focus upon rationality – with managers making decisions 
supported by information and decision-making tools. Each of these elements will be 
explored next.  
Information is central to modern decision-making but it is prone to bias and can be a 
“device for manipulating the decision” (Cyert and March, 1992, p. 79). Therefore, 
information should be more accurately considered and described as contested 
information (Hans de Bruijn and Martijn Leijten, 2008, p. 85), rather than objective 
information.  
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 40 
Tools and instruments are not neutral in decision-making. They can be used by 
project promoters (Vickerman, 2008, p. 66) to reinforce supposed wider benefits in 
support of the promoters’ desired outcomes. Different results can be achieved by 
changing assumptions, analytical approaches, and techniques. For example, the 
choice of discount rates can cause economic costs and benefits in the long term to be 
discounted towards zero. The boundaries of the system of interest can be narrowed, 
widened, or moved to prefer one outcome over another.  
Overall, decision-making should be viewed as rational, but only boundedly so 
(March, Simon and Guetzkow, 1993). Organisations are not “omnisciently rational” 
(Cyert and March, 1992, p. 117) when they make decisions, rather they respond to 
complex environments and problems by making, in effect, good guesses. Instead of 
a comprehensive and exhaustive evaluation of costs and benefits, a satisficing 
approach to options and choices uses a limited, approximate, simplified model of the 
situation that allows decisions to be made and actions to be taken.  
Studies of managerial behaviour find that managers spend very little time actually 
making decisions, with most of their time meeting people and executing “managerial 
performances” (Cyert and March, 1992, p. 236). In this way, decisions can be 
considered “less a theory of choice, than a theory of attention” (March, Simon and 
Guetzkow, 1993, p. 4), with meetings and interactions producing a form of 
negotiated knowledge (Hans de Bruijn and Martijn Leijten, 2008, p. 92) regarding 
desired outcomes and how they are to be achieved. This leads towards a view of 
decision-making takes place across a network of different parties.  
2.2.2 Relevance to this research 
For a strategic decision, such as the procurement of new trains in the UK, there is an 
expected way of making decisions, which does not involve consulting oracles 
(March, Simon and Guetzkow, 1993, p. 17), but does include timetables, contracts, 
response templates, and highly detailed requirements documents. A rigorous and 
detailed analytical process, governed by procurement legislation, reflects an 
expectation of decision-making as a rational process, that is rule-based, competitive, 
transparent, and fair. Rationality is embedded and visible in the documents and 
processes.  
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However, these decisions involve significant economic and political stakes, which 
creates a threat to these rational aspirations. The production of new trains involves 
large economic value, with, for example, new Crossrail trains costing more than 
£1Bn. Many stakeholders are involved directly in the strategic decision, and more 
have an indirect interest in the new trains, railways, and the services that they 
provide. New trains are more than mass-transit services; they can revitalise areas of a 
city, reduce congestion and pollution (Short and Kopp, 2005, p. 366), create 
employment, act as symbols of pride, and more. A heightened political environment 
can surround such strategic decisions and rational decision-making processes can 
prove to be “quite defenceless in the face of power” (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter and 
Bruzelius, 2003, p. 7). Therefore, the strategic decision to produce new trains should 
be understood as an “interweaving of both boundedly rational and political 
processes” (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992, p. 35). If heavy trains were an 
unexpected and unintended outcome (King and Crewe, 2014), then they could 
possibly be explained by the action of power and politics towards outcomes that 
contributed to an increase in weight, energy use, and emissions.  
The main lesson from this literature is recognise strategic decisions as both rational 
and political actions, involving a complex array of actors and influences. 
Organisations and managers seek to simplify complexity using models, tools, and 
information, but such devices are not neutral in this process. A managerial 
performance interacts with influences from other actors, and this collectively 
produces a form of negotiated action. The idea of a strategic decision as performance 
and the active role of tools is also relevant to the ANT literature that will be explored 
next.  
2.3 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
The ANT literature was initially accessed because of its history within the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). As discussed earlier, the application of this 
ANT to Strategic Decision-Making is the main theoretical lens for the analysis in 
this research and the contribution to literature. The following provides an overview 
of the key themes in the ANT literature and its development over time, before 
summarising its relevance to this research.  
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2.3.1 Key themes and development over time 
ANT reflects a long-standing sociological debate regarding the role of individual 
agency and social structure to understand behaviour and action. Agency recognises 
the ability of individuals to act independently and make their own choices. Social 
structure recognises the influence of class, religion, gender, ability, and other social 
forces or factors. Rather than taking a position on either side of this dualism, ANT’s 
approach is to replace “…the two traditionally separate notions of agent and network 
by the single one of agent-network” (Callon, 1998, p. 9). Latour describes ANT as a 
sociology of associations (Latour, 2007, p. 9), with various entities enmeshed in 
relationships. ANT effectively proposes an ontology that replaces actors with actor-
networks to explain action.  
Some entities within this network can be described as human or social, and others 
could be natural, technological, or some other non-human / non-social category. This 
can lead to the criticism that established concepts “of class, race, and gender – 
disappear” (Sovacool and Hess, 2017, p. 721). However, that is not the intent, rather 
ANT simply argues that “the social should not be privileged” (Law, 2012, p. 107) 
when viewing human and non-human actors. The actors in ANT may be more 
accurately described as actants, derived from semiotics, to adopt a “less-
anthropocentric term” (Bennett, 2005, p. 446) and move away from the human-
centric word actor. In this thesis, the word actor will be used throughout to align 
with more general usage, but in keeping with ANT, it should be recognised that 
actors can be human and non-human.  
This recognition of non-human actors is a controversial aspect of ANT, but Latour 
points out that when we say that “kettles ‘boil’ water, knives ‘cut’ meat” (Latour, 
2007, p. 71) we are recognising that the action is performed by the human-kettle and 
human-knife complex. For ANT, action is not only limited to what ‘intentional’, 
‘meaningful’ humans do, rather it is “a distributed achievement, emerging from 
associations between human and non-human entities (the actor-network)” (Müller 
and Schurr, 2016, p. 218). In fact, for ANT there is literally “nothing but networks” 
(Latour, 2017, pp. 4–6), with actor-networks contained within other actor-networks, 
because actions can be composed of other actions, and so on.  
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The word network, as used in ANT, is meant to convey a supple meaning, rather than 
the modern use of the word, like a computer network. This is not a network with 
wired connections transmitting data without any changes introduced. Rather it is 
more like Deleuze's and Guattari's (1988) philosophical term rhizome, and the 
associated concept of assemblage, which sees fibrous connections and “social 
formations as temporary aggregates of objects and people” (Davies, 2012, p. 276). 
Like Actor-Networks the concept of the assemblage is not straightforward to define 
(Müller and Schurr, 2016, p. 219), but it also locates heterogeneous entities together, 
and it is this “arrangement that creates agency” (Müller, 2015, p. 28). Although there 
are many similarities between ANT and assemblage theory (Müller, 2015, p. 30), 
with terms often used interchangeably, assemblage theory is more of a 
“philosophical perspective” (Müller and Schurr, 2016, p. 219) with ANT offering, 
perhaps, a more tangible theoretical ‘tool’ beneficial in the process of understanding 
the actors, agents and networks of strategic decision-making (as will be used in the 
chapters to follow).  
A critical intent, common to both Actor-Networks and assemblages, is the flexibility 
in arrangements, which means they are capable of “acting in different ways 
depending on their configuration” (Callon, 2006, p. 13). This fibrous connectivity 
can lead to a series of “transformations” (Latour, 1998, p. 15) that  can “reconstitute 
identities” (Callon, 1998, p. 17) – with changing relations rebuilding and changing 
identities. An Actor-Network should be considered as a verb instead of a noun, an 
active “site of struggle” (Law, 1992, p. 385) and dynamic development. This active 
development can involve a “successive enrolment of others to form what amounts to 
a single will across the network” (Allen, 2009, p. 204), with the actor-network as the 
ontological object with agency. Entities enrolled into the network may represent 
others, but “representation is fallible, and it cannot be foretold whether a 
representative will successfully speak for (and so mask) what it claims to represent” 
(Law, 1992, p. 388).  
This networked and distributed approach leads to a common criticism that ANT is 
“too abstract” (Sovacool and Hess, 2017, p. 721), with difficulties in defining where 
actor-networks begin and end. An actor in ANT is a more “anonymous, ill-defined 
and indiscernible entity” (Callon, 1999, p. 182). However, with this approach an 
actor is simply “something that acts” (Latour, 2017, p. 7) and “if an actor makes no 
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 44 
difference, then it’s not an actor” (Latour, 2007, p. 130). Actors are included if they 
“are able to make their presence individually felt” (Law, 2012, p. 125). 
Fundamentally, ANT is an approach and toolkit that stresses the need to avoid “the 
social scientist’s powerful gaze and methods” (Latour, 1998, p. 19), with its ever-
present risk of imposing pre-conceived answers upon a situation.  
To manage the potential open-endedness of networks the Aristotelian idea of the 
unmoved mover, or primary cause, is valuable. This identifies one entity within the 
actor-network as a Prime Mover. This entity may have been instrumental in 
assembling the network: defining the problem, engaging the interest of others, and 
allocating roles (Callon, 1984, p. 6) as the network develops. The identification of a 
Prime Mover helps to give some descriptive colour to the analysis but the 
“attribution to one actor of the role of prime mover in no way weakens the necessity 
of a composition of forces to explain the action” (Latour, 1999, p. 182).  
2.3.2 Relevance to this research 
Applying some of these ideas to this specific research problem, I propose that a train 
is a technological object (Law, 2012, p. 109) that is neither “inevitable nor 
static…[but is] the product of complex relations of alliance and conflict among 
divergent actors and their interests” (Sovacool and Hess, 2017, p. 720). A train is a 
technological object, and it is also an actor-network – a train acts and there are 
different ways in which trains can act.  
Different actor-network configurations of entities could all be recognised as a train, 
but they would have different attributes and characteristics that reflect their different 
configurations. Trains, and other entities, “acquire their attributes as a result of their 
relations with other entities” (Law, 1999, p. 3) and there are many different actor-
networks that can act as trains. An outcome of heavy trains reflects a specific 
configuration of entities in an actor-network, that has an attribute of excess weight. 
Weight is one attribute of an actor-network that acts as a train, but weight is 
entangled with other attributes, such as comfort, safety, and acceleration. There is a 
material configuration of the train, with components that contribute towards its 
weight, such as the wheels, engine, glass windows, steel bodies, aluminium doors, 
passenger seats, and so on. However, there is also a semiotic configuration of the 
train, with meanings attached to different configurations of material components. For 
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example, as discussed in Chapter 1, trains like the Pendolino are 2.7m wide, whereas 
the Japanese Shinkansen trains are 3.3m wide. A width of 2.7m is an attribute of that 
train, but to explain why it is this width requires an understanding of the Victorian 
architecture of the UK rail network and the action of the loading gauge upon the 
train.  
Therefore, this research considers the actor-network that performs as a train to be a 
material-semiotic configuration of physical objects that are caught up and 
shaped in relations that carry meanings (Law and Allaskuvla, 2019). Weight is 
one of many attributes, and there are many possible configurations of actor-networks 
that can act as a train.  
An outcome of increased weight was not inevitable, rather it was one outcome 
among “many conditions of possibility” (Mol, 1999, p. 75). Different possibilities, or 
conceptions, of trains, reflect a confrontation between competing “socio-technical 
worlds that are struggling to exist, at the expense of other socio-technical worlds” 
(Callon, 2006, p. 39). At some point a convergence (Tim J. Newton, 2002; Young, 
Borland and Coghill, 2010; Anderson, 2012) towards one configuration can arise, as 
the most suitable, most appropriate, convenient, or ‘best’, response to the world in 
which the actor-network is located. To understand how strategic decisions could 
produce heavy trains requires an understanding of this world in which they were 
produced. The idea of a decision-laboratory will be developed in more detail shortly, 
but this reflects the ‘world’ in which strategic decisions to produce new trains take 
place.  
This can quickly become conceptually complex because, as discussed earlier, with 
ANT there is nothing but networks. For example, in the modern railway there are 
typically competing bid teams in a competitive procurement contest. Each of these 
bid teams is an actor-network and they are also producing their competing proposals 
of trains, which are actor-networks. Additionally, when the train finally enters 
operational service, it will form an actor-network with the surrounding railway 
infrastructure, the passengers, and more. With an ANT perspective, the tunnels and 
other entities cannot be considered as somehow external to the action to produce new 
trains, because they actively shape the configuration of the train, which must be able 
to travel safely through this infrastructure. In addition to this physical infrastructure, 
there is a network of social relations which also act upon the body and meaning of 
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the train. For example, when new trains and similar large projects are developed, 
they are often described, or justified (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter and Bruzelius, 2003, p. 
65), in terms of their contribution towards economic growth, which will act upon the 
timetables, station stops, required speeds, carrying capacities, and more. 
To conclude, weight is one attribute among many of different material-semiotic 
configurations that can all perform as trains. Heavy trains were not inevitable but 
reflect a convergence towards specific configurations with an attribute of excess 
weight. This research will investigate how this convergence has happened. This is 
unlikely to discover a perpetrator who demanded, “make sure those trains are 
heavy!” The desire for a smoking gun does not fit well with ANT’s distributed view 
of agency.  
ANT will be applied to Strategic Decision-Making to understand the production of 
new trains and the outcome of heavy trains. Actor-networks present an interesting 
way to understand technological objects that act as trains, and the actions that 
produce new trains. The next section will describe the theoretical model that will be 
used in the rest of this research.  
2.4 Theory to understand the production of new trains  
Using insights from Actor-Network Theory this section describes the theoretical 
model used for subsequent analysis to understand the strategic decisions to produce 
new trains, and the phenomenon of heavy trains.  
My starting position is that a train is a technological object that, in ANT, is an actor-
network. I view this technological object and technology as “neither inherently 
‘Good’ nor ‘Bad’ – but nor is it neutral” (Kranzberg, 1986, p. 545), rather 
technology can be defined as “a family of methods for associating and channelling 
other entities and forces, both human and nonhuman” (Law, 2012, p. 109). A train 
“may be seen as a product or an effect of a network of heterogeneous materials” 
(Law, 1992, p. 381) and there are a multitude of ways to arrange resources to act as a 
train.  
The heterogeneous resources brought together to act as a train might include a 
human train driver, for example, or they might not. The early steam locomotives 
would include a Fireman and Driver, but this changed with the advent of trains with 
electric motors, which replaced coal-fired steam power. The human who controlled 
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the train in this network was now a Motorman. The presence of only one person in 
the cab controlling the train created a safety risk and “led to the provision of a dead-
man’s handle” (Robertson, 2005, p. 17). This technology would apply the brakes if 
there was a problem with the Motorman, whereas the Fireman would perform this 
action previously in the earlier configuration of a train using steam produced by 
burning coal. With some trains, like the automated Docklands Light Railway in 
London, there is no need for any onboard driver or controller. The socio-material 
network that acts as a train has a fluidity of relations (Law and Singleton, 2005, p. 
338).  
There are many possible actor-networks that can act as trains, with all having 
different attributes. Some will carry more people, cost more to run, provide a more 
comfortable experience, be safer, faster, and so on. Some will be heavier than others, 
as measured by kg per seat – the entry point for this research.  
With ANT, a train is an actor-network, but a train is also produced by actor-
networks. At Rainhill there were Triallists who had entered their locomotives into 
the competition; for Thameslink and Crossrail there are global manufacturers with 
their trains represented in proposals. Each competitor will have a different 
configuration of partners, processes, and other entities within their actor-networks. 
This is easily recognisable in modern procurements, which often involve bid 
consortia that might include train manufacturers, suppliers of finance and specialist 
organisations, in addition to existing relationships with companies that provide 
components, such as seats, air conditioning units, engines and more. In the case of 
Thameslink and Crossrail, in addition to the competing bidders and their consortia, 
the production of new trains also involves government bodies such as the 
Department for Transport, Transport for London, and Network Rail who own and 
manage the UK rail infrastructure. The infrastructure on which the train operates also 
shapes, and acts with, the train – the technical infrastructure, type of signalling, and 
so on, as well as the natural environment of hills, gradients, trees, leaves, and more.  
The action to produce the new trains is also acted upon by procurement legislation 
and guidelines from the EU and UK, which may influence the timetable, format of 
the process, and other factors. Other standards and legislation may act upon the 
trains so that, for example, accessibility for Persons of Reduced Mobility (PRM) is 
improved on the new trains.  
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A complex picture of actor-networks acting upon other actor-networks can easily 
lead to confusion and so, to address this, I introduce a metaphor here to help explain 
the developing theoretical model. Firstly, I will explain two metaphors that were 
considered, but ruled out.  
The metaphor of a stage performance was considered, as it involves actors in the 
foreground with major parts, and a wider cast in the background with lesser, but still 
important, roles. The wooden and steel set, electrical lighting, costumes, and other 
apparatus all contribute towards a collective performance, which is changed if, for 
example, different actors play different roles, the lighting changes, or different sound 
effects are used. There is usually a script, that provides a common endeavour being 
pursued collectively, but performances from night to night are not replays or perfect 
copies, because there are always variations, which makes them recognisably similar, 
but each is unique.  
The second metaphor to be considered, but ruled out, was a factory, involving the 
assembling of various components into a whole, with humans, machines, processes, 
and other entities all interacting towards a final output. Different human operators 
can be brought into the production, as shifts change. Machinery parts may be 
replaced through maintenance and repair. Some aspects of the process may appear to 
be more important than others, but all are necessary to produce the outcome. The 
process may be designed to minimal variance but there are still acceptable tolerances 
for variation.  
However, these were both dropped because I did not feel that they captured the idea 
of experiments taking place at Rainhill and proposals of trains being produced for 
Thameslink and Crossrail. Experiments and proposals both capture an idea of 
discovery and exploration in this action, which is not associated with the factory 
metaphor, and, although a stage performance can convey this, it did not feel like an 
ideal fit.  
Instead, the metaphor of the laboratory is used to help understand the strategic 
decision to introduce new trains. A laboratory suggests a staged and simulated 
environment, which is not real life but seeks to represent or resemble it in some 
way.  
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The competitors at Rainhill are not asked to run the real route between Liverpool and 
Manchester, which was not complete at the time, but they are taking part in 
experiments, with a test track to simulate the real railway. There are no tunnels on 
the test track, but competitors are asked to make their locomotives no taller than 15 
feet because the real railway will have tunnels 16 feet high. They are given weight 
limits for their locomotives, based upon an assessment of what the track can tolerate, 
and the test track allows this tolerance to be verified.  
A 7,000-page proposal of a train, submitted in response to the Crossrail and 
Thameslink competitions, is not as evocative an image as the exotic creatures of 
Rainhill. However, these proposals, or proposed trains, are also created in response 
to stipulations and conditions embodied in a Train Technical Specification and other 
documents. The proposed trains do not run through real tunnels in London, but they 
must demonstrate they can safely navigate the infrastructure, as represented in 
computer models. Competitors are given weight limits for the trains, not because of 
the fragility of the track, but to achieve environmental goals and reduce maintenance 
costs.  
Both Rainhill and the later actions involve modelled railways on which competing 
trains are tested and trialled in numerous experiments. An outdoor laboratory in 
1829, and a laboratory that is dispersed across physical and digital space in the 
21st century.  
There are some limitations to the metaphor of the laboratory. For example, 
laboratory experiments can value the discovery of contrary evidence that potentially 
disproves a theory. It is unlikely that the production of a ‘bad’ train would be 
appreciated, given the stakes involved, even if it might improve our understanding of 
what does not work! The production of new trains does not involve scientists 
speculating theoretically about a world out there. Instead, it involves actors and 
practices producing a form of technology (trains), but this is not a factory producing 
the same widget again and again. There is a fundamental uncertainty regarding the 
exact form that this technology should take. The experiments at Rainhill capture this 
uncertainty and the exploratory nature of this action. This metaphorical laboratory 
is a specialist place that exists for a specific purpose – to produce a best guess, or 
estimate, of a train to operate in the future on the railway of interest. Rainhill 
simulated the L&MR, and the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements did the same 
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for their railways. To differentiate it from its more traditional use I will describe this 
place as a metaphorical decision-laboratory – like a traditional laboratory, but with 
important differences that will be explored. The next part of theory development will 
consider what is taking place within these decision-laboratories.  
At Rainhill and the two later procurements there are trains taking part in experiments 
to determine which should be chosen to operate on the respective railways in the 
future. At Rainhill we have The Rocket and other competitors, whereas in the recent 
procurements we have proposals of trains that are represented in documents and 
other forms submitted by Siemens, Bombardier, and other competitors. Although 
they are in different physical forms, for the purpose of theory development I describe 
these as the same type of thing: I describe them all as propositions of trains. The 
concept of a proposition is explored by Isabelle Stengers (2011) in her analysis of 
the work of Alfred Whitehead (1929), the mathematician and philosopher. A 
proposition is linked to the process of abstraction. The trains discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1) are all abstractions of the trains that will 
run in the future. Abstractions would be of no use if they were projected “upon a 
mute reality” (Stcngers, 2011, p. 399) and that is the purpose of the experiments at 
Rainhill, and the many assessments in the recent procurements: to test and evaluate 
these propositions. However, these abstractions are not being tested in their future 
real-world environment, but in the abstracted and modelled environment of the 
laboratory. The experimental environments are part of this abstraction process 
because they are themselves abstractions of reality. The track at Rainhill is not the 
real track between Liverpool and Manchester. The competitors for Thameslink and 
Crossrail do not run real trains on the real route to demonstrate their ability to meet 
timetable commitments, instead computer models are used for the route and the 
trains.  
With this theoretical model we now have propositions of trains that are produced in 
decision-laboratories. The propositions of trains can still be described as actor-
networks – material-semiotic networks – even though Rocket’s wooden wheels are 
more evidently material than those of later trains represented in computer models 
and engineering specifications. The computer model of a train, produced for 
Thameslink and Crossrail, still acts as a train, even when it is running on the 
computer model that represents the track and infrastructure.  
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 51 
Within the decision-laboratories there are different actor-networks engaged in the 
production of different propositions of new trains. At some point a winning 
proposition is identified and selected to become, in the future, a train operating on 
the railway and carrying passengers. This future train is described in this research as 
the realised train, to differentiate it from the earlier proposition of a train. A diagram 
of this process of becoming, that produces a new train, is shown in Figure 2.1 below.  
 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical schema of the production of new trains 
This schema (Figure 2.1) identifies propositions of trains produced in a decision-
laboratory, with one proposition (in this case) selected as the winner. At some point 
later, this winning proposition becomes the realised train that transports passengers. 
A dotted line surrounds the decision-laboratory and is meant to convey porous walls, 
and a ‘place’ that is not removed from some outside world. The diagram describes 
the winning proposition as the most articulate proposition of a train – and this will 
be elaborated next.  
In his study of scientific practice, Latour proposes the concepts of articulation 
(Latour, 1999, 2004) and propositions as an alternative to the use of scientific 
statements made about the world. Where statements can be either be true or false 
(Popper, 2002), propositions are not true or false, but they can be more, or less, 
articulate. Statements about a world out there will always face the gap between the 
world of language and the real world, and this gap “shows no sign of being filled” 
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(Latour, 1999, p. 148), because our symbols, thoughts and representations will never 
be the thing (referent) to which we refer. 
The dictionary definition of articulate can mean the ability to communicate clearly, 
but it can also be understood in terms of joints and connections, like an articulated 
lorry. In this thesis the word articulate acts as both a verb and an adjective. There is 
an active process of articulation that introduces connections to other ideas and 
things that is taking place in, and with, the decision laboratory. The propositions of 
trains can also be said to be becoming more articulate, in that they increasingly 
express and communicate the best guess of a train within the decision-laboratory. 
The decision-laboratory is the place in which propositions are articulated. Some 
propositions will be more articulate than others. The winning proposition is the most 
articulate. 
So, we can say that Rocket won because it was the most articulate proposition of 
a train performing at Rainhill. It was connected (articulated) to, and with, the 
stipulations and conditions specifying weight limits, and so would not damage the 
track; it could pull the specified test loads; it consumed its own smoke by burning 
coke; and so on. The other competitors with their different propositions of 
locomotives were part of the same experiments, but they did not perform so well – 
they were not as articulate with respect to these local conditions.  
The Novelty proposition did not have a tender car and was therefore much lighter in 
weight than Rocket. However, weight was only part of what made an articulate 
proposition. Novelty’s lightweight design may have connected (articulated) well with 
the fragility of early railway track, but it was not able to travel the required distance, 
while carrying specified loads. Even when the judges modified the stipulations and 
conditions to calculate Novelty’s required load, it was still unable to perform for the 
required 10 laps of the test circuit. Rocket won because it was the most articulate 
proposition of a train at Rainhill. Rocket later became the realised train operating on 
the Liverpool & Manchester Railway.  
Siemens and Bombardier also won because they were the most articulate 
propositions of trains for the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements, respectively. 
Chapter 6 will show that both competitions were interrupted and extended, and, in 
the case of Crossrail, the conditions were changed during the process to remove the 
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requirement for private financing, and to reflect the UK Government’s updated 
guidance to public sector procurement. The propositions of trains were shaped in 
their respective decision-laboratories, with new articulations to demonstrate local 
supplier use and support to local economies. Siemens and Bombardier were awarded 
the contract because they provided the most articulate propositions of trains within 
the decision-laboratories that existed for the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements. 
These propositions of trains became the Class 700 and Class 345 realised trains.  
The most articulate propositions are produced within, and by, the decision-laboratory 
experiments taking place at Rainhill and the recent procurements. This is not same as 
saying these are the best trains for their railways, rather they are essentially a good 
guess of the best trains for these railways. Judgment of success or otherwise is in the 
“hands of later users” (Latour, 1987, p. 59) and the winning proposition of a train 
may or may not be ideal, when it is exposed to operation in the real world of rain, 
hills, angry passengers, and congested networks. Rocket is viewed by most as a 
success, but more time is needed to judge the other trains.  
To summarise, we have propositions of trains, that are articulated in a decision-
laboratory. The most articulate proposition of a train is selected as the winner 
and will become a realised train at some point in the future.  
The final piece of theory development focused upon understanding the actor-
networks involved in the action to produce articulate propositions of trains in the 
decision-laboratory. A networked view of action needs to recognise this as “a 
collective process” (Latour, 1987, p. 29) and avoid seeing some inner core of actors 
in the foreground, with a surrounding, relatively passive background. Therefore, to 
understand the collective action taking place within the decision laboratory to 
produce propositions of trains I propose to use Latour’s (1999) five loop model 
(Figure 2.2 below). This model helps to understand how the action can reach out to 
enrol and engage other groups to make the growing network stronger.  
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Figure 2.2 Theoretical model of five circulating loops used in this actor-network theory analysis of heavy trains 
Source: (Latour, 1999, p. 100) 
This model was originally developed within the study of scientific practice. In 
contrast to a model of science as an activity that is somehow removed from society, 
this model placed it firmly embedded in social systems. Science is not practiced in 
sterile and socially isolated laboratories by humans and instruments, that are 
somehow removed from the social world.  
This theoretical model is applied in this thesis to understand the action of articulation 
that produces propositions of trains within a decision-laboratory. This action is 
described across a circulatory system of five loops – “each of the five activities is as 
important as the others, and each feeds into itself and into the other four” (Latour, 
1999, p. 99). These activities are described next. 
Mobilisation of the world captures the ways in which the complexities of the real 
world are transformed into evidence, theories, numbers, tables, and other forms. This 
transformation makes them “transportable, reproducible, and diffusible” (Callon, 
1984, p. 14), so that they can represent real world complexities within this actor-
network. This inherently involves a process of abstraction and simplification to 
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 55 
achieve the goal of bringing the world into the action. This can involve techniques 
such as surveys, questionnaires, consultations, and many other ways to convert 
things out there, into a form that can then be mobilised within the action. For 
railways this could include, for example, all the ways in which the desires and needs 
of future passengers are measured and assessed – using surveys and interviews – and 
then mobilised as evidence to shape aspects of new train design.  
The second loop, autonomisation (colleagues), captures the “ways in which a 
discipline, a profession, a clique or an ‘invisible college’ becomes independent and 
forms its own criteria of evaluation and reference” (Latour, 1999, p. 102). The 
entities and activities associated with this specialist group can be recognised as an 
autonomous group within a wider network. This captures the “enrolment of support” 
(Phillips and Smith, 2018, p. 12) for an idea, concept or action within a distinct 
specialism. An actor-network is made stronger when a group of experts agree and 
come together. This loop includes colleagues, professions, disciplines, and 
institutions that all help to provide resources, status, and regulations that identify a 
group of individuals as specialists. Railways have been identified as a distinct 
profession since the early 19th century (Chapter 5). The modern production of trains 
is part of the wider railway and engineering network, and rolling stock is a specialist 
community of interest within this group. The actor-network to produce new trains is 
theoretically open to any organisation that responds to the first call for interest. 
However, those entities without recognised specialist skills are removed early in the 
process of network formation to produce new trains.  
The third loop, alliances, is about enrolment of support beyond the immediate 
activities of interest. Allies beyond the specialists within the second loop help to 
make the network more robust, including helping to rebuff those “who support 
competing outcomes” (Young, Borland and Coghill, 2010, p. 1209). For the 
railways, and the production of new trains, alliances can be formed because of the 
economic opportunities supported by the railways. This can draw local employers 
and employee groups into the network, to support one outcome over others, or to 
ensure that the action makes progress and is not stymied by other interests. 
Environmental NGOs are potential allies with an interest in the emissions and energy 
performance of trains, as well as generally supporting public transport.  
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Page 56 
The fourth and final outer loop, public representation, includes the public, media, 
“reporters, pundits and the man and woman in the street” (Latour, 1999, p. 105). The 
fourth loop represents a movement towards becoming “part of the discourse in the 
public domain” (van Eijck, 2010, p. 2434). People who travel by rail for commuting 
and other purposes are within this loop. Organisations such as Transport Focus are 
an organisation that represent the interests of passengers within the action to produce 
new trains. Occasionally rail creates news in the general media for positive and 
negative reasons – including ticket prices that increase by inflation each year, the 
new high-speed rail link (High Speed 2), the launch of new trains, and more.  
The centre, or links and knots, represents the “pumping heart…a conceptual core” 
(Latour, 1999, pp. 106–107) that holds this circulatory system of heterogeneous 
resources together. The loops provide substance and strength, whereas the links 
and knots at the centre holds the network together. The links and knots are 
dynamic, which means that the collection of resources can also change over time. 
The links and knots do not mean that there is one actor, such as the DfT, at the centre 
of this action. Rather, the links and knots reflect the concept of: what is a train and 
this train in particular? Different conceptions of trains and railways can pull in and 
hold different collections of resources together, and hence produce different trains.  
This concludes the review of literature and development of theory. Actor-Network 
Theory, or the sociology of translation (Law, 1992, p. 380; Latour, 2007, p. 106), 
will be used to understand the strategic decisions that produce new trains. The 
strategic decision that produces new trains is viewed here as a social process that 
first produces propositions of trains. Various propositions of trains can exist, but 
they do not yet carry passengers or goods. The most articulate proposition is then 
translated and becomes a realised train. This application of ANT to the study of 
strategic decision-making will contribute to theoretical understanding of this 
critical social process. The three bodies of literature reviewed above has found this to 
be a novel contribution. Strategic decisions to procure new trains are analysed by 
applying ANT and its network-based view of action as a ‘toolkit’ to understand how 
an outcome of heavy trains could have been produced.  
The next chapter explains the research approach to apply this theory and explore the 
phenomenon of heavy trains.
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3 Research Design: The Story of this Research 
This chapter explains the story of this research and how the approach developed 
over time. The final research approach adopted used secondary data sources, such as 
publicly available procurement documentation, industry data, archival sources, and 
information accessed via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. Before describing 
this final research approach, the following section describes how an ethnographic 
approach was explored that could have provided access to primary data. The 
following section describes this earlier development because it was part of the story 
of this research, and explains why the final approach was adopted, but it also 
provides some useful insight into the strategic decisions to produce new trains.  
3.1 An opportunity to observe a strategic decision 
In 2012-13 it was announced that the 35-year-old fleet of Merseyrail trains, 
operating in the Liverpool City Region, were to be replaced. Merseytravel, the local 
government body responsible for coordinating public transport across Merseyside, 
would run a competitive procurement process for the new trains. This presented an 
opportunity to observe a strategic decision using an ethnographic approach (Flick, 
von Kardorff and Steinke, 2005) from its very early stages. This procurement was 
also interesting because Merseytravel were to be the owner of the new trains. This 
was a new development because most trains are owned by Rolling Stock Operating 
Companies (ROSCOs) in the modern UK railway.  
Contact was made with Merseytravel in early 2013 to explore the possibility of using 
this procurement as a research focus. Meetings were held with various people within 
Merseytravel, including the recently appointed Project Director in charge of the 
procurement, and an in-house solicitor. As the conversation developed the subject of 
confidentiality agreements arose, because of the need to protect the procurement 
process and participants. Legal advice was sought from the University of Liverpool 
and joint discussions were held with legal advisers at Merseytravel. From these 
meetings and email exchanges a view emerged that it would not be enough for only 
Merseytravel and myself, as the Researcher, to sign confidentiality agreements. 
Rather, agreements would need to be signed and approved by all bidders, advisers, 
and other stakeholders, involved in the procurement. One suggestion that was 
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explored was for Merseytravel to incorporate the confidentiality agreement 
associated with this research into the wider tender process. When organisations 
signed up to participate in the tender, they could also agree to participate in the 
research.  
However, this was a high profile and high value strategic decision, with the contract 
for the new trains estimated at £400M to £500M. For the research proposal to 
progress, any changes made to allow access for research could not create risk of the 
procurement process being compromised in any way. Awareness of risk was 
especially heightened at the time because of problems elsewhere in the railway. Late 
in 2012, a large competitive tender to run the West Coast rail services, from London 
to North West England and Scotland, was awarded by the Department for Transport 
to First Group plc. However, this decision faced a legal challenge (Rowley, 2012) 
from Virgin Group, the incumbent operator. This led to the cancellation of the 
award, repayment of nearly £40M of bid costs by the Government to those parties 
involved, and the need to re-run the competition. This was high-profile news, and 
clearly illustrated the risks and economic stakes involved in these strategic decisions.  
By July 2013 it became clear that anything that modified or compromised the 
procurement process for new trains in Liverpool created legal and commercial risks. 
The likelihood of these risks was unknown, and arguably exceedingly small, 
however, the impact and consequences could be extremely high, as illustrated by the 
earlier case with the West Coast franchise. Observational research of the 
procurement was proving too difficult, and so discussions were concluded on good 
terms with the Merseytravel team.  
Four year later, on 16 December 2016, a contract was awarded to Stadler, a Swiss 
manufacturer, for the supply and maintenance of 52 four-car trains at a value of c. 
£700M. One of the competing bidders, Bombardier, subsequently launched a legal 
challenge in the High Court regarding “aspects of Merseytravel's procurement 
process and the way in which Merseytravel had scored the Bombardier tender” (The 
Hon. Mr Justice Coulson, 2017, p. 2). Bombardier’s claim focused upon gaining 
access to confidential Stadler documentation, and other documents relating to the 
evaluation process. The court ruling found in favour of Bombardier, who were 
awarded costs, to be paid by Stadler, but there were no further challenges to the 
contract award. It is probably safe to assume that the documentation, accessible 
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because of the legal ruling, did not provide further grounds for a challenge seeking to 
reverse the strategic decision. However, this legal challenge by Bombardier further 
demonstrated the stakes involved within these strategic decisions. Stadler Rail went 
on to deliver the new trains, which began to enter service in 2020.  
When the discussions with Merseytravel concluded a new research approach was 
developed, which is described in the remainder of this chapter.  
3.2 Summary of the research approach 
The theoretical model (Chapter 2) described multiple propositions of trains 
produced, or articulated, within a decision-laboratory. One proposition – the most 
articulate – is identified as the winner and becomes a realised train, at some point in 
the future. The propositions of trains and the realised train all have different socio-
material configurations and therefore all have different attributes. The trains in 
Figure 1.5 (page 15) are realised trains that have been translated from earlier 
propositions of trains. The design of this research was organised first around this 
outcome of heavy trains shown in Figure 1.5. However, this chart raised two issues 
that needed to be addressed. Firstly, the source data that created the chart was not 
available. Secondly, there were only five trains shown in Figure 1.5, and only the 
two most recent trains (Voyager diesel tilt and Pendolino electric tilt) showed an 
increase in weight relative to the earlier trains. With this limited dataset it was 
unclear if the increase in weight was a wider phenomenon, or just limited to those 
two trains. Therefore, the research approach needed first to verify the outcome 
shown in Figure 1.5, and then to determine if heavy trains were a wider phenomenon 
across UK rolling stock. The analysis of train weight is documented in Chapter 4. 
The research approach for this analysis is described in more detail in Section 3.3 
later in this chapter.  
The analysis in Chapter 4 provides supporting evidence for the increasing weight of 
UK trains over time. Chapters 5 and 6 then investigate how this has happened by 
applying theory, developed in Chapter 2, to the translation process that produces new 
trains.  
Chapter 5 applies ANT within an historical analysis to understand the changing 
configuration of resources that make up the railways and trains over time. The 
primary goal of this analysis is to establish that trains (and railways) are fluid 
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collections of resources that can be configured, and reconfigured, and can still act as 
a train. Using the ANT model of five circulating loops (Figure 2.2, page 54) this 
historical analysis was particularly valuable to explore the fifth loop (links and 
knots) that is the conceptual core that entangles and holds the loops together. The 
research approach adopted for this historical analysis is described in Section 3.4 later 
in this chapter.  
Chapter 6 applies ANT using two contemporary strategic decisions to 
understand the translation process within the decision-laboratory. The 
introduction of new trains for Thameslink and Crossrail were selected for several 
reasons. Firstly, the translation process is complete. The realised trains entered 
operational service, in 2016 and 2017, respectively and so publicly accessible data is 
available to measure their attributes, such as weight, number of seats, and other 
characteristics. Additionally, these new trains have been recognised by the railway 
industry for their lightweight designs and so this provided a valuable contrast to the 
wider increase in weight explored in Chapter 4. They demonstrate that increasing 
weight was not inevitable. The research approach adopted for this contemporary 
analysis is described in Section 3.5 later in this chapter.  
Finally, it is important to note a part of the translation process that was deliberately 
excluded from the scope of this research. For the UK, a decision-laboratory 
producing propositions of new trains usually involves a complex competitive 
procurement process that lasts many years. Once a winning proposition of a train is 
identified during this procurement process it is then translated to become a realised 
train. Subsequent translations are introduced during contract negotiations, change 
requests, manufacturing, testing, and more. This later translation into a realised train 
is excluded from this research because it would have extended the scope 
significantly beyond what could be achieved within the timescales and resources 
available to this research. The focus of this research is the decision-laboratory, 
where propositions are articulated, and the most articulate proposition is 
identified as the winner. This was characterised earlier in Figure 2.1 (page 51), with 
the decision-laboratory surrounded by a dotted line to recognise its porous walls. 
To recap, the design of this research approach first wanted to investigate the outcome 
of heavy trains. ANT theory was then used to produce a rich understanding of the 
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production of new trains within the railways. Each of these steps are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. 
3.3 Analysis of the weight of British trains (Chapter 4) 
The outcome of heavy trains was the prompt for this research and the analysis begins 
here. Chapter 4 provides in-depth analysis of the weight of British trains before 
exploring how this could have happened in Chapters 5 and 6. The following section 
describes the analytical approach used in Chapter 4 to investigate train weight. 
The first step in the analysis of the weight of trains was to verify the chart shown in 
Figure 1.5. Reproducing this independently was not a simple task, because there can 
be many variations in the configurations of the trains shown in the chart. For 
example, the Pendolino train typically consists of a 9-car trainset, but some were 
later lengthened to 11-car sets to increase capacity. The chart (Figure 1.5) does not 
say which Pendolino was used for the analysis. There are many other variations 
possible across the trains, such as the number of first-class carriages (with fewer 
seats), availability of dining services, and more. The analysis in Chapter 4 explains 
how these concerns were overcome. Figure 1.5 also showed Japanese vehicles that 
were getting lighter over the same period. The data for these Japanese vehicles was 
reproduced in this analysis, but, as stated in Chapter 1, they were not explored any 
further in this work because this work is not performing an international comparison 
of train weight. Data sources for each of these steps are described shortly.  
For the second step, I expanded the analysis of weight beyond the five trains shown 
in Figure 1.5. A larger set of UK trains were analysed that included inter-city 
services, commuter trains, and rural services. This expanded dataset included trains 
with different forms of traction – electric motors, diesel, and hybrid trains that use 
both diesel and electric. This second step gave a perspective on the weight of trains 
across a large and diverse group of different trains. However, this diverse database of 
trains raised a question of comparability. It was not sensible to compare, for 
example, the weight per seat of high-speed inter-city trains against, say, trains for 
rural railways. These trains provide different services and operate on different routes 
– they all act as trains, but have different attributes. To allow comparisons to be 
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made over time and see how weight was changing I used an approach2 that focused 
upon a specific sub-set of trains. This was the third step in the analysis.  
For the third step I analysed weight across the same type of train: suburban Electric 
Multiple Units (EMUs). These trains were designed for heavy-duty commuting to 
move a lot of people in and out of major cities. Different types of this train have been 
introduced over time in the UK, which provides a good dataset for comparison over 
time. Trains within this group of suburban EMUs are all powered by electric motors, 
drawing power from overhead lines using AC power, or third rails supplying DC 
power. Although there was more commonality in this group of trains, this did not 
mean that they were all identical, and there was still significant variation across their 
configurations. For example, some trains operate as 3-car trainsets, some 5-car sets, 
etc. There can also be variation in the facilities provided on-board, such as toilets, 
density of seating, air conditioning, electric doors and so on. This variation reflects 
the dynamic way in which resources can be configured to act as trains – even 
realised trains providing an operational service can continue to be reconfigured and 
reorganised through refurbishment processes and other activities.  
For the fourth and final step in the analysis of train weight I drilled down below the 
measure of kg per seat, that was used in the original chart (Figure 1.5). This measure 
was used for consistency in each of steps 1-3 described above. There is no claim 
made here that this metric (kg per seat) is the best way to judge a train. Rather, it is 
used through this analysis because it was the metric in the chart that prompted this 
research. It provides some insight into attributes that are relevant to important 
societal issues, such as climate change, and that is why it is of interest to this 
research. This fourth step recognises that weight per seat (kg/seat) is a composite 
measure consisting of two parts: the weight of the train; and the number of train 
seats. Drilling down into these two components allowed the analysis to understand if 
an increase in weight per seat was driven by trains getting heavier, if fewer seats 
were available, or some combination of both.  
Data for the analysis in each step was drawn from publicly available sources 
(Marsden, 2014; Pritchard, 2018c, 2019b, 2019a) recognised within the rail industry. 
The latest versions of these publications were used to provide the most recent data. 
 
2 I owe thanks to Roger Ford of Modern Railways for this suggestion to focus upon commuter EMUs 
to help with comparability over time.  
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The data required for this analysis was: the year that the train was first introduced, 
the train’s weight, and the number of seats available across the train. Other 
characteristics captured for the analysis included the number of cars that make up the 
train, and information relating to its construction, such as whether the body was 
made from aluminium or steel, which was used to help understand the changing 
material configuration of trains over time.  
3.4 The production of new trains: historical analysis (Chapter 5) 
The earliest trains shown in Figure 1.5 were first introduced to the railway in 1975 
when the railway was a nationalised industry, owned and operated by British 
Railways, whereas the later trains were introduced after privatisation in the 1990s. 
Given that the trains were produced in different contexts, the idea for some form of 
political economic analysis was introduced into the research approach. However, 
ANT discourages the use of the “rigid, stuffy word ‘context’” (Latour, 1996, p. 133) 
and so the historical analysis using ANT should not be viewed as context, but is an 
active part of this investigation.  
The historical analysis in Chapter 5 uses ANT to show that various configurations 
and collections of resources have acted as trains and railways over time. Initially 
the intention was to align this historical analysis with Figure 1.5 and look back to the 
1970s, however, as this work progressed the contribution of this analysis to the wider 
thesis became clearer and the period of analysis was extended. The historical 
analysis looks back into the history of the railways from the earliest developments 
through to present day.  
I framed the historical analysis by defining four different eras of the railways. The 
first era ranged from the late 18th and early 19th century to the time of the First World 
War. This was a period of rapid growth in construction and the development of many 
local railways across the country. The second era was a period of consolidation after 
World War One. Consolidation into the Big Four railways took place, and this 
period ran just beyond World War Two. The third era began when war ended, and 
the railways were nationalised. British Rail became the national operator until the 
mid-1990s when the final era began and runs to the present day. This final era is 
described as the privatised railway, but it is a mixture of public and private 
organisations, as will be described later.  
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To help understand the changing nature of the railways during each of these eras, I 
analysed four key descriptive industry variables over time. The historical analysis 
in Chapter 5 used time-based charts, to show changes over time in these key 
variables, as the railways developed across the four different eras. The first of these 
variables measured the length of railway track over time, which provided an 
indication of the extent of the physical railway as it grew and matured. The second 
variable showed industry receipts for passengers and goods, which captured the 
growing financial income of the railway, and the changing importance of passengers 
and freight. The third variable measured the number of passenger journeys over time, 
which reflected the increasing use of the railways by passengers, and the impact of 
other factors, such as the growth of car ownership. The final descriptive variable 
showed railway income and expenses, which together provided a perspective on 
industry profitability and the need for government support.  
Across the four different eras I applied Actor-Network Theory to understand 
the changing railways and production of new trains. Key industry developments 
during this time, especially legislation, were analysed using ANT to understand the 
actions and actors that are acting upon and shaping how the railways, and trains, are 
configured, assembled, and made to act. The descriptive statistics supported this 
analysis to provide a richer picture of the changing nature of the railways over time. 
In doing this I was not attempting to produce a definitive history of the railway. 
Rather, this historical perspective complemented the analysis in Chapter 6 that 
focused upon recent strategic decisions for Thameslink and Crossrail. The historical 
analysis applies ANT to show that the collection of resources that act as a train has 
changed over time and, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that it will continue to 
change in the future.  
For this analysis I used the following data sources. For the industry variables 
described above I used British Historical Statistics (Mitchell and Deane, 1962; 
Mitchell, 1988) as the primary historical resource, with more recent data accessed 
via the website of the Office of Rail and Road, which regulates the railways. 
Historical legislation was accessed using UK Government websites. Any other 
sources used are always cited in the text of the analysis. To analyse these sources, I 
used electronic and hard copies for my analysis with use of highlighting to note areas 
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that mapped to the five circulating loops described in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 
2.2 (page 54).  
3.5 The production of new trains: analysis of two contemporary 
actions (Chapter 6) 
For the analysis of contemporary strategic decisions to produce new trains I focused 
upon the procurements of Thameslink and Crossrail. These were chosen for several 
reasons.  
These strategic decisions involved large economic value, with Thameslink estimated 
at £1.6 Bn and Crossrail £1 Bn in contract value for the winning bidder to supply the 
trains and associated services. These are not operational or everyday decisions, but 
reflect the complexity, scale, and importance associated with strategic decisions.  
The two separate strategic decisions were selected because they are both seeking to 
produce similar types of trains. The trains are both electrically powered multiple 
units (EMUs) providing services to commuters and others travelling in and around 
London. Although one of the key arguments of this research is that a train is a fluid 
collection of resources, it does help with the comparative analysis of train weight 
when similar types of train are assessed. Comparability would be a challenge if, for 
example, one strategic decision was producing a high-speed inter-city train and the 
other was producing a rural stopping service. The Thameslink and Crossrail trains 
are part of the group of suburban EMU trains that are included within the analysis of 
train weight in Chapter 4.  
The Thameslink and Crossrail trains were chosen because they had been delivered 
into service and were operational on the railway3. The Thameslink procurement 
began in 2008 and Crossrail in 2010, with the trains entering operational service, in 
2016 and 2017, respectively. Using the schema developed in Chapter 2, the winning 
proposition of a train had been translated into a realised train in the form of the 
Thameslink Class 700 and Crossrail Class 345 trains that were operational on the 
railway and carrying passengers. The operation of the trains on the railway meant 
that data was publicly available to assess their attributes, including weight, number 
of seats, and more.  
 
3 Although Crossrail services were only delivering a partial service at the time 
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Data was not available, from the public sources described earlier, for strategic 
decisions that had not delivered trains into operational service. One example of this 
was the production of new trains for Merseyrail. They were excluded because the 
trains were not in operational service at the time of this analysis, and so it was not 
possible to see the attributes of the realised trains. As discussed earlier, if an 
ethnographic approach had been followed then there may have been access to 
primary data direct from the train manufacturer to assess the weight and other 
attributes of the trains. However, this research approach used secondary data sources 
to assess the attributes of the realised trains, and so it was not possible to include the 
Merseyrail strategic decision. 
Another candidate for analysis was the procurement of new trains as part of the 
Intercity Express Programme (IEP), overseen by the Department for Transport. This 
procurement began in 2005 for new trains to replace the InterCity 125 and InterCity 
225 fleets on the East Coast and Great Western main lines. A contract for c. £4.5Bn 
was awarded in 2012 to Agility Trains, a consortium of companies including 
Hitachi. The Class 800 IEP trains began to enter service on the Great Western Main 
Line in 2017, and the East Coast Main Line in 2019. Partial data on weight and other 
attributes did exist for the IEP trains. However, the IEP procurement was excluded 
primarily because they are not suburban EMUs like the Thameslink and Crossrail 
trains. The IEP trains provide a long-distance inter-city service operating between 
the main cities of the UK and into London, whereas the Thameslink and Crossrail 
services generally operate commuter routes around London and surrounding areas. 
Although this could have provided a contrasting type of service, it would have raised 
issues around comparability with Thameslink and Crossrail.  
To recap, for this analysis I focused upon the strategic decisions to introduce new 
trains for Thameslink and Crossrail. Both operated in a similar geographical area, 
moving commuters in and out of London. The two procurements are of similar 
value, and they take place at similar times. The winning bidders, selected to produce 
the final trains, were Siemens for Thameslink and Bombardier for Crossrail, which 
meant there were two different winning suppliers for the analysis.  
There was a lot of documentation associated with these procurements. The 
procurements fall within the scope of the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJEU) because of their economic value and use of Public Sector funds. Therefore, 
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they must be listed on the publicly accessible OJEU archives to encourage 
transparency and fair competition in public tendering. The early part of these 
procurements began with a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) that was open to 
many parties potentially interested in bidding. The process then progressed to an 
Invitation to Tender (ITT) only made available to those who passed the PQQ stage. 
The documentation associated with these stages provides an insight into what was, 
and was not, considered relevant to the production of new rolling stock. To analyse 
the procurements, I used these public documents, which included weightings and 
scoring criteria allocated to different aspects of the desired trains. Some information, 
such as bidders’ financial information, was unavailable from public sources because 
it was deemed commercially sensitive. Freedom of Information requests were made 
to Thameslink (28 March 2017) and Crossrail (22 June 2016), with copies of these 
requests on page 349 and page 366 of the appendices, respectively. These FOI 
requests confirmed the document sources used during the procurement and 
subsequently used for this analysis.  
An important source of data was the National Audit Office, an independent UK 
Parliamentary body responsible for auditing areas of government activity. The NAO 
completed reviews (National Audit Office, 2014c, 2014b) of these tender processes 
and the wider rail industry. All documents provided further opportunities to snowball 
references from other sources. Trade press (RAIL and Modern Railways) was 
accessed regarding these specific procurements, and for broad analysis of the 
industry. The perspective of passengers was captured from the trade and national 
press, as well as research and articles from Transport Focus, the watchdog for 
transport passengers and road users in the UK.  
To analyse these sources, I used the same approach as with the historical analysis for 
Chapter 5. Electronic and hard copies of documents were used for the analysis with 
highlighting used to note areas that mapped to the five circulating loops described in 
Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 2.2. 
3.6 Ethics 
As discussed in section 3.1, early investigations in this research sought to develop an 
ethnographic research approach. The challenges of achieving this highlighted the 
risks that can be associated with this type of research given the high financial stakes 
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and public visibility of these actions. However, these risks were negligible because I 
changed this approach and moved to the analysis of secondary data from publicly 
available historical sources. The analysis took place after the decisions have been 
made and the trains have been delivered.  
An application was submitted to the Faculty of Science and Engineering Committee 
on Research Ethics for research ethics review. This application for research ethics 
was approved (reference 2068) on 22 August 2017 and would carry for five years 
from that date.  
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has described the research approach used to apply ANT to understand 
the strategic decisions that produce new trains, and the phenomenon of heavy trains 
in the UK.  
Analysis first explored the increase in weight across an expanded dataset of UK 
passenger trains. This provided confidence in the phenomenon of heavy trains and a 
foundation for subsequent work. Actor-Network Theory was then applied to 
understand how this could have happened. This was explored first using historical 
analysis to understand the dynamic collection of resources that have been configured 
as trains within the railway over time. Two contemporary strategic decisions were 
then analysed using ANT. The strategic decisions to produce new trains for 
Thameslink and Crossrail were investigated to understand how these strategic 
decisions were made. In these two cases the trains produced have been recognised 
within the industry for their lightweight designs.  
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4 Analysis of the Weight per Seat of UK Trains 
The purpose of this chapter is to prove empirically that trains have got heavier, 
before ANT theory is used to determine how this has happened in Chapters 5 and 6. 
This chapter provides a solid empirical base for the analysis by building upon the 
chart shown in Figure 1.5 that provided the initial prompt for this research. 
There are four steps in this analysis, which are illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.  
 
Figure 4.1 Four steps in the analysis of weight per seat for UK trains 
The original chart (Figure 1.5, page 15) showed five British trains (Mk III electric, 
HST diesel, Mk IV electric, Voyager diesel tilt, and Pendolino electric tilt) getting 
heavier over time. The source data for this chart was unavailable, and so step one of 
this analysis used publicly available industry data to recreate and verify this chart.  
Step two expanded the dataset beyond this group of five British trains and 
investigated weight per seat across a larger group of UK passenger trains. Step two 
included trains designed for high-speed inter-city services, commuter, and regional 
services. This larger dataset raised a question of comparability between the different 
trains. For example, it is problematic to compare the attributes of a single-car rural 
rail service to a nine-car high-speed train operating between London and Scotland, 
because they are designed for such different purposes. This question of 
comparability was addressed in step three.  
Step three took the expanded dataset created in step two and focused, within that 
dataset, upon a specific type of train – suburban Electric Multiple Units (EMUs) 
used for commuting services into the major cities of the UK. These EMUs are all 
electrically powered trains, drawing power from overhead electric lines, or 
electrified third rails.  
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Step four recognised that the metric of weight per passenger seat is a composite 
measure consisting of two factors: the weight of the train (the numerator), and the 
number of seats on that train (the denominator). An increase in weight per seat could 
be attributable to the trains getting heavier, fewer seats available on the trains, or 
some combination of these two factors. These two factors were analysed using the 
datasets created in step two and three. 
Before completing these four steps in the analysis, the next section discusses why the 
weight of trains is important and worthy of investigation.  
4.1 Why heavy passenger trains are a concern 
For this research heavy trains are primarily a concern because they contribute to 
climate emissions. In the current UK railway, passenger trains are overwhelmingly 
powered by electric or diesel engines. A fossil-fuel-powered electricity grid and 
diesel fuel both produce greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants.  
It could be argued that, if the train is powered by clean and renewable fuel, then 
weight does not matter. For example, a carbon-free electric grid supply, and the use 
of all electric rolling stock on a fully electrified network, would produce no GHG 
emissions. This is a significant challenge in practice, however, with only 38% of the 
network that is electrified in 2019 (Office of Rail and Road, 2019b, p. 1) and there 
are ongoing cost challenges to deliver wider electrification. Instead of a carbon-free 
grid, it might be possible in the future to use hydrogen, which, if stored onboard, 
could be burnt in a combustion engine, or used by fuel cells to generate electricity to 
power the train. This technology is continually being improved but it raises various 
problems, especially regarding how the hydrogen is produced efficiently and stored 
safely, to say nothing of the costs of converting existing rolling stock.  
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the rail industry within Britain are estimated 
(RSSB, 2010, p. 21) as follows:  
• 63% from traction energy – diesel fuel and electric power used to move trains 
• 34% from infrastructure and operations, such as the stations and depots, as 
well as the lifecycle of rolling stock from production through to disposal 
• 3% from staff, offices and services associated with the offices, such as 
electricity and gas usage.  
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This analysis by the Rail Safety and Standards Board (2010) reviewed both 
passenger and freight services, using a comprehensive whole life carbon footprint 
approach, and concluded that, as shown above, traction energy is the largest part 
of GHG emissions for railways in Britain.  
Of the traction energy emissions, passenger services account for 80% compared to 
20% for freight (RSSB, 2010, p. 34, Table 5). Passenger emissions were evenly split 
across diesel and electric traction, whereas freight emissions were overwhelmingly 
from diesel. One of the main reasons for freight’s reliance on diesel is that services 
often cross parts of the network where there is no electric supply – diesel provides 
independence from the infrastructure power supply, as fuel is carried with the train.  
Train energy efficiency can be improved, using technology such as regenerative 
braking which can return power to the electricity network, or store it onboard in 
batteries. Although efficiency can be improved, trains consume energy when they 
act as a train. Many factors contribute to the energy use of trains (Peckham, 2007, p. 
14), including providing lighting, heating, air-conditioning and driving styles. Two 
of the largest factors that explain energy use are common to both diesel and electric 
trains. Energy is needed to: 
• overcome friction and drag; and  
• move the train mass 
The first bullet point – overcoming friction and drag – is not about weight, but is 
about moving through the air efficiently, and is most relevant for trains travelling at 
higher speeds, where “energy used overcoming aerodynamic drag becomes 
predominant” (Eickhoff and Nowell, 2010, p. 7). For example, “running at 360 km/h 
rather than 300 km/h increases power consumption of a 200m-long train by around 
three MegaWatts, or 70%.” (Ford, 2017, p. 29). This is because overcoming air 
resistance “increases with the square of the speed” (Ford, 2017, p. 29), and so the 
shape and profile of high speed trains is designed to make them move through the air 
with minimal air resistance, like a plane. Air resistance affects high-speed maglev 
(magnetic levitation) trains, as much as conventional trains, because maglev only 
eliminates the friction between wheel and rail. Proposals for a hyperloop service 
using partly evacuated tubes would reduce air resistance, but this is not applicable to 
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trains and other vehicles, which travel through the normal atmosphere, and will 
encounter normal air resistance.  
The second bullet point from above – moving the train mass – is the focus of this 
research because it relates to the weight of the train. Excessively heavy trains will 
require more energy to move their mass and so will produce excess emissions. 
Excess weight is relevant to all types of train – inter-city, suburban and rural – 
because they all must use energy to move their train mass. The relationship between 
train weight, energy use, and resulting emissions is not simple. For a train to move 
forward, weight is a “good thing because it provides tractive effort to put down lots 
of horsepower” (Walmsley, 2018, p. 43), with weight providing adhesion between 
wheel and rail. Too much weight means too much energy used to move the train 
“rather than their cargoes or goods or passengers” (RAIL, 2018, p. 68). This implies a 
Goldilocks characteristic of weight – where there must be enough, but not too much!  
In addition to increased fuel usage, excess weight will also increase maintenance 
costs caused by greater damage to the track and infrastructure. Costs will increase for 
all types of services, but it is amplified for inter-city services, (Eickhoff and Nowell, 
2010) because they travel over long distances, using expensive infrastructure 
designed for high speed use. Increased industry costs contribute towards higher 
ticket prices for passengers, which reduces modal shift from other modes of 
transport. This is a further problem because rail can be part of wider transport efforts 
to reduce emissions, since it is “an environmentally beneficial alternative” (Givoni, 
Brand and Watkiss, 2009, p. 83) compared to other modes, such as domestic planes 
and private cars, as shown below in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Intermodal comparison of CO2 
Source: (Department for Transport, 2007, p. 33; Roger Ford, 2019b, p. 31 analysis updated by R. Kemp) 
This intermodal comparison of grams CO2 per passenger km (Figure 4.2) 
demonstrates the important role that rail can play in reducing national GHG 
emissions. This is especially true if the grid electricity supply reduces its carbon 
intensity further, which has been happening. The carbon intensity of electricity 
supply in the UK in 1990, for example, was 770 gCO2 / kWh and this has fallen to 
263 gCO2 / kWh in 2017 (Committee on Climate Change, 2018, p. 57 Table 2.2). In 
addition to rail’s advantages in emissions, it is also “the most space and energy 
efficient way of moving large volumes of people and freight” (Shaw and Farrington, 
2003, p. 108), with a road network needing 13 times the space of suburban rail to 
move the same numbers of people.  
Although rail has an environmental advantage over other modes, this advantage will 
be reduced by unnecessarily heavy trains. Weight is an important factor to explain a 
train’s energy use, and so the remainder of this chapter will explore the increase in 
train weight over time, using the four steps described earlier.  
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4.2 Step one: verify the original chart 
The original chart (Figure 1.5, page 15) showed data points for five UK trains and 
six Japanese trains. The source data for Figure 1.5 was not available and so, given 
the importance of this starting point, the first step in this analysis was to verify 
empirically this chart.  
Although there are only five data points for British trains, there are many ways in 
which these five trains can be formed and arranged. For example, the HST (High 
Speed Train) diesel shown in Figure 1.5, consists of diesel locomotives at the front 
and back providing power, with 6-9 passenger coaches in between, depending upon 
the expected number of passengers and other operational factors. HST trains could 
also be configured internally in different ways. For example, a high-density set could 
have 564 seats, compared to a low density set with 482 seats, even though both 
might consist of 10 cars (eight passenger cars and two power cars) with a similar 
weight for the whole train. Some coaches could be configured for first class with 
fewer seats compared to standard class. There might also be a restaurant car with 
onboard kitchen, which would have fewer seats than an all-seated carriage. This 
illustrates the dynamic configuration of physical objects that act as trains. Even when 
they are realised trains – with a very material form – they can still be reconfigured 
and reconstituted. The HST diesel discussed above is not a universal and static 
configuration, and the same applies to the other trains in Figure 1.5.  
The source data for Figure 1.5 was unavailable and so it was not possible to know 
the exact configuration of trains used to create the original chart. Therefore, to verify 
Figure 1.5 in a consistent and transparent way, the configuration that I have chosen 
for each train is recorded in this analysis. For example, the HST diesel is shown in 
Table 4.1 below.  
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Table 4.1 Configuration of HST Diesel trainset used for step one of this analysis  
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
Class 43 Power Car 70.3 0 
Trailer Guard's Standard 33.5 65 
Trailer Standard 33.6 76 
Trailer Standard 33.6 76 
Trailer Standard 33.6 76 
Trailer Standard 33.6 76 
Trailer Kitchen Buffet First 38.2 17 
Trailer First 33.7 48 
Trailer First 33.7 48 
Class 43 Power Car 70.3 0 
Totals for the trainset 413.9 482 
Table 4.1 above shows the weight and number of seats for each vehicle in the HST 
formation. Industry reference books (Pritchard and Hall, 2013; Marsden, 2014; 
Pritchard, 2018c; Robert Pritchard, 2019) are used as the source for weight, number 
of seats, and other data. The HST Diesel, shown in Table 4.1, has 482 seats and a 
total weight of 413.9 tonnes. This implies a figure of 858.6 kg per seat4. This process 
was repeated for each of the five British trains: HST diesel, Mk III electric, Mk IV 
electric, Voyager diesel tilt, Pendolino electric tilt. Versions of Table 4.1 are shown 
in the appendices (page 320) for each of the UK Trains.  
The reproduction of Figure 1.5 also needed to consider the data for Japanese rolling 
stock. The Japanese trains are included to re-create the starting point of this research 
but, after step one, they will not be investigated any further. The chart values used 
 
4 Note: rounding may produce marginally different results 
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for the Japanese trains, and the sources for this data, are shown in Table 9.8 in the 
appendices.  
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 4.3 below, with the original chart 
from Rail Research UK shown for comparison.   
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The original chart: Data from Rail Research UK showing trains getting heavier in the UK (Copy of Figure 1.5) 
 
Figure 4.3 Historical vehicle mass per passenger seat for UK and Japanese rolling stock (RRUK chart above, my 
chart below) 
The plotted data shows the year that the train was first introduced into traffic and the 
weight per passenger seat. As an example, the HST diesel was first introduced into 
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service in 1975 and the weight per passenger seat is 858.6 kg/seat, as per Table 4.1 
above. The new chart that I created, shown in Figure 4.3, is not identical to the 
original chart, but it is close, and differences are likely to be explained by the 
varying configuration of trainsets as discussed above.  
For step one of this analysis, Figure 4.3 provides support for the increase in the 
weight of British rolling stock per passenger seat over time. Step two investigates 
this further by expanding the dataset beyond this group of five British trains.  
4.3 Step two: expand the dataset 
The full list of trains used in the second stage of this analysis are identified in the 
appendix, in Table 9.9, Table 9.10 and Table 9.11 for Electric Multiple Units 
(EMUs), Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs), and Bi-Modes respectively. The data 
shown in these tables, including weight, number of seats, and year of introduction, 
was used in the analysis that follows. The tables in the appendices show additional 
information on the trains, including the class identifiers that are allocated to different 
trains in the UK. For example, the Pendolino train has a class identifier of 390, with 
a sub-class of 390/0 for a 9-car trainset and a 390/1 sub-class for an 11-car trainset.  
4.3.1 Descriptive summary of the expanded dataset 
All data was sourced from publicly available industry publications (Marsden, 2014; 
Pritchard, 2018b, 2018a, 2019a) that catalogue various information regarding UK 
passenger trains. The most recent editions of these publications were used, which 
only contain trains that are still in operational service. Therefore, this extended 
database contains trains that are still running, some of which are 30+ years old. 
Retired classes of trains are excluded from this analysis, although there are some 
exceptions to this which are discussed later. A class of train is excluded from the 
analysis if relevant data (seats, weight, year of introduction) is not available. For 
example, the Class 325 Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) is excluded because it is a 
Royal Mail parcels train, with no passenger seats, and so it would not be possible to 
calculate weight per seat. The Class 195/1 (3-car DMU) is excluded because it is a 
new service and at the time of the analysis there was no data available for weight, 
however data was available for 195/0 (2-car DMU), and so that was included. The 
following sections summarise each of the EMU, DMU and Bi-Mode datasets. The 
first of these, the EMU dataset, is shown below (Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2 Summary of the EMU trains in the extended dataset 
Item Count Min Max Average 
Number of data points (classes and sub-
classes) 
91    
Total number of trainsets 2,560    
Year first introduced  1971 2017  
Number of cars in trainset  2 12 4.4 
Weight of a trainset (tonnes)  54.8 567.9 171.4 
Number of seats in a trainset  82 672 272.2 
Weight per seat for trainset (kg/seat)  383.9 1,071.4 629.9 
The summary shows that there are 91 data points in total in the EMU dataset. This 
means there are 91 different classes and sub-classes of Electric Multiple Units 
(EMUs) in this database. The table shows that these 91 types of EMU represent a 
total of 2,560 trainsets operating on the UK railway. For example, there are 21 
Pendolino Class 390/0 9-car trainsets, there are 61 Class 315 trainsets, and so on. 
The long list of 91 EMUs is given in Table 9.9 in the appendix.  
The EMU trains in this database were introduced into traffic for the first time at 
various times between 1971 and 2017. The trainset configurations range from 2-car 
sets through to 12-car sets, with an average EMU consisting of approximately four 
cars in a set. The weight and number of seats across these trainsets will depend upon 
the total number of cars in the unit, but an average EMU trainset weighs 171.4 
tonnes and has approximately 272 passenger seats. The average EMU in this 
database weighs 629.9 kg per seat, but Table 4.2 shows that the lightest weight per 
passenger seat is 383.9 kg / seat and the heaviest is 1,071.4 kg / seat. This gives an 
idea of the diversity of trains within this larger dataset. Figure 4.4 below shows the 
trains that account for these two extremes of weight per seat. 
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Figure 4.4 the extremes of the EMU dataset for kg/seat – Class 465/1 ' Networker' and Class 378/2 'Capitalstar' 
Sources: Class 465/1 ‘Networker’ (383.9 kg per seat, shown top) (Marsden, 2014, p. 246); Class 378/2 ‘Capitalstar’ (1071.4 kg per seat, shown bottom) (Marsden, 2014, p. 219) 
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The train at the top of Figure 4.4 is the Class 465/1 Networker that operates as a 
four-car trainset, with 348 seats and a train weight of 133.6 tonnes, which is 383.9 kg 
/ seat. The seating picture to the right shows a 3+2 layout, with these trains mostly 
designed for longer distance commuter duties.  
The train at the bottom of Figure 4.4 is the Class 378/2 Capitalstar that operates as a 
five-car trainset, with 192 seats and a train weight of 205.7 tonnes, which is 1,071.4 
kg / seat. The seating picture to the right shows a longitudinal ‘tube style’ layout as 
these trains were mostly designed for operating around the Transport for London 
network, with more standing room and fewer seats. From an ANT perspective we 
can see different configurations of resources that act as trains, but with different 
attributes including different seating and passenger experiences.  
There are many other differences between the two trains shown above. For example, 
the Class 387/2 can operate on electrified infrastructure that uses overhead AC 
power, as well as parts of the network in the Southern region that use third rail DC 
power. This added versatility or flexibility to operate on different infrastructure 
could be expected to mean extra equipment, and so extra weight.  
In addition to EMUs there are also DMUs in the extended dataset, with a summary 
of them shown in Table 4.3 below.  
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Table 4.3 Summary of the DMU trains in the extended dataset 
Item Count Min Max Average 
Number of data points (classes and sub-
classes) 
57    
Total number of trainsets 1,175    
Year first introduced  1960 2017  
Number of cars in trainset  1 7 2.8 
Weight of a trainset (tonnes)  12.5 337.8 119.6 
Number of seats in a trainset  21 342 177.7 
Weight per seat for trainset (kg/seat)  424.6 1,090.1 673.2 
 
This summary shows there are 57 data points in total in the DMU dataset – 57 
different classes and sub-classes of Diesel Multiple Units. These 57 types of DMU 
represent a total of 1,175 trainsets operating on the UK railway. For example, there 
are 34 Voyager Class 220 4-car DMU trainsets, there are 94 Class 142 ‘Pacer’ DMU 
trainsets, and so on. The long list of 57 DMUs is given in Table 9.10 in the appendix.  
The DMU trains in this database were first introduced into traffic between 1960 and 
2017. The Class 121 DMU is a single car train and Britain’s longest serving DMU 
that was in operational service from 1960 until 2017. It was included in this analysis 
because it was still referenced in the industry catalogues used as sources for this 
analysis. The formation of the DMU trainsets in the extended dataset range from 
single car sets through to 7-car sets, with an average DMU train consisting of 
approximately three cars. The weight and number of seats across these trainsets will 
depend upon the total number of cars in the unit, however we can see that an average 
DMU trainset weighs 119.6 tonnes and has approximately 178 passenger seats. The 
average DMU in this database weighs 673.2 kg per seat. Table 4.3 shows that the 
lightest weight per passenger seat is 424.6 kg / seat and the heaviest is 1,090.1 kg / 
seat. As with the EMU dataset, this gives an idea of the diversity of trains within this 
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larger dataset of DMU trains. Figure 4.5 below shows the trains that account for 
these two extremes of weight per seat. 
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Figure 4.5 the extremes of the DMU dataset for kg/seat - Class 165/0 Network Turbo and Class 222 Meridian 
Sources: Class 165/0 Network Turbo (424.6 kg per seat, shown top)  (Marsden, 2014, pp. 119, 121); Class 222 Meridian 4-car (1090.1 kg per seat, shown bottom)  (seats: Marsden, 2007, p. 
155, train: 2014, p. 152) 
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The train at the top of Figure 4.5 is the Class 165/0 Network Turbo that operates as a 
three-car trainset, with 284 seats and a train weight of 120.6 tonnes, which is 424.6 
kg / seat. The seating picture to the right shows an example 3+2 layout for standard 
class seating.  
The train at the bottom of Figure 4.5 is the Class 222 Meridian that operates as 
seven-, five-, and four-car formations, but it is the four-car formation that accounts 
for the largest weight per seat of the DMU dataset. The four-car Class 222 has 181 
seats and a train weight of 197.3 tonnes, which is 1,090.1 kg / seat. The seating 
picture to the right shows standard class seating in a 2+2 layout. The seating layout 
includes tables, as these trains were mostly used for longer journeys, such as London 
to Sheffield. Tables within the configuration of a train are valuable to the passenger 
experience but could be expected to increase weight and possible reduce the space 
for seating.  
The final group of trains within this expanded dataset are the Bi-Mode trains. These 
new additions to British railways have both diesel and electric traction motors. A 
summary of the Bi-Mode dataset is shown in Table 4.4 below.  
Table 4.4 Summary of the Bi-Mode trains in the extended dataset 
Item Count Min Max Average 
Number of data points (classes and sub-
classes) 
9    
Total number of trainsets 159    
Year first introduced  2013 2019  
Number of cars in trainset  3 9 6.0 
Weight of a trainset (tonnes)  138.5 430.3 288.5 
Number of seats in a trainset  167 647 399.4 
Weight per seat for trainset (kg/seat)  663.4 829.5 722.2 
Bi-Modes have only recently been introduced onto British Railways and the 
summary table above reflects this with only nine data points in total. This means 
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there are nine different classes and sub-classes of Bi-Mode Units in this dataset. 
These nine types of Bi-Mode represent a total of 159 trainsets operating on the UK 
railway. For example, there are 36 Great Western InterCity Class 800/0 5-car Bi-
Mode trainsets produced as part of the InterCity Express Programme. There are also 
14 Class 755/3 Flirt Bi-Mode trainsets in Greater Anglia, and so on. The long list of 
Bi-Modes is given in Table 9.11 in the appendix.  
The summary table shows that the Bi-Mode trains in this database were first 
introduced into traffic between 2013 and 2019. The trainset formations range from 3-
car sets through to 9-car sets, with an average Bi-Mode consisting of six cars 
forming a set. The weight and number of seats across these trainsets will depend 
upon the total number of cars in the unit, however, an average Bi-Mode trainset 
weighs 288.5 tonnes and has approximately 399 passenger seats. The average Bi-
Mode in this database weighs 722.2 kg per seat. Table 4.4 shows that the lightest 
weight per passenger seat is 663.4 kg / seat and the heaviest is 829.5 kg / seat. Figure 
4.6 below shows the trains that account for these two extremes.
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Figure 4.6 the extremes of the Bi-Mode dataset for kg/seat – Class 800/3 and Class 800/2 
Sources: Class 800/3 (663.4 kg per seat, shown top) (train: Hitachi Rail Europe; seats: By Geoff Sheppard - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=66554000 ; Class 800/2 (829.5 kg per seat, shown bottom) (train: Rail Business UK; seats: By PeterSkuce - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=86443275)    
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The train at the top of Figure 4.6 above is the Class 800/3 Bi-Mode that operates as a 
nine-car trainset, with 647 seats and a train weight of 429.2 tonnes, which is 663.4 
kg / seat and is the lightest per seat of the Bi-Modes in this dataset. The seating 
picture to the right shows an example 2+2 layout for standard class seating. This 
train operates as a high-speed service for Greater Western Railways (GWR) from 
London to the South West of England and Wales.  
The train at the bottom of Figure 4.6 is also a Class 800, but this time it is the Class 
800/2. This operates as a five-car formation and has 302 seats and a train weight of 
250.5 tonnes, which is 829.5 kg / seat and is the heaviest weight per seat of the small 
Bi-Mode dataset. The seating picture to the bottom right shows standard class 
seating in a 2+2 layout with tables. This train operates as a high-speed service for 
London and North Eastern Railway (LNER) running between London, the North 
East of England, and Scotland.  
Bi-mode trains include electric and diesel motors within their network of resources 
that act as a train. This gives the trains an attribute of flexibility, so that they can 
travel on electrified and non-electrified parts of the network, but the cost of this 
flexibility should be an increase in weight because of the extra material objects that 
are carried – the engines, diesel fuel, and other associated equipment.  
This completes the descriptive summary of the database of EMUs, DMUs and Bi-
Mode trains that form this larger database. There are 91 EMUs, 57 DMUs, and nine 
Bi-Modes. This gives 157 different classes and sub-classes of trains, compared to the 
five initial data points used in step one of this analysis. The next section analyses this 
database to explore further the increase in the weight of UK trains. 
4.3.2 Analysis of the larger dataset 
The chart below (Figure 4.7) plots the 91 EMUs, 57 DMUs and nine Bi-Modes using 
the same format as the charts in step one. The horizontal axis shows the year that the 
unit was first introduced, and the vertical axis shows mass per seat (kg/seat). The 
different groups (EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes) are identified using a blue circle, 
orange square, and red triangle, respectively.  
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Figure 4.7 Historical vehicle mass per passenger seat for British EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes 
This trend upwards in the chart provides visual evidence for a weight increase. The 
EMUs and DMUs introduced in the late 1990s show an increase compared to the 
cluster of trains introduced earlier. The small number of Bi-Mode trains (red 
triangles) that were introduced after 2010 show a spread of readings that are heavier 
(kg per seat) than trains introduced before 1990.  
To confirm this visual inspection Table 4.5 below provides a summary of the 
average kg / seat for trains split by the decade in which they were introduced.  
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Table 4.5 Average vehicle mass per passenger seat for British EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes across the decades 
Item 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Composite of three train types: kg/seat by 
decade of introduction 
493.4 524.0 577.1 747.8 706.5 
EMUs: kg/seat by decade of introduction 493.4 519.5 559.6 719.7 704.5 
DMUs: kg/seat by decade of introduction none 533.0 608.8 796.9 612.7 
Bi-Modes: kg/seat by decade of 
introduction 
none none none none 722.2 
The first row of Table 4.5 shows a composite value based upon all three types of 
trains – EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes. Trains in the extended database that were 
introduced in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s had an average weight of 493.4 
and 524.0 kg per seat. This increased by approximately 10% for trains introduced in 
the 1990s, and then increased significantly for trains introduced in the 2000s. The 
most recent trains show a reduction but not to the levels of the 1970-90s. The other 
rows show the values for EMUs, DMUs, and Bi-Modes, respectively.  
The visual inspection of Figure 4.7 above, and the summary in Table 4.5, both 
provide support for an increase over time in the weight of rolling stock relative to the 
number of passenger seats. Step two of the analysis, using a larger database of 
EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes, provides further support to the increase of rolling 
stock weight per passenger seat. 
The larger database created for step two of this analysis contains a diverse mix of 
trains. Some were designed to operate in rural areas, some provide long-distance 
inter-city services, and some operate constant commuter duties. To illustrate this 
diversity Figure 4.8 below shows a Class 144 Pacer DMU (top) and a Class 390 
Pendolino EMU (bottom). The graphic also shows a visualisation to represent the 
cars making up the train, and how each car contributes to the train’s total length, 
number of seats, and weight.   
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Figure 4.8 Class 144 Pacer DMU and Class 390/0 Pendolino EMU with visualisation of length, seats, and weight 
Class 144 top and Class 390/0 bottom. Images source: (Marsden, 2014, pp. 95 and 225) 
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The Class 144 DMU (top) was first introduced in 1986. The trainset shown here 
operates as a 2-car formation, with diesel motors in both cars allowing it to reach a 
top speed of 121 km/h. This 2-car train has 92 seats available, with 48 in one car and 
44 in the other – the second car has fewer seats because of the presence of a toilet. 
Once again this illustrates the different configuration of resources that can 
collectively act as a train with different attributes. Each carriage of the Class 144 is 
approximately 15m long and so the train is 30.6m long. The car with a toilet weighs 
24.5 tonnes and the other 24 tonnes, giving a combined weight for this trainset of 
48.5 tonnes. The relative weight per passenger seat is 527.2 kg/seat.  
By contrast, the Class 390 Pendolino EMU was first introduced in 2001. There is an 
11-car formation (390/1), but the one show here (Figure 4.8) is a 9-car formation 
(390/0) that has electric motors on seven of the nine cars. This allows it to reach a 
top speed of 225 km/h, drawing power for its motors from the AC overhead electric 
lines. The carriages are approximately 23m long and the 9-car Pendolino is 216.9m 
long, with 487 seats across standard and first, including a kitchen and onboard shop. 
The nine cars have seven toilets, including two with disabled access. The total 
weight of the trainset is 470.1 tonnes, with individual cars ranging from 45.5 tonnes, 
for a standard-class unpowered trailer (i.e., no motor) through to 56.3 tonnes for the 
first-class kitchen car that is motorised. The relative weight per passenger seat is 
965.3 kg/seat.  
These two different trains illustrate the diversity of the 157 different classes and sub-
classes of trains that make up the extended database used for step two of this 
analysis. Comparisons between a Pendolino, introduced in 2001, and a Pacer, 
introduced in 1986, should be treated with caution. Therefore, to allow for analytical 
comparisons over time, step three focuses upon a common type of train within this 
larger database. This common type of train is the suburban Electrical Multiple Units 
providing a service to commuters in and around major cities. Step three of this 
investigation identifies the relevant trains that have performed this service over time, 
and then analyses changes in their weight per seat.  
4.4 Step three: focus upon a common type of train 
Step three focuses upon the same type of suburban EMU introduced between the 
1970s and the present day – the same time horizon as Figure 1.5. For this analysis, 
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trains were split into four tranches – two earlier tranches (1970s to 1990s) and two 
later tranches (1990s to 2019). I owe thanks to Roger Ford of Modern Railways for 
this suggestion to focus upon four tranches of commuter EMUs to help with 
comparability over time. The trains included within each tranche are based upon 
suggestions from Roger Ford, and my own analysis. To give further confidence in 
the comparability that this approach introduces we will see that trains introduced in 
later tranches often replace trains within an earlier tranche. For example, the Class 
377, within tranche three, replaced Class 319s, in tranche one. This approach also 
gave a mechanism to separate trains introduced in different eras of the railway. 
Tranches one and two included trains introduced under British Rail, whereas the 
latter two included trains introduced after privatisation.  
Tranche one trains include a variety of suburban EMUs introduced from the early 
1970s under British Railways. Two classes are also included in tranche one, even 
though they discontinued service in 1980. The Class 445 and 446 EMUs are 
included within Tranche one because they were early BR prototypes that led to many 
subsequent designs included in this analysis. Tranche two trains include the 
Networker trains, which were introduced by BR in the 1990s to operate in the South 
East of England and around London. Tranche three trains include the trains 
introduced after privatisation and produced by Alstom, Siemens and Bombardier, 
and others. Tranche four trains include the most recent trains introduced after 2010, 
including the new trains for Thameslink and Crossrail, which are a focus for Chapter 
6 of this analysis. The detailed list of classes and sub-classes allocated to each 
tranche is shown in the appendix in Table 9.12 (page 348).  
The tranches in this analysis only contain Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) trains, so 
they all use electric motors, although some may draw power from overhead AC 
lines, some from third rail DC power, and some from both sources. All trains are 
designed to provide a similar type of commuting service – generally moving a lot of 
people in and out of large cities and towns. The trains within the tranches consist of 
cars that are 20-metres in length, which means that analysis of the number of seats 
and weight of trains is using a consistent length dimension. There is one exception to 
this. The recent Class 345 Crossrail trains are included in the fourth tranche, even 
though they are 22.5m long carriages. They are included because, like the other 
trains, they are an EMU and provide a commuting service into London. Also, the 
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Class 345s are replacing trains included in tranche one and tranche three, which 
provides assurance of their similar purpose.  
Each of the tranches are described in the following sections, with a photograph of a 
train from that tranche.  
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4.4.1 Description of the trains across the tranches 
The first tranche starts with BR prototype trains assigned as class number 445 (4-car) and 446 (2-car) that entered service in 1971. Their 
operational service ended in 1980 but these prototypes led to a range of subsequent EMU designs. A photograph of the Class 445 4-car from 
tranche one is shown below in Figure 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.9 Interior and exterior photographs of the 4-car Class 445 – a tranche one train introduced in 1971. 
Source:(Marsden, 1983, pp. 94–95) 
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Tranche two trains includes the Networker class of trains that operated in the South East of England. A Class 465, introduced in 1991, is shown 
in Figure 4.10 below.  
 
Figure 4.10 Interior and exterior photographs of Class 465 4-car Networker – a tranche two train introduced in 1991 
Source:(Marsden, 2014, p. 247) 
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Tranche three trains include the first trains introduced after privatisation. A photograph of Classes 377/4 built by Bombardier is shown in Figure 
4.11 below. 
 
Figure 4.11 Interior and exterior photographs of Class 377 4-car Electrostar – a tranche three train introduced in 2004 
Sources:(train interiors: Marsden, 2007, p. 213, train exteriors: 2014, p. 215)
Chapter 4. Analysis of the Weight per Seat of UK Trains  
Page 98 
Finally, tranche four includes the most recent EMUs introduced since privatisation and after 2010. A picture of a Class 345 built by Bombardier 
for Crossrail is shown in Figure 4.12 below. 
 
Figure 4.12 Interior and exterior photographs of Class 345 9-car Aventra – a tranche four train introduced in 2015 
Source:(Pritchard, 2018b, p. 68); Class 345 interior: Sunil060902 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60737188; 
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4.4.2 Analysis across the four tranches 
If we compare across the four tranches then we see (Table 4.6 below) that weight per 
seat has indeed increased over time, with tranches three and four heavier than their 
predecessors. Tranche four has decreased relative to tranche three, which will be 
explored further later.  























Tranche 1 25 2 4 125.2 249.0 502.8 
Tranche 2 6 2 4 127.5 300.0 425.3 
Tranche 3 33 3 5 170.8 241.2 708.0 
Tranche 4 4 5 12 288.0 458.5 628.0 
Tranche one has 25 different classes and sub-classes, including the Class 445 shown 
in Figure 4.9 above. (Note: the specific classes in each tranche are listed in the 
appendix in Table 9.12). Tranche one trains range from 2-car configurations through 
to 4-car sets. The average weight of a tranche one trainset is 125.2 tonnes, with 
approximately 249 seats, giving an average weight per passenger seat of 502.8 
kg/seat.  
Tranche two has 6 different classes and sub-classes, including the Class 465/9 4-car 
shown in Figure 4.10 above. The tranche two trains range from 2-car formations 
through to 4-car sets. They weigh an average of 127.5 tonnes with approximately 
300 seats per set, giving a figure of 425.3 kg/seat.  
Tranche three has 33 different classes and sub-classes, including the 377/4 4-car 
Electrostar shown in Figure 4.11 above. The trains range from 3-car trainsets 
through to 5-car sets. The average weight of a tranche three set is 170.8 tonnes with 
approximately 241 seats per train, giving a figure of 708.0 kg/seat.  
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Tranche four trains are the most recent. There are four different classes and sub-
classes of trains within this group, including the Crossrail Class 345 9-car Aventra 
shown in Figure 4.12 above. The trains in this group range from 5-car formations 
through to 12-car sets. The average weight of a tranche four trainset is 288.0 tonnes 
with approximately 459 seats, giving a figure of 628.0 kg/seat.  
Trains from the four tranches are plotted in Figure 4.13 below. As with previous 
charts, the horizontal axis shows the year of first introduction, and the vertical axis 
shows the weight of the trainset per passenger seat.  
 
Figure 4.13 Historical vehicle mass per passenger seat across four tranches of the same type of train 
Tranche one trains (blue circle) were introduced from the 1970s up to 1990 and show 
a spread around the average of 502.8 kg/seat (Table 4.6 above). The Networker trains 
of tranche two (orange square) were introduced in the 1990s and are clustered 
around the average of 425.3 kg/seat – the lowest average of the four tranches. 
Tranche three trains (grey triangle) were introduced from the 1990s through to 2015 
and show a spread around the average of 708.0 kg/seat – the highest average of the 
four tranches. The fourth tranche (yellow rotated square) includes the most recent 
trains to enter service and they are clustered around the average of 628.0 kg/seat – a 
reduction on tranche 3, but not as low as tranches one or two.  
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Step three of this analysis gives further support to the increase in the weight per 
seat of rolling stock over time. Trains introduced since the late 1990s are heavier 
per seat compared to their predecessors. There is evidence that the most recent trains 
(tranche 4) have reduced relative to tranche 3, but they are still heavier per seat than 
trains in tranches one and two. 
4.5 Step four: drill down to the factors of weight per seat 
The metric used so far (kg/seat) has two parts: the total weight of that trainset and the 
number of seats on the trainset.  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑘𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡) =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 (𝑘𝑔)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠) 
 
Weight per seat could increase because the train weight was increasing, or there were 
fewer seats, or some combination of both. Each component will now be explored.  
4.5.1 The total weight of the trainset 
The weight of a trainset will obviously be larger for 12-car trainsets than single car 
trains. Therefore, to help with comparison across trains this analysis will look at the 
average weight of a single car within the trainset. For example, a Pendolino train 
with nine cars weighs 470.1 tonnes, which implies an average weight of 52.2 tonnes 
per car. The following analysis looks first at the weight of an average car across the 
database of EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes created in step two, and then across the 
four tranches of suburban EMUs created in step three.  
Figure 4.14 below shows the average weight of a single car across the 157 Classes 
and Sub-Classes (91 EMUs, 57 DMUs and nine Bi-Modes) of trains created in step 
two. The horizontal axis shows the year of introduction, as with previous charts, but 
the vertical axis now shows the average weight of a single car measured in tonnes.  
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Figure 4.14 Historical vehicle mass (tonnes) for EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes 
A visual inspection of Figure 4.14 shows an increase in weight for trains introduced 
during the late 1990s and 2000s relative to earlier trains. There is one DMU (orange 
square) which is a notable exception, introduced in 2007 and weighing significantly 
less than the others, but this will be discussed later in this section.  
Recent EMUs (blue circles) introduced after 2010 show a spread of weights, with 
some appearing to be a similar weight to the earlier trains. The few recent DMUs 
(orange squares), introduced after 2010, appear to be heavier that the DMUs of the 
1970-1980s. The Bi-Modes (red triangles) introduced recently are heavier than trains 
introduced before the early 1990s. To supplement this visual inspection, the changes 
over the decades are shown in Table 4.7 below.  
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Table 4.7 Average vehicle mass per car for EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes across the decades 
Item 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Composite of three train types: Weight 
per car (Tonnes) by decade of 
introduction 
34.3 34.9 39.5 44.6 42.9 
EMUs: Weight per car (Tonnes) by 
decade of introduction 
34.3 35.0 37.6 43.3 40.0 
DMUs: Weight per car (Tonnes) by 
decade of introduction 
none 34.6 43.1 46.9 42.1 
Bi-Modes: Weight per car (Tonnes) by 
decade of introduction 
none none none none 48.1 
The first row shows the composite figure for all trains in the database. The 
composite data shows that an average train in this database of 157 classes increased 
in weight over time, until the most recent trains introduced after 2010. In the 1970s 
an average car in a train would weigh 34.3 tonnes. For trains introduced in the 2000s 
this had increased to 44.6 tonnes. Trains introduced after 2010 have reversed this 
increasing trend, but still weigh 42.9 tonnes on average, heavier than their earlier 
predecessors.  
Of the 96 EMUs in this database, those introduced in the 2000s were the heaviest of 
all – with a single car weighing an average of 43.3 tonnes. For rolling stock 
introduced after 2010 this reduced to 40.0 tonnes per car, which is still heavier that 
those introduced between 1970 and 1990. A similar change is visible in the table for 
DMUs, with the heaviest vehicles introduced in the 2000s, compared to the lightest 
trains introduced during the 1980s. Bi-Modes are new to British railways and so 
there is no historical comparison to make, but it is interesting to note that they have 
the heaviest cars on average for vehicles introduced after 2010. A Bi-Mode car, 
introduced after 2010, weighs an average of 48.1 tonnes compared to 40.0 tonnes 
and 42.1 tonnes for EMUs and DMUs, respectively. This could be explained by their 
configuration of resources that includes diesel and electric motors – in this case the 
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beneficial attribute of greater flexibility to travel across the network is associated 
with increased weight. 
It was noted above that there is one significant outlier in Figure 4.14 – a DMU 
(orange square on the chart) with a much lower weight than the others. This is a 
Class 139, first introduced in 2007, and it is a single car train, weighing 12.5 tonnes. 
A picture of the Class 139 is shown below in Figure 4.15. There are only two Class 
139s in service, but this is another example of the diversity of resources that can be 
configured to act as trains. The Class 139s began as a trial for a lightweight railcar 
for quiet branch lines. They have an onboard engine combined with a flywheel that 
reduces the need for a larger engine.  
 
Figure 4.15 Class 139 DMU - the lightest weight car of the dataset 
Source:(Marsden, 2014, p. 88) 
Step three in the earlier analysis addressed this diversity in train types by focusing 
upon suburban EMUs. Figure 4.16 below shows the analysis of train weight across 
the four tranches.  
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Figure 4.16 Historical vehicle mass (tonnes) across the four tranches of suburban EMUs 
A visual inspection of this chart shows a definite increase in the weight of tranche 
three trains (grey triangle) compared to earlier tranches one (blue circle) and two 
(orange square). However, tranche four trains (yellow rotated square) show a 
reduction in vehicle weight down to the level of earlier trains.  
The average weight of a car in tranche one is 35.2 tonnes and 34.8 tonnes for tranche 
two. This compares to an average tranche three car weighing 41.4 tonnes and tranche 
four at 33.9 tonnes. This confirms the visual inspection that tranche four trains are 
the lightest on average, and tranche three trains the heaviest. The tranche four trains 
include the recent procurements for Thameslink and Crossrail that are explored in 
detailed in Chapter 6. The key point that can be made here is that this analysis 
provides evidence that weight increase was not, and is not, inevitable.  
The next section completes the analysis in step four and looks at the other 
component of kg per seat: the number of seats available.  
4.5.2 The number of passenger seats  
The chart below (Figure 4.17) shows the average number of seats for a single car 
across the database of 157 classes and sub-classes (96 EMUs, 57 DMUs and nine Bi-
Modes).  
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Figure 4.17 Historical number of seats per car for EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes 
A visual inspection of Figure 4.17 shows an apparent general trend downwards, with 
fewer seats available over time. This visual inspection can be confirmed by analysis 
grouping trains into the decade of their introduction, as shown in Table 4.8 below.  
Table 4.8 Average number of seats per car for EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes across the decades 
Item 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Composite of three train types: Seats per 
car by decade of introduction 
69.5 66.5 68.5 59.7 60.7 
EMUs: Seats per car by decade of 
introduction 
69.5 67.3 67.3 60.2 56.8 
DMUs: Seats per car by decade of 
introduction 
none 64.9 70.9 58.8 68.7 
Bi-Modes: Seats per car by decade of 
introduction 
none none none none 66.6 
The first row shows the composite figure for all trains in the database. The 
composite data shows that an average train in this database had fewer passenger 
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seats after the 2000s compared to earlier decades. In the 1970s a single car in a train 
would have 70 seats on average. For the most recent trains, introduced after 2010, 
this had reduced to 61 seats.  
The EMUs (second row) show a consistent reduction from approximately 70 seats 
per car in the 1970s through to 57 seats for trains introduced after 2010. The DMUs 
are more varied. An average DMU car introduced in the 2000s had only 59 seats, but 
this had risen to 69 seats in the 2010s. The small number of Bi-Modes, introduced 
after 2010, have 67 seats per car on average.  
Finally, analysis of the four tranches of suburban EMUs is shown in Figure 4.18 
below.  
 
Figure 4.18 Historical number of seats per car across the four tranches  
A visual inspection of this chart shows a marked reduction in seats available for 
trains in tranches three and four. Analysis of this dataset shows that a car in a tranche 
one trainset (blue circle) had 69 seats on average, whereas tranche two trains (orange 
square) had 81 seats per car. By tranche three (grey triangle), this had reduced to an 
average of 58 seats per car, and 54 seats for a car within a tranche four trainset 
(yellow rotated square).  
To help visualise this, Figure 4.19 below shows an example interior for a train within 
each tranche.  
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Figure 4.19 Interior pictures for an example train from each of the four tranches 
Tranche 1: Class 319 (top left); tranche 2: Class 465 Networker (top right); tranche 3: Class 377 Electrostar 
(bottom left); tranche 4: Class 700 Desiro City (bottom right) 
Sources: Class 319 seating (Marsden, 2014, p. 171); Class 465 Networker seating (Marsden, 2007, p. 241); 
Class 377 Electrostar seating (Marsden, 2014, p. 215); Class 700 Desiro City by RM - Own work, CC BY-SA 
4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=58951382 
The class 319 (top left) is within the tranche one group of trains. It was introduced in 
1987 under British Rail and runs as a 4-car formation. The number of seats varies 
across sub-classes, but a Class 319/4 has 269 seats across the set and so an average 
of 67 seats per car.  
The Class 465 Networker (top right) within tranche two was first introduced in 1991 
under British Rail. There are some variations within the sub-classes, but a Class 
465/9 runs as a 4-car formation with 322 seats across the set, giving an average of 80 
seats per car.  
The Class 377 Electrostar (bottom left) is within tranche three and replaced Class 
319s in tranche one when it entered service. It was first introduced in 2001 and built 
by Bombardier under the privatised railway structure. The sub-classes of the 377 
operate in three, four, and five-car formations, but a class 377/6 runs as a five-car 
formation with 300 seats across the set, giving an average of 60 seats per car.  
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The Class 700 Desiro City (bottom right) is within tranche four and replaced Class 
319s in tranche one, and Class 377s in tranche three. It was first introduced in 2013 
and built by Siemens under the privatised railway structure. The sub-classes run as 
eight and 12-car formations, but a Class 700/0 runs as an 8-car formation with 433 
seats across the set, giving an average of 54 seats per car.  
This analysis found a reduction in number of seats for modern trains compared 
to their predecessors. This is the case for the larger database created in step two and 
the four tranches of suburban EMUs created in step three. Modern trains have a 
configuration of resources with fewer seats than their predecessors.  
4.5.3 Summary of the analysis in step four 
Steps one, two and three used the metric of weight per seat (kg/seat) over time and 
found supporting evidence for trains getting heavier over time relative to the number 
of seats. Step four of this analysis has investigated the two components that make up 
this metric: the train’s total weight and the number of passenger seats available. The 
increase in the weight per seat over time can be accounted for by increases in 
the weight of the rolling stock and reductions in the provision of seating. Table 
4.9 below gives a summary of this analysis using the extended database created in 
step two.  
Table 4.9 Summary of the train weight and number of seats across the extended database  
Item 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Weight per car (Tonnes) by decade of 
introduction 
34.3 34.9 39.5 44.6 42.9 
Seats per car by decade of introduction 69.5 66.5 68.5 59.7 60.7 
Weight per seat (kg / seat) by decade of 
introduction 
493.4 524.0 577.1 747.8 706.5 
Trains introduced during the 1970s and 1980s weighed on average 34.3 – 34.9 
tonnes per car and had approximately 70 and 67 seats per car, giving a weight per 
seat of 493.4 and 524.0 kg per seat, respectively. For trains introduced during the 
2000s and 2010s the weight per seat had increased to 747.8 and 706.5 kg per seat, 
driven by heavier trains and a reduction in the number of seats.  
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A summary across the four tranches of suburban EMU is shown in Table 4.10 
below. 
Table 4.10 Summary of the characteristics of trains across the four tranches 
Item Kg/seat Weight per car (Tonnes) Number of seats per car 
Tranche 1 502.8 35.2 69.9 
Tranche 2 425.3 34.8 81.7 
Tranche 3 708.0 41.4 58.5 
Tranche 4 628.0 33.9 53.9 
Tranche three trains, built immediately after privatisation, are heavier and have 
fewer seats than their predecessors. However, the most recent tranche four trains, 
including those built for Thameslink and Crossrail, weigh 33.9 tonnes per car and are 
lighter than any of their predecessors in this analysis – a demonstration that weight 
increase was not inevitable. However, a car in a tranche four train has only 53.9 seats 
on average, compared to tranche two trains that had some 81.7 seats.  
Step four of this analysis confirms that the increase in the weight per passenger 
seat of British trains is attributable to both the increased weight of the trains, 
and a reduction in the number of seats available for passengers. The tranche 
three trains introduced immediately after privatisation are the heaviest, although the 
most recent tranche four trains have achieved the lightest weight of all. The number 
of seats has reduced significantly for the trains in tranches three and four compared 
to their older peers, and this is the reason why both tranches three and four have a 
heavier figure for kg per seat compared to tranches one and two.  
4.6 Summary of all four analytical steps 
Step one of the analysis reproduced the increase in weight per seat of the group of 
trains shown in the original chart (Figure 1.5) that prompted this research. The 
second step expanded the analysis to a database of 157 different types of EMU, 
DMU and Bi-Mode trains. This larger database also showed an increase in the 
weight per seat of trains over time. Trains introduced during the 2000s were the 
heaviest, whereas those introduced after 2010 were a bit lighter, but this did not 
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reduce to the levels of trains introduced during the 1970s – 1990s. Step three focused 
upon suburban EMUs split into four tranches. The analysis in step three also found 
that weight per seat increased over time. The tranche two trains, introduced during 
the early 1990s, were the lightest per seat; the tranche three trains, introduced from 
the late 1990s through to 2010, were the heaviest per seat, but the most recent 
tranche four trains showed a reduction in weight per seat relative to trains in the 
earlier third tranche.  
The fourth and final step found that the number of seats available on trains has 
reduced significantly over time. Trains introduced after 2000 have nearly 10 fewer 
seats per car than trains introduced earlier. With several cars forming a trainset this 
could make a significant difference to the total number of seats available for 
passengers. The weight of trains was not quite so clear a story. For the extended 
dataset of EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Modes, the trains introduced during the 2000s 
weighed nearly 10 tonnes more per car than their predecessors. However, analysis of 
suburban EMUs found that the most recent trains, introduced after 2010, were the 
lightest of all four tranches.  
A chart showing an outcome of heavy trains was the starting point for this 
research. It was essential to know if this starting point provided a good 
foundation for subsequent work. This analytical chapter has built an empirical 
base to enrich (White, 2010) the analysis in the following chapters. There is good 
evidence for an increase in train weight and a reduction in the availability of seats. 
Recent trains have attributes with fewer seats and more weight compared to their 
predecessors from the 1970s and 1980s.  
The actions that produced these trains can all be understood as strategic decisions 
followed by a manufacturing stage. Propositions of trains were created, one of which 
subsequently became a realised train. In the nationalised operations of British Rail 
this might not have been a competitive procurement process, but there might have 
existed different conceptions of the trains. The current railway industry has a mix of 
private and public sector organisations involved in these strategic decisions, but the 
characterisation remains the same: propositions exist before a translated realised 
train enters service. The production of new trains is a significant endeavour, whether 
that involves just two Class 445 trains (Figure 4.9), which were built by British Rail 
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as prototypes in the 1970s, or the £1.6Bn Thameslink contract awarded to Siemens 
in the 2010s.  
Tranche 3 trains are visibly heavier than their predecessors introduced by British 
Rail. However, we should be way of simply ascribing the blame for heavy trains to 
‘privatisation’ or ‘competitive sourcing’, because the most recent tranche 4 trains are 
the lightest of all. The phenomenon of heavy trains will be investigated further by 
applying ANT theory to understand the strategic decisions that produce trains. 
Different configurations of resources can be brought together to act as a train; some 
will have attributes of excess weight. The following chapters build upon the 
empirical analysis of train weight to understand how new trains are produced – 
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5 Historical Analysis of the Railways using ANT 
We know from the empirical analysis in Chapter 4, that trains have generally 
increased in weight per seat, and this is attributable to an increase in the weight of 
the trains, as well as a reduction in the number of seats available for passengers. This 
is a problem because heavy trains use more energy and produce more emissions, 
potentially over an exceptionally long period. This is the first of two chapters to 
investigate how the general increase in the weight of trains has happened.  
This historical analysis does not aim to produce a definitive history of the railways, 
rather it develops a broad view on how the railways and trains have developed over 
time. This is not some passive context (Latour, 1996, p. 133), before getting onto the 
real action in the next chapter, which investigates two recent strategic decisions that 
have actually produced lightweight trains. The goal of the historical analysis is to 
use ANT analysis to demonstrate that trains and railways are dynamic and 
fluid concepts, even when made of iron and steel.  
This chapter will apply ANT as the theoretical lens to understand the actors and 
actions taking place as the industry changes. This action includes famous names, 
such as Brunel, that are in the spotlight of performance, but ANT’s distributed view 
of agency recognises a wider group of actors making up the network. The model of 
five circulating loops (Latour, 1999, p. 100), described in Chapter 2 and shown in 
Figure 2.2 (reproduced again below in Figure 5.1) will be the main tool to 
understand the actor-networks that act as, and act upon, the railway. Thinking with 
the loops enables us to see the human and non-human actors that come together to 
act upon and shape how the railway is performed over time.  
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Figure 5.1 Theoretical model of five circulating loops used in this ANT analysis  
Source: (Latour, 1999, p. 100) 
The analysis in this chapter is framed around four stages in the development of 
British railways. The first stage covers the earliest railways, that appear at the end of 
the 18th century, followed by the subsequent development of locomotive engines in 
the early 19th century. This first stage is a period of rapid growth, driven by hundreds 
of companies building and operating new railways across the country. The second 
stage sees industry consolidation after World War One, with the multiplicity of 
railway organisations combined to produce the era of the Big Four railways. This 
second period ran, approximately, from World War One until the end of World War 
Two, when the third stage begins with nationalisation and the creation of British Rail 
(BR). The nationalised railway was in place until the 1990s, when the fourth and 
current stage began, with the era of privatisation. None of these stages are perfectly 
delineated, however, they provide a structure for the analysis that follows.   
To help understand the changing nature of the railways I used four descriptive 
statistics that measure different aspects of the railway over time. As explained earlier 
in Section 3.4, these statistics provide a consistent way to understand the railway as 
it changes over time. The statistics used are: the length of railway track; industry 
Chapter 5. Historical Analysis of the Railways using ANT  
Page 115 
receipts for passengers and goods; the number of passenger journeys; and railway 
income, expenses, and profitability. The following sections contain charts, produced 
from my own analysis of these variables, to help create a richer picture of the 
changes taking place across the four stages. For example, the phenomenal growth of 
the early 19th century is visible in a classic ‘S-curve’ shape for the length of track 
built during this time, but this curve flattens as the railway matures and enters the era 
of the Big Four, in the second stage.  
5.1 A multiplicity of local railways and the development of a 
national rail network 
The early railway is characterised by “impermanent affairs” (Holland, 2015, p. 16) 
involving a lot of experimentation and exploration. The railway in the late 18th and 
early 19th century is a transitory and temporary service, driven by specific local 
needs, which mostly involve the movement of goods such as coal, from mines to 
ports and cities. The early focus upon the movement of goods brings merchants and 
traders into the network of relationships (loop 3, alliances) that act as railways. 
Landowners are often part of this network if, for example, they own the mine or 
require payment in return for granting the railway temporary access across their land. 
At this stage in its development, the railway cannot act without these actors in the 
network.  
A specialist railway profession (loop 2, autonomization) begins to emerge from the 
experimentation taking place, with experts produced from the amateurs learning how 
to solve the many problems that railways encounter. The sight, noise and smell of 
the machines begins to build a relationship with the wider public (loop 4, public 
representation), even if they are not involved as passengers initially.  
The early temporary nature of the railway changed when Acts of Parliament 
permitted companies to purchase land outright. The Acts allowed the substitution of 
landlords in the actor-network of a railway. In 1758 “the Middleton Railway of 
Leeds became the first railway in Britain to be granted powers of permanence by an 
Act of Parliament” (Holland, 2015, p. 16) to carry coal from local pits to a nearby 
river for onward transport to the city of Leeds. The actor-network of this early 
railway used horses for traction. Initially it ran upon wooden rails, before these were 
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replaced later with iron, with this material change acting to allow heavier loads to be 
hauled.  
Individuals begin to emerge as recognised experts. The developing profession of the 
railways (loop 2, autonomization) begins to grow and incorporates the local 
knowledge that is gained as local problems are met and overcome. Some of these 
early lessons will go on to become widely adopted as standard practice in the 
production of railways. For example, track gauge measures the distance between the 
rails and, in the current UK mainline railway this is 4 feet 8 ½ inches, which is now 
known as standard gauge. However, before standard gauge was accepted into 
practice, the early railways needed to create their own gauge, as was the case with 
the Middleton Railway, which used 4 feet and 1 inch. The Middleton still acted as a 
railway, despite its non-standard gauge and the configuration of resources that 
included wheels with this gap.  
The ability to purchase land reduced the temporary nature of railways. Increasing 
permanence of the railway was also demonstrated when the Surrey Iron Railway 
became the world’s first railway company, in 1803. It was “established by an 1801 
Act of Parliament” (Holland, 2015, p. 17) and operated a 9-mile horse-drawn railway 
in South London. The Surrey Iron Railway was built instead of a planned canal, and 
it charged tolls of private users for its freight service to move coal, agricultural 
products, and other goods. A railway actor-network now included legislation that 
allowed the railway company to act in commercial and operational ways. This 
example also illustrates how railways were bringing canals and their owners (loop 3, 
alliances) into their networks, even if they are potential disruptors and blockers given 
the competitive threat that rail posed.   
Passengers (loop 4, public representation) were first brought into the actor-network 
when the Oystermouth Railway became the world’s first passenger-carrying railway 
(Holland, 2015, p. 17) after Parliamentary approval in 1807. This 5 ½ mile railway, 
around Swansea Bay in Wales, used “stagecoach-style vehicles” (Holland, 2015, p. 
17) pulled by horses. The vehicles ran on plateway track, which was an L-shaped rail 
to guide the wheels of the coach. As rail began to specialise, this technology would 
be replaced by a smooth rail profile, with the use of flanged wheels to guide the train 
vehicles along the track. These improvements acted to allow for improvements in the 
speed, strength, and quality of the ride.  
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Early railways had many obvious differences to modern concepts of railways, with 
their wooden and plateway tracks of varying gauges, their power provided by horses, 
gravity, if on a slope, or even people pushing or pulling carts. However, these 
different socio-material networks of resources – human and non-human – all still 
collectively act, or perform, as a railway. Different actor-networks, that act as 
railways, will have different attributes, associated with their different socio-material 
configurations. Different attributes provide different railways with advantages, for 
example, the increasing use of iron rails allows for heavier loads to be carried, which 
could act to increase commercial revenue. The iron rails (a material entity) are in a 
relationship with the economic (a social entity). We could say that the economic 
acted, or caused, the introduction of iron rails, but ANT would discourage any 
privileging of the social to explain this actor-network configuration. They act 
together, collectively.  
At the start of the 19th century the railways in Britain had grown in number, but were 
still “limited to small-scale, localised railroads operated by horses or by stationary 
engines” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 531). Engines were a noticeable absence from these 
early railway actor-networks, but this began to change. Engines were already used in 
factories, coal mines and elsewhere, and this expertise was brought into the railway 
profession (loop 2, autonomization). Stationary engines would involve a fixed 
engine hauling carts with pulleys and ropes. In 1817, an early steam locomotive was 
used on the Kilmarnock & Troon Railway in Scotland. The locomotive was used 
because it could haul ten tons of coal at 5mph, but it was soon replaced by horses 
because the locomotive’s 5-ton weight (Holland, 2015, p. 18) was too heavy for the 
brittle plateway track on which it operated. In this case the actor-network using 
horses and plateway track was the most articulate proposition of a train compared to 
an alternative actor-network using the locomotive with the plateway track. The 
locomotive had a weight attribute of 5-tons, which was an excessive weight when it 
was in a relationship with the brittle track. However, locomotives had made their 
appearance in the production of railways.  
In 1825, in a significant historical development, the Stockton & Darlington Railway 
was built under the guidance of chief engineer, George Stephenson. This railway 
connected collieries in Darlington with docks on the River Tees at Stockton to 
transport coal from the mines to the port – once again we seen alliances (loop 3) 
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formed in the actor-network of a railway. However, the railway initially faced 
opposition from local landowners (loop 3, alliances) who restricted access to their 
land. Alternative routes were developed, and the subsequent 1823 Act of Parliament 
that approved the railway was evidence of successful alliance building locally, and 
with Government (loop 3, alliances). This Act included the power to “use locomotive 
or moveable engines” (His Majesty’s Government, 1823, p. 665). At the launch of 
the railway on 27 September 1825, with enormous crowds and fanfare, George 
Stephenson’s steam-powered Locomotion hauled approximately 500 passengers 
(loop 4, public representation) in a coach and some converted coal wagons. For the 
first time in the world a “passenger-carrying steam train” (Holland, 2015, p. 30) had 
transported passengers on a public railway. An oil painting by Terence Cuneo 
(Figure 5.2 below), produced in 1949, captures the excitement of the time, with 
Locomotion, driven by George Stephenson, hauling a train of wagons carrying 
passengers, as crowds cheer alongside. 
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Figure 5.2 The Opening of the Stockton & Darlington Railway by Terence Cuneo 
Source: (Holland, 2015, p. 31) 
Stephenson designed the track gauge (the width between the rails) for the Stockton 
& Darlington Railway as 4 feet 8 ½ inches (1,435mm). This was based on his earlier 
colliery railways (Holland, 2015, p. 28), with an extra half inch added to reduce 
friction on curves, as the railway profession continued to learn how to produce 
railways (loop 2, autonomization). This width would go on to be adopted as standard 
gauge for railways around the world and remains in use in the current UK mainline 
railway. The engineer of the Great Western Railway, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, 
would hold out against this, with his trains using a Broad Gauge of 2,134mm, until 
1892 when all services were converted to standard gauge. Trains using broad gauge 
still acted as trains, with some claiming advantages from this configuration, however 
their disadvantages were obvious when people were required to change trains 
because of a lack of interoperability.  
Standard gauge was implemented in 1830 when the world’s first inter-city railway, 
the Liverpool & Manchester Railway (L&MR), opened for service. These two lines 
(S&DR and L&MR) marked the beginning of the “steam railway era” (Mitchell, 
Chapter 5. Historical Analysis of the Railways using ANT  
Page 120 
1988, p. 531). They both had “specialised track, mechanical traction, facilities for 
public traffic, and provision for passengers” (Gourvish, 1980, p. 9), which had been 
absent, or only partially present, in earlier railway developments. This actor-network 
of resources that acted as the railway would be recognisable today.  
The Liverpool & Manchester Railway was built to provide cheap transport between 
the port of Liverpool and the textile mills of Lancashire. Merchants and traders are, 
again, an important part of the network (loop 3, alliances) producing this railway and 
making it act. Construction of the railway was a feat of significant engineering: the 
first railway tunnel under a city, and the crossing of Chat Moss, among many 
achievements. However, it is the Trials at Rainhill in October 1829, which are most 
well-known.  
Locomotive power was still new when the railway was being built between the cities 
of Liverpool and Manchester. The Directors of the L&MR launched the Rainhill 
Trials in 1829, with a prize of £500 (more than £50,000 in 2019) for the winning 
locomotive and its owner. Competing participants in this strategic decision to 
identify the best locomotive were required to comply with given stipulations and 
conditions that are discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1) and shown in Figure 5.3 
below.  
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Figure 5.3 Stipulations and Conditions for the Rainhill Trials 
Source: (image taken from Marshall, 1930, p. 1067) 
The L&MR railway was not yet complete, but it was brought into, or mobilised, 
(loop 1, mobilisation of the world) in this strategic decision through the creation of a 
test track that represented the future railway between the two cities. The stipulations 
and conditions defined how competing locomotives would be measured (loop 1, 
mobilisation of the world) within the Trials. The stipulations and conditions included 
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weight limits (less than six tons preferred), which represented the early fragility of 
track relative to the weight of locomotives. Other aspects of the future service were 
mobilised and brought into the strategic decision to identify the best locomotive. 
This included the ability of the locomotive to haul a train of carriages weighing 20 
tons, with this weight representing future loads of goods and passengers. The 
requirements also specified a track gauge of 4 feet 8 ½ inches (standard gauge), 
safety characteristics, the price of the locomotive, and more. The competition was 
won by Robert Stephenson, son of George Stephenson, and his locomotive Rocket. 
He was awarded the contract to build and operate locomotives for the new railway. 
The Liverpool & Manchester Railway opened on 15 September 1830, with a high-
profile launch involving the Duke of Wellington, who was then the Prime Minister, 
and various politicians, merchants, and other local representatives demonstrating 
how the wider loops of the railway actor-network reached out and strengthened it 
(loop 3, alliances; and loop 4, public representation). The first train on the railway 
carried the Duke and others was hauled by the locomotive, Northumbrian, which 
Robert Stephenson had built after the Trials. Applying the theory developed in 
Chapter 2, Northumbrian is a realised train5 that has been translated from the earlier 
winning proposition of a train, that was Rocket during the Trials. The translations 
that produced Northumbrian included improvements upon Rocket’s design.  
Rocket itself was also carrying passengers on the day of the launch. It is not possible 
to determine here whether the Rocket involved in the trials was modified in any way 
for operation on the L&MR, although that would seem likely given the pace of 
technological innovation and learning at the time. If changes were made, then there 
are effectively two Rockets: one that was a winning proposition of a train built for 
the experiments in Rainhill, running on the test track and hauling two carriages 
loaded with stones; and another Rocket that was a realised train transporting people 
and goods between Liverpool and Manchester.  
The railway was an instant success, and the locomotive was established within the 
actor-network that acted as a train and railway. This successful configuration was 
about to be translated around the country and world.  
 
5 It might not be technically accurate to describe a locomotive without a rake of carriages as a train, 
but this is used for simplicity and to avoid talking about realised locomotives and realised trains. A 
realised entity could be used but this loses the industry language.  
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After this, the railways moved into a new stage of extreme growth, with a series of 
“promotion manias” (Gourvish, 1980, p. 9) between 1830 and the mid-1860s that 
raised money acted to support new railway companies across the country. Railway 
mania produced a multiplicity of local railways, with different resources configured 
in ways that were specific, and entangled, with their localities. If we were to look 
across each of these railways, they would be recognisable as like each other, but they 
would all have unique differences specific to their local place.  
The fifth loop (links and knots) at the centre of the theoretical model (Figure 5.1) is a 
conceptual element that ties the other loops together and this collective network acts 
as a train. To understand what is holding these diverse collections of resources 
together at this point in history, then I propose that this central loop (loop 5, links 
and knots) is very much about the concept of a local railway. The multiplicity of 
railways that appear at this time are all like each other, and all act as railways, but 
they are all configured in a close relationship with their locality. At this stage in the 
development of railways, the links and knots holding each railway together is 
explained by the local human and natural geography. Railways operating in areas 
with steep gradients have locomotives with a recognisably different form to others 
operating in flatter areas. For example, the London and North Western Railway 
(L&NWR), operating in the 19th century, had to cope with the hilly country north of 
Lancaster and their locomotives were visibly larger than the Midland Railway 
operating in geography with shallow gradients. The action of the non-human, in the 
form of gravity and gradients, upon the body of the locomotive was easier to see in 
this early stage of the railways, before increasing engine power overwhelmed this 
influence. 
This diverse multiplicity of local railways also inevitably included ‘mistakes,’ 
inefficiencies, and problematic outcomes. One example, in 1837, came from none 
other than I. K. Brunel, the Engineer of the Great Western Railway (GWR), among 
other notable achievements. While the Great Western Railway was being built, he 
issued a specification to several different manufacturers to build the first locomotives 
for the new railway. Like the Rainhill Trials, we have a representation of desired 
locomotives in a written specification, and a request for suppliers to respond to these 
requirements with their propositions. However, the realised trains produced by this 
action were “an extraordinary collection of freak locomotives,” (Adams, 1993, p. 
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114). This actor-network to produce trains included one of the greatest engineers of 
the time, but this was no guarantee of a successful outcome.  
Despite problems, there were many improvements over early configurations. For 
example, early passenger vehicles followed closely the style of horse-drawn 
stagecoaches, as illustrated by GWR passenger rolling stock, shown in Figure 5.4 
below.  
 
Figure 5.4 GWR 'Posting Carriage' for passengers in the 1840s 
Source: (Adams, 1993, p. 183) 
This early four-wheeled carriage could jump the track at speed (Adams, 1993, p. 
184) and so Brunel built carriages with six wheels and three axles. This meant longer 
bodies and heavier vehicles, but weight also acted to provide greater stability at 
speed. As the railways improve upon designs borrowed from other professions, such 
as stagecoaches, the railway profession becomes specialised and distinct (loop 2, 
autonomisation) and this expertise strengthens the network.  
The growth of local railways accelerated. In 1846 there were 272 Acts of Parliament, 
which authorised “9,500 miles of new railway” (Holland, 2015, p. 6). The names of 
the railway companies from this time illustrate how connected they were to 
their local geographies. The Leicester and Swannington Railway opened in 1832, 
the Ulverston and Lancaster Railway opened in 1857, and many more. A list of more 
than 200 companies from this time is shown in Table 9.1 in the appendix. These 
private organisations were driving the expansion of the railways “from the choice of 
routes and the raising of capital to the operation of services” (Gourvish, 2008, p. 49). 
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A writer in 1885 noted the “stupendous” (Williams, 1885, p. 468) amount of £831 
million pounds (c. £107Bn6 in 2019) of capital provided by private shareholders, and 
authorised by Acts of Parliament, to build, maintain, and enlarge the network. Not all 
schemes were built, but a lot did progress and, by 1880, 75% of the eventual rail 
network was built. The first of the descriptive statistics is used here to help tell this 
story. The length of railway track is shown in Figure 5.5 below, for the period up to 
1880. The data is first available from c. 1830, when the Liverpool & Manchester 
Railway opened.  
 
Figure 5.5 The length of the railway in Britain (1830-1880) 
Source: (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 541–542, table 5) and my own analysis 
This chart (Figure 5.5) shows 25,000 km of railway in place by 1880 – a compound 
annual growth rate of 11% per year for the period 1830 to 1880, which meant that 
the rail network was doubling in size approximately every seven years. Wherever the 
railway went it reached out to form alliances (loop 3) because it was also a 
significant construction enterprise, creator of opportunities, and provider of 
employment (loop 4, public representation). To take one example, Railway 
Engineers (loop 2, autonomization) built “an average of 1,000 bridges” (Johnson and 
Long, 1981, p. 7) every year between 1830 and 1860.  
 
6 Bank of England Inflation Calculator: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-
policy/inflation/inflation-calculator 
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Government was an actor in each local railway through supporting Acts of 
Parliament, but it also introduces legislation that affects and acts upon all railways. 
In 1840, the Railway Regulation Act (Her Majesty’s Government, 1840) included 
the establishment of Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) as a body to 
oversee safety. In 1844 the Railway Regulation Act (Her Majesty’s Government, 
1844), referred to as Gladstone's Act after William Gladstone, introduced various 
measures beyond safety, including the ability to control railway charges, and 
purchase future railways for the state. The 1844 Act also introduced a requirement 
for operators to provide inexpensive and basic rail transport. These trains, referred to 
as parliamentary trains, were required to carry third class passengers at minimum 
standards of comfort, including protection from the weather, at least once per day, at 
specified minimum speeds with fare rates capped. Not all operators supported this 
and “GWR was forced, much against its will, to provide carriages for the ‘lower 
orders,’ which gave some protection from the elements” (Adams, 1993, p. 184). 
However, in 1872, the Midland Railway agreed to run third-class carriages on all 
trains (Williams, 1885, p. 389), above and beyond what was required by the 1844 
Act. This change was introduced by the General Manager, James Allport. In 1875 he 
abolished second class on all of the Midland’s trains (Wolmar, 2007, p. 132), 
ensured that all seats were upholstered, provided more leg-room for passengers, and 
introduced further improvements to the travelling experience for the passenger (loop 
4, public representation). The success of this strategy would see it adopted across the 
railway and, by 1881, third class accounted for more than 80% of all passengers and 
65% of all receipts across the railways. The changing responses of operators to 
Gladstone’s Act can be viewed as a clash of different concepts of the railway (loop 
5, links and knots), with the Act moving rail towards a national mass transit 
service.  
During this period, rail was competing with road, canals, and coastal shipping. Poor 
quality roads were not an enjoyable experience for passengers, and often caused 
damage to goods. These other options could also be very slow, for example the 29-
mile journey on the Worcester & Birmingham Canal, which opened in 1815, 
involved passing through 58 locks and four single-lane tunnels, with journeys 
sometimes taking a couple of days (Holland, 2015, p. 15). By contrast, the specialist 
technology of the railway (loop 2, autonomization) was improving all the time 
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strengthening the actor-networks that acted as trains. For example, steel rails 
replaced iron in the 1860s (Gourvish, 1980, p. 25), enabling increasing speeds and 
quality of service. Stephenson’s Rocket achieved a top speed of 29 mph in 1829, but 
this was surpassed in 1846 by a speed of 74 mph, then 90 mph by 1897. High profile 
races took place between different operators, with marketing campaigns showing 
trains transporting people to new tourist locations. Train speed reaches out and 
captures the public imagination (loop 4, public representation) and is a visible 
demonstration of the expertise of engineers (loop 2, autonomization). Some Chief 
Engineers become household names.  
The railway’s speed and smooth running was creating new commercial opportunities 
(loop 3, alliances; and loop 4, public representation) that begin to transform society, 
with these loops further strengthening the railways. For example, journalists were 
now able to send intelligence quickly to London for morning papers (Lardner, 1850, 
p. 39) from correspondents across Europe, and physical newsprint could now be 
widely communicated. Perishable goods – meat, fish, fresh milk and vegetables – 
could be transported (Gourvish, 1980, p. 31) to cities with minimal breakages and 
losses, reaching their destination faster and fresher. Figure 5.6 below shows a 
specific vehicle created for fish traffic (loop 3, alliances) from Fleetwood dock, 
which opened in 1877 and became a major industry in 1890.  
 
Figure 5.6 Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway fish van for Fleetwood Dock 
Source: (Simmons, 1987, p. 235) 
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In Great Britain and beyond railways forged unified national markets, linked 
domestic producers to the expanding world economy, facilitated the development of 
mass-production techniques, and incubated modern management practices 
(Eichengreen, 1995). The success of the railways is illustrated by the second of the 
descriptive statistics used to help tell this story: industry receipts (income) for 
passengers and goods (see Figure 5.7 below).  
 
Figure 5.7 Historical growth of rail receipts for passenger and freight services in Britain 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550, table 7) and my analysis 
The chart shows receipts from passenger and freight services from 1843, when data 
is first available, through to 1880, up to the same period as the previous chart 
showing the length of railway track. The mixed use of the railway is visible in this 
chart, with freight income larger at the end of the period. Between 1843 and 1880 
passenger receipts saw 6% compound annual growth and 9% for goods. This meant 
that passenger railway income was doubling approximately every 12 years and 
freight income every eight years.  
An author writing in 1885 illustrates the high regard of the railways at this time, 
when he says that, “every mile of every railway…has at almost every stage enriched 
somebody, has enriched the nation and the world” (Williams, 1885, p. 498). Despite 
this positive regard for the railways, there were still problems, and safety concerns 
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especially would prompt Government action. The Regulation of Railways Act of 
1868 (Her Majesty’s Government, 1868) introduced various impositions and powers 
related to the railways, including a measure to improve passenger safety using a 
“Means of Communication between the Passengers and the Servants of the Company 
in charge of the Train” (Her Majesty’s Government, 1868, p. 1165). At this time 
there was no way to move safely between cars, or to contact the driver, in the event 
of a problem, therefore legislation acted upon the configuration of resources that 
make up a train. A cord or chain was required that could be pulled by a passenger in 
an emergency. The communication cord had to run the full length of the train, but 
this proved a technical challenge at the time because this length can change, 
depending upon if the train is travelling in a straight line or following a curved 
section of the route. Making the cord too short could lead to it snapping, whereas too 
much slack would make it difficult for passengers to alert the driver. The mandated 
requirement for a train cord proved to be a “patently unsatisfactory method…[and 
was] withdrawn five years later” (Gourvish, 1980, pp. 51–52). Instead, operators 
were required to propose their own systems for approval, with a fine levied for 
inaction. Legislation still acted upon the train actor-network, but as a penalty for 
inaction rather than a prescription of how to configure resources and act.   
Government introduced further safety legislation after a rail disaster on 12 June 
1889, near Armagh in the North of Ireland, in which 80 people died and 260 were 
injured. A crowded Sunday school excursion train, pulled by a steam locomotive, 
was unable to climb a steep hill. The train crew decided to divide the train, to reduce 
weight, and then use the locomotive to take forward the front portion, leaving the 
rear portion on the running line until the locomotive returned. Tragically, the rear 
portion was inadequately braked and ran back down the gradient, colliding with 
another train. Braking technology had been developing but was not uniformly 
applied across all trains. The Regulation of Railways Act 1889 (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1889) required a single operator, the driver or guard, to be able to 
activate the brakes on every vehicle of the train. This Act also made the use of 
interlocking of points and signals compulsory, so that it is impossible to display a 
signal to proceed, unless the route to be used is safe for travel. Another key safety 
requirement was for the railway companies to adopt the block system, with a route 
broken up into a series of blocks, with only one train permitted to occupy a block at a 
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time. The block system and interlockings remain central safety components in the 
action of the modern railway. By the late 19th century improved safety equipment 
was widely used across vehicles and infrastructure.  
Passenger fatalities were terrible, but those working on the railway were subject to 
extreme rates of death and injury – with 742 men killed and 3,500 injured in 1874. 
Long working hours were an important contributing factor to accidents and fatalities, 
with employees often working a 60-hour week (Gourvish, 1980, p. 54). The 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) had 38,000 members in 1895, 
98,000 in 1907, and 273,000 members in 1914, when it was known as the National 
Union of Railwaymen. Increasing tussles took place between employees and 
employers, with strikes during the late 19th and early 20th century. In August 1911, 
the ASRS and other unions jointly called the first national rail strike. The increased 
strength of organised labour was demonstrated again in 1919 with a 9-day strike in 
response to government proposals to reduce rates of pay. This also “provided the 
first impetus to the development of competitive road transport” (Fenelon, 1933, p. 
383).  
A growing dissatisfaction with the railways was beginning to develop. The bursting 
of the earlier railway mania bubble had given way to a recognition that new 
railways, especially those built to serve the local needs of small communities, could 
not be built economically, with fare revenue unlikely to justify capital cost. Not 
everyone cared about the economics of the railway, however, as illustrated by a 
trader in Berwick on the borders of England and Scotland who said, c. 1890,  
“What we want is to have our fish carried at half present rates. We 
don’t care a ____ whether it pays the railways or not. Railways 
ought to be made to carry for the good of the country, or they 
should be taken over by the Government. That is what all Traders 
want and mean to try to get.” (Tatlow, 1920, p. 104) 
The early railways had been strengthened because their loops reached out to many 
different parts of society. This had been a critical enabler of early growth and 
success, but the railway’s importance to other industries and parts of society was 
leading to competing conceptions of the railway (loop 5, links and knots) and its 
purpose. A railway configured to run for the benefit of fish traders, and other 
Chapter 5. Historical Analysis of the Railways using ANT  
Page 131 
industries, has a different conception at its centre (loop 5, links and knots) than a 
railway designed to run for, say, passengers, or shareholders. Different conceptions 
at the centre (loop 5, links and knots) will all act as railways, but they will lock in 
different resources into the network and so have different attributes and 
characteristics in how they act as railways. Questions were being asked about who 
should benefit from railway services, who should pay the costs, and how the 
railways should be organised.  
After 1880 the early frantic growth began to plateau and the railways entered a 
mature stage (Gourvish, 1980, p. 41), as illustrated in Figure 5.8 below, which 
updates the chart shown earlier for the length of railway track built. 
 
Figure 5.8 Historical growth of the railway in Britain – the length of the railway (1830-1927).  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 541–542, table 5) and my analysis 
New railways were still being built after 1880 and the length of the rail network 
increased, however, the steepness of the graph eased off, reflecting a reduced growth 
rate of 1% per year between 1880 and 1927, as construction activity slowed. Growth 
would eventually stop in 1927, when the railway reached its maximum length of 
32,850km. The extent of the physical network has never been greater and would 
reduce in length in future years.  
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Although construction of the physical network was slowing after 1880, the use of 
that network continued to grow. This can be demonstrated using the third descriptive 
statistic, which measures the number of passenger journeys on the railway. This 
statistic could mean more people using the railway, or people using it more often, or 
some combination. The number of passenger journeys is shown in Figure 5.9 below, 
with the point in 1880 noted when 75% of the physical rail network was built, and 
1927 also marked when the physical rail network reached its largest ever size.  
 
Figure 5.9 Historical growth of Rail Passenger Journeys in Britain (1830-1920)  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)) and my analysis 
Between 1843 and 1880 passenger journeys were growing at a compound rate of 9% 
per year, which meant a doubling of passenger journeys every eight years. From 
1880 to 1913, before the start of World War One, the growth of passenger journeys 
continued to grow at 3% per year. Passenger journeys reached a maximum of 1.6 
Billion in 1920, nearly treble the figure for 1880. This number of passenger journeys 
would not be surpassed again until the year 2013.  
The increasing maturity of the railway was evident in ongoing consolidation within 
the industry. By 1906, 233 of the 351 companies that existed in 1881, had closed or 
been absorbed by larger rail organisations (Aldcroft, 1968, p. 8). The earlier actor-
networks of local railways are giving way to railway organisations that are enormous 
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enterprises, with vast operations in place to produce trains and deliver the railway 
service. For example, in 1875 the Midland Railway Company could produce trains at 
their site in Derby, which employed 2,000 men, had a sawmill, wagon-shop, 
carriage-shop, painting and trimming shop (Williams, 1883, pp. 364–365).  
The industry were already consolidating but the First World War produced a “form 
of quasi-nationalisation” (Murray, 2001, p. 4). The railways were to be “managed as 
a single system” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 9) under the unified control of a Railway 
Executive Committee (REC), consisting of the General Managers of the largest 
railway companies. This government body was set up in 1912 to act as an 
intermediary between the War Office and the various railway companies. On 4 
August 1914, “unified control was imposed by the Railway Executive Committee” 
(Grieves, 1989, p. 10) to ensure prioritisation of military traffic, to avoid duplication, 
and save resources. During World War One a new concept of the railways (loop 5, 
links and knots) meant that “utility replaced glamour” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 95) in how 
the railways were enacted. This concept meant a focus upon heavy train loads, a 
reduced speed limit of 60 mph, cleaning was abandoned, and maintenance reduced.  
The combination of industrial action, regulatory interventions over time, including 
an eight-hour working day, and government’s control of the railways during the First 
World War, meant that “Government intervention, once piecemeal and lukewarm, 
had penetrated all areas of managerial activity” (Gourvish, 1980, p. 54). By 1921, a 
combination of increased costs and Government’s refusal to allow charges to be 
raised, would lead to the first loss for the industry. This is illustrated using the fourth 
and final descriptive statistic to help tell this story. Figure 5.10 below shows railway 
income, expenses, and resulting profitability for the period 1853 to 1921.  
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Figure 5.10 Total (Freight and Passenger) receipts, expenses, and profitability 1853 – 1921.  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)) and my analysis 
The chart above shows the receipts of the railway, from both freight and passenger 
traffic, as a bar chart, with a gap during World War One. Income is shown above the 
line as a positive value, and it is growing over time. Expenses are shown as a 
negative value below the line, and they are also growing over time. The net-working 
receipts of the railway (income – expenses) is shown as the black solid line. In 1921, 
for the first time in its history, rail industry profitability moved negative – industry 
costs were greater than income from passenger and freight traffic. This is the total 
income for the railway, rather than individual lines, some of which were loss-
making, some profit-making. Profitability is shown here as an absolute value, 
however if it were shown as a percentage, then the railway’s profitability, from the 
1850s to the end of the 19th century, was in the 40-50% range i.e., income was 40-
50% greater than costs. This illustrated the large returns possible in the early growth 
stage and why railway mania took such a grip.  
The railway was vitally important to the nation and British Railways were still 
“generally considered the best in Europe, if not the world” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 7). 
However, the conditions were developing for a significant change. The railways’ 
deficit for 1919-20 was £41M (£2 billion at 2019 prices) and was estimated to 
become £54.5m the following year (Adams, 1993, p. 92). The growth of private 
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motor vehicles was also about to challenge the dominance of rail, with freight first to 
bear the brunt when soldiers returned from war and bought former military lorries 
that were released for use as private goods vehicles. Operating the railway as a single 
system during World War One, and the industry’s negative financial position, might 
have pointed towards nationalisation as the answer. Indeed, Winston Churchill gave 
a speech saying that “…it might pay the State to run railways at a loss to develop 
industries and agriculture” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 11). However, nationalisation was not 
chosen, instead the government White Paper (His Majesty’s Government, 1920) 
proposed a grouping of railway undertakings.  
Among other measures, the White Paper contained a proposal for Worker Directors 
on the Board of Management of the new grouped organisations: “the Government 
are of the opinion that the time has arrived when the workers – both officials and 
manual workers – should have some voice in management” (His Majesty’s 
Government, 1920, p. 2). Sir Eric Geddes, the first ever Minister of Transport, was 
said to have “personal enthusiasm for worker participation at Board level…to 
promote a fuller awareness in the workforce of the commercial implications of pay 
awards” (Grieves, 1989, p. 90). However, the companies viewed it as “unwarranted 
interference in the right of companies to choose a Board” (Grieves, 1989, p. 90). 
Railway trade unions were against minority representation, preferring state 
ownership, so the two groups jointly acted to “persuade the Government to drop the 
plan for worker directors” (Wolmar, 2007, p. 225) from the legislation. Competing 
conceptions (loop 5, links and knots) of railway organisations to deliver railways are 
playing out.  
The subsequent Railways Act of 1921, also known as the Grouping Act, sought to 
achieve a “reorganisation and more efficient and economical working of the railway 
system” (His Majesty’s Government, 1921, p. 1). This next era, between 1923 and 
1947, was the time of the Big Four, dominated by the four largest railway 
companies. The new conception of the railway (loop 5, links and knots), driven by 
legislation, was a work in progress.  
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5.2 The era of the Big Four 
In 1921 there were 214 separate railway companies (Fenelon, 1933, p. 383), of 
which 120 were to be amalgamated by the Railways Act into four groupings (His 
Majesty’s Government, 1921, p. 69, First Schedule): 
1. The Southern Group – known as the Southern Railway (SR) 
2. The Western Group – known as the Great Western Railway (GWR) 
3. The North Western, Midland, and West Scottish Group – known as the 
London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) 
4. The North Eastern, Eastern, and East Scottish Group – known as the 
London and North Eastern Railway (LNER) 
Table 9.2 in the appendix (page 315) sets out the list of 120 companies that made up 
the four groupings, including 27 larger railways identified as constituents, and 93 
smaller railways identified as subsidiary companies. Some railways, such as the 
Liverpool Overhead Railway, remained outside of the grouping, but the Big Four 
organisations accounted for 95% of total route mileage. The Act took effect on 1 
January 1923 and the period from 1923 to 1947 became known as the era of the Big 
Four. The earlier railways were a diverse mix that reflected the places in which they 
were located and operated. Industry consolidation was already changing this, but the 
railways now were being forcibly shaped by the Act with large and small railways 
combined.  
The LMS Railway was the largest of the Big Four by size of network and “was 
Britain’s largest commercial enterprise” (Johnson and Long, 1981, p. 3). It employed 
275,000 people, owned 10,000 steam locomotives, 20,000 passenger carriages, 
207,000 freight wagons and 9,000 horses (Wolmar, 2007, p. 232) across 7,331 route 
miles (11,798 km) between London, the North West of England and Glasgow in 
Scotland. LNER was the second largest, with 6,671 route miles (10,736 km) and 
control of the East Coast, including London to Edinburgh. The Southern Railway 
was the smallest with 2,115 route miles (3,403 km), but the largest operator of 
passenger services with busy commuter services to London. Although the Big Four 
were in private ownership, Government played a significant role in the production of 
the railway, through standardised wages, conditions, and other regulations. 
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The groupings were the most visible feature of the Railways Act, but its primary aim 
was the “quest for financial stability in the industry” (Grieves, 1989, p. 92) in 
response to the first ever industry loss in 1921. The rail network reflected this quest 
for stability, with new track growth relatively flat and reducing slightly after peaking 
in 1927, as illustrated by the updated chart showing the length of rail track in Figure 
5.11 below.  
 
Figure 5.11 Historical growth of the railway in Britain – the length of the railway (1830-1948). 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 541–542, table 5) and my analysis 
To recover from World War One the new railway went on a drive for greater 
efficiency, which led to consolidation and standardisation around train designs and 
practices within the profession (loop 2, autonomization). However, this 
standardisation was not necessarily about the ‘best’ designs wining out. The existing 
engines of smaller constituent companies within the groups, were scrapped in the 
first 10 years after grouping (Bonavia, 1980, p. 27). New orders were aligned with 
the views of dominant organisations within the groups and the smaller railways 
struggled to gain a voice relative to their larger peers. For example, the Western 
Group was dominated by the Great Western Railway Company with 4,836 km of 
route, compared to its largest fellow constituent company, the Cambrian Railway, 
which had 475 route km. The 26 smaller subsidiary companies within the Western 
Group had even smaller railways and less voice. The other three groupings did not 
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have one large organisation like the Western, instead they contained several large 
railway organisations (appendices, Table 9.2 on page 315) and these companies were 
not always natural partners, given their geographies and history. The Big Four 
organisations were “artificial constructs formed by legislation” (Wolmar, 2007, p. 
228). 
A new concept of trains and the railways (loop 5, links and knots) was being forged 
and developed within each of the groups. Each of the Big Four railway organisations 
were recognisably like each other, but there were also different conceptions of how 
railways and trains should be configured. Early railways were strongly influenced by 
local geography, whereas now differences were more likely to reflect the dominance 
of different organisations within the groups. An organisation with a large railway but 
a flat and urban terrain could have greater influence over the concept of how 
railways and trains should be configured, than a smaller railway with a hilly rural 
geography. Consolidation did not produce standardisation across the industry, with 
each of the Big Four maintaining their own ways of delivering a railway service and 
producing new trains (loop 5, links and knots). 
Although each of the Big Four operated mostly within their own geographies, there 
was a strong rivalry to claim technical leadership. Development of the railways and 
new trains was led by Chief Mechanical Engineers (loop 2, autonomisation) within 
each of the Big Four. During the Big Four era these engineers produced world-
leading designs and competed to reach ever higher speeds. The “publicity value” 
(Bonavia, 1980, p. 93) of this was fully exploited in supporting advertising 
campaigns (loop 4, public representation). This reached a peak on 3 July 1938, when 
the Mallard (see Figure 5.12 below) of LNER set a world speed record for steam of 
126 mph (202.8 km/h).  
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Figure 5.12 Gresley's 'A4' No. 4468 Mallard 
Source: (Holland, 2015, p. 197) 
Sir Nigel Gresley, who built The Mallard, was the Chief Mechanical Engineer 
(CME) for LNER Railway from 1923 to 1941. The Mallard weighed 240 tons in 
total (Holland, 2015, p. 197), which included six coaches and a dynamometer car to 
measure speed (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) and other variables, so that 
Mallard’s achievement could be validated and communicated around the world. The 
locomotive and its tender (for carrying coal) accounted for 165 tons of the total train 
weight. For comparison, Rocket and its tender car weighed about seven tons at 
Rainhill in 1829. Unfortunately, Mallard had to come off at Peterborough instead of 
continuing to London, because a bearing over-heated. However, a new concept of 
the railways (loop 5, links and knots) can be discerned in this Big Four battle for 
speed and technical dominance. This new concept saw the railways as technical 
and engineering masters, with the CMEs becoming household names and 
embodying this mastery. 
The early period of the Big Four included the financial crash of 1923, General Strike 
of 1926, and the Great Depression from 1929-1932. Despite these events, passenger 
numbers stabilised after the war, and the industry returned to profitability with a rail 
network that was slightly reduced in size. The earlier railway reached out and formed 
alliances (loop 3) with many industries and connected positively with the public 
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(loop 4) in many cities, towns, and villages. However, these loops that had 
strengthened the railway actor-network were beginning to weaken. A significant 
source of new competition to rail’s dominance was coming from the growth of the 
private motor car and goods vehicles.  
The growth of goods vehicles had begun after the first World War, when the 
government sold off large numbers of military vehicles. Many were bought by 
returning soldiers, trained to drive them during their service. Road hauliers were not 
subject to common carrier regulations, which dated from the 19th century legislation 
and the Railways and Canal Traffic Act (His Majesty’s Government, 1854). 
Common carrier regulations, established when the railways were effective 
monopolies, required them to carry any goods at nationally agreed rates. This 
legislation now allowed private goods hauliers to cherry pick profitable services, 
with the railways unable to act until these responsibilities were lifted many years 
later.  
Rail was still able to offer passengers a faster service than the private motor car 
because motorways did not appear until the 1960s, with the opening of the M1 on 2 
November 1959 (Merriman, 2007, p. 106). The level of comfort on the railway had 
improved significantly from the early days when passenger coaches were no more 
than open carts for third class passengers. Trains often had compartments with a 
much-improved level of comfort, even in 3rd class, as shown in Figure 5.13 below 
for a carriage that began operations during the Big Four era. 
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Figure 5.13 Third class comfort in a carriage operating c. 1930-1968 
Source: (Robertson, 2005, p. 22) 
Improving passenger comfort and other attributes was influencing train design, but 
so were passenger numbers and the requirements for extra capacity. In response to 
this Oliver Bulleid, Chief Mechanical Engineer (CME) of the Southern Railway, 
designed a double decker train (Figure 5.14 below), that could still fit within the rail 
network’s loading gauge to navigate tunnels and other infrastructure. These double 
deck trains were discontinued because passengers in the upper compartments could 
feel trapped, and the time taken to load, and unload trains, was significantly longer.  
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Figure 5.14 Double Decker train designed by Oliver Bulleid for the Southern Railway in 1949 
The Big Four era can be viewed as a period of technology mastery, with CMEs and 
organisations with long-established technical expertise in the production of steam-
powered trains. However, war would once again bring change to the railways and 
make it difficult to judge the success, or otherwise, of the Big Four companies.  
Figure 5.15 below shows that industry income from passenger and freight traffic (the 
2nd descriptive statistic used through this chapter) grew at an average of 2% per year 
between 1923 and 1948. The chart shows a significant spike during the Second 
World War, which most likely reflected use of the railway for war-time operations.  
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Figure 5.15 Historical growth of rail receipts for passenger and freight services in Britain (1842 – 1948) 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550, table 7) and my analysis 
Figure 5.15 (above) does show an increase in income during the Big Four era from 
1923 to 1948. However, the third descriptive statistic used in this chapter, which 
measures the number of passenger journeys, provides a different perspective on the 
changes underway in the railway. This statistic, measuring passenger journeys, is 
shown in Figure 5.16 below.  
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Figure 5.16 Historical growth of Rail Passenger Journeys in Britain (1830-1948)  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550, table 7) and my analysis 
This chart (Figure 5.16 above) shows the rapid growth in passenger journeys during 
the first phase of the railways, which peaks at 1.5 billion in 1920. When the Big Four 
Era began in 1923, there were 1.24 billion passenger journeys, but this had reduced 
to 700 million at the end of this period in 1948 – a reduction of over 2% each year. 
The reasons behind this are explored shortly.  
A key goal of the Grouping Act was to address industry losses and stabilise the 
industry through consolidation. The creation of the Big Four did initially achieve this 
with a return to profitability early on, as shown in Figure 5.17 below. However, by 
the end of this period we see profitability turning negative again in 1947, with 
expenses greater than income.  
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Figure 5.17 Total (Freight and Passenger) receipts, expenses and profitability 1853 – 1947.  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)) and my analysis 
World War Two undoubtedly played a major role in this financial outcome for the 
industry. Once again, railways were involved in war efforts. As happened prior to 
World War One, the Government appointed a Railway Executive Committee (REC) 
in 1938, consisting of the General Managers of the Big Four railways. The REC took 
control of the railways on 31 August 1939, supporting evacuation of people from 
cities, as well as the movement of troops and goods. The railways were to be 
“operated as a unified system” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 189), with the goal of reducing 
wasted mileage of freight and passenger traffic – a different conception (loop 5, 
links and knots) of what the railways are for is in operation. This is changing 
how railways and trains are configured and act.  
Locomotive workshops were freed up for war efforts, with a reduced level of new 
stock built. Freight only travelled with full loads to avoid waste. Rationing of 
passenger journeys did not take place, but it was actively discouraged with a famous 
slogan ‘Is Your Journey Really Necessary?’ (Bonavia, 1980, p. 191) and an 
uncomfortable experience for those who chose to travel. Passenger accommodation 
was increased by abolishing First Class in the London area, and removing seat rests 
to permit four-a-side seating in Third Class.  
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When the War ended there was a need for investment in the railways. However, the 
railway organisations were never compensated by the Government for the reduced 
maintenance and lack of investment in railway assets during the war years. A need 
for investment was also happening at a point when the age of steam was beginning to 
reach its end, with diesel and electric power improving. Rail was also facing 
increasing challenges from roads and the growth of the private motor vehicle.  
However, the era of the Big Four ended before the organisations were able to 
respond to these challenges. A General Election in July 1945 returned Clement 
Attlee’s Labour Government to power, with a commitment to nationalise the 
railways. A new concept of the railways (loop 5, links and knots) saw them as a 
single and unified railway as part of a wider transport system. This concept of 
the railways as a part of wider integrated transport was arguably related to the 
perceived success of the London Passenger Transport Board, responsible for 
coordinating rail, bus, and tram across the capital. 
The proposed changes to the railways, as part of a wider integrated transport system, 
were developed in a Transport Bill (His Majesty’s Government, 1946) introduced on 
28 November 1946, although there had been “virtually no contact between the civil 
servants engaged in drafting the Bill and the railways” (Bonavia, 1980, p. 199). The 
resulting 1947 Transport Act (His Majesty’s Government, 1947, p. 146) identified 
59 railway bodies, including the Big Four organisations, that were to be transferred 
to a newly created British Transport Commission (BTC). The period of rail 
nationalisation had begun.  
5.3 Nationalisation and British Rail 
The Transport Act of 1947 of Clement Attlee’s post-war Labour Government 
fundamentally reorganised Britain’s transport system, with a focus upon integration. 
The British Transport Commission (BTC) was accountable to the Ministry of 
Transport with responsibility to oversee railways, canals, and road freight transport. 
It was an enormous organisation, with an estimated 4% of the national labour force 
employed in BTC undertakings (Sloman, 1978, p. 33).  
The Railway Executive was created from each of the four main railways and traded 
under the name British Railways. Although the Railway Executive was a part of the 
BTC, it was the Transport Minister who appointed members of the Railway 
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Executive (Bonavia, 1971, p. 43), probably because of its size and importance. The 
Railway Executive was estimated to employ 632,00 staff, with 20,000 steam 
locomotives, 1.2 million freight wagons, 56,000 coaches and 7,000 horses (Wolmar, 
2007, p. 269). An early reorganisation moved some Big Four railway lines to the 
London Transport Executive (Johnson and Long, 1981, p. 29), and a diverse range of 
non-rail assets, including docks, hotels and canals, were moved to different 
Executives within the BTC.  
The BTC left the Railway Executive to manage the railways, but reserved certain 
powers for itself (Johnson and Long, 1981, p. 63), including research and 
development and the annual building programme for locomotives and rolling stock. 
This structure appears to recognise the expertise of the railway organisations and 
their staff (loop 2, autonomization), but with centralisation of these reserved matters 
to support the new concept of the railways (loop 5, links and knots) as part of an 
integrated transport system.  
The Railway Executive, within the BTC, was organised around six regional units: 
London Midland, Southern, Eastern, Western, North Eastern and Scottish. 
Implementation of national standards and practices met with resistance, because the 
new regional units were effectively formed from the Big Four. The Railway 
Executive had a difficult relationship with its regional units and with the BTC above 
it. The BTC considered that too much focus was given to internal railway questions 
of standardisation, and too little time looking at integration of rail with other 
transport modes and hubs. Two competing conceptions of the railways (loop 5, links 
and knots) were jostling for position. The BTC’s concept saw the railways as part of 
a nation-wide integrated transport service, whereas the Railway Executive’s concept 
focused upon integration of the previously separate rail networks into a single 
national rail network.  
In 1947 the Railway Executive appointed Robert Riddles as the first Chief 
Mechanical Engineer of British Railways. Riddles saw nationalisation as an 
opportunity to achieve technical standardisation that had been “sought on British 
Railways since the 1860’s” (Riddles, 1950, p. 678). Subsequently, the 1950s saw “a 
massive contribution to the unification of the railway systems of Britain” (Johnson 
and Long, 1981, p. 56). The first standardised designs of railway carriages began to 
be used c. 1954 (Robertson, 2005, p. 50), with Figure 5.18 below showing seats in 
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2+2 layout, with 3+2 also available for higher density services. The coaches were 
built with steel bodies, with the steel acting and contributing to a strong safety record 
during their service from 1951 to 1974.  
 
Figure 5.18 Mk1 design visible in above photo with seating in 2+2 format 
In a speech at the Institute of Mechanical Engineers (loop 2, autonomization) in 
1950, Riddles stated “there is a case for continuing the development of the steam 
engine along with the diesels and electrics for some time yet” (Riddles, 1950, p. 
681). This recognised the different attributes of trains powered by steam, diesel and 
electric, with steam often able to offer the most economical option given the industry 
knowledge (loop 2, autonomization) of this technology and its long history of 
development. On this basis Riddles continued to order steam locomotives on a large 
scale from 1948 to 1953 and also introduced “a series of new and efficient steam 
locomotives utilising interchangeable and standardised parts” (Holland, 2015, p. 
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227). However, this Indian Summer (Bonavia, 1980, p. 97) for steam would prove 
illusory.  
In the 1951 General Election, Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party came to 
power again. The new government viewed the 1947 Act, which created the BTC, 
Railway Executive and nationalised the Big Four, as an “abhorrent symbol of the 
triumph of public planning over private enterprise….[that] destroyed the 
individualism and boldness of the former Companies” (Johnson and Long, 1981, p. 
58). The concept of the railways as part of a centrally controlled and integrated 
transport system was rejected (loop 5, links and knots).  
The Government published a White Paper in May 1952, criticising the BTC and 
stating that “even if integration in the fullest sense were practicable, it would result 
in a huge unwieldy machine” (Her Majesty’s Government, 1952, p. 2) ill-suited to 
the demands of modern industry and life. The resulting Transport Act of 1953 (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 1953) allowed the railways more commercial freedom to 
adjust their pricing, and focused upon competition and decentralisation (loop 5, links 
and knots). The British Transport Commission survived for the moment, but the 
Railway Executive was abolished from 1 October 1953 and replaced by six Area 
Boards with responsibility for the railways in different parts of Britain. The Area 
Boards reported into the BTC, which retained control of certain reserved subjects, 
including standards for the design, manufacture, and maintenance of locomotives, 
carriages, and wagons.  
Recognising that investment had been missing from the railways since the War, the 
BTC was given significant investment as part of a Modernisation Plan (British 
Transport Commission, 1954). The Plan began in 1955 and, over 10-15 years, was 
intended to address the financial deficit and bring the railways up to modern 
standards. Investments included a large sum of £1.2 billion (£33 billion at 2019 
prices) to be spent upgrading track and signalling (£210m), replacing and improving 
passenger coach stock, improving stations (£285m), and modernising freight services 
and yards (£365m). Also included was £345m (£9.2 Bn at 2019 prices) so that steam 
was “replaced as a form of motive power” (British Transport Commission, 1954, p. 
6) with a stated desire to introduce electric or diesel traction quickly. The 
Modernisation Plan was acting to change the configuration of trains. This would 
mean the end of BR’s 19,000 steam locomotives. This included 12 new classes of 
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steam locomotive developed by Riddles in 1954 that reflected “the epitome of 
British steam locomotive design…but survived less than a decade” (Holland, 2015, 
p. 227), with some lasting only five years, despite a planned working life of 40 years. 
The earlier Big Four, with an emphasis upon technical leadership embodied in their 
famous engineers (loop 2, autonomization) had been replaced. A concept of railway 
modernisation had reconfigured the railways (loop 5, links and knots). With a lot of 
investment money behind it steam motive power was removed from the actor-
network of a train, apparently despite the analysis of the CME, who believed it could 
still play a role for some time (Riddles, 1950, p. 681). 
Although diesels were more expensive than their steam predecessors, they did have 
advantages. Diesels were cleaner, had lower maintenance and running costs, and had 
a larger operating range. However, the Modernisation Plan failed to take into account 
the “almost complete lack of expertise in building diesel locomotives in Britain” 
(Holland, 2015, p. 230) (loop 2, autonomization). For example, the North British 
Locomotive Company was founded in 1903 in Glasgow and became the largest 
locomotive manufacturer in Europe. However, “when it moved from steam to diesel 
production in the late 1950s…it went on to build some of the most unreliable 
locomotives ever ordered by BR” (Holland, 2015, p. 158). Despite the lack of 
industry capability, the British Transport Commission “hurriedly ordered nearly 
3,000 mainline diesel locomotives of various non-standard types even before 
prototype testing had been properly evaluated” (Holland, 2015, p. 234).  
By 1960 the earlier hope of the 1955 Modernisation Plan was replaced by a negative 
outlook. In response to a record industry loss of £67m, and the perceived failings of 
the Modernisation Plan, the Government calling for sweeping changes because of the 
grave financial plight facing the railways (Her Majesty’s Government, 1960). The 
British Transport Commission was viewed as too large and diverse to be managed as 
a single undertaking, with British Railways dominating activities owing to its size 
and complexity. The Government’s White Paper also noted frequent confusion 
within the BTC “judging between what is economically right and what is socially 
desirable” (Her Majesty’s Government, 1960, p. 4). A new concept of the railways 
(loop 5, links and knots) was developing. This new concept recognised a tension 
highlighted earlier in this chapter by the fish trader in Berwick c. 1890, who wanted 
their goods to be carried and did not care if the railways recovered their costs (loop 
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5, links and knots). We can see here a concept of the railways as a utility and social 
necessity that is jostling with other conceptions of the railway as an industry that 
covers its own costs.  
The resulting Transport Act (Her Majesty’s Government, 1962) dissolved the British 
Transport Commission. Separate Boards were created for parts of the BTC, 
including British Railways, London Transport, British Transport Docks, Inland 
Waterways, and others. The newly created British Railways Board reported to the 
Transport Minister and managed six Regional Railway Boards – Eastern, London 
Midland, North Eastern, Scottish, Southern, and Western. Matters reserved for the 
British Railways Board included the “design, procurement, allocation and overall 
control of rolling stock and ships” (Bonavia, 1971, p. 98), as well as pay 
negotiations, finance and investment. The Act stated that none of the Regional 
Railway Boards were to be “regarded as common carriers” (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1962, p. 45), thereby finally removing a requirement that had existed 
for rail since the 19th century.  
The Minister of Transport at the time was Ernest Marples MP, who had a 
background with a successful road construction company. In 1963, the Minister 
appointed Dr Richard Beeching as the first Chairman of the new British Railways 
Board. A different commercial concept of the railways (loop 5, links and knots) 
emerged under his leadership. This was described in The Reshaping of British 
Railways (British Railways Board, 1963), more commonly known as the Beeching 
report.  
This different concept of the railways (loop 5, links and knots) was based around its 
“specialised and exclusive route system” (British Railways Board, 1963, p. 57). , 
which was efficient for dense flows of well-loaded trains. This meant that many 
lesser used lines and stations, which did not fit this concept, were to be closed. They 
did not fit the new concept (loop 5, links and knots) and so they were effectively no 
longer railways, despite their track, stations, signals and more. The report 
recommended the closure of more than 2,300 stations (one third of the total at the 
time) and 6,000 miles of route. This resulted in the loss of approximately 70,000 jobs 
in British Railways over several years. The changes had a drastic impact, as can be 
seen in Figure 5.19 below, which shows the first descriptive statistic used in this 
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chapter – the length of the physical railway. The chart updates the values to the 
present day.  
 
Figure 5.19 Historical growth of the railway in Britain – the length of the railway (1830-2016) 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 541–542 (table 5); Office of Rail Regulation, 2017 Table 2.52) and my 
analysis 
The extent of railway infrastructure had already reduced before 1963, however the 
effect of the Beeching Report and its new concept of the railways was drastic. By 
1970 the railway was approximately 19,000 km – the size of the network in the year 
1866 during railway mania. Further small reductions continued after this period, but 
never to the same degree, with the figure for 2016 showing the UK network as 
15,811km, similar in size to the network in 1862.  
A key objective of the Beeching reports was to address the £67M loss made by the 
railways in 1960. Some of the smaller lines were undoubtedly unprofitable, but cost 
savings made minimal impact, even if there were a lot of them. By 1970 the railway 
was still making a loss, although this had reduced to £22M, as shown by the black 
line in Figure 5.20 below.  
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Figure 5.20 Total (Freight and Passenger) Working Receipts, Expenses and Net Working Receipts 1853-1970 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)) and my analysis 
Dr Beeching delivered a follow-up report (British Railways Board, 1965) focused 
upon the central trunk routes, that identified 3,000 miles (4,800 km) of the 7,500 
mile (12,100 km) trunk railway for investment. This second report regretted that the 
public focus had been upon the abandonment of the unsound parts of our railway 
system and sought to draw attention to the “constructive proposals for the 
development of a new railway out of the old one” (British Railways Board, 1965, p. 
5). However, it is not possible to say if these additional changes would have been 
successful, because Harold Wilson’s Labour Government came to power in 1964. Dr 
Beeching’s proposals were rejected, and his time as the first Chair of the British 
Railways Board finished in 1965. 
The new Minister for Transport, Barbara Castle, formed a Steering Group, set up 
with staff from government and the British Railways Board – bringing together 
industry expertise (loop 2, autonomization) and Government (loop 3, alliances) as 
often happened in the early days of the railway, although Government was more 
actively involved now. The subsequent report recognised that, although some 
railway services had little chance of paying their way economically, their “value to 
the community outweighs their accounting cost” (Ministry of Transport, 1967, p. 1). 
The social and economic benefits to the country of a substantial railway system were 
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recognised and a new concept of the railway was developing (loop 5, links and 
knots).  
The resulting Transport Act (Her Majesty’s Government, 1968) introduced the 
“recognition in statute of the separate social and commercial roles of the railway 
[emphasis added]” (Johnson and Long, 1981, p. 78). The Minister was to take 
responsibility for approving specific grants to support “unremunerative passenger 
services” (Her Majesty’s Government, 1968, p. 58), in light of the social and 
economic benefits of those services. British Rail became the first of the nationalised 
industries to have “its social obligations identified and priced separately” (Gourvish 
and Anson, 2002, p. 50), with grants approved by the Minister. The Act also sought 
to bring back some of the previous Labour Government’s desire for rail and bus 
integration, albeit at a local level, rather than managed nationally. Passenger 
Transport Authorities were created, initially for Merseyside, West Midlands, 
Tyneside, and Greater Manchester, to provide more localised decision-making. The 
1968 Transport Act also saw a need for further reductions across the network, with 
cuts identified to take it from 13,200 miles (21,243 km) to 11,000 miles (17,703 km), 
but the drastic reductions of previous times were stopped. By 1968, some 20 years 
since nationalisation, staff numbers had “dropped from over 640,000 to 296,000 and 
20,000 steam locomotives had been replaced by diesel or electric traction” (Johnson 
and Long, 1981, p. 79), with similar scale of reductions at freight terminals, yards, 
and stations. A lot of change in the configuration of railways, but more was to come.  
The 1970 General Election returned a Conservative Government under Edward 
Heath. During this period, the UK joined the European Community and a global oil 
and energy crisis occurred. The Labour government of Harold Wilson took power 
from 1974, with industrial relations becoming a critical issue, and railway unions 
playing a full part in “labour assertiveness” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 6). The 
Labour Government introduced the Railways Act of 1974 (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1974), which included, among other measures, a “block grant system 
covering the passenger network as a whole” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 12). 
Instead of specific grants to support specific unremunerative services, this approach 
was replaced by a block grant provided to cover BR’s continued losses. This block 
grant, known as the Public Service Obligation (PSO), reflected a concept of the 
Chapter 5. Historical Analysis of the Railways using ANT  
Page 155 
railways as a whole network, including specific services that needed economic 
support (loop 5, links and knots).  
The relationship between Government and the nationalised industries was fraught. A 
lack of trust existed between the railways and Government (loop 3, alliances) 
(National Economic Development Office, 1976, p. 8), with the perception of a 
perpetual audit process (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 44). The role of the railways 
in Government Transport Policy remained unclear, with no system for reaching 
agreement on long term objectives and strategy, and no effective system for 
measuring performance. The 1968 and 1974 Railway Acts may have recognised the 
social and economic value of the railways, but a report by the British Railways 
Board found “little account of social and environmental factors” (1976, p. 10) in 
decision-making, apart from vague requests to “’help energy conservation’, ‘get 
traffic off the roads’ or ‘help preserve the environment’” (British Railways Board, 
1976, p. 23).  
A Government White Paper (Her Majesty’s Government, 1978, p. 10) recognised the 
need for clarification of the responsibilities of Government and the railways. 
However, by 1980 the industry was £677M in the red (Figure 5.21 below), with 
expenses having grown significantly faster than income.  
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Figure 5.21 Total (Freight and Passenger) Working Receipts, Expenses and Net Working Receipts 1853-1980 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)) and my own analysis 
The 1980s would be the decade of privatisations – telecommunications (1984), gas 
(1986), water (1989), and electricity (1990) – and British Rail would not be immune. 
The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher was elected in the 1979 
General Election with a focus upon reducing the size of the public sector and 
growing free enterprise. The British Railways Board (BRB) “wanted privatisation to 
involve the attraction of private capital” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 232), with 
the public sector gaining capital for investment, but retaining an ownership stake. 
The Government’s main desire was to reduce spending and the size of the public 
sector.  
A railway privatisation process began that would span the next two decades. First 
was the sale of subsidiaries outside core railway activities. Between 1980 and 1990 
assets were sold that generated £1.4Bn income for British Rail (Gourvish and Anson, 
2002, p. 254), with the bulk (£1.2Bn) coming from the sale of non-operational BR 
property and land. Also included in the sale were various activities that had accrued 
to the railways over time, such as British Transport Hotels, BR Hovercraft, 
Superbreak holidays, Hoverspeed UK, Sealink, British Transport Advertising and 
Travellers Fare. A claim was made that that these businesses were “languishing in a 
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public sector industry” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 253) dominated by the core 
activity of railways.  
Competitive tendering for the railways’ rolling stock requirements began in 1983. 
Over the following four years (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 243) the private sector 
obtained orders of £380M out of a total of £720M for passenger vehicles, and £45M 
out of £100M for freight vehicles. Another precedent was set within freight when 
Foster Yeoman, a large quarrying business, introduced its own diesel locomotives 
from General Motors in 1986. By 1987/8 31% of the railway freight wagon fleet was 
privately owned, and a year later the proportion was close to 50%, producing 
“privatisation in essence, even if no transfer of ownership was involved” (Gourvish 
and Anson, 2002, p. 243).  
British Rail Engineering Limited (BREL) designed and built rolling stock for BR, 
however, a government report noted that British Rail was “the only major railway in 
the world, other than that in India, which manufactures its own stock” (Department 
for Transport, 1982, p. 37). In October 1987 the end came to 140 years (Gourvish 
and Anson, 2002, p. 245) of British Railways building the rolling stock that they also 
operated. By 1989 BREL was sold to a consortium involving former management 
and large engineering organisations. It would eventually become part of Bombardier 
Transportation.  
On 12 December 1988 problems with the railways were brought to the fore, when a 
major crash at Clapham Junction killed 35, and injured 484. BR accepted the blame, 
which was “the result of faulty wiring in an electrical box following poor 
maintenance by a signalling engineer” (Wolmar, 2007, p. 297). Safety concerns 
featured prominently in the national press (loop 4, public representation). The 
purpose of the railways and how they should be organised was up for national debate 
(loop 5, links and knots). British Rail was viewed as too large, especially when 
compared to perceptions of an earlier golden age of railways.  
The options considered for privatisation were “selling BR as a whole (unitary); 
selling by business sector; selling by region; and separating BR into track and 
operating companies” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 384). An influence upon this 
process came from a European Union (EU) directive (91/440/EC) that recognised 
“greater integration of the Community transport sector is an essential element of the 
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internal market” (European Union, 1991, p. 1). This concept of the railways saw 
them as part of an integrated transport system to support the European Community 
(loop 5, links and knots). The EU directive required separate accounting of rail 
infrastructure and rail services (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 262), but this could be 
an administrative and reporting exercise, and did not necessarily mean separate 
ownership and organisational structures.  
On 9 April 1992, a General Election saw an unexpected win for the Conservative 
party, led by John Major, who had promised to “end British Rail's monopoly…and 
restore the pride and local commitment that died with nationalisation” (Conservative 
Party, 1992, pp. 14 & 44). The latest era of the railways was beginning with 
privatisation of the core railway services. The actor-network of resources that act as 
a railway was still recognisable when compared even with the Liverpool & 
Manchester Railway of 1830, but the concept of the railways (loop 5, links and 
knots) holding this diverse collection of resources together was about to go through a 
change that had never been seen to this extent – the separation of wheel and rail.  
A privatised industry structure was about to separate the ownership and management 
of the track and other infrastructure, from the ownership and operation of the trains 
and railway services that operate on the infrastructure. This structure would still act 
as a railway, but with a radical reconfiguration of resources and relationships. 
5.4 Privatisation  
As the details of privatisation were finalised, British Rail managers had a “strong 
preference for vertically integrated franchises” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 394), 
with track and trains under the control of the same organisation for an area or sector 
– a geographically integrated concept of the railways (loop 5, links and knots) 
similar to the Big Four era. Vertical integration appeared to be an essential feature of 
railways across the world (Wellings, 2014, p. 257), whether they had developed in 
the public or private sector. Japanese National Railways was privatised in 1987 and 
had maintained vertical integration, with a breakup into six regional passenger 
companies, and one freight company.  
The alternative to vertical integration was to separate ownership of the infrastructure, 
from the operations that run on that infrastructure. Sweden had chosen this approach 
in 1988, but the two companies that were created remained publicly controlled with 
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minimal on-rail competition. Vertical separation of infrastructure and operations had 
been applied in other UK privatisations (gas, telecommunications, water) “on the 
grounds that the grid or infrastructure was a natural monopoly” (Wellings, 2014, p. 
257). The national electricity grid, for example, could be managed as a separate 
whole, whereas the operations using that infrastructure could be more easily broken 
up. In making the decision, it was said that the Prime Minister, John Major, was also 
“influenced by the fact that the safest transport industry in the country was also the 
most fragmented: namely Civil Aviation” (Wolmar, 2017, p. 69). A new concept of 
the railways (loop 5, links and knots) was apparently being informed by a chain of 
translation (Latour, 1999, p. 92), creating equivalence, to some degree, between 
trains and planes, trains and water, and trains and gas. Vertical separation was to be 
implemented in the UK, with private sector organisations operating franchised 
services for different routes and geographies, and a rail infrastructure manager, 
Railtrack, that was initially within the public sector. During the 19th and early 20th 
century a train from one operator would sometimes run on the infrastructure of 
another organisation, but, as a permanent way of organising the railways, this had 
never been seen before.  
In July 1992 a Government White Paper (Department for Transport, 1992) set out 
how British Rail was to be privatised and broken into its component parts, with 
contractual agreements to manage the resulting commercial and operating 
relationships. A Bill was “drafted and passed while policy was still evolving” 
(Welsby and Nichols, 1999, p. 61). The Railways Act of 1993 (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 1993) led to the restructuring of BR “into 90 to 100 companies” 
(Welsby and Nichols, 1999, p. 61) in preparation for subsequent privatisation. I will 
describe this new concept of the railway (loop 5, links and knots) as functional 
specialism with contractual and regulatory integration.  
A nationalised infrastructure provider, Railtrack, was responsible for managing the 
track, stations, and other parts of the railway network. A newly created Regulator 
was to monitor Railtrack’s costs and outputs, using various metrics to measure the 
state of bridges, the renewal of track, and more (loop 1, mobilisation of the world). 
However, regulation would still face the “perennial problems…of reconciling public 
service objectives, particularly for passengers, with commercial ones” (Gourvish and 
Anson, 2002, p. 422).  
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BR’s train operations were moved into the private sector in the form of 25 passenger 
franchises, or train operating companies (TOCs), and three freight operating 
companies (FOCs). The franchisee would own few assets – leasing rolling stock 
from rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) and paying charges to operate on 
Railtrack infrastructure. In 1995 the first two passenger franchises were awarded 
and, by March 1997, all 25 had been let. A Franchising Authority (the Office of 
Passenger Rail Franchising) would oversee the franchise process and monitor 
franchisees. 
Three rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) would own the bulk of BR’s 
rolling stock and lease it to TOCs. The need for ROSCOs was driven by the 
Government’s initial desire for short-term rail operating franchises of 5-7 years, 
whereas rolling stock has a life of 25-40 years. The ROSCOs were there to provide 
longer-term asset management of the trains, and to reduce the capital investment 
requirements for operating franchise bidders, who only had to meet the annual 
leasing requirements. In April 1993 the Government announced that British Rail’s 
“entire fleet of 11,000 vehicles” (Gourvish and Anson, 2002, p. 420) was to be 
transferred to three newly created ROSCOs – Angel Trains, Eversholt Leasing, and 
Porterbrook Leasing.  
By 1994 it was decided that Railtrack would also be privatised, and it was listed on 
the London Stock exchange in May 1996. The Government had a “desire to 
complete the privatisation prior to the 1997 General Election” (Butcher, 2010, p. 14).  
The General Election of May 1997 saw the victory of Tony Blair’s Labour Party. 
Labour talked about integrated transport, although “what exactly ‘integration’ meant 
was never really made clear” (Docherty, 2003, p. 13). Alternatives to the privatised 
industry structure were investigated, but radical change would involve large sums of 
government money, at a time when the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was seeking to 
demonstrate prudence. Simplification was a recurring theme from commentators 
outside of Government (Shaw and Farrington, 2003, p. 128), with Labour 
encouraged to reduce the number of franchises, reduce maintenance complexity, and 
more.  
On 19 September 1997, the new government was compelled to focus more upon the 
railways, when a Great Western InterCity-125 passenger service failed to stop at a 
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red signal and hit an EWS freight train at Southall in West London, killing seven 
passengers and injuring 139. Driver error and failed onboard train control systems 
(both part of the collection of resources that acts as a train) brought safety concerns 
to the fore of public attention (loop 4, public representation). In response, the 
Government established a “Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) for Great Britain, to 
provide a clear, coherent and strategic programme for the development of our 
railways” (Department for Transport, Local Government and Regions, 1998, p. 37). 
Before the SRA was legally established, another serious accident happened at 
Ladbroke Grove in West London on 5 October 1999. A Thames Train passed a red 
signal and crashed into a First Great Western High Speed Train, with 31 people 
killed. The prime cause was identified as human error but it “raised general issues 
relating to the governance of the privatised railway” (Gourvish, 2008, p. 55). Before 
the repercussions could be fully understood this accident was unfortunately followed 
by another. On 17 October 2000 at Hatfield on the East Coast mainline north of 
London, a broken rail caused a GNER train to derail, when travelling from King’s 
Cross to Leeds – killing four passengers and injuring 70 more. Responsibility was 
attributed to Railtrack and its maintenance contractor, Balfour Beatty Maintenance. 
Railtrack’s response saw the railway nearly shut down, with speed limits and line 
closures imposed across the network and an “expensive maintenance binge” 
(Gourvish, 2008, p. 73). In the privatised concept of the railway (loop 5, links and 
knots) different organisations are responsible for various parts of the action. In this 
case, responsibility for the failure has been directed to Railtrack and Balfour Beatty, 
although proponents for a nationalised railway pointed at the privatised structure 
itself (loop 5, links and knots).  
As part of the response to this failure, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) was given 
legal status by the Transport Act 2000 (Her Majesty’s Government, 2000), effective 
from 1 February 2001. The Franchising Regulator, OPRAF, was abolished by the 
same Act and its responsibilities given to the SRA. On 7 June 2001, a General 
Election returned a Labour government for a second term. Railtrack lobbied the 
Regulator and Government for additional funds for maintenance and renewals work. 
The Government was not willing to provide additional financial support to Railtrack 
and so Stephen Byers, the new Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government, 
and the Regions, placed Railtrack into railway administration on 7 October 2001. A 
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new company, Network Rail (NR), was created to buy Railtrack plc on 3 October 
2002.  
Network Rail stated that it would require more than £6 billion per year funding – 
almost double the provision agreed by the earlier regulatory review of 2000 – but 
this posed a threat to public expenditure levels. In response, a Government White 
Paper (Department for Transport, 2004) and subsequent Railways Act (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 2005) implemented further changes to the control and 
management of the railways. Safety regulation moved from the Health and Safety 
Executive to the Office of Rail Regulation. The Strategic Rail Authority was to be 
closed, with Network Rail given a leadership role for the industry.  
The SRA was gone, but during its brief time (c. 2000 – 2006) it had brought a central 
“directing mind” (Gourvish, 2008, p. 280) to the railway. Its legacy was visible in a 
new funding process, whereby government was required to define more explicitly 
what it expected from rail in return for the funds made available. This clarification of 
Government’s expectations reflects the concept of the railways (loop 5, links and 
knots) and effectively asks “what are the railways for?” (Shaw and Farrington, 2003, 
p. 130). 
Further changes in the configuration of resources that act as a railway occurred 
when, in October 2003, Network Rail was approved to bring infrastructure 
maintenance back in-house, based upon a view that this failure was a key contributor 
to accidents. From 2014 Network Rail was “reclassified from the private sector to 
the central government sector in the UK national accounts” (Office of Rail and Road, 
2017, p. 45). Network Rail is an arms-length body of the Department for Transport 
(DfT) and recognised in government debt finances.  
The descriptive statistics used throughout this chapter provide insight into the current 
railway compared to earlier times. Figure 5.22 below shows the number of passenger 
journeys on the railway. In 2018, a record 1.76 billion passenger journeys were made 
– the highest level of usage ever in the history of the railways.  
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Figure 5.22 Historical growth of Rail Passenger Journeys in Britain (1830-2018)  
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 545–550 (table 7)), Office of Rail and Road (ORR) Table 12.5 (Passenger 
journeys by year) and my analysis 
However, this increase in passenger usage has been achieved with higher levels of 
government support than was provided during the days of British Rail, as shown in 
Figure 5.23 below.  
 
Figure 5.23 Government support to the rail industry in real terms, Great Britain, 1985-86 to 2018-19 
Source: Rail Finance 2018-19 Annual Statistical Release (Office of Rail and Road, 2019a) 
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It was not possible to obtain data to update the descriptive statistic for railway 
income, expenses, and profits. However, Figure 5.23 above shows government 
support to the rail industry since 1985. The spike in government support is clear after 
the accidents that led to the demise of Railtrack and the introduction of Network 
Rail. In 2018-19, total subsidy to the industry was £7.1 bn. By comparison, 
Government support to the railway in 1994-95, during the last days of British Rail, 
was £1.5Bn (Parliament. House of Commons Papers, 1995, p. ix Table 1), which is 
equal to £3.0bn at 2019 prices. In 2019 the privatised railway received more subsidy 
than the former nationalised railway under BR.  
The record usage of the railway by passengers, shown above in Figure 5.22, has 
taken place on a smaller network than the previous record number of passenger 
journeys, achieved in 1920. The rail network today is approximately 15,800 km in 
track length, whereas in 1927 it reached a maximum of 32,850 km, as shown in 
previous charts (Figure 5.5, Figure 5.11, and Figure 5.19). The implications of 
record usage and a reduced network can be explored by combining the descriptive 
statistics for passenger journeys and length of the network together. Figure 5.24 
below shows the resulting number of passenger journey per track km.  
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Figure 5.24 Historical Passenger Journeys per track km (1830-2018) 
Source: based on (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 541–542, 545–550 (table 5, table 7)), Office of Rail and Road (ORR) Table 
12.5 (Passenger journeys by year); Office of Rail Regulation, 2017 Table 2.52) and my analysis 
Figure 5.24 above shows that the era of privatisation is associated with a much 
greater intensity of use of the railway, as measured by the record number of 
passenger journeys taking place on the same extent of physical network. Capacity 
and crowding are significant issues for the modern railway, but they are not the only 
ones.  
In 2018 the Conservative Government commissioned the Williams Rail Review to 
look at the structure of the whole rail industry and the way passenger rail services are 
delivered. At the time there was increasing public support for re-nationalisation, 
although some argue that the current privatised railway has “even greater state 
control than at any time since the days of the British Transport Commission 
following nationalisation in 1948” (Modern Railways, 2017, p. 6). Network Rail and 
DfT are dominant actors in the industry, and both are public sector organisations. 
The new CEO of Network Rail, Andrew Haines, appointed in August 2018 has 
significant experience of the operational side of the railway (loop 2, autonomization) 
and has called for a more joined-up industry (loop 5, links and knots), with 
integrated performance targets (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) for Network Rail 
and the Operators.  
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The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 impacted the railways significantly and has led to 
even greater government intervention and control. The future structure of the rail 
industry is expected to undergo further changes. 
5.5 Summary of the historical analysis of the railways 
When viewed through the lens of Actor-Network Theory the railways bring together 
a variety of resources, including trains, that collectively act. The five-loop model 
(Figure 5.1) encourages a broad view of action, with resources drawn from within 
the railway industry and beyond. Holding this collection of resources together is a 
concept of the railway (loop 5, links and knots) that has changed over time. This 
concept of what the railway is, and what it is for, will influence the type of trains 
produced.  
The earliest concept was characterised as a multiplicity of local railways, reflecting 
the individual and bespoke nature of these hyper-local railways tightly coupled with 
their specific circumstances and geographies. For example, a railway in a hilly area 
may act using gravity, horses, or people to provide motive power.  
As the railway matured, a new concept of mass transit began to develop. 
Gladstone’s Act of 1844 required the provision of certain levels of service for third 
class passengers. Early begrudging responses by railway organisations were given 
impetus in 1872 when the Midland Railway went above and beyond what was 
required, and third-class railway income became increasingly important. 
The increasing success and importance of the railways led to new conceptions 
towards the end of the 19th Century. The railways had become integral to so many 
other social activities that access became a necessity – effectively the railways had 
become an essential service for many and not a discretionary one. This was most 
clearly articulated by the fish trader in Berwick who wanted his fish to be carried but 
did not care whether this was economical for the railways.  
During World War One the concept of the railways was based upon support for the 
war effort. Resources cannot be wasted, service is reduced to a bare minimum, and 
the railway is focused upon maximising the efficient movement of goods and 
people.  
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After World War One, recovery is important and efficiency efforts focus upon 
consolidation of the industry and standardisation of practices within each of the Big 
Four. However, this consolidation also introduces a rivalry and competition for 
technical leadership, most clearly visible in the quest for speed. This concept could 
be described as consolidation and optimisation, with the Big Four and their Chief 
Mechanical Engineers demonstrating their ability to optimise the performance of 
steam locomotives, as the end of the steam age approaches.  
World War Two sees a return to the railways run in support of the war effort. The 
post-war period introduces a new concept of the railways as a part of a nationally 
integrated transport system. However, there was a tension between this multi-
modal view of integrated transport and the newly nationalised railway’s concept, 
which focused upon the creation of a national rail network that unified the 
previously separate Big Four railways.  
A new government came to power with a perception that the earlier boldness of the 
railways was lost within the British Transport Commission and its desire for 
centrally managed transport integration. The new concept that developed could be 
described as local empowerment within a nationalised railway. The railways 
remained in public control, but they were removed from the requirement for 
integrated transport, as embodied in the British Transport Commission. The British 
Railways Board managed six Area Boards with responsibility for the railways across 
the regions. 
Significant investment, in the form of the Modernisation Plan, was provided 
reinvigorate the railways. Robert Riddles, the CME of BR, had intended for steam 
locomotives to continue to play an active role in the railways, but the Modernisation 
Plan effectively acted to remove steam power from the resources that act as a train 
within the railways. The concept of the railways at this time could be described as 
centralised funding and technological decision-making, to reflect the provision of 
significant funds, but with decisions regarding how those funds should be spent, 
apparently, centrally directed towards diesel and electric.  
Problems with new diesel engines contributed to perceived failings of the 
Modernisation Plan and alternative conceptions of the railways developed. The 
Beeching era saw the railways as a transport provider of specialist infrastructure, 
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with a focus upon core routes where this costly specialised infrastructure was of 
most use compared to other transport alternatives. Parts of the railway that did not fit 
this concept were closed and no longer act as railways, as the network is drastically 
reduced.  
Probably as a reaction to this, a new concept of the railway developed after the 
Beeching cuts. This recognised the importance of the social railway, which brought 
additional benefits that could be lost with a narrow economic view. The Government 
provided economic support for the railway’s uneconomic services that provided 
social benefits.  
The era of privatisation in Britain introduced competing concepts driven by the 
privatisation of other nationalised industries in water, gas and telecoms, and aviation. 
Privatisation meant that BR was to be “vertically separated” (Shaw and Farrington, 
2003, p. 110) with specialist organisations responsible for components of the 
previously vertically integrated activities. This new concept could be described as 
functional specialisation with contractual integration.  
The next chapter investigates recent strategic decisions that have produced 
lightweight trains for the Thameslink and Crossrail railways. These strategic 
decisions are taking place within a concept of the railways that could arguably be 
slightly modified from its predecessor. I will describe the current concept of the 
railway as industry-led integration within the functionally specialised and 
contractual railway. This is admittedly a bit of a mouthful! This new concept is still 
influenced by the industry structure, with its vertical disaggregation and 
specialisation – separation of wheel and rail – but there is a noticeable desire for 
more integration and joining up within the railway. The public sector infrastructure 
owner, Network Rail, is a dominant organisation now led by a CEO who has spent 
many years in the operational side of the industry. Contractual incentives continue to 
act and influence behaviour in this actor-network, but there is greater awareness of 
these pressures and, I believe, a greater desire to overcome these pressures and 
deliver the promise. 
The current railway has produced record levels of passenger journeys (Figure 5.22, 
page 163), but this has taken place on a busy network (Figure 5.24). The COVID-19 
pandemic has threatened the viability of densely packed public transport. The role of 
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the railways in UK transport are still worthy of debate (Shaw and Farrington, 2003, 
p. 131). Whether a debate takes place or not, there should be no doubt that there will 
be further changes to the concept of the railways, as has happened through the 
history of the railways.  
This chapter has demonstrated that trains and railways can be produced and 
configured in many ways, with different attributes associated with different 
collections of resources. Some actor-networks that act as trains will have 
attributes of excess weight, but this is not an inevitability.  
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6 Analysis of the Procurement of New Trains using 
ANT 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 found supporting evidence that UK trains have 
been getting heavier over time, as measured by kg per seat. This is the second of two 
chapters applying Actor-Network Theory to understand the configuration of trains, 
some of which will have an attribute of excess weight. This chapter focuses upon 
two recent strategic decisions that have produced new trains for Thameslink and 
Crossrail. Chapter 4 found that the most recent (tranche four) suburban EMUs, 
which included the Thameslink Class 700 and Crossrail Class 345, were lighter in 
weight than their predecessors, albeit with fewer seats available. The strategic 
decisions for Thameslink and Crossrail have produced trains recognised as a 
“considerable achievement” (Ford, 2018a, p. 33) in lightweight design.  
Chapter 3 explained why these strategic decisions were chosen as a focus for this 
chapter. Both strategic decisions have completed all steps in the process described in 
Chapter 2. The Class 700 and Class 345 are realised trains providing a service on the 
Thameslink and Crossrail networks, respectively. These realised trains were 
translated from earlier propositions of trains, which were articulated within the 
Thameslink and Crossrail procurements. In Chapter 2 this strategic decision, 
including the procurement activity, occurs within a ‘place’ that was described 
metaphorically as a decision-laboratory. In this place, propositions of trains are 
articulated, with the most articulate proposition selected to become a realised train. 
Therefore, the outcomes of these two strategic decisions can be assessed, in terms of 
the attributes of the realised trains that are central to this research i.e., the weight per 
seat of the trains.  
To understand how trains are produced, this chapter will investigate the 
procurements – the decision-laboratories – of Thameslink and Crossrail using the 
theoretical model of five circulating loops (Figure 2.2) first introduced and explored 
in Chapter 2. This model helps to understand the actor-networks – the collection of 
resources – involved in the production of propositions of new trains within the 
decision-laboratory.  
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The analysis in Chapter 5 used ANT to demonstrate that different concepts of the 
railway (loop 5, links and knots at the centre of Figure 2.2) have existed over time. 
This 5th loop acts “like a central knot” (Latour, 1999, p. 100) holding together 
different networks of resources. The early railways could include trains using horses 
for power, with carriages hauled on wooden rails of varying width (gauge). The new 
trains for Thameslink and Crossrail have both been produced during the era of 
privatisation and this will influence the concept of the railways and how trains act. 
However, Chapter 5 tells us that concepts are not static and there are many ways to 
configure railways and trains. Different collections of resources can all act as trains, 
but with different attributes. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses upon the procurements for Thameslink and 
Crossrail, with the same format adopted in each case. This begins with a brief 
introduction to the rail network, followed by a summary of the main events and dates 
regarding the strategic decision to produce new trains. After this there is analysis of 
the realised trains that have been produced by the two strategic decisions i.e., the 
Class 700 and Class 345. This analysis used the same approach as Chapter 4 for 
these specific trains and the trains that they replace. For example, the Class 700 
trains replaced 30-year-old Class 319 trains on the Thameslink route, and so a direct 
comparison is made to understand if weight has increased. ANT analysis is then 
applied to each procurement – each decision-laboratory – to understand how the 
propositions of trains were produced and how one proposition was selected as a 
winner to be translated (to become) the Class 700 and Class 345 realised trains. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this analysis used secondary data sources to investigate the 
procurement processes and other aspects associated with these strategic decisions.  
In summary, the analysis investigated how propositions were developed, and how 
the propositions of Siemens and Bombardier were selected as the most articulate 
propositions in each procurement. If we want trains to be lightweight, then the Class 
700 and Class 345 trains provide good evidence that we can achieve this. Our 
decision-laboratories are the places where we experiment and assemble the trains 
that we want. This chapter investigates these important places.  
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6.1 Thameslink and the Class 700s 
The procurement of new trains for Thameslink was part of a larger programme to 
upgrade and expand this part of the UK rail network, forming part of London's north-
south commuter network. A schematic of the Thameslink network is show in Figure 
6.1 below.  
 
Figure 6.1 Thameslink route diagram 
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A summary of the dates and key events in the Thameslink Rolling Stock 
procurement are given in Table 6.1 below. This table provides an overview before 
subsequent analysis investigating these activities in detail.  
Table 6.1 Key events in Thameslink rolling stock procurement 
Year Event 
2008 
• 9 April 2008: issue of pre-qualification OJEU Notice (Official 
Journal of the European Union). 
• November 2008: Government issues Invitation to Tender to 
accredited respondents 
2009 • June 2009: Bids received from Siemens, Bombardier, and Alstom 
2010 
• 6 May 2010: General Election 
• June 2010: Spending review. Thameslink paused 
• November 2010: Thameslink programme reconfirmed 
2011 • June 2011: Siemens announced as preferred bidder 
2013 • June 2013: Contract awarded to Siemens  
2016 • February 2016: First train in service 
2018 • June 2018: All trains in service 
 
6.1.1 The realised trains: the outcome of the strategic decision 
The introduction of the new Class 700 trains saw six different classes of trains 
replaced or moved elsewhere. Of these six different classes, there is one  – the class 
319 – that is specifically mentioned in the Thameslink Invitation to Tender document 
(Department for Transport, 2008b, p. 52) provided by the Department for Transport 
(DfT) to bidders. Class 319s are 30 years old and are either being retired or cascaded 
to other parts of the network. For example, Class 319/3 trains were transferred to 
Northern Rail for newly-electrified lines in the North West of England. The Class 
319 is used here to provide a comparison between old and new. Pictures of the 
Chapter 6. Analysis of the Procurement of New Trains using ANT 
Page 174 
exterior and interior of the Class 700 and Class 319 trains are shown below. A visual 
representation (Figure 6.6) of the Class 700 and Class 319 shows how each car 
contributes to each trains’ total length, number of seats, and weight.  
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Figure 6.2 Thameslink Class 700 built by Siemens 
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Figure 6.3 Seating for Thameslink Class 700 built by Siemens 
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Figure 6.4 Class 319 replaced by Class 700 on Thameslink 
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Figure 6.5 Class 319 typical seating (3+2 in standard class) 
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Figure 6.6 Weight and seat profile for Class 700/0 12-car EMU (top) and Class 319/3 4-car EMU (bottom) 




            
  46 54 63 56 64 59 47 64 56 63 54 46 
Seats 672 
            
Length 242.6m 20.52m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.16m 20.52m 
 




    
  79 81 64 79 
Seats 303 
    
Length 80.7m 20.17m 20.16m 20.16m 20.17m 
 
Chapter 6. Analysis of the Procurement of New Trains using ANT 
Page 180 
Using the same format as the chart that prompted this research (Figure 1.5), the Class 
700 EMUs for Thameslink, and the replaced trains, are shown in Figure 6.7 below.  
 
Figure 6.7 Class 700 EMUs and the trains they replaced (kg/seat and year of introduction) 
There are two sub-classes of the Class 700 – an 8-car set (700/0) and a 12-car set 
(700/1). A visual inspection shows that the Class 700 trains are lighter per seat than 
some of the units they are replacing, but heavier than others. Some classes replaced 
by the new Class 700s are shown but not labelled. The four sub-classes of the Class 
319 are labelled in the chart, and will be explored in more detail, as it was referenced 
by the DfT as a comparison train. Table 6.2 below contains the information for the 
Class 700 and Class 319 trains used to make the chart above.  
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700/0 8 433 273.5 34.2 54.1 631.6 
700/1 12 672 399.6 33.3 56.0 594.6 
       
319/0 4 304 136.5  34.1   76.0   449.0  
319/2 4 243 142  35.5   60.8   584.4  
319/3 4 303 140.3  35.1   75.8   463.0  
319/4 4 267 138.3  34.6   66.8   518.0  
This table shows that the new Class 700s are heavier per seat than all class 319s. The 
8-car Class 700/0 has 433 seats and weighs 273.5 tonnes in total, giving a figure of 
631.6 kg/seat. The 12-car set has 672 seats and weighs 399.6 tonnes, giving a figure 
of 594.6 kg/seat. However, the Class 319/0 is the lightest per seat. It is a 4-car unit 
with 304 seats and weighs 136.5 tonnes, giving a figure of 449.0 kg/seat – lighter per 
seat than either of the new Class 700s. To investigate this further, like in Chapter 4, 
we can break the metric of weight per seat into its component parts.  
Table 6.2 shows that the average weight of a Class 700 12-car is the lightest, at 33.3 
tonnes per car, and the 8-car Class 700 is lighter than all bar one of the Class 319s. 
However, the Class 700s have an average of 54-56 seats per car, whereas the Class 
319s vary between 60-76 seats per car. Some of this reflects the higher density 3+2 
seating used in Class 319s, as shown in Figure 6.5 above.  
The new Class 700 trains have a lightweight design, albeit with fewer seats per 
car than their predecessors.  
The next sections explore how this came about, focusing upon the Thameslink 
procurement where propositions of trains were articulated and one was selected to 
become the realised train described above.  
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6.1.2 Activities before the procurement 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the exact starting point of a strategic decision is difficult 
to define. Improvements to the Thameslink network were first investigated by 
British Rail in the 1980s and 1990s. Thameslink services were consistently among 
the most crowded London routes (loop 4, public representation). British Rail made 
unsuccessful proposals to Government to increase capacity in 1989, with further 
proposals submitted later by Railtrack. When Railtrack was put into administration 
in 2002 the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) took over, until it was abolished by the 
Railways Act 2005. In the modern privatised railway, the identification of a sponsor 
to take over from the SRA raised problems.  
At the end of Chapter 5 the privatised concept of the railway (loop 5, links and 
knots) was described as functional specialisation with contractual integration. The 
rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) were created at privatisation specifically to 
manage long-term ownership of rolling stock in the privatised railway. These 
specialist organisations competed to lease their rolling stock to the Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs). The TOCs had contracts with Network Rail to operate these 
trains on the network. The privatised concept used contractual incentives and charges 
to integrate the railway service. The TOCs pay access charges to Network Rail for 
access to the rail network and to compensate for the wear and tear associated with 
usage and damage caused by different types of rolling stock. Network Rail manage 
ongoing maintenance and improvements to the network. Damage caused by rolling 
stock would be expected to incur higher access charges, which would make it 
potentially less attractive to TOCs, and so ROSCOs would have an incentive to 
manage this industry cost.  
The importance of managing life-time costs for long-lived assets, such as trains, was 
a known issue within the industry. There was increased recognition that costs needed 
to be managed across the whole rail system. The capital costs to build new trains 
were important, but managing total costs was vital because nearly 40% of total costs 
“goes on maintaining and operating trains over their lifetime” (National Audit 
Office, 2014c, p. 18). However, access charges bore “little relation to the specific 
costs that they impose” (Department for Transport, 2004, p. 19).  
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Strategic decisions, like the Thameslink Programme, exposed problems with the 
privatised concept of the railways. Specialisation could begin to look more like 
fragmentation, because costs and benefits cut across various institutions and 
processes and achieving the ‘best’ outcome for the industry, rather than individual 
organisations became more challenging. The ROSCOs were intended to manage 
rolling stock, but this procurement was on a scale that exceeded the capacity of any 
single ROSCO. Additionally there were also concerns at the time regarding the 
leasing market, with the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) referring the market to the 
Competition Commission in 2007 (Rolling Stock Leasing market investigation, 
2009).  
Network Rail were a candidate to take over as Project Sponsor. Upgrading the 
infrastructure for the Thameslink Programme was primarily their responsibility as 
the specialist railway infrastructure manager. However, although Network Rail 
owned and operated some trains used for maintenance and renewal work, they did 
not own the bulk of UK trains, and they did not operate passenger services. They 
would be involved in the Thameslink decision to procure new trains, because the 
trains would run on their infrastructure, but they would not lead it.  
The Train Operating Companies were a candidate for Project Sponsor, because they 
provide the drivers and other staff to deliver the railway services that would use the 
new trains and upgraded infrastructure. However, the new trains were to operate 
across three existing franchise geographies, which made it difficult for any single 
TOC to take a lead on the procurement. Even if a TOC could be chosen, there was 
still a problem regarding their transitory and relatively short-term nature. A TOC 
with a limited franchise duration might favour short-term outcomes, even when 
making decisions on new trains with an expected 30+ year life.  
The institutions of TOCs and Network Rail acted in this strategic decision, as did 
contractual incentives, such as access charge payments. None of these institutions 
were able to take on the role of early sponsor. The succession of rail industry 
sponsors from BR to Railtrack and then the SRA (National Audit Office, 2013, pp. 
5, 12) concluded in July 2005, when the Department for Transport became the active 
sponsor of the Thameslink programme, including the procurement of new trains. 
This strategic decision required a long-term and whole industry perspective, 
that spanned infrastructure and train services. This had been provided by British 
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Rail and later by the Strategic Rail Authority. BR no longer existed after 
privatisation, and the SRA was abolished in 2004, therefore the DfT took on this role 
for the Thameslink Programme and procurement of new trains.  
The Department for Transport can be considered a Prime Mover (Latour, 1999, p. 
182) in the strategic decision to produce new trains. They have a clear early role in 
shaping the early actor-network as it develops, but this does not mean they are solely 
responsible for the action. As discussed in Chapter 2, to manage the potential open-
endedness of networks, the idea of a Prime Mover can be helpful. This Prime Mover 
entity is instrumental in assembling the network: defining the problem, engaging the 
interest of others, and allocating roles (Callon, 1984, p. 6). However, it would be an 
incomplete ANT analysis to say that the DfT are responsible for making the strategic 
decision that produced new trains. They are simply part of a larger performance, 
even if they are an important actor. 
When the DfT took over from the SRA it commissioned an updated business case. 
The main objective of the Thameslink Programme had remained in place since the 
1980s – to increase capacity and thereby support the rapid transport of 
passengers in and out of London. Increased capacity was to be achieved by 
running higher frequency, longer trains on an expanded and enhanced infrastructure, 
including longer platforms and other improvements that would collectively act to 
deliver the increased capacity. The DfT estimated benefits of £2.9 billion  (National 
Audit Office, 2013, p. 5) deriving from reduced journey times, reduced crowding on 
trains and quicker interchanges between services. The strategic decision is made 
stronger by these modelled benefits that are mobilised (loop 1, mobilisation of the 
world) and brought into the action. DfT subsequently decided to proceed with the 
Thameslink programme in 2007. The fleet of new trains, with two new maintenance 
depots, had an estimated capital cost of £1.6 billion, which the DfT planned to 
finance through a private finance initiative (PFI).  
The network of actors involved in the production of these new trains was about to 
develop, as the DfT published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJEU). New actors were about to be enrolled with this public notification of the 
procurement process that was about to begin.  
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6.1.3 Early actor-network development: the OJEU is issued in April 2008 
On 9 April 2008, a notice was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union to alert potential suppliers to the coming procurement. A copy of this notice is 
shown in the Appendix (page 351). The OJEU notice states that the DfT is doing it 
on behalf of the train operating company (TOC) operating the Thameslink franchise. 
The Department’s role is to “ensure that the rolling stock gets built (i.e. it puts out 
the procurement) and then it guarantees that the stock will be leased by a TOC over a 
certain period” (Butcher, 2017, p. 12), with the final contract likely to be with the 
TOC, and not with the DfT.  
The information in the OJEU notice supports early actor-network enrolment by 
asking for expressions of interest from organisations able to supply and maintain a 
fleet of new rolling stock, expected to range from 900 to 1300 new vehicles. 
However, the OJEU bundles more than just passenger-carrying trains into the actor-
network. It is possible, but not certain, that new depots to support the trains will be 
included. The provision of financing for the trains and the depots is also part of this 
action. This articulation of new trains requires that the “winning bidder establishes a 
Special Purpose Company (SPC), which…then raises the funds required to build and 
maintain the stock” (Butcher, 2017, p. 12), with the SPC owning the rolling stock. 
This is effectively creating a mini-ROSCO and a potential new competitor to the 
three existing ROSCOs that owned c. 90% (Butcher, 2017, p. 5) of rolling stock at 
this time. The OJEU notes that financing may be subject to change, which may 
reflect the timing of this request, in 2008, when the global financial crisis impacted 
credit markets across the world and the ability of organisations to raise financing. At 
this stage in the process the developing actor-network to produce new trains may, or 
may not, involve the production of depots and the provision of private financing.  
When it comes to why the trains are needed, the OJEU directs interested parties to 
supporting documentation available on the DfT’s website. Capacity issues are clearly 
evident, with the procurement described as “a major initiative to provide additional 
capacity and remove bottlenecks on the London commuter network” (Department for 
Transport, 2008c, p. 4). DfT is looking for expressions of interest from organisations 
that can help to produce trains with attributes that help to address capacity problems. 
DfT, as Prime Mover, is defining the problem and drawing interested parties into this 
developing actor-network – a process of problematisation and interessement (Callon, 
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1984, p. 8) that develops and shapes the actor-network. Interested parties are 
enmeshed in relationships by the DfT when, for example, they are told that they must 
work with Network Rail, the TOC, and other relevant parties to ensure train 
acceptance and full operational approval for the realised trains to be allowed to use 
the UK rail network.  
Although the OJEU notice does not give a lot of information regarding the desired 
future trains, it does provide some specific guidance regarding certain attributes. For 
example, they must be dual voltage, which means that they can operate on rail 
networks with 25kV AC power, supplied by overhead lines, and 750V DC, supplied 
by a third rail. The predecessor Class 319s were also dual voltage. This reflects their 
operating area, which includes both AC and DC supply. The trains need to act with 
the local infrastructure.  
The notice provides the following set of high-level requirements that the desired 
trains are expected to deliver: 
c1. A safe, consistently reliable journey. 
c2. An environmentally sustainable solution. 
c3. Customer expectations on ambiance, amenities, and facilities 
c4. Whole life/whole system value for money, and, compared to the existing 
Thameslink fleet 
c5. Increased capacity per train 
c6. Increased capacity on the network 
c7. Improved safety and security. 
Early problematisation (Callon, 1984, p. 6) around capacity is visible in this list (c5, 
c6 above), but a broader set of desired attributes for the trains are also articulated, 
including reliability, environmental sustainability, customer experience, safety and 
security.  
The OJEU notice provides the timetable for this strategic decision. The deadline for 
expressions of interest is 9 June 2008, two months after the publication of the OJEU 
notice. Expected contract award is stated as mid-2009 (actual: June 2013), with new 
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trains (realised trains) expected to start in passenger service February 2012 (actual: 
February 2016).  
A final analytical point to highlight regarding the OJEU notice relates to the stated 
award criteria, which is defined as the most economically advantageous tender in 
terms of the criteria stated in the specifications or in the invitation to tender or to 
negotiate. Under EU law, procurement can be based on price alone, or on the 
broader basis of the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT) (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2011, p. 12). The definition of MEAT is not given 
here but will be developed as the procurement process unfolds – typically this uses 
scoring criteria allocated to different aspects of the process. The propositions of 
trains will need to articulate with the criteria defined for MEAT if they are to be 
selected as the winner. This will be explored further later, as the definition of MEAT 
is developed in more detail and shared with bidders.  
Organisations expressing an interest are required to respond using an Accreditation 
Questionnaire (AQ) (Department for Transport, 2008a) provided as part of the 
supporting information on the DfT’s website. In addition to the AQ there are also 
various presentations, industry briefings, and processes to raise questions and receive 
answers. Only Applicants that are successfully accredited are eligible to receive an 
Invitation to Tender (ITT), which is the next stage of the procurement competition to 
produce propositions of trains. At this stage it is not propositions of trains that are 
being evaluated, but the suitability of institutions expressing an interest to 
participate. The AQ document asks a range of questions regarding characteristics of 
the respondent organisations and their ability to fulfil the requirements of this notice. 
The structure of the AQ, and the associated scoring for each section, is shown in 
Figure 6.8 below.  
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Figure 6.8 Structure of the Thameslink Accreditation Questionnaire 
Sections A and B of the AQ relate to the character and financial standing of the 
responding organisations. This is a pass or fail set of questions. For example, the 
three-year average turnover for the manufacturing constituent of the Applicant must 
meet a minimum annual threshold of £0.5Bn, if they are to take part in this process. 
With an expected value for this procurement of c. £1.4Bn, the AQ acts to enrol 
(Callon, 1984, p. 10) suitably large organisations into this network. The large 
organisations may have smaller institutions within their consortium, but the lead role 
is only open to institutions with certain attributes.  
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Sections C and D are scored, with section C attracting 40% of the weighted 
aggregate score and Section D the remaining 60%. There are different weightings 
attached to sub-sections, with, for example, Design receiving the most in Section D 
at 25%. There is no information regarding how these weightings were produced, but, 
like an exam paper, it would be reasonable to expect that respondents would ensure 
that their answers – their propositions of trains – are articulated in relation to this 
scoring scheme.  
Section C is structured around something called the Business Excellence Model, 
which was created by the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM). 
The EFQM Business Excellence Model is mobilised and brought into this action 
(loop 1, mobilisation of the world), but it is not opened up or explored in any detail 
and is effectively treated as a blackbox (Latour, 1999, p. 70) that is to be accepted by 
participants. The EFQM Model provides a structure for Section C of the AQ that 
acts to choose among interested parties. Section C uses the nine EFQM categories – 
five for enablers and four for results – with a brief 1-2 sentence description, taken 
from the EFQM literature, given for each of the nine criteria. The response to 
Section C is limited to a maximum of 30 pages of A4. 
Section D attracts 60% of the weighted score and is broken into nine sub-sections to 
assess the Technical Capability and Experience of the respondent. Respondents are 
asked to give references of prior work, similar in scope and objectives to 
Thameslink. The response for section D is limited to a maximum of 70 pages. 
The AQ has no explicit reference to weight, or the number of seats, of the desired 
trains, however, energy and environmental considerations do occur in the document. 
Section D1, Design, asks the respondent to give prior examples demonstrating “how 
new technology was used to improve energy efficiency.” Section D6, Programme 
Interfaces, asks for examples of how “environmental considerations were managed 
within your projects” and D7, Compliance, asks for experience “working to 
International Environmental Standards.”  
In response to the OJEU notice, five organisations expressed an interest. Four were 
subsequently accepted by DfT and, in November 2008, the Invitation to Tender 
(ITT) documentation was issued to “Alstom Transport, Bombardier Transportation, 
Hitachi Rail (Europe) and Siemens plc” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 
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2011, p. 48). These four bidders, with their partners and specialist suppliers, are part 
of different and competing actor-networks. They will come together with other 
actors within the decision laboratory to produce competing propositions of trains for 
Thameslink. These other actors will include other human (social) actors, such as 
Network Rail, passengers, and so on. It will also include non-human actors, such as 
the local electrical supply, the tunnels, the weather, and more.  
The Rail Minister, Tom Harris said at the time, “These new lighter, greener trains 
will benefit passengers on some of the busiest commuter services” (Rail Technology 
Magazine, 2008). Proposition development is about to move into the ITT phase, 
where competing propositions will be articulated in much more detail.  
6.1.4 The development of articulate propositions of trains: the ITT is issued in 
November 2008 
The ITT was the next stage in the production of the Thameslink Class 700 trains. 
One of the four organisations invited to participate, Hitachi Rail, decided to 
withdraw so that they could concentrate on another large procurement for the 
Intercity Express Programme. This left Alstom, Bombardier, and Siemens, together 
with their associated partners and advisers. These companies were leaders of 
competing bid consortia that brought existing capability in the delivery of trains, 
depots, maintenance, and financing. Siemens based their core offer around their 
Desiro City model, Bombardier their Aventra design, and Alstom their X’Trapolis 
train.  
The DfT issued a range of documentation regarding their requirements, and to 
explain how the procurement process would work. A clarification process between 
DfT and bidders begins with the launch of the ITT, in November 2008, and runs 
until bids were required to be submitted, which was stated as April 2009 (actual June 
2009). This clarification process is part of a collaborative effort to articulate 
propositions that will continue throughout this action.  
The documentation provides objectives for the Thameslink Rolling Stock Project 
(TRSP) (Department for Transport, 2008b, p. 19) that are broadly similar to those 
stated earlier in the OJEU stage: 
(a) deliver increased capacity on the rail network 
(b) deliver a reliable journey time 
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(c) meet customer requirements by providing an enhanced passenger 
environment 
(d) improve safety 
(e) deliver an environmentally sustainable solution 
(f) minimise whole-life, whole-system cost 
(g) offer flexibility of deployment 
(h) manage the transition during the replacement of existing fleets 
The need to deliver more capacity is identified first, but these objectives are not 
described as hierarchical, or prioritised. The objectives also include the delivery of 
an environmentally sustainable solution (item ‘e’ in the list above), but the meaning 
of this is not given.  
The Department directs bidders to connections and relationships that must be made 
in the articulation of propositions. Appendix O of the provided ITT documentation 
provides the following list of stakeholders: 
1. Department for Transport 
2. Operator and Initial Operator – reflecting changes in the boundaries of the 
operating franchises in the area 
3. First Capital Connect Limited (FCC) – the initial Operator 
4. Network Rail – an integral part of the TRSP team and responsible for the 
delivery of the Thameslink infrastructure 
5. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) – Her Majesty’s Rail Inspectorate (as part 
of the ORR) has a role as safety authority and ORR also oversees regulated 
agreements including depot access agreements 
6. Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) – the independent body that sets 
standards for the UK mainline railway 
7. Passenger Focus and London TravelWatch – key stakeholders in the 
development of the specifications 
The stakeholders identified in the list above are all industry institutions. Propositions 
will be strengthened if they reach out and connect this group (loop 2, 
autonomization) of industry professionals and colleagues into the process of 
articulation. Passenger Focus and London TravelWatch are industry institutions that 
Chapter 6. Analysis of the Procurement of New Trains using ANT 
Page 192 
also represent passengers (loop 4, public representation) in the articulation of 
propositions of trains.  
Bidders’ requests for stakeholder meetings with this group are expected to be made 
via, and managed by, DfT. Questions and answers to the DfT are made visible to all 
bidders by default, and bidders know this in advance of submitting their questions. 
Procurement legislation, requiring an open and transparent process, is likely to be 
acting here.  
The documentation supplied to bidders includes three technical specifications that 
describe the desired trains and their attributes. These are the Train Technical 
Specification (TTS), Train Control Specification (TCS), and Train Infrastructure 
Interface Specification (TIIS). The TTS documents the requirements for the trains, 
the TCS documents the control systems onboard the trains that interface to control 
systems on the rail network, and the TIIS documents the infrastructure on which the 
trains will run. For a train to act it must work collectively with the surrounding 
infrastructure and local systems. These documents are central to the procurement and 
articulation of propositions within the decision-laboratory.  
The Train Technical Specification (TTS) was created by a company called Interfleet 
Technology Ltd for the DfT. This document represents the desired future train in 
more than 500 unique TTS identifiers describing various characteristics. Bidders 
are required to articulate their proposition using the same structure – this is how the 
complex socio-material thing called a train will be simplified and measured (loop 1, 
mobilisation of the world) for the purpose of evaluation within the decision-
laboratory environment. The TTS will be explored in detail later in this analysis, but 
some examples are shown below. These examples illustrate the range of actors – 
human and non-human – collectively acting as the propositions of trains are being 
produced and articulated:  
• TTS 4.1.1: The Thameslink Units shall comply with the requirements of all 
applicable British and European Standards, and all relevant European and 
UK legislation at the time of contract. 
• TTS 5.1.2: Units shall be manufactured, delivered, and operated in two 
different lengths to meet different service requirements. 
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• TTS 6.7.2: The capacity of the Unit windscreen wash system shall support a 
minimum of three days of Thameslink service operation between top ups. 
• TTS 8.11.9: The Unit shall be designed for optimal recyclability. 
• TTS 9.1.1: The Unit shall have a design life of not less than 35 years. 
The Train Infrastructure Interface Specification (TIIS) was written by Network Rail 
(NR), who are responsible for rail infrastructure in the UK. NR also leads on 
infrastructure development for the wider Thameslink programme to re-develop 
stations, extend platforms, etc. The TIIS represents the infrastructure on which the 
trains will operate – the tracks, signals, stations, platforms, and other components. 
The information in this document describes the local gauging (spacing) in tunnels, 
gaps to platforms, the availability of AC power from overhead lines, or DC power 
from 3rd rail supply, and other attributes. There are more than 250 unique TIIS 
identifiers to represent attributes of the future trains and their interface to 
infrastructure. If they are to act successfully as a train, then the propositions being 
developed must articulate with the surrounding infrastructure as represented in the 
TIIS. The complexity of the real-world infrastructure has been mobilised, in these 
250+ identifiers, and brought into the decision-laboratory (loop 1, mobilisation of the 
world) for the purpose of experimentation and proposition development.  
The Train Control Specification (TCS) was also written by Network Rail and relates 
to the systems that control the train’s operation, which also interact with systems that 
manage regulation of all trains in the area. A new train control system is required to 
deliver the key capacity objective of the Thameslink Programme, with a goal 24 
trains per hour at stations in central London – one train every 2-3 minutes. There are 
more than 150 unique TCS identifiers that describe the attributes of the control 
systems onboard and their interfaces to wider network control.  
These documents are an important part of the action to produce new trains, however, 
bidders are not starting from a blank sheet of paper. They have been accepted as 
participants in this action because of existing capabilities assessed at the previous 
stage. Existing propositions of trains from each bidder are connected to, or 
articulated with, these specification documents and the wider action taking 
place in the decision-laboratory.  
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As propositions are articulated, the ITT includes four stages to evaluate their 
progress and suitability to proceed to the next stage: 
1. Stage 1 – Mandatory Requirements 
2. Stage 2 – Evaluation of Proposals 
3. Stage 3 – Project Deliverability 
4. Stage 4 – Value Assessment 
6.1.4.1 ITT stage 1 – mandatory requirements 
A subset of criteria from the specification documents must be satisfied by Bidders 
and their propositions to be considered further. Of the 500+ identifiers in the Train 
Technical Specification (TTS) there are 90 deemed mandatory to pass stage 1. This 
mandatory list is shown in the appendix (page 357). Some mandatory criteria 
represent the characteristics of the local network and infrastructure as it is now 
because this is not expected to change. For example, “Units shall be capable of 
operating over both the Network Rail 750V DC 3rd rail and 25kV AC electrified 
systems” (TTS 6.3.1). Other mandatory criteria reflect the infrastructure as it will be 
in the future. For example, longer platforms do not exist now, but the competing 
propositions of trains are tested against them. “Full Length Units shall not exceed 
243m in overall length between coupler faces” (TTS 5.1.3).  
Directly relevant to this research is the seating and passenger carrying capacity. The 
capacity required of the trains is shown below in Table 6.3 and detailed in TTS 5.2.1, 
which requires that: “Each Unit shall provide at least the capacity given in the table 
below whilst simultaneously meeting the dwell time requirements of clause 6.6.”  
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Table 6.3 Minimum level of seating, standing and luggage capacity identified by DfT for Thameslink trains 
 
This desired attribute of the proposition of a train, as articulated by DfT and others in 
the TTS in 2008, can be compared to the Class 700 realised trains that entered 
service in 2016. The Class 700/0 8-car trains (reduced length in the table above) 
have 433 seats in total, consisting of 52 in first class, 364 standard class and 17 
additional tip-up seats. This exceeds the requirements for first class seating, given in 
Table 6.3 above, whilst meeting the number of standard class seats exactly, with 17 
additional tip-up seats. The Class 700/1 12-car trains have 672 seats in total, 
consisting of 52 in first class, 602 standard class and 18 additional tip-up seats – 
exceeding the requirements for first and standard class seating. The requirements for 
seating are mandatory and so Bidders, that want to progress beyond stage one, must 
articulate their propositions with these attributes. The attributes, as described in the 
TTS and other documents, are acting collectively with the Bidders and other actors 
to shape the configuration of resources that act as propositions of trains and later 
become realised trains carrying passengers. The realised trains produced by 
Siemens, that are translated from the early winning proposition, have attributes that 
are more than articulate with this mandatory requirement.  
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The mandatory requirements for seating (TTS 5.2.1) also refer to the dwell time 
requirements of clause 6.6. TTS clause 6.6 includes four sub-clauses (TTS 6.6.1-4), 
which are mandatory requirements relating to station dwell time i.e., how long the 
train stops at a platform to board and un-board passengers. Propositions of trains 
must articulate with the mandated seating capacity, but this cannot impact their 
ability to load and unload passengers as fast as possible to meet the capacity 
throughput required. A 45 second dwell time is a key goal for Thameslink, to 
support high levels of throughput in the central London stations.  
Another example of a mandatory requirement relates to desired reliability levels of 
the propositions. With TTS 7.1.3 we see that reliability is measured (loop 1, 
mobilisation of the world) using a standard established by the British Standards 
Institution, EN50126-1:1999, or an equivalent approved framework. Standards act in 
the articulation of propositions by defining and measuring different attributes of the 
propositions – like the weighing machine at Rainhill in 1829. Propositions of trains 
will be articulate, or not, according to such measurement systems.  
The final point to note from stage 1 of the ITT is that weight is not a mandatory 
requirement. Weight will be introduced into the articulation of propositions during 
stage 2.  
6.1.4.2 ITT stage 2 – evaluation of proposals 
Stage 1 reviewed bidders’ proposals (propositions of trains) against a subset of the 
specifications identified as mandatory. The second stage evaluates propositions 
against the wider set that also includes depots and financing required in this 
collective action to produce new trains. Evaluation scores are weighted 70% for 
technical requirements and 30% for financial deliverability, as shown below:  
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• Technical Requirements (70%) 
o Train Technical Specification (TTS) (60% weighting) 
o Train Infrastructure Interface Specification (TIIS) (20% weighting) 
o Train Maintenance and Depots Technical Proposal (20% weighting) 
• Financial Deliverability (30%) 
o Funding Deliverability: extent to which the financing proposal 
demonstrates that there is full and unconditional commitment in place 
from all providers of finance (Department for Transport, 2008b, p. 38). 
o Financial Robustness: an evaluation of the Bidder’s hedging strategies 
and any parent company guarantees, standby facilities, bonding 
arrangements and insurance arrangements (Department for Transport, 
2008b, p. 39). 
The allocation of 30% to financial deliverability demonstrates that the production of 
the new trains is not just about steel wheels, bogies, and traction. The translation of 
the most articulate proposition of a train into a realised train requires financial capital 
because there is likely to be several years of expense before the trains enter 
operational service and begin to generate revenues. This financial part of the 
production brings in an associated cast of actors. The actor-networks producing 
propositions of new trains in the decision-laboratory now also includes equity and 
debt providers, and others providing guarantees and capital to manage risk. The 
competing actor-networks reach out beyond the railway industry to form alliances 
(loop 3, alliances) that can strengthen their networks, through, for example, the 
provision of better financing terms.  
The technical assessment of propositions receives 70% of the score. The bulk of this 
(60%) is given to the TTS – the Train Technical Specification – and this will be 
explored in detail in the rest of this section. The balance of the technical scoring is 
given to assessment of the TIIS (20%) and proposals for the depots and maintenance 
(20%) to support the trains during their service. Maintenance and depots are not 
explored in detail in this research, given the focus upon train seats and train weight, 
however the competing bidders need to articulate this within their proposals.  
The TIIS was discussed briefly earlier. It represents the external infrastructure on 
which the future trains will operate. Effectively, the propositions of trains will run on 
this represented infrastructure. The TIIS mobilises aspects of the external world 
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(loop 1, mobilisation of the world) and brings it into this experimental environment 
to produce new trains. For example, the TIIS brings in London underground tunnels 
through which the trains will operate. These tunnels are very tight, and so emergency 
exits (TIIS_1958) need to be able to use the ends of the train, rather than the sides 
like other trains. In addition to tunnels and other infrastructure, the TIIS also brings 
people who live near to the railway lines (loop 4, public representation) into the 
action. Requirements focused upon operational interfaces include a desire 
(TIIS_1760, TIIS_1761) to reduce the noise of train wheels for neighbours. 
The largest weighting (60%) of the technical assessment is measured against 543 
requirements contained in the Train Technical Specification (TTS), which includes 
the 90 mandatory criteria reviewed previously. Stage 2 assesses the remaining 
requirements and allocates weightings across these criteria. The detailed scoring 
matrix for the TTS is shown in the appendix (page 360 onwards). As an example of 
the level of detail, item 10.23 defines the desired characteristics of the Windscreen 
Wiper System with TTS 10.23.1 stating that the windscreen wiper system shall 
include an intermittent wipe facility. The scoring matrix in the appendix (page 357) 
shows that TTS 10.23.1 attracts 1% of the total scoring for category 10 within the 
TTS, which covers a range of characteristics grouped under the title, system 
functions. This category, system functions, is allocated 15% of the total marks for the 
Technical Train Specification. As stated above, the TTS reflects 60% of the total 
Technical Requirements, and the Technical Requirements is 70% of the total score, 
with 30% allocated to the financial deliverability. This implies that a maximum score 
on windscreen wipers for a bidders’ proposition is worth some 0.06% of the total 
score, which suggests that it is part of the articulation of a train that is taking place, 
even if it is obviously not the most important part!  
The TTS has 500+ desired characteristics and attributes, which include other specific 
requirements. TTS 5.2.6 requires that: Each Full Length Unit shall be fitted with five 
toilets including a universal toilet compliant with the PRM TSI. TTS 6.2.1 requires 
that Each Unit shall be capable of a maximum speed of 100mph (160km/h) on level 
tangent track when travelling into a head wind of 60km/h. TTS 9.1.1 states that The 
Unit shall have a design life of not less than 35 years.  
The specification often includes a definition of the measurement system to be used 
for specific attributes. For example, TTS 6.1.10 defines a requirement for …at least 
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a 9.5% reduction on the actual journey running times for the current Thameslink 
Class 319 Unit when operating on the AC power supply network part of a Bedford to 
Brighton semi fast diagram. The measurement system for journey time is defined 
relative to a specific predecessor train (Class 319), and on a specific part of the 
network (Bedford to Brighton). This route and the Class 319 are brought into the 
action (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) to represent all journeys that the realised 
trains will operate. The propositions are assessed against this abstract and simplified 
representation of the entire network.  
Energy use is important for the focus this research, and category 8.3 of the TTS 
describes the Energy Use and Efficiency of the desired trains in 17 separate 
requirements (TTS 8.3.1 to TTS 8.3.17), including the need for energy recovery 
during braking and other characteristics. Net energy consumption (including 
regeneration) is described in TTS 8.3.1, which defines the requirement as: an 
improvement of at least 15% in net energy consumption, over current design rolling 
stock using regenerative braking operating a Bedford to Brighton semi fast diagram. 
Once again, we see the measurement system defined using a specific route (Bedford 
to Brighton), and type of service (semi-fast). Bidders are also instructed (TTS 8.3.1) 
that for the purposes of this calculation, the AC and DC power supply networks shall 
be considered to be 100% receptive [emphasis added]. Energy recovery from 
onboard regenerative braking systems may not work if the electricity supply 
networks are unable to receive the power from the train. However, propositions are 
articulated and operate in a modelled world that does have receptive networks, 
rather than the present real world, which may not be able to receive 
regenerated power.  
The comfort of trains also has a measurement system. Category 8.4 describes aspects 
of the Ride Quality of the desired train. There are five requirements identified (TTS 
8.4.1-5) with TTS 8.4.1 requiring that Unit ride quality shall achieve a mean comfort 
index of 2 based on the ENV 12299:1999 Ride Comfort for Passengers, 
Measurement and Evaluation. This references a European standard first published in 
1999, based upon research by UIC (International Union of Railways, or Union 
Internationale des Chemins de fer) and British Rail Research. This standard, created 
by railway institutions, represents passenger comfort (loop 4, public representation) 
within this action to produce new trains.  
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The ability of the trains to carry passengers is defined in Category 5.2 (Unit 
Capacity) across nine separate requirements (TTS 5.2.1-9). One of these (TTS 5.2.1) 
was a stage 1 mandatory requirement for the minimum number of seats. Stage 2 
articulates this capacity attribute of the desired trains in further detail. The guidance 
contained in TTS 5.2.4 provides the measurement approach to be used to calculate 
the capacity of the proposed trains, and it is worth reproducing in full below:  
Three plus two seating arrangements are not permitted in any 
configuration. [Emphasis added] 
Tip up seats can only be included in the seat count once the minimum 
number of conventional seats and the space necessary for the minimum 
standing capacity required by TTS 5.2.1 has been achieved.  
The space used by the occupied tip up seat shall be included in the seat 
count calculations unless it is primarily required for wheelchair 
passengers or is required for the minimum standing space calculation. It 
may not be double-counted for seat and standing capacity.  
Standing capacity shall be calculated at 4 passengers per square 
metre of usable standing area. [Emphasis added] Usable standing area 
is defined as the aggregate of all areas of floor within the Unit greater 
than 0.25m² and with no fixed obstruction from the floor to a height of 
1800mm and where suitable hand holds are provided to allow 
passengers to safely stand.  
Here we see some extremely specific articulation (forbidding 3+2 seating). This can 
help to explain the reduced seating of the realised Class 700 trains relative to their 
predecessors, that was discussed earlier (section 6.1.1) and in the empirical analysis 
of Chapter 4. Some predecessor trains, such as the Class 319, did use 3+2 seating in 
some standard class layouts, whereas the new trains were not permitted this 
configuration. The Bidders could have ignored this, but then their propositions 
would be inarticulate with respect to the collective action to produce new trains 
taking place in the decision-laboratory.  
It is likely that this guidance regarding 3+2 seating was driven by research conducted 
by PassengerFocus and London Travel Watch for the DfT that was made available to 
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Bidders. Passenger Focus (now called Transport Focus) is the independent passenger 
watchdog, set up by the UK government. London TravelWatch is the official 
watchdog organisation representing the interests of transport users in and around 
London. They conducted research with 93 passengers and interviews with nine 
passengers with various disabilities. A key finding (Passenger Focus and London 
Travel Watch, 2008, p. ii) was that “’Three plus two’ seating was universally 
unpopular with passengers because of the practical and social ‘awkwardness’ of 
getting in and out of the window and middle seat.” Passengers, represented by this 
qualitative research and these institutions, have been mobilised, and brought into the 
decision-laboratory (loop 4, public representation). These passengers, as represented 
in research, have acted to shape the propositions of trains, as evidenced by the lack 
of 3+2 seating in the Class 700 realised trains produced by Siemens.  
TTS 5.2.4 described above also defines the measurement approach for standing 
capacity with 4 passengers per square metre of usable standing area defined as the 
calculation that Bidders should use. This is how the proposition of a train is to be 
measured and modelled and does not necessarily reflect how many passengers will 
stand and squeeze onto the realised train during busy periods of actual use.  
Weight was not a mandatory requirement during Stage 1, but it is a factor in Stage 2. 
Category 5.3 defines the Unit Mass requirements of the desired train across four 
separate requirements (TTS5.3.1-4) and here we see again some precise articulation. 
TTS 5.3.1 states that a full length unit should weigh less than 401 tonnes (actual for 
the 12-car Class 700 is 399.6 tonnes) and TTS 5.3.2 states that the reduced length 
unit should weigh less than 267 tonnes (actual for the 8-car Class 700 is 273.5 
tonnes). The other two requirements give figures of 385 tonnes and 256 tonnes, as 
desirable weights for the full and reduced length trains. The full-length 12-car train 
delivered by Siemens was articulate with one set of requirements, but not the 
desirable stretch target, whereas the 8-car train was inarticulate to either target.  
When considering this missed weight target, it is important to reiterate the model 
developed in Chapter 2. The realised train (Class 700) is a translation of the earlier 
proposition produced by Siemens and others. It is possible that the earlier 
proposition of a train achieved the weight targets in 8-car formation, and weight was 
introduced during the translation process. For example, changes might have been 
needed during the manufacturing process because different components had to be 
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used for many reasons. Alternatively, it is possible that the earlier proposition of a 
train also had excess weight in the 8-car formation like the realised train. This point 
of inarticulation would potentially score fewer points compared to rival Bidders if 
their proposed trains were lighter. It is possible that the Siemens-led proposition 
scored higher elsewhere. The bid documents from Siemens and other suppliers are 
commercially sensitive and so it is not possible to know for sure. 
The ITT process defines minimum scores required to progress to Stage 3. The 
competing propositions of trains have been configured and reconfigured by these 
stages. All three Bidders, and their respective actor-networks, met the requirements 
to proceed to the next stage.  
6.1.4.3 ITT stage 3 – project deliverability 
Stage 3 is effectively focused upon the translation gap that exists between 
propositions, developed in the decision-laboratory, and the realised trains they will 
become in the future. Bidders are required to describe how they will “convert their 
Proposals into a fully functional maintained fleet of Units” (Department for 
Transport, 2008b, p. 38). This is assessed in terms of the Bidders’ approach to the 
Overall Programme (40%) and their Management Plans (60%). As before, 
weightings are allocated to sub-categories within each of these larger categories, 
with supporting documentation provided. The Business Excellence Model, 
referenced in the Accreditation Questionnaire (AQ) as part of the initial OJEU 
notice, appears again during Stage 3 of the ITT. Bidders are asked to identify the 
components of their response according to: Results, Approach, Deployment, 
Assessment, and Review (RADAR), which is taken from the EFQM model. Each of 
these elements is given different weightings by the DfT.  
The Department asks Bidders to describe how they will deliver the Overall 
Programme across three milestones defined by the DfT:  
• 20% weighting for demonstration of the ability to deliver 152 vehicles by the 
later of July 2013 or 39 months from Contract Award 
• 30% weighting for demonstration of the ability to deliver 452 vehicles by the 
later of June 2014 or 50 months from Contract Award 
• 50% weighting for demonstration of the ability to deliver the full fleet by the 
later of December 2015 or 68 months from Contract Award. 
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Bidders are given a list of Management Plans that the DfT requires across three 
categories:  
• Project Management Plan 
• Engineering Management Plan 
• In-Service Management Plan 
Within each of these three categories there are sub-categories, which have 
weightings identified against them for the scoring process.  
All three Bidders passed stage 3 and entered the final ITT stage.  
6.1.4.4 ITT stage 4 – value assessment 
Those bids that reach Stage 4 are expected to be able to meet the aims of the 
Department for the Thameslink Rolling Stock Programme, because they will have 
achieved the minimum levels of technical compliance in Stage 1, and demonstrated a 
high level of technical and commercial competence, and deliverability, in Stages 2 
and 3. Therefore, Stage 4 is designed to make a selection, or decision, in favour of 
the best value proposal with a “value assessment based on whole life and whole 
industry cost of each Bidder’s Proposal” (Department for Transport, 2008b, p. 40). 
As discussed earlier, the need to manage whole industry costs was a key reason for 
DfT’s leadership on this strategic decision.  
To support the evaluation, DfT made available to the Bidders a cost model with 
supporting documentation. This cost model calculates the costs over 30 years 
(Department for Transport, 2008b, p. 40) across categories for train leasing, train 
maintenance, depot leasing, energy consumption, and costs identified using a 
modelling tool called VTISM – the Vehicle Track Interaction Strategic Model. The 
VTISM model is described as a whole life cost model for the Vehicle–Track system 
and was developed for the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) and Network 
Rail (NR), by a combination of Serco, DeltaRail, and the University of Huddersfield. 
The DfT arranged for VTISM training and a help desk to be provided by RSSB. This 
would allow Bidders to become more articulate with respect to the VTISM model 
and for this model to act with the propositions.  
Upon receiving the completed cost models from Bidders, the DfT then made some 
value adjustments. This included a performance adjustment to reflect the expected 
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reliability of the new trains. Reliability problems would incur delays to the train, and 
a knock-on effect (reactionary delay) to other trains in the area, which would be 
significant in a congested area like central London. Each modelled delay minute is 
given a value of £800 per minute in line with the contractual performance regime 
that exists in the current railway (loop 5, links and knots: functional specialisation 
with contractual integration). This performance adjustment represents the 
Thameslink focus upon high throughput and the need for high reliability of services 
in congested areas. A modelled lack of reliability will produce a modelled set of 
delays, and a modelled set of incurred costs for those delays. A further adjustment is 
made by the DfT to reflect the Bidders’ acceptance, or otherwise, of a collection of 
legal agreements that they will be required to sign. This reflects an adjustment for 
risk and liability between the Bidder and the Department.  
Submission of proposals by Bidders during Stage 4 marks the completion of the ITT 
stage of this strategic decision. The initial publication of the ITT took place in 
November 2008 with proposals submitted in June 2009. In October 2009, Alstom 
was deselected from the competition (House of Commons Transport Committee, 
2011, p. 48) and informed by the DfT that its bid had been eliminated from the final 
stage of the contest. Siemens and Bombardier were the final two competitors for 
consideration as Preferred Bidder. This selection was planned for October 2009, but 
it did not actually happen until June 2011. Critical external events would 
demonstrate that this decision-laboratory had very porous walls and was clearly part 
of a wider social world. This also demonstrated the challenge of delimiting and 
defining boundaries to Actor-Networks.  
6.1.5 The strategic decision is delayed by ‘external’ action 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 had an impact upon markets and countries 
around the world and contributed to a Eurozone crisis affecting Greece and other 
countries across Europe. Continuing problems in global financial markets “affected 
the ability of the bidding consortia, with their supporting banking groups, to raise 
finance” (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 27). This produced lengthy delays 
throughout 2009, and the first half of 2010. 
Additionally, 2009 was the last year of the Labour Government’s third term in 
office, with an election called for 6 May 2010. The General Election returned no 
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overall majority for any party. A Coalition Government was formed, involving the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties, which would govern for the following 
five years. Against the backdrop of the Global Financial Crisis, and problems in the 
Eurozone, the Coalition Government ordered a Spending Review of all infrastructure 
projects in June 2010. The Thameslink Programme was paused pending a review of 
costs and scope (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 29). On 25 November 2010, the 
Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, confirmed that the Coalition 
Government would “fund and deliver the Thameslink programme in its entirety” 
(Butcher, 2012, p. 3), but with completion of the programme delayed to 2018. 
During this time, the DfT and the final two Bidders had continued to interact. 
Between February 2009 and January 2011, the DfT issued five Supplementary 
Instructions to the Bidders. These acted upon various aspects of the proposals, 
including re-financing options in response to external factors, possible changes to the 
throughput of trains, possible depot changes, and more.  
The final submission in 2011 “was around 7,000 pages in content” (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2011, p. 63), according to written evidence from 
Siemens plc. The propositions of trains from Siemens and Bombardier – represented 
in documents, models, measurements, and calculations – would now be evaluated by 
the DfT to select a Preferred Bidder.  
6.1.6 The selection of a Preferred Bidder in June 2011 
Bidders’ Proposals were ranked in order of the Net Present Value (NPV) of their 
submitted Stage 4 cost model, after risk and value adjustments were made. The 
Bidder whose Proposal had the lowest NPV of costs was to be ranked first. On 16 
June 2011, the Rail Minister, Theresa Villiers, announced (Butcher, 2017, p. 17) that 
Siemens PLC with Cross London Trains – a consortium comprising of Siemens 
Project Ventures GmbH, Innisfree Ltd and 3i Infrastructure Plc – had been appointed 
as the Preferred Bidder to build, own, finance and maintain the new trains. The 
Minister stated that this would “create around 2,000 new jobs and will provide 
Thameslink passengers with modern, greener and more reliable trains” (Railnews, 
2011). 
However, the decision caused significant headlines in the national press (loop 4, 
public representation), as illustrated by an article in The Times (Lehal, 2011) titled 
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“Death knell for train industry as Germany wins key contract.” The future of the 
Derby factory of Canadian-based Bombardier was of particular concern, with talk of 
job losses, impact upon local supply chains (loop 3, alliances), and wider national 
interests threatened by the selection of a foreign supplier. In evidence to the House 
of Commons Transport Committee (2011, p. 73) Unite, the majority union at the 
Bombardier Transportation site in Derby, stated that the selection of Siemens as 
Preferred Bidder meant that 1,400 jobs were threatened, all apprenticeships had been 
stopped, and the future of the plant was at risk. In the same evidence gathering 
session, Bombardier said that “countries such as France and Germany use [MEAT] 
to ensure that procurement decisions can safeguard a domestic industrial base in the 
long-term interests of the country” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011, 
p. 12). However, there was no legal challenge, and Siemens remained the Preferred 
Bidder.  
The winning consortium, led by Siemens, still faced problems. Capital was needed to 
finance the actions to translate the proposition into a realised train, but in this 
challenging climate prospective lenders were requesting extra support and 
guarantees from Siemens AG, the parent company headquartered in Germany. An 
additional guarantee was provided in mid-2012. Later that year “the Department and 
Siemens held a workshop with some prospective financiers to explain the 
programme” (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 31) so that the Department could be 
assured that these organisations would provide finance (loop 3, alliances). By early 
2013 the Thameslink programme debt financing was oversubscribed. The total 
financing requirement for Thameslink of £1.8Bn (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 
32) was funded by the European Investment Bank (£425m), Commercial Lenders 
(£1,188m), and £183m of equity finance from Siemens.  
In June 2013, the contract was finalised. Siemens and partners would finance, 
supply, and maintain the fleet of 115 high-capacity trains – 60 Class 700/0 8-car 
trains and 55 Class 700/1 12-car trains, a total of 1,140 new carriages. The 
Department – acting on behalf of the future Train Operator – provided guarantees to 
the train owner that a franchise operator would enter into contracts to use the trains 
for 20 years (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 12).  
After so long spent represented on paper, in computer models and spreadsheets, the 
most articulate proposition of a train would now be translated to become the realised 
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train. This further action is outside of the scope of this research, but it is important to 
note that this is a translation and not a replication. There are many changes that 
can take place as the proposed trains move through manufacturing and into 
operational service. Even when trains emerge from the factory, they are required to 
go through various acceptance processes with Network Rail to ensure they are safe 
to operate on the UK network.  
6.1.7 The realised trains enter service from February 2016 
The first unit was delivered in the Summer of 2015, and entered traffic in spring 
2016, with all units accepted into traffic by the summer of 2018. The Class 700 
trains are the outcome of a strategic decision that began in April 2008, with the 
publication by the DfT of the OJEU notice, with a history dating even further back.  
At the launch of the OJEU in 2008 the Rail Minister, Tom Harris had described 
“lighter, greener trains” (Rail Technology Magazine, 2008). The analysis in Table 
6.2 (page 181) found that the Class 700 trains are indeed lightweight designs, with 
the 12-car Class 700/1 lighter than all predecessor Class 319s. The green credentials 
of the train are hard to validate, but the new trains have features, such as regenerative 
braking, that were not present on older trains. The new trains are also proving to be 
reliable (Roger Ford, 2019a, p. 36) as measured by Miles per Technical Incident as 
of November 2019. It is too early to determine if the new trains provide value for 
money, which will depend upon “the Department and train operators managing the 
contracts and…assumptions…holding true” (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 45).  
Capacity and high-volume throughput into London was a clear focus for this 
strategic decision and it has been achieved through a combination of the 
infrastructure programme and new trains. The new trains, together with 
improvements to stations and signalling, act collectively to provide more trains per 
hour, reduced dwell times, and to carry more people with their long formations of 
eight and 12 carriages and long platforms.  
Capacity has been increased, but the new trains have fewer seats per car (Table 6.2, 
page 181) than their predecessors. A train layout with fewer seats works well on 
short-distance high frequency stopping services but may not work so well for longer 
journeys on the Thameslink route, such as between Cambridge and Brighton (a 
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direct journey of more than two hours), or for airline passengers with luggage 
travelling to Gatwick and Luton airports.  
The judgment of success of the trains will take longer to assess and will be revealed 
through use over time. Usage to date has identified a potential problem. Complaints 
have been “rising about the seating comfort…[with] bone hard fabric seats with poor 
legroom" (RAIL Opinion, 2017, p. 57). The phrase “ironing board seats” (Graeme 
Paton, 2018) has been used in the national papers and elsewhere (loop 4, public 
representation). This apparent problem with comfort is despite the Thameslink ITT 
specifically requiring (TTS 8.4.1) that the Unit ride quality shall achieve a mean 
comfort index of 2 based on the ENV 12299:1999 Ride Comfort for Passengers, 
Measurement and Evaluation. It is possible that the proposition of a train from 
Siemens did not achieve this index of 2, because this was not a mandatory 
requirement. If this was the case, then the proposition of a train had less comfortable 
seats than desired and this could have been translated into less comfortable seats in 
the realised train. We cannot say, however we do know that comfort has surfaced as 
a problem in their actual use. Some of the response to this criticism pointed to the 
need to meet fire and anti-graffiti standards, which might give a firmer feel. 
However, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) did not accept this 
explanation and commissioned research (RSSB, 2019) to improve the specification 
of comfortable seats, building upon earlier work to measure (loop 1, mobilisation of 
the world) rolling stock comfort (RSSB, 2016).  
One thing we cannot know is how the alternative propositions of trains, created by 
Bombardier and Alstom, would have performed if they were translated into realised 
trains. Bombardier based their proposal around their Aventra train model. They also 
included a consortium of partners, branded as VeloCity, to help provide the whole of 
this action – the financing, depots, and maintenance. Alstom had proposed a train 
based on its X'Trapolis design. Unlike the other two proposals with 12-car 
formations, the Alstom proposal was a train in a 15-car formation, with two doors 
per car, potentially supporting faster loading and unloading of passengers from a 
cumulative 30 doors per train, compared to 24 for the Siemens Class 700. Both 
alternative propositions remain unknown in practice – they remained in propositional 
form.  
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Ultimately it was the Siemens consortium, based on the Desiro City model, that was 
translated into the Thameslink Class 700. We know how that has performed to-date, 
and its actual performance can continue to be monitored and evaluated.  
This section has used ANT to understand how the propositions of trains were 
articulated and shaped within the Thameslink decision-laboratory. A diverse 
collection of resources come together to act upon the propositions being articulated. 
The five circulating loops were used to explore the activities taking place within this 
decision-laboratory to produce propositions of new trains. This next section applies 
the same approach but with a different strategic decision – the selection of new trains 
for the Crossrail network. The Crossrail Class 345 trains are suburban EMUs, like 
Thameslink Class 700s, that provide commuter services in and around London. The 
Class 345s have also been recognised for their lightweight designs. The following 
analysis will investigate how they were articulated within the Crossrail decision-
laboratory. At the end of this chapter there will be a summary to review the lessons 
from both Thameslink and Crossrail.  
6.2 Crossrail and the Class 345s 
Crossrail is the project name for a large railway programme to join the mainline 
railways to the east and west of London, through the construction of two tunnels 
beneath central London, from Paddington to Liverpool Street. The completed project 
will allow Crossrail services to operate between Reading, in the west, and Shenfield 
and Abbey Wood, to the east of London, as well as providing links from central 
London to Heathrow Airport. A map of Crossrail is shown below in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9 Crossrail route map 
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When complete, the railway will be around 74 miles (118km) long (Reading to 
Shenfield), with around 13 miles of new tunnels under central London. There are 10 
new stations being built as part of the Crossrail programme, and a further 31 are 
being improved. Once Crossrail is open, it will become part of Transport for 
London’s (TfL) rail and underground network and it will be known as the Elizabeth 
line. As part of this wider programme, a fleet of new trains were to be ordered to 
operate on the new railway and provide a high frequency, high-capacity service 
linking 41 stations. The western section of the Elizabeth line route will run on the 
existing rail network from Paddington to Heathrow and Reading. The central section 
will run from Paddington to Whitechapel in the east, with a branch to Abbey Wood 
in the south-east. There will be up to 24 services per hour during the peak in the 
central section. The eastern section of the Elizabeth line route runs on the existing 
rail network between Stratford and Shenfield in Essex. 
A summary of the dates and key events in the Crossrail Rolling Stock procurement 
are shown in Table 6.4 below. This table provides an overview before the subsequent 
detailed analysis. 
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Table 6.4 Key events in Crossrail rolling stock procurement 
Year Event 
2010 
• Government spending review agrees £14.8Bn funding package 
(excluding trains and depot) for Crossrail programme  
• November 2010: Issue of pre-qualification OJEU notice for supply 
of Crossrail rolling stock and depot facilities 
2011 
• 30 March 2011: Crossrail invites five companies to tender: Alstom; 
Bombardier; CAF SA; Hitachi Rail; and Siemens 
• August 2011: delay following award of Thameslink (June 2011) to 
Siemens and Government review of public procurement practices  
• 30 August 2011: Alstom withdraws 
2012 
• 28 February 2012: Crossrail issues Invitation To Negotiate to 
remaining four Bidders  
• November 2012: First-round bids received from Bombardier, CAF 
of Spain, Hitachi, and Siemens 
2013 
• March 2013: Government announce change to financing approach  
• July 2013: Siemens withdraws citing Thameslink commitments 
• August 2013: Revised bids from Bombardier, CAF, and Hitachi 
2014 
• February 2014: TfL awards contract to design, build and maintain 
the trains for Elizabeth line (including a maintenance depot) to 
Bombardier Transportation. 
2017 
• 22 June 2017: first train enters service between Shenfield and 
Liverpool Street in 7-car (not 9-car) formation 
 
6.2.1 The realised trains: the outcome of the strategic decision 
The new Class 345 trains replace services that were previously operated by Class 
315 and Class 360 trains. There are five Class 360/2 trains, that operate between 
London Paddington and Heathrow, that are replaced by the new Class 345s and 49 
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Class 315 units that operate other parts of the network. The Class 315s were first 
introduced into service in 1980 and are expected to be scrapped when all Class 345 
trains are finally introduced. To provide a comparison between old and new some 
pictures of the exterior and interior of the Class 345 and Class 315 trains are shown 
below. A visual representation (Figure 6.14) of the Class 345 and Class 315 shows 
how each car contributes to each trains’ total length, number of seats, and weight.  
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Figure 6.10 Crossrail Class 345 built by Bombardier 
Source: Crossrail website  
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Figure 6.11 Seating for Crossrail Class 345 built by Bombardier 
Source: Crossrail website  
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Figure 6.12 Class 315 replaced by Class 345 on Crossrail 
Source:(Marsden, 2011, p. 176)  
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Figure 6.13 Class 315 typical seating of 3+2 
Source:(Marsden, 2011, p. 177)  
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Figure 6.14 Weight and seat profile for Class 345 9-car EMU (top) and Class 315 4-car EMU (bottom) 




         
  46 52 52 52 50 52 52 52 46 
Seats 454 
         
Length 204.7m 23.62m 22.5m 22.5m 22.5m 22.5m 22.5m 22.5m 22.5m 23.62m 
 




    
  74 86 82 74 
Seats 316 
    
Length 80.7m 20.18m 20.18m 20.18m 20.18m 
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Using the same format as the original chart that prompted this research (Figure 1.5) 
the Class 345 EMUs for Crossrail, and the trains that they replace, are shown in 
Figure 6.15 below.  
 
Figure 6.15 Class 345 EMUs and the trains they replaced (kg/seat and year of introduction) 
A visual inspection of Figure 6.15 shows that the Class 345 trains are heavier per 
seat than the units they are replacing. Table 6.5 below contains the information for 
the Class 345, Class 315 and Class 360/2 trains that was used to make the chart. 


















345 9 454 318.4 35.4 50.4 701.3 
       
315 4 316 137.6  34.4  79.0   435.4  
360/2 5 331 202.8 40.6 66.2 612.7 
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This table shows that the new Class 345s are heavier per seat than the Class 315s and 
Class 360/2 that they replace. The 9-car Class 345 has 454 seats and weighs 318.4 
tonnes in total, giving a figure of 701.3 kg/seat. However, the Class 315 is the 
lightest per seat in this table. It is a 4-car unit with 316 seats and weighs 137.6 
tonnes, giving a figure of 435.4 kg/seat. To investigate this further, like in Chapter 4, 
we can break the metric of weight per seat into its component parts. 
Table 6.5 shows the average weight of a car for the 9-car Class 345 is 35.4 tonnes 
per car, which is heavier than the Class 315s that weigh 34.4 tonnes per car, but 
lighter than the Class 360/2 at 40.6 tonnes per car. However, the Class 345 carriages 
are 23 metres long, whereas the Class 315 and 360 are 20 metres long (see Figure 
6.14 on page 218). The Class 345 has more usable space onboard for passengers and 
facilities, but this would be expected to increase weight.  
A significant difference is visible in the number of seats, with an average of 79 seats 
per car for the Class 315s, compared to 50 seats per car for the new Class 345s. An 
explanation for this difference is that the Class 345 trains feature a mix of 
longitudinal and bay seating in 2+2 layout (Figure 6.11), whereas the Class 315s use 
a 3+2 seating format, as shown in Figure 6.13 above. The Class 345s have space 
devoted to standing passengers with hanging straps and grab rails.  
The new Class 345 trains are a lightweight design, which is impressive 
considering their longer carriages. Their hybrid seating and standing 
configuration means that they have fewer seats per car than their predecessors.  
The next section explores the Crossrail procurement where propositions of trains 
were articulated, and one was selected to become the realised train described above.  
6.2.2 Activities before the procurement 
Like Thameslink, the starting point of this strategic decision to produce new trains 
for Crossrail has a long history. Early work started in the 1970s, under British Rail, 
to investigate opportunities to relieve congestion around London and the South East 
to cope with expected future growth. However, feasibility studies in 1974 and 1980 
(National Audit Office, 2019, p. 8) concluded that it would be too costly.  
The project was picked up again in December 1999 when John Prescott, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, asked the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) to review east-west travel 
across London. The resulting report (Shadow Strategic Rail Authority, 2000) 
Chapter 6. Analysis of the Procurement of New Trains using ANT 
Page 221 
recommended new rail links across London to relieve existing, and forecast, 
overcrowding and congestion. In 2002, Cross London Rail Links (which became 
Crossrail Ltd in 2009) was formed by Transport for London (TfL) and the SRA. TfL 
is the local government body responsible for the Greater London transport system, 
including roads, trams, buses, taxis, cycling and aspects of railway services, such as 
London Underground When the SRA was abolished in 2005, the Department for 
Transport (DfT) took on the SRA’s role and acted as joint sponsor, together with 
TfL.  
The Crossrail programme was re-assessed (Crossrail Ltd, 2005). Forecasted growth 
to the population in London and the South East was expected to produce increased 
demand for public transport. The Crossrail Elizabeth line was estimated to provide a 
10% increase in rail capacity in central London. The benefits of Crossrail included 
“reduced journey times, reduced crowding on public transport and quicker 
interchanges between services” (National Audit Office, 2014a, p. 5). These benefits 
were mobilised (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) to strengthen the Crossrail 
programme. Benefits were calculated to exceed costs (Haylen, 2019, p. 19) and so, 
both the Department and Transport for London decided to invest and progress the 
project. Legislation required to build the railway gained Royal Assent in 2008 (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 2008). Cross London Rail Links was renamed Crossrail Ltd 
in 2009. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of TfL and is responsible for delivering the 
Crossrail programme. Network Rail were responsible for work to improve existing 
rail infrastructure. Construction started in 2009 on the first Crossrail site, Canary 
Wharf station.  
The General Election of 6 May 2010 produced a Coalition Government which, 
against the backdrop of the Global Financial Crisis and problems in the Eurozone, 
paused infrastructure projects subject to a Comprehensive Spending Review in June 
2010. Overall funding for Crossrail was reduced by £1 billion to £14.8bn. This 
funding was provided (National Audit Office, 2014a, p. 5) by a network of alliances 
(loop 3, alliances) including direct grant funding from DfT and TfL, borrowing by 
Network Rail and Transport for London, and contributions from businesses, 
including a supplement to London business rates. The funding only covered the 
construction costs of the railway. An estimated £1 billion additional cost (National 
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Audit Office, 2014a, p. 9) was needed to buy the trains. The majority of this was 
funded directly by Transport for London, with DfT providing £100 million.  
As with Thameslink, the detailed analysis of the production of new trains will start 
with the OJEU notice of the procurement, which was published by Transport for 
London and Crossrail Ltd in November 2010.  
6.2.3 Early actor-network development: the OJEU is issued in November 2010 
An OJEU Contract Notice (2010/S 233-356965) was issued 26 November 2010 and 
requested expressions of interest by February 2011. The first thing to highlight on 
the OJEU notice (Appendix, page 369) is that the address for the contracting entity is 
Transport for London c/o (care of) Crossrail Ltd. Although DfT are a joint sponsor, 
there is no mention of them in the OJEU notice. This reflects the fact that Crossrail 
Limited was established as the company to build the new Crossrail railway that will 
become known as the Elizabeth line. Crossrail Limited is the “delivery body” 
(National Audit Office, 2014a, p. 10) and it is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Transport for London (TfL). Once the railway is complete, it will be run by TfL as 
part of London’s integrated transport network. To help understand early actor-
network formation we can define Crossrail Ltd here as Prime Mover. Crossrail, the 
institution, is shaping the early network and allocating roles to actors expressing an 
interest in response to the notice that they have published.  
The OJEU notice does not give much information on the background to this 
procurement. The initial problematisation (Callon, 1984, p. 6) – definition of the 
problem to be addressed by the actor-network – is provided by a mix of high-level 
information and some specific direction. The trains are to be 200 metres long, 
although early services will need to operate as 160m-long trains. Their design life 
should be 35 years with high levels of reliability and performance, and able to 
support 24 trains per hour in the central section. The trains must integrate with the 
local technical infrastructure. A future member of the network is described in the 
OJEU, because the supplier of trains will be expected to work with a Crossrail Train 
Operating Company that is expected to be in place as the services go live. The scope 
of work also includes the design and construction of a depot and maintenance 
services for the new trains. Financing for each part of the scope is a requirement, 
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although there are options for Crossrail to change their approach. The cost for this 
package of requirements is estimated to be between £1bn and £1.9bn.  
The final point to note regarding the OJEU notice relates to the stated award criteria, 
which is defined as the most economically advantageous tender in terms of the 
criteria stated in the specifications or in the invitation to tender or to negotiate. This 
is the same as the Thameslink procurement, and reflects EU law where a 
procurement can be based on price alone, or on the broader basis of the ‘most 
economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT) (House of Commons Transport 
Committee, 2011, p. 12). The definition of MEAT will be developed as the 
procurement process unfolds.  
The OJEU directs interested parties to download a Pre-Qualification Pack, which 
must be returned by the deadline of 24 January 2011. The Pre-Qualification Pack 
was obtained from Crossrail via a Freedom of Information request (Appendix, page 
366). Included is a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) which aims to assess 
Applicants against the characteristics which CRL [Crossrail] has identified as being 
important for the successful tendering and delivery of the Project Services. The PQQ 
is clear throughout that it is CRL (Crossrail) seeking answers and looking for 
evidence from interested parties. Trading and financial information must be provided 
for the lead organisation and any members of a consortium. This document provides 
Crossrail a way to engage respondents in a process of interessement (Callon, 1984, 
p. 8). Crossrail, as Prime Mover, are allocating roles to interested parties and create 
associations across the developing actor-network that will produce propositions of 
new trains. The scoring system for the PQQ, with areas and weightings, is shown in 
Table 6.6 below.  
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Table 6.6 Structure of the Crossrail Pre-qualification Questionnaire with weightings for scoring system 
PQQ Areas Weighting 
Section C1 - Health and Safety 5% 
Section C2 - Quality and Assurance 3% 
Section C3 - Environment 2% 
Section D - Corporate Social Responsibility and Customer 
Relationships 
5% 
Section E - Ability to design and build trains 30% 
Section F - Ability to design and build the depot 17.5% 
Section G - Ability to maintain trains and support operational 
requirements 
27.5% 
Section H - Ability to arrange and provide finance 10% 
Total 100% 
How these figures have been allocated is not explained, but the structure aligns with 
that set out in the OJEU. The sections that attract the most points are those that relate 
to the ability to design and build trains (Section E, 30%) and to the ability to 
maintain trains and support operational requirements (Section G, 27.5%). For 
Crossrail, propositions of trains are also articulated with the building of a depot 
(17.5% weighting) and financing (10% weighting) as part of the collective action.  
This document acts to create relationships and associations among actors. For 
example, a sub-category (E 6) assesses the Respondents’ ability to manage 
compliance, testing, commissioning, and customer acceptance. This will involve 
Network Rail accepting the trains onto UK rail infrastructure.  
Seats are not mentioned explicitly anywhere in the PQQ. However, the weight of the 
trains is referenced within Section E. Recognising that Bidders will bring their 
existing propositions of trains to this action the PQQ asks them to demonstrate an 
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ability to adapt existing designs to meet the Crossrail specification requirements 
including… 
• delivering an efficient mass to passenger capacity ratio [emphasis added] to 
reduce energy and track maintenance costs 
• optimising whole life costs (including energy efficiency) while meeting 
performance requirements 
Mass to passenger capacity is a similar metric to kg per seat, although it could 
include standing room capacity and not just seats. The emerging actor-network needs 
to consider the weight and energy usage of the trains that will be produced, but there 
are no specific targets or numbers provided at this stage.  
Potential trade-offs between whole life costs and performance requirements are 
recognised, which reflects timetable requirements for 24 trains per hour in the central 
section. This implies short dwell times at stations with trains arriving and departing 
every 2-3 minutes. Achieving this requires a range of attributes of the trains, 
including fast acceleration and braking, which could lead to greater energy usage. 
The PQQ directs Bidders to optimise whole life costs if there are trade-offs to be 
made. The design life of the train is not stated in the PQQ, but the OJEU had given it 
as 35 years.  
This PQQ forms part of a wider discourse, which also includes presentations, 
industry briefings, Q&A, and various discussions inside the railway industry and 
related sectors. This early stage of network formation is mostly formed from within 
the railway professions (loop 2, autonomization), but the high-profile nature of the 
Crossrail programme places this within the public eye, given its large economic costs 
and visible impact upon the London geography.  
Responses to the PQQ were required by 24 January 2011, according to the OJEU, 
and, in March 2011, Crossrail confirmed that five organisations would be invited to 
tender: Alstom Transport; Bombardier Transportation (UK) Ltd.; Construcciones y 
Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA; Hitachi Rail Europe Limited; and Siemens plc. 
Crossrail stated that detailed requirements for the new trains were being finalised and 
the intention was to put out an Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) and invite these five 
companies to submit bids in 2011, with a view to awarding a contract to build the 
Crossrail fleet in late 2013. 
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6.2.4 Increasing articulation of propositions: the ITN is issued in March 2011 
This ITN stage represents the development of more articulate propositions and it was 
to involve two rounds. In the first-round, Bidders would provide technical proposals 
and their approach to securing the necessary finance. Shortlisted bidders were then to 
be invited to provide fully funded proposals in the second round, with a preferred 
bidder selected at the end.  
Crossrail provided further technical aspects of the desired trains (appendix D, page 
375) and required attributes, such as the maximum length (205 metres), power 
supply (25 kV AC from the overhead line), and so on. This document included an 
explicit weight target, with the new train to be less than 350 tonnes. Energy-saving 
features, including regenerative braking, were detailed, as was a desired energy 
efficiency of 24 KWh per train kilometre, which it says is equivalent to 55g CO2 per 
passenger kilometre.  
However, in June 2011 it was announced that Siemens had been made preferred 
supplier for the Thameslink contract, with the new trains to be built in Germany. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Bombardier had lost out and subsequently 
announced job losses, including a review of the future of its Derby plant. Unite the 
union said that it was “not just the jobs at Bombardier placed at risk, but also those 
in the region’s supply chain” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011, p. 74 
Ev 48). A political debate about UK public sector procurement ensued, and Crossrail 
announced that the issuing of tender documents was to be deferred. The difficulty of 
defining the edges of an actor-network were demonstrated, as the separate 
Thameslink strategic decision acted upon Crossrail.  
6.2.5 Public sector procurement practices come under scrutiny in June 2011 
Upon coming to power in 2010 the Coalition Government created a National 
Infrastructure Plan. The annual review of this plan, in 2011, reviewed issues 
associated with public procurement practices. A Crossrail press release described 
this review as “examining…the degree to which the Government can set out 
requirements and evaluation criteria with a sharper focus on the UK’s strategic 
interest” (Peter MacLennan, 2011). To allow the findings to be factored into the 
Crossrail procurement, the date for the planned award of the contract was pushed 
back from 2013 to 2014.  
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In August 2011 it was announced (Milmo, 2011) that Alstom, the French 
manufacturer of the Pendolino trains operating on the West Coast of England, was to 
withdraw from the Crossrail tender process. Alstom stated that “it lacked a suitable 
product for the work” (Robert Wright and Helen Warrell, 2011) and that adaptation 
of their existing products was not compatible with Alstom’s strategy and Crossrail’s 
requirements.  
The National Infrastructure Plan stated that “the UK’s transparent and fair approach 
to public procurement is viewed positively by inward investors” (HM Treasury, 
2011a, p. 112). However, the Plan identified opportunities for improvements to 
procurement practices to “support a consistent approach to the consideration and 
appraisal of infrastructure projects across Government” (HM Treasury, 2011a, p. 
92). Supplementary guidance was issued for the Treasury’s Green Book (HM 
Treasury, 2018), which is the central Government framework for appraisal and 
evaluation of policies, programmes and projects. This guidance recognised the 
challenges of assessing costs and benefits for infrastructure spending. This was 
illustrated with an example of a railway line, which provided direct benefits to 
passengers through faster journey times, reduced over-crowding and a more pleasant 
journey. Additional benefits beyond this could include reduced road congestion, 
which could lead to reduced CO2, improved air quality and less noise pollution. The 
supplementary guidance to the Green Book went on to suggest (HM Treasury, 
2011b, p. 9) that the “new rail line may also have a positive effect on economic 
activity in deprived areas served, potentially bringing a combination of regeneration 
benefits and new employment opportunities.” This is a recognition of the wider 
actor-network involved in the production of new trains, with this action reaching out 
to form alliances (loop 3) and connect with a wider public (loop 4) beyond the 
immediate railway industry. The revised Green Book approach states that costs and 
benefits should be quantified and monetised where possible, and still included in the 
analysis where this is not possible.  
In November 2011 the intention to “continue to implement the £14.5 billion 
Crossrail project” (HM Treasury, 2011a, p. 47) was announced. The updated 
National Infrastructure Plan from the Treasury had acted and would be incorporated 
into the revised Crossrail action.  
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6.2.6 The ITN resumes in 2012 with a requirement for responsible 
procurement 
On 28 February 2012, the Secretary of State for Transport published a Written 
Ministerial Statement outlining how recommendations from the procurement review 
were reflected in the Crossrail rolling stock and depot procurement. The Invitation to 
Negotiate (ITN) included requirements for responsible procurement. Bidders were 
required to describe “how they will engage with the wider supply chain and provide 
opportunities for training, apprenticeships, and small and medium-sized 
businesses…to establish an appropriate local presence to manage the delivery of the 
contract…[and] to specify from where each element of the contract will be sourced” 
(Greening, 2012). A wider actor-network was explicitly recognised in this strategic 
decision.  
The award of Thameslink to Siemens had acted upon the revised procurement 
guidelines, but it was also claimed that Siemens now held an advantage in the 
Crossrail procurement because of “clear similarities” (Milmo, 2012) between the two 
railways. The head of Siemens' UK train division denied this and stated that he 
expected the Crossrail process to be handled “in a fair manner that offers a level 
playing field to all bidders, regardless of nationality” (Milmo, 2012). Under EU 
rules, the government cannot prefer a domestic company, and the Ministerial 
statement clarified that this was “not an assessment criterion in the decision process” 
(Greening, 2012). However, bidders were required to provide estimates for local 
sourcing, and these estimates would be monitored subsequently.  
A new concept of how trains are produced (loop 5, links and knots) has 
emerged. This new concept places greater emphasis upon the wider social and 
economic value associated with the translation of propositions into realised trains. 
This has parallels with the early days of the railway (see section 5.1) when the 
railways were not just a provider of transportation services. They were also a 
significant construction enterprise, provider of employment, and creator of 
opportunities (loop 3, alliances and loop 4, public representation).  
Alstom had withdrawn earlier in August 2011. The remaining four bidders 
(Bombardier, CAF, Hitachi, Siemens) were issued with revised tender documents in 
February 2012. In November 2012 the Transport Minister, Norman Baker, indicated 
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(Butcher, 2017, p. 18) that the four bidders had submitted first-round proposals by 
the deadline of 29 October. The submitted proposals described the technical 
characteristics of the propositions of trains, as well as how each Bidder would secure 
finance to manufacture and deliver the realised trains. However, the financial aspect 
of this strategic decision was coming under scrutiny.  
6.2.7 Financing is reconfigured in early 2013 
As discussed above, the Department and TfL had originally agreed (National Audit 
Office, 2014a, p. 26) that the trains and their maintenance depot should be funded 
through a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) deal, with private sector companies 
arranging finance. However, the Global Financial Crisis and Eurozone problems had 
impacted the availability of private finance. Even as the Global Financial Crisis 
began to recede, changed lending rules led to a reduction in long-term lending for 
infrastructure. In response to this the Chancellor, George Osborne, launched the UK 
Guarantees scheme in July 2012. The Crossrail trains were a candidate for this 
scheme and, in September 2012, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Danny 
Alexander, announced that the Government, which was already providing 30 per 
cent of the funding for rolling stock, was “prepared to guarantee the remainder, 
which will be financed as a private finance initiative” (Jim Pickard and Mark Odell, 
2012).  
In late 2012, TfL expressed concerns that private financing could delay the 
programme, citing recent transport PFI deals such as the Thameslink programme, 
which was delayed by over three years. Transport for London now proposed to buy 
the trains and depot directly. Assessments of the value for money of PFI and 100 per 
cent public procurement were re-visited. Transport for London’s analysis found in 
favour of public procurement, whereas the Department for Transport’s (co-sponsor) 
analysis (National Audit Office, 2014a, p. 26) was in favour of PFI. Each of these 
analyses are mobilising evidence from the world (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) 
to support their case. However, the difference between each organisation’s 
assessment was marginal.  
By 2013, market conditions had improved and “lending to UK infrastructure projects 
had returned to 2006 levels” (National Audit Office, 2015, p. 7). Private financing 
was again a viable option that did not require the UK Guarantee scheme. However, 
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in February 2013, following discussions between Transport for London, HM 
Treasury, and the DfT, the sponsors agreed to abandon the PFI approach. In effect, 
the Government agreed to the Mayor of London’s (Boris Johnson) proposal to move 
from a financing model involving a substantial element of private sector funding, to 
one entirely funded by the public sector. On 1 March 2013 the Transport Minister, 
Stephen Hammond, announced “a change in the financing approach for the Crossrail 
rolling stock and associated depot facilities contract” (Butcher, 2017, p. 19).  
The concept of how to produce new trains (loop 5, links and knots) had changed 
again. A changing concept produced a reconfiguration of the actor-network. 
Financing was still necessary in this strategic decision, but it had moved from 
privately sourced finance to public.  
6.2.8 The ITN is reissued in April 2013 
An updated ITN (Invitation to Negotiate) was issued in April 2013, with a deadline 
for proposals of 29 July 2013.  
In July 2013 Siemens announced it was withdrawing from the process. The German 
company insisted this was not a result of political pressure, and said it had no 
complaints about the bid process, which had been “fair and diligent” (Rankin, 2013). 
However, the reconfigured concept of trains with public financing and local sourcing 
may have impacted the advantages of their actor-network to produce new trains 
relative to the actor-networks of their rival Bidders. An earlier House of Commons 
Transport Committee review of the Thameslink procurement had stated that it was 
“hard to escape the conclusion that Siemens’ A+ credit rating made a significant 
contribution to its success” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011, p. 3).  
The remaining Bidders received the ITN documentation and the articulation of 
propositions recommenced. A long list of stakeholders involved in this action was 
provided to Bidders:  
1. TfL and the Secretary of State for Transport (Sponsors of the Crossrail 
Project) 
2. Crossrail Limited (responsible to the Sponsors for delivering Crossrail) 
3. Network Rail; Canary Wharf Group and Berkeley Homes (industry partners 
in the construction of Crossrail infrastructure) 
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4. Crossrail and the industry partners’ contractors and subcontractors engaged 
in delivering the Crossrail infrastructure and associated services 
5. Heathrow Airport Limited and Network Rail (owners of infrastructure over 
which Crossrail services will operate) 
6. Rail for London (subsidiary of TfL) as manager of infrastructure in the 
Central Section of the Crossrail Project 
7. Network Rail (manager of part of the infrastructure over which Crossrail 
Services will operate) 
8. various statutory bodies (approvers of the trains, depot, and railway 
operations) 
9. various public and private bodies who may be affected by the Works and / or 
the Services 
10. Crossrail Train Operating Company (the operator of the trains and user of the 
depot) 
11. London Underground, Network Rail and various train operating companies 
(users of the infrastructure or operators of stations on the Crossrail route) 
12. neighbours of the new depot; and 
13. members of the public (users of Crossrail Services) 
This list recognises a range of actors, including railway institutions (loop 2, 
autonomization), partners who will benefit from the services, such as Heathrow 
(loop 3, alliances), and neighbours and users of the Crossrail services (loop 4, public 
representation). Bidders were not allowed to contact stakeholders regarding the 
proposal, unless approved by Crossrail.  
The ITN reconfirms that this action to produce new trains also included the building 
of a depot, and the provision of maintenance and other services. This is to be 
provided by the selected Bidder for 32 years from the start of the contract. This 
collective – trains, depot, and services – will become, with the wider Crossrail 
programme, the Crossrail railway service operating in and around London. The ITN 
describes Crossrail’s requirements for the desired trains, depot, and services; 
however, it is only the requirements for the trains that will be explored in detail here.  
The ITN states that a minimum fleet of 60 new trains are required. This is an 
increased level of specificity over the OJEU and PQQ, which had described a desired 
level of future operational service required from a fleet of unstated size. Desired 
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features (attributes) of the trains are provided (appendix D, page 375). The trains 
must have a hybrid nature that allows them to accommodate large numbers of 
passengers for metro style operations in the central section, but also provide a 
comfortable environment for longer journeys. The high throughput in the central 
section (24 trains per hour) requires rapid movement of passengers on and off the 
train, so dwell times at stations must be minimised. The train’s acceleration and 
braking performance must also support the rapid transportation of large volumes of 
people. Integration with lineside signalling systems is critical to regulate access of all 
services, especially in the busy central section. A collective effort is required to 
deliver the high throughput in the central section.  
Crossrail has created a Train Technical Specification (TTS) to embody [emphasis 
added] those technical features considered necessary to deliver the Sponsors' 
requirements for the Crossrail Project. The TTS was used by Crossrail to evaluate 
propositions and so competing Bidders will need to articulate their propositions with 
the attributes and characteristics embodied in the TTS. A similar technical 
specification was created for the Depot works, but this will not be explored here.  
The TTS has more than 750 unique identifiers describing desired characteristics of 
the propositions of trains. Some examples are shown below:  
• TTS 3.2.1.4: The Unit shall be able to achieve and maintain a maximum 
operating speed of 145kph on tangent level track in open air whilst 
travelling into a headwind of 50kph [emphasis added], and at all loading 
conditions up to and including Normal Payload while operating on traction 
power supplies of 24kV. 
• TTS 3.9.1.2: The Unit shall ensure the Mean Comfort Index shall not exceed 
1.9 when operating on any section of the Crossrail Infrastructure…For each 
measurement location within the saloon the Mean Comfort Index shall be 
calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of all comfort indices [emphasis 
added] calculated for that location. 
• TTS 3.13.1.12: When regenerating the maximum current returned to the AC 
network by the Unit shall not exceed 300A. 
• TTS 3.26.1.2: Inter-vehicle gangways shall be as wide as practicable, having 
sufficient width to allow at least two 95th percentile adult UK male 
passengers to pass each other [emphasis added] line abreast unimpeded. 
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• TTS 3.40.3.1: The driver’s cab shall be provided with the following facilities: 
two coat hooks [emphasis added]; small waste bin; two cup holders…and 
two BS1363 type socket outlets… 
• TTS 3.34.4.4: Toilet facilities shall not be fitted within the Units… 
• TTS 3.47.1.1: The Unit shall have a design life of 35 years based on the 
service specifications outlined… 
These examples illustrate the high level of specificity (e.g., two coat hooks, 300A 
maximum current returned by regenerative braking) regarding the desired future 
train. The train will not include toilets, which reflects its metro-style service like 
London Underground trains. Gangways between carriages, that allow congestion to 
be eased as the trains are moving, must be the width of two 95th percentile adult UK 
male passengers. Here, adult UK males are brought into this action (loop 1, 
mobilisation of the world) in the form of statistics. Train comfort is mobilised 
through the uses of a Mean Comfort Index, which Bidders are required to use to 
measure and articulate their propositions. The TTS acts with propositions of trains 
under development in the decision-laboratory. Propositions become more articulate 
through this action.  
Crossrail will also assess Bidders’ ability to deliver – to translate their propositions 
of trains into realised trains. This assessment of deliverability was also assessed 
during the earlier PQQ stage. For example, Bidders’ approaches to Health and 
Safety, Quality and Environment were all assessed at the PQQ and are further 
assessed during the ITN. One important point to note is that the ability to arrange 
and provide finance that was assessed during the PQQ stage (weighting of 10% in 
the total score) is no longer assessed for the ITN. The changed concept of how 
trains are produced (loop 5, links and knots) has reconfigured the actor-networks 
producing propositions. Financing is still part of the actor-network to produce new 
trains, but it is now being provided by TfL rather than private finance institutions. 
TfL are arranging loans, with finance institutions, to buy the trains outright from the 
winner, rather than the Bidder owning the realised trains and leasing them to TfL. 
The evaluation criteria defined in the TTS and other parts of the ITN are applied by 
Crossrail at each stage leading up to Contract Award. The four stages to evaluate the 
competing propositions are:  
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Stage 1 – General Review and Mandatory Requirements 
Stage 2 – Technical and Deliverability Evaluation 
Stage 3 – Commercial Evaluation and negotiations 
Stage 4 – Contract Award 
6.2.8.1 ITN stage 1 – general review and mandatory requirements 
This first stage involves a general review of the proposals from Bidders and 
assessment against a sub-set of mandatory requirements. A mandatory set of 27 
requirements are identified from more than 750 separate requirements in the Train 
Technical Specification (TTS). Mandated aspects of the depot proposal are also 
described in the ITN, but they will not be explored here.  
The mandated requirements state that the fleet size must consist of a minimum of 60 
full length units. The length of the train is mandated, with a Full Length Unit 
required to be no longer than 205 metres, and a Reduced Length Unit no more than 
163 metres. Station platforms act upon the length of the trains because of the 
material relationship between train and infrastructure.  
A specific weight target for the trains is mandated: A Full Length Unit is not to 
exceed 350 tonnes (TTS 3.5.1.1). The actual weight of the realised trains – the 9-car 
Class 345s – subsequently delivered by Bombardier was 318.4 tonnes. Without 
access to Bombardier’s proposal, we do not know the exact weight of the proposition 
that preceded the Class 345. However, we do know that it must have been less than 
the mandated maximum weight of 350 tonnes, or it should not have progressed.  
The number of seats is not mandated, but total capacity (seated and standing) is 
required to be a minimum of 1500 passengers (TTS 3.34.3.2). The actual Class 345 
realised trains have a total capacity of 1,500 that includes 454 seats. This reflects the 
mixed use of these trains as metro operations in central London, while also providing 
services to regions outside of the city. The Class 345 realised trains are articulate 
with the hybrid requirements for seating and standing. They have some 2+2 seating 
for longer distances, but mostly longitudinal seating, like London Underground, to 
give maximum floor space. The internal picture shown earlier (Figure 6.11, page 
215) illustrates this layout. The ITN states that the number of standing passengers 
that can be carried must be calculated using a density of no more than four persons 
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per square metre. The realised trains may carry more, or less, than four standing 
persons per m2, but the propositions of trains cannot.  
6.2.8.2 ITN stage 2 - technical and deliverability evaluation 
Proposals which pass stage 1 are next evaluated across a range of technical and 
deliverability criteria. The technical criteria include two main sub-categories that 
further demonstrate the articulation of trains with their depots.   
a) Technical criteria 
• Train Works 
• Depot Works 
The technical criteria for the depot works will not be explored here. The Train 
Works criteria are provided in the appendix of this document (appendix D, page 
378). Within Train Works there are 13 sub-criteria that articulate attributes of the 
desired trains and are used to assess the competing propositions of trains created in 
this decision-laboratory. Each of these sub-criteria are associated with different 
clauses from the TTS. For example, Physical Behaviour is one of 13 sub-criteria to 
assess the proposed Train Works. This is shown in Figure 6.16 below and will be 
discussed further to show how this articulates the propositions of trains being 
configured.  
 
Figure 6.16 Crossrail Train Works Sub-criteria and TTS Clauses 
Physical Behaviour is given 10% of the total score for the assessment of Train 
Works, alongside the 12 other sub-criteria, shown in appendix D (page 378). We do 
not know how this percentage was chosen. The relevant attributes of the desired 
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train’s Physical Behaviour are described across five different clauses in the TTS: 
TTS 3.7, TTS 3.8, TTS 3.9, TTS 3.10, and TTS 3.23. Each of these clauses has a 
weighting, as shown in Figure 6.16 above. For example, TTS Clause 3.7 describes 
aspects of Gauging, Routes and Stepping Distance related to the train and its 
infrastructure. A proposition that is articulated with this requirement can gain 25% of 
the total score for Physical Behaviour.  
TTS clause 3.7 is part of a hierarchy that in turn contains 12 sub-clauses, 3.7.1.1 to 
3.7.1.12 that describe various attributes related to gauging, routes and stepping 
distance, which is effectively about required clearances in tunnels, the connection 
between train and platform, and so on. For example, TTS 3.7.1.1 provides the 
following lengthy requirement that is reproduced below: 
• TTS 3.7.1.1: The Unit (including all physical features such as underframe 
equipment, bogies, door light indicators, buttons, roof mounted antennae, 
stowed pantographs but excluding footsteps) shall have a swept envelope no 
larger than that generated by the Crossrail Class 345 Vehicle Model for all 
movement and behaviours (including operation in degraded conditions). For 
the lower sector the requirements of Appendix C C.2.3 shall apply. Note this 
shall be demonstrated by the derivation of a KE [Kinematic Envelope] 
and comparison with the Crossrail Class 345 Vehicle Model and the 
swept envelopes contained in Appendix C (using ClearRoute™) 
[Emphasis added]. The development of the KE shall take note of the 
guidance note GE/GN8573. Crossrail Class 345 Vehicle Model: Means the 
Crossrail and Network Rail authorised ClearRoute™ Crossrail Class 345 
vehicle model which is designated within ClearRoute™ as LV- 345-1.  
In this sub-clause (TTS 3.7.1.1) Crossrail define the measurement system to be used 
by Bidders when they articulate their propositions of trains. The software package, 
ClearRoute ™, is a tool for calculating clearances between railway vehicles and 
surrounding infrastructure. Bidders are instructed, in TTS 3.7.1.1, to create a model 
of their proposed train using this software. They are effectively creating a model of a 
model, using the software modelling package to model their proposition of a train, 
that is itself a model represented in documents and other forms. The Bidders are 
asked to compare the model of their proposition of a train to a Crossrail Class 345 
Vehicle Model (LV-345-1), which has been created by Crossrail. We do not have a 
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physical test track like at Rainhill, but the propositions of trains are required to prove 
themselves on a similar abstraction. The route through which the trains will navigate 
was brought into this action (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) using this software, 
with modelled infrastructure and a model competitor.  
The other 12 sub-criteria within Train Works, and the associated clauses from the 
TTS, describe different aspects of the desired train, including further requirements 
regarding weight and seats. The mandatory requirements of stage one (above) 
included a maximum weight limit and minimum total capacity for seating and 
standing. It is at this second stage that specific requirements for seating are given.  
A set of sub-criteria described as Industrial Design (Figure 6.17) is allocated 6% of 
the total score for Train Works.  
 
Figure 6.17 Crossrail Train Works Sub-criteria and TTS Clauses - Industrial Design (including seating) 
Within Industrial Design the TTS Clause 3.34, Passenger Environment, attracts 60% 
of the score. TTS Clause 3.34 includes some 98 sub-clauses, including the following 
examples:  
• TTS 3.34.3.3: The FLU [Full Length Unit] interior shall provide seated 
accommodation for a minimum of 450 passengers [emphasis added] … 
• TTS 3.34.3.6: The Unit interior layout shall allow for a mixture of seated 
accommodation in the longitudinal and transverse configurations, with 
the distribution being approximately 2/3rd longitudinal seating 
[emphasis added] … 
• TTS 3.34.3.7: The Unit interior layout shall not include 3+2 transverse 
seated configurations [emphasis added]. 
• TTS 3.34.3.9: The interior seated capacity and layout shall be calculated 
on the following basis [emphasis added]: perch type seats shall be excluded 
from the seated capacity calculation; where tip-up seats are provided, they 
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shall not be included in the seated capacity calculation if their deployed space 
is required to meet the standing capacity requirement; and where tip-up seats 
are provided in wheelchair space or open areas, they shall be included in the 
seated capacity. 
A requirement for a minimum of 450 passenger seats is given (TTS 3.34.3.3). As 
described earlier, the realised Class 345 delivered by Bombardier has 454 seats in its 
full 9-car formation. A split of two thirds (TTS 3.34.3.6) for longitudinal (London 
Underground style) seating and transverse seating is also evident in the internal 
photographs shown earlier (Figure 6.11, page 215) of the realised Class 345 trains.  
The 3+2 seating layout, which might increase seating numbers, is forbidden 
according to TTS 3.34.3.7. However, these requirements are not mandated, and so it 
could be possible for a Bidder to introduce 3+2 seating in their proposal of a train. 
This would mean that their proposition was inarticulate with this attribute, and it is 
the most articulate train that is selected as winner.  
Alongside this technical evaluation of the Train and Depot Works there is also an 
evaluation of the deliverability of Bidders’ proposals across the following criteria:  
b) Deliverability criteria 
• Train Works 
• Depot Works 
• Services 
• Health and Safety 
• Environment 
• Responsible Procurement 
• Assurance and Quality 
The same approach is adopted. Each of these criteria is broken down into sub-
criteria, with weightings allocated for scoring. These criteria will not be explored in 
depth here, but the purpose of this is to measure the ability of competitors to 
translate their propositions of trains into realised trains. This translation process is 
outside of the scope of this study, but it is interesting to note that the procurement 
taking place within the decision-laboratory does look forward to the required future 
translation.  
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One area to note is that Responsible Procurement (above) relates to the Greater 
London Assembly’s responsible procurement policies and includes sub-criteria to 
assess the Bidder’s proposals around Diversity, Strategic Labour Needs and 
Training, and Ethical Sourcing and the London Living Wage. The recommendations 
from the Government’s Review of Public Sector Procurement described earlier 
(section 6.2.5) act upon this aspect of the articulation of propositions.  
Proposals which pass stages 1 and 2 progress to stage 3 of the evaluation. 
6.2.8.3 ITN stage 3 - commercial evaluation and negotiations 
This stage produces a Total Commercial Score (TCS) for Bidders’ proposals. This is 
defined as:   
• TCS = weighted Net Present Value (NPV) Score + weighted Contractual 
Compliance Score  
The first part of the TCS, the NPV score, is effectively the costs of building and 
supplying the trains, depot, and related services, over the expected 32-year duration 
of the trains and contract. Bidders were provided with an Evaluation Model to 
complete as part of their proposals. Crossrail reserved the right to adjust Evaluation 
Models, including for inconsistencies, errors, or abnormally low tenders. Crossrail 
then ranked Bidders’ proposals relative to each other. The proposal with the lowest 
NPV (lowest cost) is awarded 100 points, with other proposals scored relative to this. 
Crossrail state that the weighted NPV score accounts for 65% of the Total 
Commercial Score (TCS). 
The second part of the TCS is the Weighted Contractual Compliance Score and this 
accounts for the remaining 35% of the TCS. This is an evaluation of how compliant 
the proposals are with the requirements of the tender. This measures any 
qualifications, or gaps, between the Proposers’ Bids and the requirements for the 
entire procurement. Evaluation criteria for this are provided to Bidders.  
Finally, Bidders are ranked in descending order of their TCS, such that the Bidder 
with the highest TCS is ranked 1st, the second highest TCS is ranked 2nd, and so on. 
Crossrail can, at its discretion, then begin to undertake negotiations with one or more 
Bidders, according to this order of ranking. 
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The OJEU notice that launched this procurement stated that the tender would be 
awarded to the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) in terms of the 
criteria stated in subsequent documentation. The most articulate proposition of a 
train is selected from within the decision-laboratory according to MEAT. 
Propositions of trains have been configured across three stages within the Crossrail 
decision-laboratory, that includes this ITN process. The most articulate proposition 
has passed stages 1 and 2, and then achieved the highest Total Commercial Score at 
stage 3. The winner can go forward towards contract award.  
6.2.8.4 ITN stage 4 – contract award  
With the withdrawal of Siemens in July 2013, the three remaining Bidders 
(Bombardier, CAF, and Hitachi) submitted revised bids in August 2013. In February 
2014, the Government and TfL announced that the £1 billion contract to supply, 
deliver, and maintain 65 new trains and a depot had been awarded to Bombardier. 
The contract was signed on 19 February 2014. The Crossrail press release (Crossrail 
Ltd, 2014) stated that 65 new trains would be manufactured and assembled at 
Bombardier’s UK plant at Derby, supporting 760 UK manufacturing jobs and 80 
apprenticeships, with around three quarters of the contract spend remaining in the 
UK economy. This press release illustrates the revised concept of how to produce 
new trains (loop 5, links and knots), with greater emphasis placed upon local 
production and impacts.  
Bombardier’s winning proposal was the most articulate proposition of a train 
produced within the decision-laboratory. TfL would now work with Bombardier on 
the final designs for the trains, as the action moves to the translation of the 
proposition into a realised train, with the first planned for delivery in May 2017.  
6.2.9 The realised trains enter service from June 2017 
In September 2015 the first test train carriage rolled off the Bombardier assembly 
line in Derby (Haylen, 2019, p. 38) and was on the local test track in August 2016. A 
phased rollout was planned for the new trains to align with progress in the wider 
Crossrail programme. This phased introduction was to start in May 2017 and 
conclude by December 2019. The first phase introduced services between Liverpool 
Street in London and Shenfield in Essex, with 7-car units used because of shorter 
platforms. The first train entered service on 22 June 2017 and replaced Class 315 4-
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car units. In July 2017, TfL awarded Bombardier a contract to supply a further five 
trains for use on the Elizabeth Line, taking its total order to 70 trains. 
Subsequent planned stages were to introduce Crossrail services to other parts of the 
network: Paddington, Heathrow Airport, Abbey Wood, Maidenhead and Reading. 
However, delays in testing the trains and integrating the signalling systems, 
especially through the tunnels under central London, delayed plans significantly. The 
central tunnels connect the eastern and western sections straight through central 
London, from Reading and Heathrow in the west to Abbey Wood and Shenfield in 
the east. The full Crossrail service was planned to be in operation by December 
2019, however, in early 2020 Crossrail Ltd stated that they expected the central 
section to open in summer 2021, with the full service planned to operate from mid-
2022. Total costs for the entire Crossrail Programme were forecast to exceed £18bn, 
compared to the £14.8bn authorised in the 2010 Spending Review (Sean Farrell and 
Gwyn Topham, 2019).  
In March 2019 TfL agreed a 20-year deal to sell and leaseback the 70 Class 345 
trains (Clinnick, 2019) to a finance company, 345 Rail Leasing. This deal raised 
£1bn for reinvestment into London Underground. Financing was always part of the 
actor-network that produced the new trains, but it was provided by different actors 
through the process.  
The final Class 345 was released from assembly at Derby by Bombardier at the end 
of Nov 2019 (RAIL, 2019, p. 28). The translation of propositions into realised trains 
was complete. However, delays with the Crossrail infrastructure project would lead 
to many of the Crossrail trains being placed in store at Old Oak Common, the depot 
built as part of this action. Despite this delay into full service, the new trains have 
been described as a “ray of light” (Dan Harvey, 2019, p. 18) in the larger troubled 
Crossrail project. The trains are in an actor-network with the infrastructure and 
delays there have meant that many trains are unable to act as trains. The expensive 
trains in store (Figure 6.18 below) have been associated with negative headlines  
(James Salmon, 2019) (loop 4, public representation).  
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Figure 6.18 Class 345 trains at Old Oak Common Depot 
Source: (James Salmon, 2019) 
Crossrail’s new Class 345 trains have been described as the “first of a new class of 
train” (National Audit Office, 2019, p. 22). They have new systems and software that 
support high throughput operations. Operating as nine carriages they are nearly twice 
the length of a tube train. Each coach has three double doors to allow the rapid 
loading and unloading of passengers. Their wide gangways between the cars allow 
people to board and then move through the train. They are designed to carry 1,500 
passengers, including seating and plenty of standing room. They can run at up to 
90mph, with fast acceleration and braking capability. These are some of the 
attributes of the trains, combined with changes to infrastructure, that collectively act 
to achieve the rapid movement of large amounts of people – in line with the goal to 
increase capacity in London.  
In terms of the focus of this research, the earlier analysis in Table 6.5 (page 219) 
found that the 9-car Class 345 trains are heavier per seat that the 4-car Class 315s 
that they replace, but their hybrid nature means they have a large total capacity of 
1,500 that includes 454 seats. The new trains weigh an average of 35.4 tonnes per car 
compared to 34.4 tonnes for the Class 315, and 33.3 tonnes for the new Siemens 
Thameslink Class 700 trains. However, the Class 345 consists of 22.5m long 
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vehicles compared with 20.2m vehicles for the Class 700 and 315. The Class 345s 
provides more floor space, which is valuable for high-capacity metro services.  
The Class 345 trains, produced by Bombardier, do not just transport people, they 
also support 760 UK manufacturing jobs, 80 apprenticeships, with an estimated 74% 
of contract spend remaining in the UK economy. This wider economic contribution 
may be produced by construction of the new trains, their ongoing maintenance, and 
further work is generated because of the experience and capability resulting from the 
Crossrail programme. Recognition for this wider set of attributes emerged during the 
process, as described earlier, and involved HM Treasury, Unite the Union, 
Bombardier, and other actors in a very public discourse regarding the nature of 
procurement within the UK and EU. These actors are not directly involved in the 
strategic decision to produce new trains, but there can be no doubt that they 
demonstrated their ability to act. A different concept (loop 5, links and knots) 
emerged for how trains should be produced. The most articulate proposition was able 
to support capacity improvements and other goals, but it also had attributes 
associated with the wider benefits of local construction.  
The fluidity of actor-networks that act and produce new trains was further illustrated 
by the financing part of this strategic decision. This changed as the strategic decision 
progressed: moving from a supplier requirement to a TfL responsibility, and finally 
back to a private financier. Financing was always part of the network, but it was 
provided by different actors in different relationships.  
The success or otherwise of the Class 345 trains will become clearer as they continue 
to rack up service miles. The movement of large amounts of people in the central 
section during peak times will reveal the public’s perception of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the new trains. Those travelling on longer journeys may not be happy 
if they are unable to find a seat or need toilet facilities. Reliability and value for 
money will also become clearer over time (National Audit Office, 2014c, p. 10), as 
costs and benefits are realised and can be compared to forecasts and models. 
What we cannot know is how the alternative propositions of trains, created by 
Hitachi and CAF, would have performed. Similarly, there were other propositions 
that were ruled out by the earlier withdrawal of Alstom and Siemens. All alternative 
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propositions of trains remain unknown in practice – they were not translated, and 
they were unable to become realised trains. 
Hitachi did not win the Crossrail procurement, but, in July 2012, they were awarded 
the £4.5Bn Intercity Express Programme contract for new trains for the Great 
Western and East Coast services. In 2011 Hitachi had selected Newton Aycliffe in 
County Durham as the site for their new UK factory. The production of this factory 
started in 2013 and it was opened in 2015. Hitachi Class 800 electro-diesel hybrid 
trains have been in service since October 2017, and Class 801 electric multiple units, 
have operated on the East Coast Main Line since September 2019.  
CAF were the other competitor who lost out to Bombardier. In 2017 CAF announced 
that its UK factory was to be the Llanwern steelworks in Newport, Wales. It has 
since built several new trains, including the Class 195 DMU and Class 331 EMU. A 
total of 58 Class 195 2-car and 3-car DMUs were built for the Eversholt Rail Group, 
a rail industry ROSCO, to be operated by Northern Trains in the north of England.  
Siemens, who withdrew from the Crossrail procurement in July 2013, went on to 
deliver the Thameslink Class 700 trains, as described earlier in this chapter.  
Alstom withdrew from the Crossrail procurement in August 2011. In 2020, Alstom 
announced a Memorandum of Understanding with Bombardier Inc. to acquire 
Bombardier Transportation.  
6.3 Summary 
Both trains reviewed here are suburban Electric Multiple Units that can transport 
large numbers of people to address capacity and congestion problems in London. 
The Class 700 and Class 345 operate as longer formations (12-car and 9-car) than the 
trains they replace. Their material and physical form acts to transport more people. 
The trains, together with wider infrastructure programmes that are upgrading local 
infrastructure, act collectively to support an increase in capacity.  
This research started with a focus upon weight (kg per seat) because of its 
importance to energy use and environmental emissions. The empirical analysis in 
Chapter 4 found that UK trains have generally been getting heavier over time, as 
measured by kg per seat. This is also the case for the Thameslink Class 700 and 
Crossrail Class 345 trains, which are heavier per seat than the Class 319 and Class 
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315 trains that they replace. The new trains have fewer seats that their predecessors. 
However, in terms of weight per car, the Class 700 trains are lighter. The Class 345 
trains are marginally heavier than some of the trains they replace, although they have 
longer carriages with more floor space and a larger overall capacity.  
Chapter 5 demonstrated that railways and trains are fluid concepts that can configure 
and re-configure a heterogenous collection of entities to act as a train. In these two 
strategic decisions the configuration of resources that act as trains can help to 
address capacity problems that have existed in this part of the network for decades. 
This capacity improvement has been achieved with trains that have been applauded 
by industry commentators for their lightweight designs, which are expected to 
deliver benefits throughout their operational life.  
To investigate how the lightweight realised trains were produced the research 
focused upon the procurement process, where propositions of trains are articulated, 
and the most articulate was selected as the winner. These procurements were 
described (section 2.4) using the metaphor of a laboratory. In the same way that the 
“laboratory is an artificial setting in which experiments are organized” (Callon, 
2001, p. 62), the procurement tender, including PQQ and ITT/ITN processes, creates 
an artificial environment, a decision-laboratory, in which propositions of trains are 
created, articulated, and evaluated.  
Each decision-laboratory included a Train Technical Specification (TTS) that 
captures and conveys the characteristics of the desired trains. The TTS is part of the 
system by which propositions of trains will be measured and judged – it helps to 
assesses whether propositions are articulate or not (adjective), but it also 
actively articulates propositions (verb). Such tools and instruments act upon and 
articulate a proposition of a train “simply by measuring it,” (Callon, 1998, pp. 23, 
25) – disciplining behaviour and the configuration of resources that make up the 
train towards the things to be measured.  
The winner from each action is the Most Economically Advantageous Tender 
(MEAT) – this is a system that is defined and measured within, and by, the decision-
laboratory. The laboratory is not a sterile environment that is isolated and excluded 
from the wider social world, rather the external world can act and change the 
definition of MEAT and activities to produce new trains. The winning proposition, 
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as defined by MEAT, is the most articulate proposition of a train. It is, by definition, 
the best articulation of a train produced within this laboratory environment – it is 
connected to, and articulated with, the decision-laboratory that was created to 
produce propositions of trains.  
ANT’s wider view of action was used as the main theoretical lens to understand how 
the propositions of trains were produced within the decision-laboratory. This 
approach abandons “the core / context model” (Latour, 1999, p. 100) that sees action 
happening in a core of activity, within a context that provides a background to the 
real action. In both recent procurements the context has proven to be active, with 
interventions from ‘outside’ of the immediate procurement leading to disruptions to 
timescales, changes in the nature of the process, arguably contributing to some actors 
(Siemens, Alstom) exiting the process, and changing the concept of how trains 
should be produced. The Global Financial Crisis, HM Treasury, the London Mayor, 
threatened jobs in Derby and associated supply chains, newspaper headlines, and 
unions have all demonstrated their ability to act, and to shape the strategic decisions 
and production of propositions of trains. Relegating them to context and background 
does not reflect their contribution to this social process of production. 
Latour’s model (Figure 2.2, page 54 and Figure 5.1, page 114) has five circulating 
loops of activities and it was used to understand the articulation of propositions of 
trains within the decision-laboratory. Each of these loops is as important as the other 
to understand action. There is no inner core and surrounding context. The following 
sections summarise the research findings across each loop in the two strategic 
decisions investigated in this chapter.  
6.3.1 Loop 1: mobilisation of the world (instruments) 
This loop is about practices that mobilise the real world. Propositions are 
strengthened by connecting them with an external world that is mobilised and 
brought into the decision-laboratory. In these strategic decisions we do not have 
trains running on the real Thameslink and Crossrail networks, but we do have 
propositions of trains, in various forms, being shaped and evaluated on 
representations and models of the rail network. The current and future infrastructure 
on which the trains will operate is represented in technical documentation, computer 
models and other forms. Thameslink brings London underground tunnels into the 
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action in the Train Infrastructure Interface Specification (TIIS), which represents the 
tight tunnels and the need for emergency evacuation through the ends of the train, 
rather than the sides. Crossrail uses a software package to model Bidders’ 
propositions of trains against a model of the infrastructure and a model benchmark 
train created by Crossrail and others. The electric supply network for the trains is 
brought into the action, but the modelled network is considered to be 100% 
receptive, when calculating the return of power from the train’s regenerative braking 
systems. This may not be the case for the real network.  
The complex socio-material reality of a train is simplified, abstracted, and 
represented in a Train Technical Specification (TTS) developed for each 
procurement. This articulates various attributes of the desired trains against which 
propositions will be measured. For example, train acceleration and speed are 
measured by bringing in real places, and the timings of the current service. The 
Thameslink procurement used the Bedford to Farringdon route, together with 
timings for the current Class 319 services. The Crossrail procurement used the 
Shenfield to Tottenham Court Road route and stated that this must be achieved in 47 
minutes, including stopping patterns and dwell times. Bidders did not have to run 
real trains on these real routes, but they did need to use the approved practices to 
demonstrate their propositions of trains achieving these targets. The test routes 
represent the rest of the network and propositions are strengthened when they 
demonstrate their performance on these ‘test tracks’ that have been mobilised and 
brought into the decision-laboratory.  
6.3.2 Loop 2: autonomisation (colleagues) 
The second loop considers the actions of industry insiders in this collective action. 
This includes the colleagues, professions, disciplines, “organisations, resources, 
statutes, and regulations” (Latour, 1999, p. 103) that are closely associated with the 
production of new trains. There are a diverse group of institutions and colleagues 
within this loop, and they strengthen the network and articulation of propositions 
with their expertise. The early stage of network formation is developed within the 
railway and related professions.  
The DfT sponsored the Thameslink procurement for several reasons, including a 
desire to reduce long term costs to the whole rail system. Crossrail Ltd, a wholly 
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owned subsidiary of Transport for London, jointly sponsored the Crossrail 
procurement, because integration with the wider programme was critical. The 
institutions are Prime Movers in the earlier analysis. They issue a call for expressions 
of interest and respondents must demonstrate their relevant experience if they are to 
be considered for inclusion within the network. Respondents are provided with a list 
of stakeholders, although they are not allowed to make contact without the 
permission of DfT or Crossrail. The lists identify industry stakeholders who are 
responsible for different parts of the railway, such as Network Rail, the Rail Safety 
and Standards Board (RSSB), rail regulator, and others. The Bidders themselves are 
global train manufacturers and are part of this group colleagues and professionals. 
They have specialist knowledge and skills related to the production of new trains, but 
that does not imply uniformity regarding the best ways to produce trains. 
The most notable feature of this loop for the two strategic decisions is arguably 
related to an absent member. As described in Chapter 5, at the time of privatisation 
British Rail’s rolling stock was sold to three ROSCOs (rolling stock companies). 
Their industry role was to own and maintain the rolling stock, and lease it to train 
operating companies, who would operate the train service. Although both strategic 
decisions involve the procurement of new rolling stock, there are no ROSCOs 
directly involved. Instead a mini-ROSCO (Butcher, 2017, p. 6) was effectively 
created by the Thameslink tender, with the Siemens-led consortium arranging 
financial capital to build the trains, which was recovered by lease payments from the 
Train Operating Company. No ROSCO was originally involved in the Crossrail 
procurement, but the ownership of the trains changed. The initial intention was, like 
Thameslink, for the winning supplier to finance and own the trains. However, this 
changed to public ownership by TfL, until March 2019 when TfL sold the trains to a 
leasing organisation, which can effectively be considered as a new mini-ROSCO.  
The ROSCOs omission from these procurements, and the changing sources of 
finance, further demonstrates a fluidity in the actors that produce new trains.  
6.3.3 Loop 3: alliances (allies) 
This loop strengthens the networks producing the new trains by reaching out and 
connecting the articulation of propositions with a wider set of alliances. The 
translation of the most articulate proposition into a realised train requires financial 
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capital. This brings in allies beyond rail that can provide equity, debt, and other 
forms of finance, insurance, and risk management. The Crossrail action created an 
alliance with local businesses, who would benefit from the improved services and 
contributed to the Crossrail programme via a supplement to London business rates. 
Allies support the action and make the network more robust in response to any 
destabilising forces that may seek to detract from the network, or to support 
competing outcomes. 
The railway also creates alliances because it can be a significant construction 
enterprise, as well as a provider of transportation services. The Crossrail 
procurement references Heathrow Airport Limited, Canary Wharf Group, Berkeley 
Homes and others who are allies connected to this action. These relationships may be 
formed because of the construction and development activity of Crossrail, or because 
of the future services when they become operational. For example, faster 
connections to Heathrow will form an alliance between the trains, railway, and 
Heathrow. This alliance strengthens the network producing new trains for Crossrail.  
The geographic spread of railway services means that they often travel through 
several political constituencies, with the resulting entanglement of political leaders 
and organisations within those geographies. The award of Thameslink to Siemens 
drew in political representatives for Derby, home to Bombardier’s factory. Threats to 
the local labour and supply chains created alliances, that did not reverse the 
Thameslink decision, but they did change how these strategic decisions were made 
in the future. The Treasury was effectively brought into the network, when they 
issued supplementary guidance to the Green Book, clarifying how wider costs and 
benefits should be recognised. The Bombardier proposition of a train, developed 
within the Crossrail procurement, was strengthened by alliances in the Derby area 
and with local supply chains.  
6.3.4 Loop 4: public representation 
The fourth loop represents a movement of this action into the wider public domain, 
with the public mobilised and represented in various ways in the actions to produce 
new trains.  
The public who travels on railways are drawn into these actions through their 
experience as passengers. If the railways are congested, then there is likely to be 
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positive support from passengers for actions to increase capacity. However, 
passengers will only see this benefit when the realised trains, and associated 
infrastructure improvements, are complete. In the case of Thameslink, a full service 
is in operation and the public can experience the trains. However, a full service is not 
yet operating for Crossrail, because of delays to the wider infrastructure programme. 
The Crossrail trains have all been delivered and are ready for service, but newspaper 
pictures show idle trains sitting at the newly built depot. Until the trains and 
signalling systems in the new central sections are safely tested together, then the 
trains cannot provide the service and deliver on the promise to the passenger.  
Passenger Focus and London TravelWatch are institutions that represented 
passenger interests during these strategic decisions. Their research found that 3 + 2 
seating was universally unpopular among passengers. This research acted and this 
form of seating was forbidden in both procurements, which contributed to a reduced 
number of seats on the new trains, compared to their predecessors. How passengers 
perceive the availability of fewer seats, especially on longer journeys, will be 
discovered over time. Passenger standing room was represented in both 
procurements, which required the propositions of trains to carry people standing at a 
density of 4 passengers per square metre. Again, the effectiveness of this 
representation will be revealed over time, with COVID-19 highlighting fundamental 
problems with such assumptions in 2020.  
Passengers and their comfort are mobilised in both procurements, but this is not real 
people sitting on real chairs, rather it is comfort indices and standards for ride 
comfort (British Standards, 1999), which are interacting with fire and safety 
standards regarding the materials used in seats. The propositions of trains produced 
within both procurements were required to have seats that achieved levels of comfort 
measured by a comfort index. The comfort index represented passengers and their 
comfort. However, complaints about the new Thameslink trains talked about “bone 
hard fabric seats with poor legroom" (RAIL Opinion, 2017, p. 57) and headlines in 
national newspapers have described “ironing board seats” (Graeme Paton, 2018). 
The models of comfort are being revised (RSSB, 2019) and updated.  
There are various other ways in which the public is brought into both procurements. 
People with disabilities are represented though legislation for Persons with Reduced 
Mobility (PRM) that is a mandatory requirement for passenger trains from 1 January 
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2020. Neighbours to the railway are recognised in the Crossrail procurement, which 
highlights potential negative impacts from noises associated with the railway and 
encourages propositions that address these concerns. The movement of people 
through gangways between carriages is important to allow congestion to be eased. 
The required width of this gangway is defined by Crossrail as the width of two 95th 
percentile adult UK male passengers. These adult UK males are brought into this 
action in the form of statistics (also loop 1, mobilisation of the world).  
Understanding how the wider public is mobilised is relevant to all strategic decisions 
and actions. The strategic decisions of interest here are to produce new passenger 
trains. This might suggest that it is even more important to ensure that propositions 
of trains are strengthened and made more articulate with a wider public, as 
represented by this loop.  
6.3.5 Loop 5: links and knots 
The fifth loop, links and knots, can be considered as the conceptual knot that holds 
the heterogenous collection of resources together. This could be the collection of 
resources that acts as a train, or the collections of resources that comes together to 
produce a proposition of a train. Chapter 5 showed how the concept of the railways 
and trains has changed over time and this can reconfigure the heterogenous 
collection of resources required to produce new trains and deliver a railway service.  
It was proposed at the end of Chapter 5 that the concept of the railways at the time of 
these procurements could be described as industry-led integration within the 
functionally specialised and contractual railway. This admittedly inelegant 
description seeks to capture the privatisation concept, with railway functions split 
among specialists, but also increased motivation within the industry to join-up, 
sometimes despite the incentives that can exist. The action to produce new trains 
reflects this concept. In each action DfT and Crossrail took on the role of sponsors 
because of the need for a long-term and industry-wide perspective. This was required 
to deliver trains that achieved wider industry goals, rather than the narrow goals of 
any specialist within the railways. The Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCO) were 
created at privatisation, however they were notably absent from these actions. These 
actions are effectively producing a mini-ROSCO (Butcher, 2017, p. 6).  
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The concept of how to produce new trains – the links and knots – can be seen to have 
shifted during the period of these two procurements. The concept at the centre of the 
early Thameslink strategic decision included financing for the trains and depots that 
was to be provided by the Bidders. Trains were to be produced this way, until it 
became unviable when the Global Financial Crisis and Eurozone problems made it 
difficult for private companies to access credit markets. The financing part of this 
production moved into the public sector, before returning to private sector provision 
as credit markets re-opened. The links and knots locked in financing as part of this 
action, but there was a fluidity demonstrated in how resources were configured to 
achieve this.  
The Thameslink strategic decision led to headlines of job losses and the closure of 
Bombardier’s Derby factory. The production of new trains became publicly 
connected to employees, apprenticeships, unions, politicians, communities, 
newspapers, national self-interest, and the Treasury, who recognised the “wider costs 
and benefits of infrastructure spending and investment” (HM Treasury, 2011b, p. 9). 
The Treasury’s supplementary guidance was brought into the Crossrail strategic 
decision. Recognition of the extended network associated with the production of new 
trains led to a modified concept of how trains should be produced. The specialist 
focus of privatisation has been modified to recognise the importance of where the 
train was built, and how this strategic decision was connected to the local and 
national economy.  
Both strategic decisions made their selection on the broad basis of the ‘most 
economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT) (House of Commons Transport 
Committee, 2011, p. 12). Each procurement then went on to describe to participants 
how it defined MEAT. The production of these new trains forbade the use of 3 + 2 
seating, because passenger feedback said it did not produce a good passenger 
experience. The new trains produced have been recognised for their lightweight 
designs that will help with acceleration and deceleration for high throughput, but will 
also save energy, maintenance costs, and environmental emissions. The concept of 
MEAT is defined by, and within, the decision laboratory, and it can mean 
whatever we want it to mean. Looking beyond these two strategic decisions, the 
National Audit Office has pointed out that “transforming the transport system, 
supporting economic growth and other national aspirations” (National Audit Office, 
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2014b, p. 7) were objectives for High Speed 1 (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) and 
High Speed 2 (the planned high speed link from London to the North). These 
objectives go beyond meeting immediate transport needs and recognises a wider role 
for rail and transport.  
The actor-network that performs as a train is a material-semiotic configuration of 
physical objects that are caught up and shaped in relations that carry meanings (Law 
and Allaskuvla, 2019). The concept of the railway has changed over time, it has 
changed during the two strategic decisions discussed in this chapter, and it will 
continue to change in the future. Different meanings will produce different trains. 
If we want trains to be lightweight, then these actions provide good evidence 
that we can make them lightweight. Weight is one of many attributes associated 
with different collections of resources that can all act as trains. Giving 
preference and priority to weight is likely to produce lightweight designs, but 
this will impact other desirable and non-desirable attributes. Our decision-
laboratories are great places to experiment and create the trains that we want.  
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7 Reflections and Conclusions 
The introduction to this thesis described strategic decisions taking place at Rainhill 
in 1829, and more than 180 years later with Thameslink and Crossrail. Three 
strategic decisions at two different points in time, but all, ostensibly, seeking the 
‘best’ trains for their railways. This juxtaposition was used to show the changes, and 
many similarities, common to such strategic decisions. This chapter returns to these 
three cases and uses them to illustrate some of the main lessons learnt during the 
development of this thesis. This starts with a reflection on how Actor-Network 
Theory has helped to think about and understand strategic decision-making.  
7.1 How to understand strategic decision-making 
Models of decision-making often describe a progressive shift from instability to 
stability, or convergence around the final selection, as “multiple possibilities are 
progressively narrowed down until a single outcome is achieved” (Dugdale, 1999, p. 
131). Each of the three cases do fit this description. Decisions are made to award the 
Rainhill prize to Robert Stephenson, and the contracts for Thameslink and Crossrail 
are awarded to Siemens and Bombardier, respectively. However, using the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2, the concept of converging upon a single 
outcome can be defined more precisely as converging upon a particular proposition 
of a train. Stephenson’s Rocket was the winner because it was the best proposition 
of a train at Rainhill. Siemens and Crossrail are the winners because they were the 
best propositions of trains in the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements. The 
selection of a proposition can be considered as an outcome, but it is an outcome 
which needs to be translated to become a realised train before its use and value is 
tested in the real world. It is the realised train that carries passengers, moves goods, 
consumes energy, produces emissions, and has other attributes of interest. 
The metaphor of a decision-laboratory was introduced in Chapter 2 to characterise 
the strategic decisions taking place at Rainhill and for Thameslink and Crossrail. 
This metaphor aimed to capture the exploratory and experimental nature of what is 
taking place – a characteristic that can easily get lost in the idea of decision-making 
as a rational selection process. Calling the ordeal at Rainhill a decision, or even a 
strategic decision, does not really capture the hissing, spitting experiments taking 
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place in front of cheering crowds. The Thameslink and Crossrail procurements did 
not involve experiments taking place at a single physical location, like Rainhill, but 
these actions exploded into front page headlines when there were potential threats to 
jobs and local economies connected with the decisions. The five-loop model, 
described in Chapter 2, was used to understand the action within this place – the 
decision-laboratory – where propositions are articulated. What follows is a summary 
of this model applied to Rainhill and the two recent strategic decisions.  
At Rainhill we have a model track (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) to simulate the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway (L&MR), which is not yet complete. Competitors’ 
locomotives are no taller than fifteen feet from the ground to the top of the chimney, 
because they were given this height limit that represented tunnels and other parts of 
the real railway infrastructure. A weighing machine at the site measured the 
contenders and their load to carry, which was allocated using an agreed approach. 
Weight and the weighing machine effectively represented damage to the track, fuel 
costs, and the ability of motive power to haul people and goods. Locomotives hauled 
rocks and stones to represent passengers and goods that they would carry in the 
future. Timing points were used to assess speed, with positions on the test track 
marked and monitored by timekeepers. Competing locomotives were required to run 
back and forth 10 times on the test track, with this distance equivalent to the real 
Liverpool to Manchester railway. At the end of each run, Judges, appointed by 
L&MR, recorded the time, and the quantity of fuel and water used, which provided 
an estimate for future operational performance.  
In 1829 there were only 50 locomotives in the world. The railway profession (loop 2, 
autonomization) was developing and mostly based around coal mines and stationary 
steam engines. The emergence of a new profession is evident in the judges appointed 
by L&MR Directors for the Rainhill trials – a chief engineer of a colliery, a steam 
engine factory owner, and an inventor of cotton spinning machinery. The Rocket 
locomotive was built by Robert Stephenson, the son of George Stephenson, who 
built the Stockton & Darlington Railway in 1825, discussed in Chapter 5. The early 
locomotive pioneers at Rainhill each brought their own ideas about how to make 
locomotives and there were very visibly different designs. The engineers, and the 
developing profession of locomotive design, were constantly finding new ways to 
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make locomotives act and overcome challenges, such as the ability to consume their 
own smoke and ensure safe operation of high-pressure boilers near people.  
The promise of cheaper and better-quality transport created many alliances (loop 3, 
alliances) with local traders, merchants, bankers, politicians, and others. The 
Directors of the L&MR, who offered the prize at Rainhill, were also local merchants 
and traders from Liverpool and Manchester. These allies provide support to help 
progress this action and make the network more resilient to overcome forces of 
resistance. Those opposed to this action, including the existing road and canal 
networks, would try to stop it, but if there were objections at the time, they failed to 
stop the action progressing.  
The public (loop 4, public representation) were given a grandstand to watch the 
Rainhill Trials. Mixed with the excitement for the new locomotive engines there was 
also a fear, no doubt increased by the noise, smell, and early reliability problems and 
risks associated with high pressurised steam engines. To comply with the Act that 
permitted development of the railway every Engine in the competition was 
constructed to use coke, which produces low emissions of smoke – the coke acted to 
reduce smoke. Acceptance of these new creatures was evident when, on the final 
day, the public were happily taking free rides and travelling at speed on 
Stephenson’s Rocket. 
The different loops of the ordeal at Rainhill are held together (loop 5, links and 
knots) by the need to identify if locomotives were an acceptable method of power to 
move people and goods – to act as a railway. At this time, railways could be formed 
using horses, gravity or even people as power sources. Engines increasingly became 
part of the railway, but this was initially in the form of stationary engines hauling 
carriages via ropes and pulleys. Stationary engines were more robust than early 
locomotives and did not pose weight problems for early fragile track. An earlier 
report that led to Rainhill had found marginally in favour of stationary engines. 
Locomotives are under trial at Rainhill, to determine if they can act as a train safely, 
efficiently, and effectively. Chapter 5 characterised the concept of the railways 
following Rainhill as a multiplicity of local railways, reflecting the individual and 
bespoke nature of these networks that were configured for their specific 
circumstances and geographies. The collection of resources that could act as a train 
and provide a railway service was visibly diverse at this time.  
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Like Rainhill, the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements do not have trains running 
on the real Thameslink and Crossrail networks. However, modelled parts of the route 
are brought into the laboratory (loop 1, mobilisation of the world) as timing points to 
measure acceleration and speed. Thameslink uses the Bedford to Farringdon route. 
Crossrail uses the Shenfield to Tottenham Court Road route. Instead of the 
stipulations and conditions produced at Rainhill, we have Train Technical 
Specifications (TTS) and other documentation, that described how competing 
propositions of trains will be measured and assessed. Bidders need to use approved 
practices – instrumentation and measurement tools – to demonstrate that their 
propositions can achieve targets and performance requirements. Propositions of 
trains are tested using the current, and future, infrastructure that is represented in the 
laboratory. Propositions of trains for Thameslink must work with London 
underground tunnels, that have limited side access. Crossrail uses a software package 
to model Bidders’ propositions of trains against the modelled infrastructure. The 
future infrastructure, on which the propositions are operating, has longer platforms 
and can accept regenerated power from the trains’ regenerative braking systems, 
whereas this capability does not exist on the real railway at the time of these strategic 
decisions.  
When Crossrail and Thameslink issue a call for expressions of interest, they receive 
responses from global rolling stock manufacturers (loop 2, autonomization), 
experienced in producing many different types of trains. These institutions have 
specialist knowledge and skills related to the production of new trains, but that does 
not imply uniformity regarding the best ways to produce trains. The Bidders are 
provided with a list of industry stakeholders, who are responsible for different parts 
of the railway, such as Network Rail, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), 
rail regulator, and others. The development of propositions within the laboratory 
must connect (articulate) with these industry institutions and activities. The most 
notable feature of the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements is arguably the 
absence of ROSCOs (rolling stock companies) demonstrating a fluidity in the 
configuration of resources to produce propositions of new trains. Thameslink 
effectively create a mini-ROSCO (Butcher, 2017, p. 6), whereas Crossrail adopt 
public financing and ownership, before also moving to a mini-ROSCO in March 
2019, when TfL sold the trains to a leasing organisation.  
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The benefits of improved services resulting from Crossrail created an alliance (loop 
3, alliances) with local businesses, who contributed to the Crossrail programme via a 
supplement to London business rates. Further alliances were formed with Heathrow, 
through the connection between the airport and central London. Housing developers 
were brought into the network, with new developments along the route. Both 
strategic decisions build relationships because of associated construction and 
development work, as well as the benefits of future services. Political representatives 
for Derby, home to Bombardier’s factory and local suppliers, were drawn into the 
action with the award of Thameslink to Siemens. This did not reverse the 
Thameslink decision, but the Treasury was subsequently brought into the action 
when they issued supplementary guidance for future decisions, including Crossrail.  
Crossrail and Thameslink may not have had a grandstand, but the public (loop 4, 
public representation) who travel on these railways are involved in these actions as 
passengers. Experience of congestion on old trains is likely to generate support from 
passengers, but delayed delivery into service may lead to frustration. Passenger 
Focus and London TravelWatch are institutions that represented passenger interests, 
with their research shaping the trains, especially the seating configurations. 
Passengers and their comfort are mobilised in both procurements using comfort 
indices, which perhaps did not prove too representative given subsequent complaints 
regarding seat comfort and leg room of the realised trains. People with disabilities 
are represented in the action though legislation and research. Neighbours are in the 
laboratory, represented in documentation that encourages reduced noise levels 
associated with railway operations and depot activity. The required width of the 
gangway between Crossrail cars should allow two 95th percentile adult UK male 
passengers to pass.  
Chapter 6 discussed in detail what is at the centre of, and holding together (loop 5, 
links and knots), the different loops of the Thameslink and Crossrail actions. 
Capacity was key to the early problematisation of the trains, and both actions are 
achieving this through new trains connected to (articulated with) infrastructure 
improvements. The concept of the railway at this time was characterised as industry-
led integration within the functionally specialised and contractual railway. Both DfT 
and Crossrail took on roles in response to known industry problems, as they sought 
to bring a long-term and industry-wide perspective to these strategic decisions. The 
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concept of the railway appeared to develop during each procurement, with a greater 
value placed upon where the train was built, and how this strategic decision was 
connected to the local and national economy.  
So, we have activities taking place across five circulating loops, within decision-
laboratories that are actively involved in the production of propositions of trains. In 
each case a convergence does take place, and a winner is identified. We could say 
that the Judges selected Rocket as the winner, according to pre-agreed stipulations 
and conditions. However, those stipulations and conditions were modified during the 
process to reflect new knowledge formed during the Trials. The Judges were not 
removed observers neutrally applying rules, rather they were actively engaged in this 
action, gathering timing data, recording fuel consumed, and providing opinions when 
the conditions and stipulations needed to be adapted, as was the case with Novelty 
and Sans Pareil. DfT and Crossrail also produced pre-agreed criteria, against which 
they judged Bidders. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, external events delayed 
and modified the process to identify winning propositions. Like at Rainhill, rules and 
timetables were clarified and modified. In both Thameslink and Crossrail, the 
winning bid will be the Most Economically Advantageous Tender, but MEAT is not 
like gravity, a property or force out there. On the contrary, MEAT is defined within 
the laboratory and can be re-defined according to the needs of the laboratory. 
Strategic decision-making often implies that there is an “actor who actively chooses” 
(Mol, 1999, p. 74), but that does not fit the picture described here. Instead, of an 
actor choosing I propose that the winner is the best proposition of a train 
produced by the laboratory. Decision-laboratories are valuable places that support 
and enable decision-making. They are not passive and removed from the action 
taking place to shape and develop propositions of trains. The decision-laboratory is 
an active site of development in the production of propositions. Whether this is a 
good decision will become clear over time as the realised trains enter service.  
The strategic decision taking place in 1829 used Rainhill as a decision-laboratory for 
experiments to find the best locomotive for the L&MR. The winner was the one that 
is most articulate to, or connected with, the laboratory and the experiments taking 
place there. Rocket was the only locomotive to complete 10 laps twice, for a total of 
70 miles. Novelty achieved a higher average speed (15mph vs Rocket’s 14.2mph) but 
failed to complete the return leg. Sans Pareil completed 27 ½ miles but used 2.3 lbs. 
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of coke per ton per mile, compared to 0.91 lbs per ton per mile for Rocket. At this 
laboratory excited onlookers became passengers, as Stephenson gave them rides – a 
mass in motion involving people, instead of the stones used during the experiments. 
Stephenson’s Rocket, and his other locomotives, went on to become realised trains 
operating as part of a successful railway between Liverpool and Manchester.  
Thameslink and Crossrail also involve a decision-laboratory and experiments to find 
the best trains for their railways. They do not have a physical test track, like at 
Rainhill, but use computer models and simulations. Attributes of the propositions are 
measured and assessed against the modelled railway. For example, the modelled 
electric supply network can accept power from the onboard regenerative braking of 
propositions of trains, even though the real network may not be able to do this, at 
least for now. Passengers are not in a grandstand, but they are represented by 
industry institutions, legislation, in research reports, in models of comfort, and 
statistics regarding body size and width. The realised trains for Thameslink and 
Crossrail have been applauded by industry experts for their lightweight designs, that 
are expected to deliver benefits through their expected 35-year life. However, unlike 
Rocket they are not competing with stagecoaches running on rutted ground, and 
Thameslink passengers have expressed dissatisfaction with ironing board seats. 
Despite this specific problem, judging the success of these new trains will take more 
time to develop a fuller picture of their performance in operational service.  
To conclude, strategic decision-making can be understood as a collective action, 
that occurs within a metaphorical decision-laboratory, that produces 
propositions. These decision-laboratories are valuable places, in which 
propositions are actively developed through a collective effort that reaches out 
across five circulating loops. The winning proposition is the most articulate 
within the laboratory – it is articulated with (connected to) the laboratory – but 
it remains, effectively, a good guess. The effectiveness of the laboratory, and this 
guess, will be discovered later, when the proposition is translated into its realised 
form.  
A chart (Figure 1.5) showing trains getting heavier over time provided the frustrating 
starting point for this research. The next section uses this understanding of strategic 
decision-making to help explain why passenger trains have got heavier over time.  
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7.2 Explaining heavy trains 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 found supporting evidence for an increase in 
weight per passenger seat. Across a large dataset of different types of passenger 
trains the average weight per seat for those introduced during the 1970s (Table 4.9, 
page 109), was 493 kg/seat, which increased to 524 (1980s), 577 (1990s), and then 
748 for trains introduced during the 2000s. This dropped back to 707 kg/seat for the 
most recent trains, introduced since 2010, but this is still an increase over earlier 
decades. The analysis found that this was attributable to both increasing vehicle 
weight and a reduction in the number of passenger seats. An average car in a trainset 
introduced during the 1970s weighed 34.3 tonnes, and carried 70 passengers, 
whereas those introduced during the 2000s weighed an average of 44.6 tonnes and 
carried 60 passengers.  
Weight increase is not an inevitability. The analysis of suburban Electric Multiple 
Units (EMUs) found a reduction in vehicle weight for the most recent trains, which 
includes the Thameslink and Crossrail trains, although they provided fewer seats 
than their predecessors. A suburban EMU train, introduced after 2010, weighed an 
average of 33.9 tonnes per car – lighter than trains introduced during previous 
decades in the analysis. However, suburban EMU trains introduced after 2010 only 
had 54 passenger seats per car on average, compared to earlier trains with 69 to 81 
seats per car.  
A train was described in Chapter 2 as a material-semiotic entity – it consists of 
physical and material things caught up, and shaped, in relations (Law and 
Allaskuvla, 2019). A collection of resources – human and non-human – act, 
collectively, as a train. Different actor-networks can act as trains in different ways, 
and they will have different attributes, such as weight, and the number of passenger 
seats. To understand why one train is heavier than another, we could simply list the 
material things that make up the train, and add up their individual weights, to arrive 
at the total weight of the train. Although this could provide some useful insights, it 
does not explain why those different material things have been brought into this 
network and configured in this way. To understand why a particular configuration of 
material objects exists, we need to understand the meaning attached to relationships 
between those objects. The analysis in Chapter 6 allows us to do this for the 
Thameslink and Crossrail actions.  
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To understand how heavy trains were produced, we can look to the recent 
Thameslink and Crossrail procurements that have bucked the historical trend of 
increasing train weight. Thameslink and Crossrail have produced notably lightweight 
realised trains, albeit with fewer seats. These realised trains, running on the 
Thameslink and Crossrail networks, were translated from earlier propositions of 
trains. To understand the lightweight realised trains, we need to understand the 
propositions. Without access to the commercially sensitive bid documents, it is not 
possible to know for sure that these earlier propositions also had attributes of 
lightweight and fewer seats, however the analysis in Chapter 6 investigated how 
propositions were articulated within each decision-laboratory.  
In terms of weight, we know that the Thameslink procurement did not mandate a 
weight limit for the propositions of trains, but the Train Technical Specification 
(TTS) articulated that a full-length unit should weigh less than 401 tonnes (TTS 
5.3.1). The actual weight of the 12-car Class 700 train (the realised train) is 399.6 
tonnes. We know that Crossrail did mandate a specific weight target, with a full-
length unit required not to exceed 350 tonnes (TTS 3.5.1.1). The actual weight of the 
9-car Class 345 train (the realised train) delivered into service is 318.4 tonnes.  
Like the weighing machine for competitors at Rainhill, both procurements measured 
and scored weight as part of the action to identify the most articulate proposition. For 
Thameslink, we can say that weight (TTS 5.3, Unit mass) attracted a score7 of 
0.8064% of the total, which is small, but significantly larger than, for example, the 
score8 of 0.1638% given to comfort. Crossrail propositions were given a mandatory 
target (described above), but weight was further assessed and scored beyond this. 
The weight targets accounted for a maximum of 3.2% 9 compared, for example, to 
1% 10 for comfort. Both scoring systems suggest that weight was relatively important 
in the articulation of propositions of trains taking place within these decision-
laboratories, at least when compared to comfort, as an example.  
In terms of the seating available on these propositions of trains, we know that 
Thameslink had articulated (TTS 5.2.1) a minimum level of seating (572 standard, 
 
7 12% (Unit mass) x 16% (Unit requirements) x 60% (TTS) x 70% (Technical Requirements) 
8 3% (Ride Quality) x 13% (Train wide functions) x 60% (TTS) x 70% (Technical Requirements) 
9 40% (Unit weight targets) x 8% (Energy and weight)  
10 10% (Ride and Stability) x 10% (Physical behaviour) 
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48 first class) required for full-length units. This total of 620 seats compares with the 
Class 700/1 12-car Thameslink realised train, which has 672 seats in total. The 
Crossrail procurement required propositions to have at least 450 seats and total 
capacity (seated and standing) (TTS 3.34.3.2) to be a minimum of 1,500 passengers. 
The Crossrail Class 345 realised train, subsequently delivered by Bombardier, has 
454 seats and 1,500 total capacity.  
Both procurements also articulated aspects of how the seats should be configured, 
with 3 + 2 seating explicitly forbidden in both the Thameslink and Crossrail actions. 
This type of seating, which had been used on some of the trains being replaced, was 
disliked by passengers, according to research brought into the action (Passenger 
Focus and London Travel Watch, 2008, p. ii). Crossrail also required a distribution 
of approximately 2/3rd longitudinal to transverse seating, reflecting the hybrid nature 
of this metro and mainline service.  
Therefore, the lightweight Class 700 and Class 345 realised trains can be explained 
by a decision-laboratory that articulated weight as an important attribute. Fewer seats 
can be explained by passengers’ dislike of 3 + 2 seating, with their feelings 
represented in the action taking place within the decision-laboratory by institutions 
and research. We do not know how the weightings given to different desired 
attributes were derived, but we do know that DfT and Crossrail took a leadership 
role for the procurement, because of a recognised need for a long-term and industry-
wide perspective for new trains with expected 35-year lives. We do not know 
whether other bidders produced propositions with less weight and more seats than 
Siemens and Bombardier. This was the case at Rainhill, where Novelty was the 
lightest competitor, however weight was only part of the articulation of a winning 
proposition. The winning Bidders for Thameslink and Crossrail produced 
propositions that were articulate with their respective decision-laboratories. In the 
case of the Crossrail procurement, articulation also included revised guidelines for 
responsible procurement issued by the Treasury, which emphasised the wider social 
and environmental impacts associated with such strategic decisions.  
If we look beyond the attributes of weight and the number of seats, then we can 
clearly see the need for increased capacity in the bodies of both trains. Capacity was 
a critical objective, and central to the early problematisation identified by DfT and 
Crossrail. The Crossrail Class 345 has three pairs of wide double doors per car, the 
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Thameslink Class 700 has two pairs per car, and both trains have these doors 
centrally located to support a high throughput of passengers with quick loading and 
unloading. Not all trains are like this. For example, Class 158 Diesel Multiple Units 
(DMUs) were introduced in 1989 and have been used across various parts of the UK 
network, including longer distance services, such as Liverpool to Norwich. Unlike 
the Class 345 and Class 700 trains they have a pair of narrow double doors at each 
end of a car. The narrow width of the Class 158 doors means that passengers must 
queue to leave the trains, which does not support rapid loading and unloading, 
however this configuration still acts as a train. The Class 158 may have attributes 
that produce longer dwell-time at stations, but it may have positive attributes, such as 
reduced heat loss in the carriages compared to trains with large double width doors. 
There are many ways to arrange resources to act as trains.  
Given what we know about the production of propositions for Thameslink and 
Crossrail, which were translated to become the lightweight Class 700 and Class 345 
trains, then it is possible to infer that heavy trains (kg per seat) were translated from 
earlier propositions, produced in, and by, decision-laboratories that were inarticulate 
with respect to train weight relative to seating. Producing lightweight trains, or trains 
with other desirable attributes, requires decision-laboratories that are articulate to 
weight. Decision-laboratories are active places in which propositions are articulated. 
Propositions of trains can be configured, and re-configured, much more easily than 
realised trains. Experiments taking place in a decision-laboratory allow us to test 
different propositions before we select the most articulate to go forward for 
translation into a realised train.  
However, the articulation of propositions of trains in a decision-laboratory cannot 
avoid certain challenges that affect all strategic decisions. These challenges can lead 
to problems and dissatisfaction that are discovered later as propositions are translated 
into their realised form. Each of these challenges are explored next.  
7.3 Three challenges for strategic decision-making: treachery, 
adaptability, and change 
The strategic decision to produce new trains involves the articulation of propositions 
of trains, with one (usually) proposition chosen as the winner, which is then 
translated into a realised train. The metaphorical decision-laboratory in which 
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propositions are produced, articulated, and a winner is selected, was described in 
Chapter 2 as a manufactured environment that exists for a specific purpose – to 
produce a best guess, or estimate, of a train to operate in the future on the railway of 
interest. An ideal situation would be for a decision-laboratory (procurement etc) to 
produce a strong field of propositions, with the most articulate proposition (the best 
guess) selected and then translated into a realised train, which was subsequently 
discovered to be a great train. This is not a naïve model that ignores, for example, 
bribery and corruption influencing the selection of the winner. Quite the opposite, 
producing a best guess requires a decision-laboratory that actively seeks to eliminate 
these types of distortions, using whistle-blower processes, and so on. Ways to 
improve strategic decision-making will be discussed later. However, if we assume 
that the decision-laboratory is set up to produce a best guess of the best train to 
operate on the railway, then there are three challenges that can stop this happening. 
These challenges impact the effectiveness of all strategic decision-making.  
7.3.1 The treachery of model trains 
The first challenge to the effectiveness of strategic decision-making relates to 
treachery. This treachery arises because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the gap between 
the world of language and the real world “shows no sign of being filled” (Latour, 
1999, p. 148), because our symbols, thoughts and representations are not the thing 
(referent) to which we refer.  
Propositions of trains, and realised trains, are distinct entities that exist in two 
separate worlds that could be described as a laboratory world, and an operational 
world. The laboratory world aspires to represent the operational world, but there is a 
gap that cannot be bridged. The title of this thesis, The Treachery of Strategic 
Decision, borrows from René Magritte’s The Treachery of Images. This treachery is 
illustrated with the diagram below, showing Magritte’s painting next to a model train 
of Rocket and a representation of the Thameslink and Crossrail propositions 
contained in “around 7,000 pages” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011, 
p. 63) of documents.  
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Figure 7.1 Borrowing from René Magritte. This is not a train 
Source for model Rocket: Stephenson's Rocket Train Pack, Centenary Year Limited Edition – 1963, Hornby 
Trains 
The proposition of a train and the realised train are not the same type of things, but 
there is a relationship between them. However, translation problems, in moving 
from one to the other, can mean that a best guess produced in the laboratory, is not 
so good when it becomes a realised train operating on the railway. The translation, 
from proposition to realised train, is not a straight line and passive process. The 
winning proposition, produced in the decision-laboratory, is translated by a “flow of 
intermediaries” (Callon, 1998, p. 17) engaged in an active process, whereby they 
“translate their various and contradictory interests” (Latour, 1999, p. 311) in a social 
process that acts until the realised train finally emerges.  
The elongated nature of modern procurements amplifies the opportunity for 
translation changes to be introduced between the winning proposition of a train and 
the realised train. Contracts were awarded for Thameslink and Crossrail in 2013 and 
2014, respectively. The first trains did not appear in service until approximately three 
years after the contract was awarded. Signed contracts do not isolate this process of 
producing trains from a wider world. During this time, a General Election and 
change of Government took place in 2015. In addition to major events, such as this, 
there would also be a myriad of smaller changes: different staff involved as the train 
moves from sales to manufacturing; changes of personnel in many organisations; 
changing legislation; shifting patterns of housing, work and flows of people; and 
more.  
Problems with realised trains arise because changes are introduced during the 
translation process, but there can also be problems that are only discovered when the 
realised trains are in use. A best guess is produced by, and in, the decision-
laboratory. However, the modelled railway environment, within the decision-
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laboratory, is not the real railway on which the realised trains will operate. A 
proposition of a train may perform ideally on the modelled railway, within the 
decision-laboratory, but the realised train and real railway may reveal problems. An 
example follows to illustrate this.  
The DfT’s InterCity Express Programme (IEP) was discussed briefly in Chapter 3. It 
is a strategic decision to replace ageing InterCity services on the East Coast and 
Great Western lines. A consortium, led by Hitachi, was awarded the contract in 
2012. Class 800 electro-diesel hybrid trains first entered service on the Great 
Western Railway in 2017, with Class 801 EMUs on the East Coast Main Line from 
2019. However, Electro Magnetic Compatibility issues have been discovered (Ford, 
2018b, pp. 38–39, 2018c, pp. 30–33), with the train’s onboard electrical systems 
causing electro-magnetic interference with track-side control systems. One solution 
to this problem was to choke, or suppress, the interference by carrying c. 1½ -2 
tonnes of copper onboard the train.  
This unintended outcome is likely to reflect an inaccurate electric model of the trains 
and railway systems. The propositions of trains, and the modelled electrical railway, 
presumably did not produce electrical interference, but the realised train and the real 
electrical railway did. It is possible that translation problems, as explained above, 
have introduced changes in the electrical configuration of the realised train to cause 
this problem. However, this has not been evident in any discussion of this issue in 
the industry press. Rather, it seems that the decision-laboratory has inaccurately 
represented the real railway. If computer models were used to test electrical 
compatibility between train and track, then this could be the source of the problem 
and an area for subsequent improvement. However, there are many other possible 
explanations, because the decision-laboratory is ultimately trying to model the socio-
material reality of the railway. For example, electrical interference could be 
eliminated by making changes to the track-side control systems, but this would incur 
costs for Network Rail, as the infrastructure manager. Alternatively, interference 
could be, and was, addressed by making changes to the onboard electrical systems, 
but this incurs costs for the train manufacturer (Hitachi) and train operators. There 
are real incentives not to carry these costs, with train manufacturers and operators 
likely to be keen for Network Rail to pick them up, and vice versa. Such incentives 
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play a very real role in the socio-materiality of the railway and, in theory, this should 
be represented in the modelled railway created within the decision-laboratory.  
The IEP procurement is a complex strategic decision that cannot be explored in the 
detail it deserves here. However, our decision-laboratories should aspire to 
accurately reflect the railway – in its electrical, commercial, and other forms. In this 
example, the gap between models and reality is evident in the form of 1½ -2 tonnes 
of copper. If this extra weight continues to be carried on the new Class 800 trains, 
then this will increase energy usage, cause additional damage to the track, and 
increase maintenance costs. These excessively heavy trains might have been 
addressed with propositions produced in a more articulate decision-laboratory.  
To conclude, our models help us to produce a best guess. The example with 
electrical interference illustrates how the articulation of propositions can be 
discovered to be lacking. This is because our models can never be reality and, in 
effect, “all models are wrong” (Box, 1976, p. 792). Abstraction and simplification is 
essential to strategic decision-making, but we should “seek simplicity and distrust it” 
(A.N. Whitehead quoted in Stcngers, 2011, p. 104). Although this challenge presents 
an unbridgeable gap – between models and reality – improvements can still be made, 
as will be discussed later.  
7.3.2 Trains are performative technology 
The first challenge for strategic decision-making highlighted the unbridgeable gap 
between models and reality, whereas this second is driven by the ability of models to 
become reality. To explore this, I will first revisit some of the limitations of the 
metaphor of a decision-laboratory discussed in Chapter 2.  
The production of propositions of new trains is not like a scientist trying to discover 
a world out there. The collective effort within the decision laboratory produces a 
proposition, which will later be translated into a realised train, and hopefully it is 
proven to be a good outcome. The decision laboratory may not necessarily relate to 
an existing world, but how the world will be, or even how the world should be. For 
example, the Crossrail propositions ran on infrastructure that could accept power 
returned by their regenerative braking. In this case, the propositions of a train 
produced in the Crossrail decision laboratory would not work in the current real 
world but should work in a future real world when it is translated into its realised 
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form. If improvements to the Crossrail electrical infrastructure were delayed, then 
the Class 345 trains would not be able to return power generated by their braking. 
However, the Class 345 trains could act to make sure these improvements were 
delivered – even if this were delayed. The capability of this trains would act upon the 
infrastructure.  
There is an aspect of the decision laboratory that is not about passively speculating 
about a world out there but is more about actively creating and changing the world 
out there. It is possible for propositions, when they are translated, to change the real 
world “in a way that fitted the model” (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003, p. 137). For 
example, if a new train service is developed between town A and town B, based 
upon an expectation of growth in town A and B, then the new line contributes to 
making that growth happen – this growth is (partially) enacted by the train service 
which has provided additional transport capacity. 
The first challenge explored the problems that can be discovered because of the gap 
between models and reality. This second challenge relates to the performative nature 
of technology, such as a train, which can influence and change this real world in 
which they will operate. This challenge is not like the problem with electro-magnetic 
interference described above. Electricity and electrical systems do not negotiate, or 
compromise, and so problems are likely to be quickly identified. Unlike electrical 
interference there can be a feedback lag to discover problems. To a certain extent, 
especially where there are no alternatives, people will use whatever trains are 
produced, but that does not mean they are ‘good’ trains. Problems can be discovered 
later, as frustration grows, or inadequacies are revealed. An example from the 
Thameslink procurement can illustrate this challenge in action.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Thameslink Class 700 trains produced by Siemens 
have been criticised for their ironing board seats (Graeme Paton, 2018). The same 
accusation has also been levelled at the new Class 800 trains (Horton, 2018), 
produced in the InterCity Express Programme. We know that comfort was part of the 
articulation of propositions within the Thameslink procurement. The Train Technical 
Specification, created by DfT, included five requirements relating to ride quality, 
including TTS 8.4.1 which stated the ride quality shall achieve a mean comfort index 
of 2.  
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An unexpected outcome of uncomfortable seats could be viewed as an example of 
the treachery of models described in the previous challenge. Uncomfortable seats in 
the realised Class 700 trains could reflect a problem with the comfort index, used in 
the articulation of propositions. Maybe this model of comfort was not close enough 
to real comfort. In line with this thinking, research has been commissioned (RSSB, 
2019) to improve the seat selection process. This is valuable research, but I believe 
that this example illustrates a separate and distinct challenge for strategic decision-
making.  
This problem with seat comfort might not have come to attention as a problem. 
Unlike electro-magnetic interference, this problem might have been masked by other 
entities in the actor-network that makes up the railway service. People might have 
simply accepted this new reality and adapted. Passengers are part of the railway 
service and they can adapt, where electricity cannot. The flexibility of people and 
social systems allows them to adapt and fit the proposition. The railway industry 
might have argued that passengers were in the ‘wrong’, and the seats are 
comfortable, or that it is only an unrepresentative group that have a problem. These 
seats might have been accepted as comfortable, and it is likely to be true that not all 
people thought they were a problem. However, sometimes this flexibility can snap, 
and what was acceptable before, is no longer acceptable.  
The second challenge for strategic decision-making recognises that the actor-
network that acts as a train is performative, and it can bring about “different 
realities” (Law and Allaskuvla, 2019, p. 9). People and social systems can be 
changed by trains, but this has limits. Ideas and assumptions embodied in the train 
can be discovered to be ‘wrong’, or at least problematic. With discretionary travel 
this could manifest through alternative travel choices, but where there is no realistic 
alternative, then we might expect anger, frustration, and disappointment in the new 
trains and service.  
If strategic decisions are trying to produce a best guess for a good train, then we need 
to recognise the adaptability of people and social systems that can mask a poor 
outcome. In other words, people may suffer in relative silence and that is a challenge 
for strategic decision-making if we want to articulate the best propositions of trains.  
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7.3.3 Society in the making 
The first challenge for strategic decision-making derives from the gap between 
propositions and reality. The second reflects the performative nature of propositions 
that can create different realities in the social world. The third challenge arises 
because “‘society’ is an ongoing achievement…[and] in the making” (Callon, 2001, 
p. 62). This means that the definition of what is a ‘good’ train can shift. The 
extended duration of the actions to produce new trains exacerbates this problem. A 
good outcome at the start of the strategic decision, may not be the same when the 
trains finally enter service. Needs and requirements can shift, and so the articulation 
taking place within the modelled decision laboratory can diverge from an evolving 
social reality. Examples from the Thameslink and Crossrail procurements can 
illustrate this challenge. 
Thameslink made “the procurement blunder of failing to specify charging points for 
mobile devices” (RAIL Opinion, 2017, p. 57), with USB charging increasingly 
prevalent in cars and public transport. When procurement began in 2008, this was 
perhaps not as common, but by the time the trains entered service, in 2016, this 
omission became more obvious. For trains that are seeking to encourage people 
away from their cars, attributes like this are an important part of the experience.  
The Crossrail procurement provides a more significant example of this challenge. 
The location for the manufacture of the new trains became a critical issue during the 
Crossrail strategic decision, but this not the case at the start. This change occurred 
after Siemens was awarded the Thameslink contract, and Bombardier’s Derby 
factory faced potential closure. In this case, the Crossrail procurement was updated 
for revised procurement guidance from the Treasury, and propositions of trains were 
then articulated with this new societal recognition of the wider costs and benefits 
associated with the production of new trains.  
Propositions and models are how we make decisions about the future. Sometimes the 
goalposts shift, and do not turn out as expected, because society is constantly in the 
making. Over the 35-year life of a new train, this challenge is even more 
pronounced. The impact of the third challenge upon the new Class 700 and Class 
345 trains will be determined over time, but a modelled standing capacity of 4 
persons per m2, used in both procurements, looks out of place in the 2020 world of 
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social distancing and the COVID-19 crisis. This is a challenge for all railways and 
mass transit systems however, and it remains to be seen how they operate in a post-
COVID reality.  
7.4 Improving strategic decision-making  
Making strategic decision to produce new trains is not easy. As discussed in Chapter 
5, even the involvement of one of the greatest engineers of the time, I. K. Brunel, led 
to the production of “an extraordinary collection of freak locomotives,” (Adams, 
1993, p. 114). The previous section explored three challenges common to all 
strategic decisions, and the outcomes they produce.  
Firstly, the proposition of a train is not the realised train (the treachery of models), 
and so problems can arise because of changes discovered after the translation 
process. Secondly, problems with realised trains can be masked because humans are 
adaptable (trains are performative technology) and they can compensate for, or 
simply put up with, inadequacies in the outcome produced. The third challenge for 
strategic decision-making is because the future is unknowable (society in the 
making), and so a good outcome at the start of this process, may not be the same 
over time, especially given lengthy decision-making processes and the 30–35-year 
operating life of a train. These challenges will continue to contribute to unexpected, 
unintended, and undesirable outcomes. The following describes ways in which 
strategic decision-making can be adapted in response to these challenges.  
Improvements in strategic decision-making to produce new trains could be identified 
within the translation stage when the proposition is translated into the realised train. 
However, this is beyond the scope of this research, which has focused upon the 
procurement process, from early problematisation through to selection of a winner. 
The procurement occurs within the decision-laboratory – a valuable place that brings 
actors together in a collective action to experiment, model, measure, discuss, 
interact, explore uncertainties, and speculate about new trains that will carry 
passengers in the future. These important places should be a focus for improving 
strategic decision-making.  
What follows are three ideas to improve the effectiveness of decision-laboratories. 
The first relates to prioritising the objectives of the strategic decision and the 
desired outcomes that are to be achieved – this is about clarifying what the decision-
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laboratory is being asked to produce. The second focuses upon improvements to 
support deliberate articulation of propositions within, and by, the decision-
laboratory – this is about recognising the laboratory as a site of active articulation of 
propositions to achieve the given objectives, rather than a neutral and passive place. 
The third improvement argues that the design of the decision-laboratory should also 
support some activities, that are described here as exploratory articulation – 
recognising the potential value of unplanned, unforeseen, and unexpected 
articulations that may be discovered to be useful.  
7.4.1 Prioritising the objectives of the strategic decision 
A decision-laboratory can produce propositions of trains, with many different 
attributes, that could all act as trains in different ways. This research has always 
appreciated that there are many other attributes of trains – beyond the focus here 
upon weight and the number of seats. Passenger trains take people from A to B at 
specified times punctually. Other attributes include the passenger experience, cost, 
comfort, safety, speed, and more. The Crossrail strategic decision added other 
desirable attributes. An articulate proposition of a train now placed more emphasis 
upon the wider social and environmental benefits to support the economy and local 
communities.  
Different views have existed for a long time regarding the desirable attributes of 
trains and the railway. As discussed in Chapter 5, a 19th century trader in Berwick 
wanted his fish to be carried at half rates and did not care whether it paid the 
railways or not. During two World Wars the railways were managed to support the 
war effort, with a focus upon efficiency, maximising loads (freight and passenger) 
and eliminating unnecessary trips. Dr. Beeching saw the need to reduce uneconomic 
services, but later the Public Sector Obligation (PSO) grant was given to BR to 
compensate for these socially necessary loss-making services. Chapter 5 explores 
these developments over time.  
Despite developments in the mechanisms by which the Government provides overall 
support to the railways, expectations of the railways at the level of strategic decisions 
can still be as vague as those placed upon British Railways to “’help energy 
conservation’, ‘get traffic off the roads’ or ‘help preserve the environment’” (British 
Railways Board, 1976, p. 23). Although there can be win-wins around 
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environmental, social, and economic outcomes, we also know, from Chapter 2, that 
trade-offs are real, and it is often managers (public and private sector), who are left 
to resolve these uncertainties. This may be the best approach, with managerial 
judgement applied to specific actions, within a broad and open set of expectations set 
by Government. However, I think there is an argument for a more explicit 
prioritisation of objectives.  
Chapter 6 showed that each strategic decision described various objectives and 
desired attributes for the new trains. The scoring attached to attributes of the trains 
described in the TTS documents is effectively a form of prioritisation – higher scores 
are effectively prioritised over attributes with lower scores. These two strategic 
decisions both include government (DfT and TfL) and so this could be viewed as 
Government specifying a prioritisation for the type of trains that it wants. 
Government bodies will not always be involved in these strategic decisions however 
and so, in these occasions, it may be necessary to clarify a prioritisation of objectives 
before the strategic decision begins.  
Clarity of objectives is important because decision-laboratories are active sites in the 
articulation of propositions. For example, Eurostar trains, operating between London 
and Paris, were required to “offer more space and greater comfort than an A320 
Airbus” (Walmsley, 2017, p. 44). Eurostar was seeking to compete with flights 
between London and Paris, and so this clear guidance would inform the articulation 
of propositions so that they did not maximise capacity at the expense of legroom and 
service. Other strategic decisions, such as new trains for rural railways, may not be 
competing with planes, but they may be aiming to encourage people out of private 
cars. These different objectives effectively mean that the Airbus A320 and modern 
cars, are brought into the decision-laboratories articulating propositions of new 
trains.  
This prioritisation of objectives may not be necessary at the start of every strategic 
decision, and it might be sufficient to produce archetypal objectives for, say, 
intercity, rural, and commuting services. Clearly prioritising the objectives of 
strategic decisions could help to guide how the decision-laboratory articulates and 
produces propositions.  
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7.4.2 Deliberate articulation of propositions  
The previous improvement to strategic decision-making focused upon the 
prioritisation of objectives provided to the decision laboratory. This improvement 
focuses within the decision-laboratory – the place where propositions are actively 
produced and articulated.  
In a competitive situation, like Rainhill, Thameslink and Crossrail, the decision-
laboratory should aim to produce several well-articulated propositions from which it 
is difficult to identify the most articulate. This is described here as ‘deliberate 
articulation,’ because it recognises that the laboratory is active in the process of 
articulation. If the laboratory excludes something, or prioritises one attribute over 
another, then this will play an active role in the articulation of propositions. If we 
improve the effectiveness of the decision-laboratory, then we improve propositions.  
The first way to improve decision-laboratories is to learn from mistakes. As realised 
trains enter service then feedback begins to accumulate and areas for improvement 
are discovered. The problem of uncomfortable seats on the Thameslink trains 
provides an example of this in action. The Train Technical Specification required 
propositions to achieve a mean comfort index of 2 (TTS 8.4.1), using research and 
standards produced within the railway industry. The Thameslink procurement 
recognised the importance of comfort in the production of propositions, and comfort 
was deliberately designed into the laboratory’s articulation process. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, problems with seat comfort have been discovered in the 
realised Class 700 trains. The discovery of this problem means that the ways of 
articulating comfort within the decision-laboratory can be reviewed, and ideally 
improved for next time. This has been the case for seat comfort, with new – and 
hopefully improved – guidance (RSSB, 2019) issued for seat selection in future 
strategic decisions.  
Feedback can help to improve future strategic decisions, but the aspiration should be 
for the decision-laboratory to produce propositions that do not have such problems in 
the first place. To explore this, I will look at how comfort, in this case, is brought 
into the decision laboratory to articulate propositions.  
A comfort model represented passengers (loop 4, public representation) and their 
comfort in the Thameslink procurement. However, seat comfort can be articulated, 
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and brought into the action shaping propositions, in different ways, as illustrated in 
Figure 7.2 below.  
 
Figure 7.2 Testing train seats for comfort in 1922 and in 2019 
Source: (Robertson, 2005, p. 26; RSSB, 2019, p. 8) 
Figure 7.2 shows the testing of seats for a passenger train in the 1920s (top) using, 
what I will describe here, as the knee method. Below the image of the knee method is 
a summary of the revised guidance on seat selection (RSSB, 2019) discussed earlier. 
Both methods are ways to measure and articulate comfort within the laboratory 
environment. The image shows that there are different ways of articulating comfort 
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within a decision-laboratory. Other ways to articulate comfort could involve direct 
passenger feedback with trials of seats. There are various ways in which the 
decision-laboratory could be designed to articulate comfortable seats. I propose here 
that option that is most representative should be selected. This is not simple to 
discern, but there are risks that need to be managed.  
In such complex technical actions, like the production of new trains, there is a risk 
that the value of public involvement is too easily dismissed or relegated. An unstated 
ordering of knowledge (Mol and Law, 2004, p. 44) can privilege some actors and 
practices over others. The updated comfort method for 2019 is more socially 
networked (Kofman, 2018) than the knee method of the 1920s. The 2019 comfort 
method has various actors, such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board, mobilised 
around it and connecting it to other industry practices. This does not mean it is 
‘better’ than the knee method, but it is strengthened by these social connections that 
reach out and connect it to other actors. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the past decision-makers consulted oracles and 
sacrificed animals. This thesis does not argue for a return to such methods! However, 
given that these strategic decisions are focused upon passenger trains, then the risk of 
inadequate representation of the public should be carefully monitored. 
Representation matters if we are seeking to create a rich experimental environment 
which represents the future operating environment of the realised trains. This 
representation can take many forms, but to “speak for others is to first silence those 
in whose name we speak” (Callon, 1984, p. 14). Passengers will remain the ultimate 
arbiters on the effectiveness of this representation.  
The decision-laboratory is a valuable place for experimentation and articulation of 
propositions of trains. The three challenges for strategic decision-making mean that 
problems will still arise when these propositions are translated, but these places can 
be improved through feedback when problems are discovered. Attempts to avoid 
problems in the first place should focus upon the representativeness of the decision-
laboratory. The five loops can help to consider how the decision-laboratory reaches 
out to the wider society in which the realised trains will operate.  
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7.4.3 Exploratory articulation of propositions 
This third improvement of strategic decision-making introduces a tension with the 
previous idea of deliberate articulation. The metaphor developed in Chapter 2 
described the experiments taking place at Rainhill, Thameslink, and Crossrail, as a 
metaphorical decision-laboratory. The metaphor of a factory was rejected because 
this action is not producing the same widget again and again, rather there is 
uncertainty regarding what is a ‘good’ train, which is translated from the most 
articulate proposition produced within the decision laboratory.  
This idea introduces a slight modification to the understanding of what makes an 
articulate proposition. Building upon the work of Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane 
Despret (1993; Despret, 1996, 2004; Stcngers, 2011), Latour posits that an 
articulate proposition is interesting, compared to a bad articulation that is 
“‘Boring’, ‘repetitive’, ‘redundant’, ‘inelegant’, ‘simply accurate’, ‘sterile’” (Latour, 
2004, p. 215). Therefore, I propose that a decision-laboratory should produce 
articulate propositions that are interesting. I will now explore what this means 
using a counter-example to show the risks of uninteresting and sterile propositions.  
Both Crossrail and Thameslink included a Train Technical Specification (TTS) as 
part of the action to produce propositions of trains. Among the many detailed 
requirements that were deliberately articulated by Crossrail was TTS 3.40.3.1, 
which described the facilities required within the driver’s cab, including the need for 
two coat hooks. I do not know, but it is likely that these two coat hooks represent 
train drivers in this action, bringing in their views on the design of cabs, and 
problems that they encounter with other train cabs. Chapter 6 describes in detail how 
competing propositions were assessed, but, for here, it is sufficient to say that the 
requirements for the driving cab attracted a weighted score as part of the overall 
Train Works assessment. The coat hooks attracted a tiny part of the overall score, but 
they are there, nonetheless. It is reasonable to assume that Siemens, Bombardier, 
CAF, and Hitachi, all produced propositions of trains that had two coat hooks. If this 
is the case, the decision-laboratory has in many ways worked well. The propositions 
of trains are articulate to the needs of drivers. Of course, there is unlikely to be any 
need for experimentation with coat hooks and this potentially raises a challenge 
regarding the metaphor of a laboratory. It could be argued that the procurement of 
new trains is more like a hybrid of a factory and laboratory, with this example 
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illustrating the factory component. However, I propose, that this small example, 
illustrates the risk of a decision-laboratory that loses too much of the hissing, spitting 
experiments that were clearly taking place at Rainhill. A decision-laboratory that 
becomes too constraining, specific, and directive regarding the action taking place, is 
potentially producing a contractual train, rather than an interesting and 
articulate proposition of a train.  
A desire can easily arise during a procurement, to specify in detail what is required. 
This can be based upon good intentions, such as managing the risks associated with 
the later translation stage. If two coat hooks for the driver’s cabin were specified as a 
mandatory requirement (this was not mandated in the Crossrail procurement), then 
the chance of getting two coat hooks in the realised trains is greatly improved! 
Similarly, specifying that 3+2 seating is forbidden, avoids the risk of giving a seat 
count target that may be met by squeezing in seats to get a higher score in the 
assessment. In the collective action to produce propositions of trains, there is a risk 
that Bidders adopt an attitude of ‘give them what they want,’ which would lead to 
articulate propositions, in the sense of connecting to specific requirements, but the 
ambiguous, exploratory, and exciting, nature of the decision-laboratory becomes 
lost. The propositions produced could be articulate, but dull. To maintain, or 
introduce, more experimental and exploratory articulation of propositions I suggest 
there are two key considerations, which I describe as letting go, and bringing in. The 
idea of letting go will be explored first.  
Decision-laboratories can support many possibilities for articulation of propositions, 
but this requires those in charge to let go and allow surprises to happen (de Laet and 
Mol, 2000, p. 250). To support the process of exploratory articulation, those in 
charge must “jeopardize this privilege of being in command” (Latour, 2004, p. 216), 
and view their role as active participants in a collaborative action.  
The Trials at Rainhill illustrated a willingness to adapt the rules in aid of exploratory 
and unforeseen articulation. The assignment of a load to competitors, was based 
upon a prior view of a locomotive, that included a tender car to carry fuel and water. 
Stephenson’s Rocket had a tender car, but Novelty did not fit this model. The judges 
at Rainhill exercised their judgement and allowed the stipulations and conditions to 
be modified and reissued. The laboratory was adapted to allow new articulations of 
how a locomotive acted. Similarly, Sans Pareil was too heavy, and did not have the 
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required six wheels for its weight, but it too was permitted to run. Although Sans 
Pareil failed, the Trials were more interesting for its involvement, and the success of 
Rocket could be viewed more confidently, because it was connected to a wider 
performance that demonstrated the limitations of other propositions.  
The Judges at Rainhill did not act as isolated and removed observers of experiments, 
rather they were active participants enriching the laboratory environment, to support 
the creation of interesting and articulate propositions of trains. The Judges were part 
of a collective effort at Rainhill. Rocket was a success, and the willingness of the 
Judges, and others, to take some risks and adapt the laboratory played a part in that 
outcome. 
In the case of Thameslink and Crossrail this idea of letting go could involve a 
reduction in the levels of specificity, and deliberate articulation, undertaken by DfT 
and Crossrail, although this needs to be recognised for the risky endeavour that it is. 
A desire to produce interesting and articulate propositions of trains has a tension 
with the desire for accountability, especially where public monies are involved. 
There may be occasions when we know exactly what we want from new trains, and 
so very precise requirements are appropriate. However, if we want interesting and 
articulate propositions of new trains, then this involves taking some risks and 
allowing room for exploratory articulations.  
In addition to letting go, more interesting and articulate propositions can be 
encouraged by deliberately bringing in actors that can produce unforeseen 
opportunities to make propositions more articulate and interesting. Rainhill provides 
an example to explore this idea.  
At the time of the Rainhill trials, locomotive engines were a shock to the public, 
making a fearful noise and smell. However, the Trials provided a grandstand for the 
public that allowed them to see, hear and smell these new creations. The organisers 
took a risk that the public might reject these new temperamental creatures. A desire 
to demonstrate the safety of the new technology could have been achieved in other 
ways. This may have been a calculated risk, given the earlier success of the Stockton 
and Darlington Railway (Chapter 5), but it was still a risk. The public were not an 
official part of the judging, but they are part of the action. The Trials, and the 
articulation of propositions, effectively continued after the award, when Stephenson 
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took excited groups for rides at speed. This was not required for the competition, but 
the cheering and excited crowds hauled by Rocket would provide further reassurance 
to Stephenson, and the Directors, that the railway would be a success. These 
additional rides provided further opportunities for objections, or new articulations, to 
be identified.  
Bringing in the public like this was risky, but bringing the public into the action at 
Rainhill, is also bringing in the public’s experience of canals and roads – the main 
competitors at the time to locomotives. The public can experience the noise and 
smells of the locomotives, but also their superior speed compared to road and rail. 
Stephenson’s Rocket was the most articulate at the Trials, and could achieve what 
was required in the experiments, but the cheers from the grandstand are evidence that 
it was also an interesting and articulate proposition to the public.  
The later procurements at Thameslink and Crossrail were no longer competing with 
canals and stagecoaches on rutted roads. The example of Eurostar, given earlier, 
illustrates how planes were brought into that action. The “A320 Airbus” (Walmsley, 
2017, p. 44) was effectively brought in because Eurostar was seeking to compete 
with flights between London and Paris, and so legroom and comfort was to be 
articulated with this airplane.  
Actively bringing in other actors to the decision laboratory is worthy of 
consideration to produce more articulate and interesting propositions. Railway 
engineering and professional expertise (loop 2, autonomization) is understandably 
privileged when considering many aspects of the safe design of trains. The idea here 
is that propositions of trains can be made more interesting by integrating insights 
from passengers “alongside or on top” (Mol and Law, 2004, p. 44) of knowledge 
from other actors. Passengers and the public have been explored here, but other 
communities of interest could introduce unexpected and unforeseen articulations that 
could potentially strengthen propositions. It is claimed that including concerned 
groups affected by strategic decisions can lead to more successful outcomes 
(Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter and Bruzelius, 2003, p. 89), providing they are involved in 
a constructive role. Such groups are part of the success of a train and railway, 
especially when they become passengers. 
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7.5 Further work  
The InterCity Express Programme (IEP) has been referenced briefly in this research 
and would be worthy of more in-depth analysis. IEP was a complex strategic 
decision, like Thameslink and Crossrail, that also involved the DfT and many of the 
same actors. IEP was awarded to Hitachi Trains in 2012, and the realised trains are 
now mostly in service, therefore it is possible to assess the outcome of the strategic 
decision, using the attributes of the trains. In particular, the IEP is of interest 
because, in addition to electrically-powered trains, it also produced bi-mode 
trains. The bi-modes carry both diesel and electric engines that collectively act to 
provide flexibility for the train to travel on parts of the network that are not 
electrified. This flexibility is at the cost of potentially increased weight to carry 
different engines, as was suggested by the empirical analysis (Figure 4.14) in 
Chapter 4. Electrifying the network and running electrically-powered trains would 
have been an alternative approach, but reports suggested that this was too costly. Bi-
modes allowed an onboard power supply (diesel fuel and engines) to be substituted 
for a programme of electrification.  
Another area for further research, that was also referenced earlier, would be to focus 
upon the translation of propositions into realised trains. This begins with the 
selection of a winning proposition of a train and concludes with the realised train 
carrying passengers on the operational railway. It would be interesting to determine 
if there are examples of lightweight propositions of trains that are produced within 
the decision-laboratory, but when translated they become heavy trains. There are 
many translations that take place after the identification of a winning bidder, which 
might explain such an outcome. Research could focus upon the contracting process, 
that takes place between the contracting body (e.g., DfT) and the winning Bidder 
(e.g., Siemens). The commercial sensitivity of these interactions would present a 
methodological challenge, as discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the new Merseyrail 
trains. Changes in translation can also be introduced because of organisational 
changes within the winning bidder and its partners, as the organisations move from 
sales to delivery with changes of personnel and processes. Translation changes could 
be introduced after the train leaves the factory. The manufactured trains must still go 
through acceptance processes for the train to be accepted onto the railway.  
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Beyond rail it would be interesting to apply this thinking to strategic decisions in 
other sectors and situations. The theory developed here could be usefully applied 
to building bridges, developing new products, research and development, and many 
other settings. Strategic decision-making involves models, abstractions, and 
propositions, with the most articulate proposition then translated and realised. For 
example, the network of resources that act as a bridge is as fluid as a train. There are 
many ways to configure socio-material collections of resources so that they 
collectively act as a bridge. Different conceptions (loop 5, links and knots) of the 
bridge and its purpose (Winner, 1980; Joerges, 1999) will draw in and arrange 
resources in different ways. They might all span a gap between two points, but they 
will all have different attributes. The theory developed here, using ANT and the five 
loops, can help to provide a richer understanding of strategic decision-making, and 
the heterogenous resources that are assembled to act.  
The final area that I think would be interesting for further research relates to blame 
and accountability. There is often a strong social desire to find a smoking gun and 
someone to blame when things go wrong, whether that is heavy trains or any other 
problematic outcome. However, heavy trains are not so much someone’s mistake, 
but are more like a “collective drift of good intentions” (Latour, 1996, p. 290). 
ANT’s distributed view of agency can “jeopardise attempts to hold individuals 
responsible for their actions” (Bennett, 2005, p. 452). The desire for accountability 
can be particularly strong when it comes to large public projects. It would be 
interesting to understand how a distributed view of agency interacts with a desire 
for accountability, and simply blame.  
7.6 Concluding remarks 
Heavy trains were the frustrating starting point for this research because of the 
environmental implications of this outcome. The goal was to understand how this 
could have happened, and how it could be improved in the future. There will be 
many other strategic decisions that begin with good intentions of what they will 
deliver, but somewhere along the way this gets lost. Unintended and unexpected 
outcomes are a sign of strategic decision-making that maybe could have been 
managed better.  
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This research has demonstrated that trains and railways are dynamic and fluid 
concepts, even when made of iron and steel. Heavy trains were not an inevitable 
outcome; they reflect one of many possibilities.  
The proposition is a valuable concept to understand strategic decisions. Propositions 
exist within the world of models, abstractions, and simplification, which is essential 
for strategic decision-making. They allow us to speculate, experiment and, 
essentially, produce a good guess. When a proposition is translated and realised, we 
will discover if it was a good guess or not.  
Propositions are produced within a decision-laboratory. This valuable social place 
brings together a collection of actors – human and non-human – in a collective action 
that articulates propositions. The winning proposition is the most articulate within 
the modelled and abstracted environment of the decision-laboratory. This proposition 
will be translated and realised, and we will discover if it was a good guess or not.  
The ability to criticise and improve our abstractions is ”essential to the healthy 
progress of society” (A.N. Whitehead quoted in Stcngers, 2011, p. 130). This thesis 
proposes that if we improve decision-laboratories, then we will improve 
strategic decisions and outcomes.  
On Monday 5th October 1829 a “hissing, spluttering” (Marshall, 1930, p. 1063) set of 
experiments began taking place, on a model railway track at Rainhill, near 
Liverpool. From these Trials the Rocket emerged as the winner and would operate 
successfully on the Liverpool & Manchester Railway – the world’s first inter-city 
railway. After this, railways expanded across the country and the world. Improving 
strategic decision-making does not require a grandstand for an audience, but it 
should be recognised as a collective action, with various actors in the foreground and 
background. The place in which strategic decision-making takes place can be 
considered as a decision-laboratory, that is active in the experiments taking place. 
The outcomes of our strategic decisions are not ordained by the movement of planets 
and other forces to be studied in a world out there. Nobody in this decision-
laboratory said, ‘Make sure those trains are heavy.’ We should aspire to design, and 
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A. Table of early railway companies created by Acts of Parliament in the 19th century.  
Table 9.1 Early Railway Companies set up by Acts of Parliament in the 19th Century until the 1850s.  
Source:(Wikipedia, 2017) 
Scottish early railways 
 Caledonian Railway (incorporated 1845) 
  Caledonian Railway 
became part of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway on 1 July 1923 
under the Railways Act 1921. 
   Aberdeen Railway opened in stages between 1848 and 1853 
   Brechin and Edzell District Railway  
   Cathcart District Railway  
   Crieff and Comrie Railway authorised 1890 
   Crieff and Methven Junction Railway opened 1867 
   Crieff Junction Railway opened 1856 
   Dunblane, Doune and Callander Railway incorporated in 1846 
   Dundee and Newtyle Railway opened 1841 (incorporated in Scottish Central Railway) 
   Glasgow and Paisley Joint Railway opened 12 August 1840 
   Glasgow Central Railway opened 26 November 1894 
   Glasgow, Garnkirk and Coatbridge Railway opened 1831 as the Garnkirk and Glasgow Railway 
   Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway opened 29 March 1840; merged with the Caledonian Railway 1847 
   Hamilton and Strathaven Railway opened 6 August 1860; taken over by the Caledonian Railway 1864 
   Lanarkshire and Dunbartonshire Railway authorised in 1891 
   Lochearnhead, St Fillans and Comrie Railway 




   Perth, Almond Valley & Methven Railway opened 1858 
   Scottish Central Railway (to Perth and Dundee) formed in 1845 
   Scottish North Eastern Railway (to Aberdeen)  
   Wishaw and Coltness Railway  
  Independent Lines operated by the Caledonian Railway  
   Callander and Oban Railway opened 1 July 1880 
   Killin Railway opened 13 March 1886 
   Lanarkshire and Ayrshire Railway opened 1888 
 
 Glasgow and South Western Railway (title assumed 1850) 
  Glasgow and South Western Railway 
became part of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway on 1 January 
1923 under the Railways Act 1921. 
   Ardrossan and Johnstone Railway 
opened 6 November 1831; became the dual-tracked Ardrossan Railway on 23 
July 1840 
   Bridge of Weir Railway opened 1864 
   Glasgow and Paisley Joint Railway opened 12 August 1840.[1] 
   Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway opened 12 August 1840 
   Glasgow, Barrhead and Kilmarnock Joint Railway opened 29 September 1848 
   Greenock and Ayrshire Railway opened 23 December 1869 
   Kilmarnock and Troon Railway 
First railway in Scotland authorised by Act of Parliament, opened 6 July 1812; 
originally worked by horses, converted to steam operation in 1817 
   Maidens and Dunure Railway opened 17 May 1906 
   Paisley and Renfrew Railway 
opened 21 July 1835; Scottish gauge railway originally locomotive hauled, 
then down graded to horse operation. Reopened as dual track, standard gauge, 
line 1 May 1866. 
 Great North of Scotland Railway (incorporated 1846) 
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  Great North of Scotland Railway 
became part of the London and North Eastern Railway on 1 January 
1923 under the Railways Act 1921. 
   Aberdeen and Turriff Railway  
   Alford Valley Railway built 1859 
   Banffshire Railway  
   Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway  
   Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway  
   Deeside Railway  
   Deeside Extension Railway  
   Formartine and Buchan Railway  
   Inverury and Old Meldrum Junction Railway  
   Keith and Dufftown Railway  
   Morayshire Railway opened 10 August 1852 
   Strathspey Railway  
 Highland Railway (title assumed 1865) 
  Highland Railway 
became part of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway on 1 January 
1923 under the Railways Act 1921. 
   Dingwall and Skye Railway opened 19 August 1870 
   Duke of Sutherland's Railway opened 19 June 1871 
   Findhorn Railway opened 18 April 1859 
   Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway opened 18 August 1858 
   Inverness and Nairn Railway (INR) opened 5 November 1855 
   Inverness and Perth Junction Railway opened 9 September 1863 
   Inverness and Ross-shire Railway opened 23 March 1863 
   Nairn and Keith Railway opened 1858 amalgamated with INR 1861 
   Perth and Dunkeld Railway opened 7 April 1856 
   Sutherland Railway opened 13 April 1868 
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   Sutherland and Caithness Railway opened 28 July 1874 
   Wick and Lybster Railway  
       
 North British Railway (incorporated 1844) 
  North British Railway 
became part of the London and North Eastern Railway on 1 January 
1923 under the Railways Act 1921. 
   Ballochney Railway opened 8 August 1828 
   Dundee and Arbroath Railway opened 1831 
   Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway  
   Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway opened 28 July 1863 
   Edinburgh Suburban and Southside Junction Railway  
   Glasgow, Yoker and Clydebank Railway authorised in 1878 
   Invergarry and Fort Augustus Railway opened 1901 
   Kincardine Line open to Kincardine in 1893, and on to Dunfermline in 1906 
   Monkland and Kirkintilloch Railway first public steam railway in Scotland opened 1826 
   Newburgh and North Fife Railway  
   Slamannan Railway opened 31 August 1840 
   Stirling and Dunfermline Railway opened progressively between 1850 and 1853 
   West Highland Railway opened 7 August 1894 with an extension to Mallaig opened 1901. 
 
English and Welsh early railways  
 East  
  Great Eastern Railway  
   Eastern Counties Railway (ECR) 
opened 20 June 1839; original 5 ft gauge converted to standard in 1845, 
absorbed into GER Aug 1862 
    Eastern Union Railway incorporated 1844, opened 1846, absorbed 1847. 
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Eastern Union and Hadleigh Junction 
Railway 
 
     Ipswich and Bury St Edmunds Railway  
    
Colchester, Stour Valley, Sudbury and Halstead 
Railway 
incorporated 1846, opened 1848 
    East Anglia Railway absorbed into Eastern Counties Railway, Jan 1852 
    Saffron Walden Railway incorporated 1861, sponsored by ECR. 
   Northern and Eastern Railway incorporated 1836 gauge conversion as with ECR 
   London and Blackwall Railway 
opened 1840, extended to Tilbury with ECR 1854 (authorised 1852 as 
London, Tilbury and Southend Railway (LT&SR)), absorbed by GER 1866. 
Started with non-standard gauge, converted 1849. 
   
Ely, Haddenham and Sutton Railway (later Ely and St 
Ives Railway) 
authorised 1864, opened 1866, leased by ECR since opening, absorbed by 
GER 1897 
   Norfolk Railway  
   Colne Valley and Halstead Railway incorporated 1856 
   Harwich Railway  
   East Anglian Railways 
(the plural is correct!) formed by merger in 1847. Bankrupt in 1851, it was 
operated by arrangement by ECR until the takeover by GER. 
    Lynn and Dereham Railway  
    Lynn and Ely Railway  
    Ely and Huntingdon Railway  
   East Suffolk Railway 
(re-incorporation of the "Halesworth, Beccles and Hadiscoe Railway" in 
1854), absorbed by ECR 1859 
    Yarmouth and Haddiscoe Railway absorbed 1858 
    Lowestoft and Beccles Railway absorbed 1858 




 Great Western Railway  
  Great Western Railway 
incorporated 1835, opened London to Maidenhead Bridge 4 June 1838, 
completed throughout to Bristol 30 June 1841 
   Hayle Railway 
opened 23 December 1837, closed for rebuilding 16 February 1852, reopened 
by West Cornwall Railway 
   Cheltenham and Great Western Union Railway 
opened Swindon to Cirencester 31 May 1841, opened throughout to 
Cheltenham 13 October 1847 
   Bristol and Exeter Railway 
opened to Bridgwater 14 June 1841, completed in stages to Exeter 1 May 
1844, amalgamated with GWR 1 January 1876 
   Cornwall Minerals Railway 
opened 1 June 1874 replacing and connecting several earlier railways and 
tramways. Amalgamated with GWR 1 July 1896 
    Par Tramway 
construction started c.1841, completed north of Pontsmill 1847, extended to 
Par Harbour 1855 
    Newquay Railway authorised by Act of Parliament 1844, completed 1849 
    Lostwithiel and Fowey Railway 
opened 1 June 1869, closed 1 January 1880, transferred to CMR 27 June 1893 
and reopened 1893 
    Newquay and Cornwall Junction Railway opened 1 July 1869, transferred to CMR 1 June 1874 
   Liskeard and Caradon Railway opened 28 November 1844, vested in GWR 1 July 1909 
   Shrewsbury and Chester Railway opened 4 November 1846, amalgamated with GWR 1 September 1854 
   South Devon Railway 
opened 30 May 1846, completed in stages to Plymouth 2 April 1849, 
amalgamated with GWR 1 February 1876 
    Torquay branch opened 18 December 1848 
    South Devon and Tavistock Railway opened 22 June 1859 
    Dartmouth and Torbay Railway completed 16 August 1864 
    Launceston and South Devon Railway opened 22 June 1865 
    Moretonhampstead and South Devon Railway opened 4 July 1866 
    Buckfastleigh, Totnes and South Devon Railway opened 1 May 1872 
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   Berks and Hants Railway 
opened Reading to Hungerford 21 December 1847 and Reading to 
Basingstoke 1 November 1848; Berks and Hants Extension Hungerford to 
Devizes opened 11 November 1862 
   Wilts, Somerset and Weymouth Railway 
opened Chippenham to Westbury 5 September 1848; completed in stages to 
Weymouth 20 January 1857 
   Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway opened 1 June 1849, amalgamated with GWR 1 September 1854 
   South Wales Railway 
opened Chepstow to Landore 18 June 1850, Chepstow Bridge opened 19 June 
1862, amalgamated with GWR 1 January 1862 
   Gloucester and Dean Forest Railway opened 19 September 1851 
   Vale of Neath Railway opened 24 September 1851, amalgamated into GWR 1 February 1865 
   West Cornwall Railway 
opened 11 March 1852 including previous Hayle Railway, transferred to 
GWR 1 January 1868 
   Hereford, Ross and Gloucester Railway opened 11 July 1853 
   Wycombe Railway opened 1 August 1854 
   Abingdon Railway opened 2 June 1856 
   Bridport Railway opened 12 November 1857, bought by GWR 1 July 1901, closed 5 May 1975 
   Liskeard and Looe Union Canal railway opened 11 May 1858, vested in GWR 1 January 1923 
   East Somerset Railway first stage opened 9 November 1858, completed 1 March 1862 
   Great Western and Brentford Railway opened 18 July 1858 
   Cornwall Railway 
opened to Truro 4 May 1859, extended to Falmouth 21 August 1863, 
amalgamated with GWR 1 July 1889 
   West Midland Railway formed 1 July 1860, amalgamated with GWR 1 August 1863 
    Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway 
opened at Worcester 5 October 1850, completed from Wolverhampton to 
Oxford in stages by April 1854 
    Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway opened 2 January 1851 
    Worcester and Hereford Railway opened 25 July 1859 
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   Ely Valley Railway opened 1 August 1860 
 
 Midlands  
  Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (became Great Central Railway 1897) 
  Great Central Railway incorporated 1897 
   
Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway: 
formed by an amalgamation of: 
 
    
Sheffield, Ashton-under-Lyne and Manchester 
Railway 
 
    Sheffield and Lincolnshire Junction Railway  
    Great Grimsby and Sheffield Junction Railway  
     including Grimsby Docks Company.  
   South Yorkshire Railway opened 9 September 1854, merged with GCR 1 August 1864 
     
Including southern part of Sheffield, 
Rotherham, Barnsley, Wakefield, 
Huddersfield and Goole Railway Company 
 
   Wigan Junction Railway  
   Wrexham, Mold and Connah's Quay Railway  
   North Wales and Liverpool Railway  
   Liverpool, St Helens and South Lancashire Railway  
   Lancashire, Derbyshire and East Coast Railway acquired in 1907 
  Midland Railway: formed 1844 by amalgamation:  
   North Midland Railway  
   Midland Counties Railway  
   Birmingham and Derby Junction Railway  
  Later acquired:  
   Leicester and Swannington Railway opened 14 July 1832 
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   Sheffield and Rotherham Railway 1838 
   Birmingham and Gloucester Railway opened 17 December 1840 
   Little North Western Railway (Skipton – Lancaster) opened 1 June 1850 
   
Manchester, Buxton, Matlock and Midlands Junction 
Railway 
 
  North Staffordshire Railway 
 incorporated in 1845 to promote three railway schemes. Three Acts of 
Parliament on 26 June 1846 were given to the one company. Main line opened 
in 1848. Further Acts were all granted to the NSR Co. which remained 
independent until the 1923 Grouping. 
 
 North  
  Maryport and Carlisle Railway (first section) opened 1845. Remained independent until the 1923 Grouping 
  Furness Railway (Furness) (first section) opened 11 August 1846 
   Ulverston and Lancaster Railway opened 1857 amalgamated with Furness in 1862 
  Great Northern Railway incorporated 1846 
   Edgware, Highgate and London Railway incorporated 1862 
   London and York Railway  
   Direct Northern Railway  
  North Eastern Railway (NER) incorporated 1854 
   York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway 
was York and Newcastle Railway (1846–1847) and Newcastle and Darlington 
Junction Railway (1842–1846) 
    Durham Junction Railway incorporated 1834, amalgamated with N&DJR in 1844 
    Brandling Junction Railway incorporated 1836, amalgamated with N&DJR in 1845 
    Durham and Sunderland Railway incorporated 1834, amalgamated with N&DJR in 1846 
    Pontop and South Shields Railway incorporated 1842, amalgamated with N&DJR in 1846 
     Stanhope and Tyne Railway incorporated 1834, amalgamated with P&SSR in 1842 
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    Newcastle and Berwick Railway incorporated 1845, amalgamated with Y&NR in 1847 
     Newcastle and North Shields Railway incorporated 1836, amalgamated with N&BR in 1845 
    Great North of England Railway incorporated 1836, amalgamated with YN&BR in 1850 
   York and North Midland Railway incorporated 1836 
    Leeds and Selby Railway incorporated 1830, amalgamated with Y&NMR in 1844 
    Whitby and Pickering Railway incorporated 1833, amalgamated with Y&NMR in 1845 
    East and West Yorkshire Junction Railway incorporated 1846, amalgamated with Y&NMR in 1852 
   Leeds Northern Railway was Leeds and Thirsk Railway (1845–1849) 
   Malton and Driffield Railway incorporated 1846 
   Deerness Valley Railway incorporated 1855, amalgamated with NER in 1857 
   Hartlepool Dock and Railway incorporated 1832, amalgamated with NER in 1857 
   North Yorkshire and Cleveland Railway incorporated 1854, amalgamated with NER in 1858 
   Bedale and Leyburn Railway incorporated 1853, amalgamated with NER in 1859 
   Hull and Holderness Railway incorporated 1853, amalgamated with NER in 1862 
   Newcastle and Carlisle Railway incorporated 1829, amalgamated with NER in 1862 
    Blaydon, Gateshead and Hebburn Railway incorporated 1834, amalgamated with N&CR in 1839 
   Stockton and Darlington Railway incorporated 1821, amalgamated with NER in 1863 
    Darlington and Barnard Castle Railway incorporated 1854, amalgamated with S&DR in 1858 
    Middlesbrough and Guisborough Railway incorporated 1852, amalgamated with S&DR in 1858 
    Middlesbrough and Redcar Railway incorporated 1845, amalgamated with S&DR in 1858 
    Wear Valley Railway incorporated 1845, amalgamated with S&DR in 1858 
     Bishop Auckland and Weardale Railway  incorporated 1837, amalgamated with WVR in 1847 
    Eden Valley Railway incorporated 1858, amalgamated with S&DR in 1862 
    Frosterley and Stanhope Railway incorporated 1861, amalgamated with S&DR in 1862 
    South Durham and Lancashire Union Railway incorporated 1857, amalgamated with S&DR in 1862 
   Cleveland Railway incorporated 1858, amalgamated with NER in 1865 
   West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway incorporated 1852, amalgamated with NER in 1865 
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    Clarence Railway incorporated 1828, amalgamated with WHH&R in 1853 
    Stockton and Hartlepool Railway incorporated 1839, amalgamated with WHH&R in 1853 
   Hull and Hornsea Railway incorporated 1862, amalgamated with NER in 1866 
   West Durham Railway incorporated 1839, amalgamated with NER in 1870 
   Hull and Selby Railway incorporated 1836, amalgamated with NER in 1872 
   Blyth and Tyne Railway incorporated 1852, amalgamated with NER in 1874 
   Hexham and Allendale Railway incorporated 1865, amalgamated with NER in 1876 
   Leeds, Castleford and Pontefract Junction Railway incorporated 1873, amalgamated with NER in 1876 
   Tees Valley Railway incorporated 1865, amalgamated with NER in 1882 
   Hylton, Southwick and Monkwearmouth Railway incorporated 1871, amalgamated with NER in 1883 
   Scotswood, Newburn and Wylam Railway incorporated 1871, amalgamated with NER in 1883 
   Whitby, Redcar and Middlesbrough Union Railway incorporated 1866, amalgamated with NER in 1889 
   Wear Valley Extension Railway incorporated 1892, amalgamated with NER in 1893 
   Scarborough & Whitby Railway incorporated 1871, amalgamated with NER in 1898 
   Cawood, Wistow and Selby Light Railway incorporated 1896, amalgamated with NER in 1900 
   
Scarborough, Bridlington and West Riding Junction 
Railway 
incorporated 1885, amalgamated with NER in 1914 
  Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
incorporated 1847. In 1846 the Liverpool and Bury Railway was amalgamated 
with the Manchester and Leeds Railway, which became known as The 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway in 1847 
   Manchester and Leeds Railway incorporated 1836 
   Manchester and Bolton Railway opened 1838 
   Ashton, Stalybridge and Liverpool Junction Railway 1844 
   Liverpool and Bury Railway 1845 
   East Lancashire Railway opened 1846: a section of this line is now a heritage railway 
   Wakefield, Pontefract and Goole Railway opened 1848 
   Liverpool, Crosby and Southport Railway opened 1848 
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  London and North Western Railway (LNWR) 
formed by amalgamation in 1846, there were 45 formerly independent 
railways within the LNWR, including: 
   Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened 15 September 1830 
   London and Birmingham Railway (first section) opened 20 July 1837; opened throughout 17 September 1838 
   Grand Junction Railway opened 1837 
   Chester and Crewe Railway opened 1846 
   Chester and Holyhead Railway opened 1848 to Bangor 1850 to Holyhead 
   Manchester and Birmingham Railway  
   Lancaster and Carlisle Railway  
   Cromford and High Peak Railway  
   Kendal and Windermere Railway  
   Watford and Rickmansworth Railway 
opened 1 October 1862 closed 1998 possible reopening (see Watford tube 
station) 
       
 South  
  Isle of Wight Central Railway incorporated 1887, amalgamation of several smaller railways including: 
   Cowes and Newport Railway incorporated 1859 
   Ryde & Newport Railway opened 1875 
   Isle of Wight (Newport Junction) Railway completed 1879 
  London Brighton and South Coast Railway amalgamation of five railways August 1846: 
   London and Croydon Railway incorporated 1835 opened 1839 
   London and Brighton Railway incorporated 1837 opened 21 September 1841 
   Croydon and Epsom Railway incorporated 1844. 
   Brighton and Chichester Railway incorporated 1844. 
   Brighton Lewes and Hastings Railway incorporated 1844. 
   West End of London and Crystal Palace Railway opened 1856-8. 
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   Victoria Station and Pimlico Railway incorporated 1858. 
  London, Chatham and Dover Railway  
   East Kent Railway incorporated 1853 
   Victoria Station and Pimlico Railway incorporated 1858. 
   Mid-Kent Railway incorporated 1855. 
  London and South Western Railway (LSWR)  
   London and Southampton Railway opened (first section) 21 May 1838; renamed LSWR 1838 
   Bodmin and Wadebridge Railway 
opened 23 May 1832, sold to LSWR autumn 1846 but not legally vested in 
that company until 1 July 1886 
   Richmond Railway opened 27 July 1846 
   Windsor, Staines and South Western Railway opened 1848/1849 
   Southampton and Dorchester Railway opened 1 June 1847; extended to Weymouth 20 June 1857 
   Staines, Wokingham and Woking Junction Railway opened 1856 
   Andover and Redbridge Railway opened 6 March 1865, closed 1967 
   Lymington Railway opened 12 July 1858, closed 1967 
  London, Tilbury and Southend Railway incorporated 1862 amalgamated with Midland Railway 1912 
   London and Blackwall Railway  
  Metropolitan Railway (MetR)  
   North Metropolitan Railway incorporated 1853; became MetrR 1854. Other sections followed in 1860–70 
  
Midland and South Western Junction Railway: formed in 
1884 by amalgamation of 
 
   Swindon, Marlborough and Andover Railway incorporated 1873 
   Swindon and Cheltenham Extension Railway incorporated 1881 
  North London Railway incorporated 1846 original name:  
   





  Pentewan Railway 
The railway from St Austell was complete by 22 June 1829 but not 
incorporated until 20 February 1873 as the Pentewan Railway and Harbour 
Company Limited. An Act of Parliament on 7 August 1874 authorised the use 
of locomotives. It was closed from 4 March 1918. 
  Redruth and Chasewater Railway 
This was opened on 30 January 1826 and was locomotive worked from 1 
December 1864. It was closed from 27 September 1915. 
  
Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway (S&DJR). An 
amalgamation of the: 
 
   Somerset Central Railway first section opened on 1 November 1860, and 
   Dorset Central Railway first section opened on 28 August 1854. 
   The S&D Joint Railway 
was jointly operated by the Midland Railway and the London and South 
Western Railway (L&SWR). After the 1 January 1923 Grouping, joint 
ownership of the S&DJR passed to the LMS and the Southern Railway.[1] 
  South Eastern Railway incorporated 1836 
   London and Greenwich Railway  
   Canterbury and Whitstable Railway  
   Mid-Kent Railway incorporated 1855. 
   Reading, Guildford and Reigate Railway  
  Surrey Iron Railway(SIR) opened 1804 (4 ft gauge): 
   
Croydon Merstham and Godstone Railway – 
extension of SIR 
 
  West Somerset Mineral Railway 
incorporated 1855 to carry iron ore; passenger service from 1865; closed to all 
traffic 1898 see article here 
       
Wales  
 Cambrian Railways incorporated between 1864 and 1904 
  Oswestry and Newtown Railway 30 miles: incorporated 6 June 1855; opened 1860-1 
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  Llanidloes and Newtown Railway 
12 1/4 miles: 4 August 1853; 1859. Until 1861 this section of the line was 
completely isolated 
  Newtown and Machynlleth Railway 23 miles: 27 July 1857; 1863 
  Oswestry, Ellesmere and Whitchurch Railway 18 miles: 1 August 1861; 1863-4 
  Aberystwyth and Welsh Coast Railway 86 miles: 26 July 1861; 1863–69 
  Mid Wales Railway 
45 1/2 miles: 1 August 1859; 1 September 1864. This Railway maintained 
complete independence from the Cambrian until 1 January 1888, when the 
latter took over working the line; and on 1 July 1904 when the two Railways 
amalgamated. 
  and several railways opened in the 1860s  
 Festiniog Railway 
incorporated 23 May 1832 (1 ft 11 1/2 in (597 mm) gauge) ?13 1/2 miles 
opened 1836 to carry dressed slate from Blaenau Ffestiniog to Porthmadog for 
export by sea, carried passengers from 1865. Still independent and since 1954 
a leading heritage railway. 
 Llanelly Railway and Dock Company incorporated 1828 
 Rhymney Railway incorporated 1854 
 Taff Vale Railway (TVR) 
incorporated 1836. Among the eight railways amalgamated with the TVR is 
one early railway: 





B. The Grouping of Railways. Reorganisation of Railway System, Railways Act 1921 
Table 9.2 Reorganisation of Railway System 1921. Grouping of Railways.  
Source: (His Majesty’s Government, 1921, pp. 69–72) 
Group Constituent Companies Route km 
1. The Southern Group. The London and South Western Railway Company 1,642  
The London Brighton and South Coast Railway Company  736  
 The South Eastern Railway Company 637  
 The London Chatham and Dover Railway Company 
1,026   The South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies Managing Committee. 
 Subsidiary Companies   
 The Bridgwater Railway Company 12  
 The Brighton and Dyke Railway Company 8  
 The Freshwater Yarmouth and Newport (Isle of Wight) Railway Company 19  
 The Hayling Railways Company 8  
 The Isle of Wight Railway Company 24  
 The Isle of Wight Central Railway Company 46  
 The Lee-on-the-Solent Railway Company 5  
 The London and Greenwich Railway Company 6 
 The Mid Kent Railway (Bromley to St. Mary Cray) Company 4  
 The North Cornwall Railway Company 84  
 The Plymouth and Dartmoor Railway Company 4  
 The Plymouth, Devonport and South Western Junction Railway Company 31  
 The Sidmouth Railway Company 13  
 The Victoria Station and Pimlico Railway Company.  
Group Constituent Companies Route km 
2. The Western Group. The Great Western Railway Company 4,836  
 The Barry Railway Company 109  
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 The Cambrian Railway Company 475  
 The Cardiff Railway Company 19  
 The Rhymney Railway company 82  
 The Taff Vale Railway Company 200  
 The Alexandra (Newport and South Wales) Docks and Railway Company. 17  
 Subsidiary Companies   
 The Brecon and Merthyr Tydfil Junction Railway Company 97  
 The Burry Port and Gwendreath Valley Railway Company 34  
 The Cleobury Mortimer and Ditton Priors Light Railway Company 19  
 The Didcot Newbury and Southampton Railway Company 68  
 The Exeter Railway Company 14  
 The Forest of Dean Central Railway Company 8  
 The Gwendreath Valleys Railway Company; 5  
 The Lampeter, Aberayron and New Quay Light Railway Company 19  
 The Liskeard and Looe Railway Company 14  
 The Llanelly and Mynydd Mawr Railway Company 21  
 The Mawddy Railway Company  
 The Midland and South Western Junction Railway Company 101  
 The Neath and Brecon Railway Company  
 The Penarth Extension Railway Company 3  
 The Penarth Harbour, Dock and Railway Company 16  
 The Port Talbot Railway and Docks Company; 56  
 The Princetown Railway Company; 17  
 The Rhondda and Swansea Bay Railway Company 46  
 The Ross and Monmouth Railway Company 20  
 The South Wales Mineral Railway Company 21  
 The Teign Valley Railway Company 12  
 The Vale of Glamorgan Railway Company 33  
 The Van Railway Company  
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 The Welshpool and Llanfair Light Railway Campany  
 The West Somerset Railway Company 23  
 The Wrexham and Ellesmere Railway Company.  
Group Constituent Companies Route km 
3. The North Western, 
Midland, and West 
Scottish Group 
The London and North Western Railway Company 4,293  
The Midland Railway Company 3,493  
The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (incl in London and North Western 
Railway Company) 
  
 The North Staffordshire Railway Company 355  
 The Furness Railway Company 254  
 The Caledonian Railway Company 1,794  
 The Glasgow and South Western Railway Company 794  
 The Highland Railway Company. 814  
 Subsidiary Companies   
 The Arbroath and Forfar Railway Company 24  
 The Brechin and Edzell District Railway Company 10  
 The Callander and Oban Railway Company 161  
 The Catheart District Railway Company  
 The Charnwood Forest Railway Company 17  
 The Cleator and Workington Junction Railway Company 56  
 The Cockermouth Keswick and Penrith Railway Company 49  
 The Dearne Valley Railway Company 34  
 The Dornoch Light Railway Company 12  
 The Dundee and Newtyle Railway Company 23  
 The Harborne Railway Company 4  
 The Killin Railway Company 8  
 The Lanarkshire and Ayrshire Railway Company 58  
 The Knott End Railway Company 19  
 The Leek and Manifold Valley Light Railway company; 13  
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 The Maryport and Carlisle Railway Company; 69  
 The Mold and Denbigh Junction Railway Company 24  
 The North and South Western Junction Railway Company; 8  
 The North London Railway Company 26  
 The Portpatrick and Wigtownshire Joint Committee 132  
 The Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company 47  
 The Solway Junction Railway Company 20  
 The Stratford-upon-Avon and Midland Junction Railway Company 109  
 The Tottenham and Forest Gate Railway Company 10  
 The Wick and Lybster Light Railway Company 22  
 The Wirral Railway Company  22  
 The Yorkshire Dales Railway (Skipton to Grassington) Company 14  
Group Constituent Companies Route km 
4. The North Eastern, 
Eastern, and East 
Scottish Group. 
The North Eastern Railway Company 2,829  
The Great Central Railway Company 1,372  
The Great Eastern Railway Company 1,917  
 The Great Northern Railway Company 1,692  
 The Hull and Barnsley Railway Company 171  
 The North British Railway Company 2,218  
 The Great North of Scotland Railway Company. 538  
 Subsidiary Companies   
 The Brackenhill Light Railway Company  
 The Colne Valley and Halstead Railway Company 31  
 The East and West Yorkshire Union Railways Company 15  
 The East Lincolnshire Railway Company 76  
 The Edinburgh and Bathgate Railway Company; 16  
 The Forcett Railway Company  
 The Forth and Clyde Junction Railway Company 49  
 The Gifford and Garvald Railway Company 15  
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 The Great North of England, Clarence and Hartlepool Junction Railway Company 10  
 The Horncastle Railway Company 12  
 The Humber Commercial Railway and Dock Company  
 The Kilsyth and Bonnybridge Railway Company 14  
 The Lauder Light Railway Company 16  
 The London and Blackwall Railway Company 10  
 The Mansfield Railway Company 16  
 The Mid-Suffolk Light Railway Company 31  
 The Newburgh and North Fife Railway Company; 21  
 The North Lindsey Light Railways Company  19  
 The Nottingham and Grantham Railway and Canal Company  37  
 The Nottingham Joint Station Committee  
 The Nottingham Suburban Railway Company 6  
 The Seaforth and Sefton Junction Railway Company 
 
 The Sheffield District Railway Company 7  
 The South Yorkshire Junction Railway Company 18  
 The Stamford and Essendine Railway Company 20  







C. Analysis of train weight – supporting data for Chapter 4 
The following tables show the train formation used to derive the figure for each 
different train set shown in Figure 4.3. The data on weight and number of seats is 
taken from an industry reference book (Pritchard and Hall, 2013).  
Mark III Electric 
Table 9.3 Data for Mark III Electric trainset used for step one and Figure 4.3 
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
Class 87 Electric Locomotive 83.3  
Open Standard 34.3 76 
Open Standard 34.3 70 
Open Standard 34.3 76 
Open Standard 34.3 76 
Open Standard 34.3 76 
Open Standard 34.3 76 
Restaurant First 33.7 70 
Open First 36.5 48 
Open First 36.5 48 
Class 87 Electric Locomotive 83.3  
TOTAL 480.8 564 
 
Mark IV Electric – InterCity 225 
Table 9.4 Data for Mark IV Electric trainset used for step one and Figure 4.3 
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
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Class 91 Electric Locomotive 84  
Open Standard (end) 39.5 76 
Open Standard 40.8 76 
Open Standard 40.8 76 
Open Standard 40.8 76 
Open Standard (Disabled) 39.4 68 
Kitchen Buffet Standard 43.2 30 
Open First 41.3 41 
Open First (Disabled) 40.7 42 
Open First 42.1 46 
Driving Brake Van (140 mph) 43.5  





Pendolino electric tilt 
Class 390/0 9-car set 
Table 9.5 Data for Pendolino Electric Tilt rolling stock (9-car) for step one and Figure 4.3 
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
DMRF (Driving Motor Restaurant First) 56.3 18 
MF (Motorised First) 52.3 39 
PTF (Pantograph Trailer First) 51.2 44 
MF (Motorised First) 52.3 46 
TS (Trailer Standard) 45.5 76 
MS (Motorised Standard) 52.3 76 
PTSRMB (Pantograph Trailer Standard 
Restaurant Manager Buffet) 
53.2 48 
MS (Motorised Standard) 52.5 64 
DMSO (Driving Motor Standard Open) 54.5 46 





Class 390/1 11-car set 
Table 9.6 Data for Pendolino Electric Tilt rolling stock (11-car) for step one and Figure 4.3 
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
DMRF 56.3 18 
MF 52.3 39 
PTF 51.2 44 
MF 52.3 46 
TS 45.5 76 
MS 52.3 76 
TS 45.5 76 
MS 52.3 76 
PTSRMB 53.2 48 
MS 52.5 64 
DMSO 54.5 46 





Voyager Diesel tilt 
Class 221 5-car 
Table 9.7 Data for Voyager Diesel Tilt rolling stock for step one and Figure 4.3 
Vehicle type Weight (tonnes) Seats 
DMSO 58.9 42 
MS 54.3 68 
MS 54.4 68 
MSRMB 55.9 52 
DMF 59.1 26 





Japanese rolling stock data 
This research is focused upon British rolling stock, but the following data is captured 
to re-create the original chart (Figure 1.5) that started this research.  





Weight (tonnes) Seats 
Series 0 1964 972 1,340 
Series 100 1985 925 1,321 
Series 300 1992 711 1,323 
Series 500 1997 700 1,324 
Series 700 1999 708 1,323 
Series N700 2007 700 1,323 
Series E5 2011 450 731 
Sources:  
(a) All data, except below, from UIC World High Speed Rolling Stock. 
https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/20180910_highspeed_rolling_stock.pdf   
(b) Seating capacity for Series 100 sourced from Wikipedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_Series_Shinkansen  





Database of EMUs, DMUs and Bi-Mode trains used in analysis 
The data given in each of the following tables is described below: 
A. Class and sub-class: the identifier for the train  
B. Year introduced: the year that the trainset (class or sub-class) was first 
introduced 
C. Weight of set: the weight of the trainset 
D. Seats per set: the total number of seats of the trainset (including flip seats) 
E. Kg/seat: the weight of the trainset relative to the number of seats. This is the 
total weight of the set (C) divided by the total number of seats for the set (D). 
F. Cars per set: the number of cars that make up the trainset.  
G. Average weight of car: the average weight of a car for that class or sub-class. 
This is the total weight of the set (C) divided by the number cars that form 
the set (F). 
H. Total sets in traffic: the total number of sets in traffic for each class and sub-
class 





Table 9.9 Database of Electric Multiple Units 











weight of car 





313/0 1976 104.5 231 452.4 3 34.8 41 19.86 
313/1 1976 105.0 231 452.4 3 35.0 3 19.86 
313/2 1976 105.0 194 541.2 3 35.0 19 19.86 
Class 314 1979 102.0 212 481.1 3 34.0 16 19.86 
Class 315 1980 137.6 316 435.4 4 34.4 61 19.86 
Class 317 
317/1 1981 137.0 292 469.2 4 34.3 12 19.88 
317/5 1981 137.0 292 469.2 4 34.3 15 19.88 
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weight of car 




317/6 1985 137.0 258 531.0 4 34.3 24 19.88 
317/7 1981 144.5 194 744.9 4 36.1 9 19.88 
317/8 1981 137.0 265 517.0 4 34.3 12 19.88 
Class 318 1985 116.6 205 568.8 3 38.9 21 19.88 
Class 319 
319/0 1987 136.5 304  449.0  4  34.1  11 19.88 
319/2 1987 142 243  584.4  4  35.5  7 19.88 
319/3 1990 140.3 303  463.0  4  35.1  26 19.88 















weight of car 




320/3 1990 115.9 210 551.9 3 38.6 22 19.86 
320/4 1990 116.2 213 545.5 3 38.7 22 19.86 
Class 321 
321/3 1988 140 308 454.6  4 35.0  66 19.88 
321/4 1989 140.4 299 469.6  4 35.1  40 19.88 
321/9 1990 145 287 505.2  4 36.3  40 19.88 
Class 322 1990 145.0 300 483.3  4 36.3 5 19.88 
Class 323 1992 121.4 289 420.1  3 40.5 43 23.41 
Class 331 Civity 
331/0 2017 115.5 203  569.0  3  38.5  31  23.80  
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weight of car 




331/1 2017 145.6 283  514.5  4  36.4  12  23.69  
Class 332 - Heathrow Express 1997 221.2 241 917.8 5 44.2 14 23.44 
Class 333 2001 184.5 360 512.5 4 46.1 16 23.44 
Class 334 'Juniper' 1999 124.6 181 688.4 3 41.5 40 20.67 
Class 345 'Crossrail' Aventra 2015 318.4 454  701.32  9  35.4  70  22.50  
Class 350 'Desiro' 
350/1 2004 179.3 235 763.0 4 44.8 30 20.34 
350/2 2008 166.1 276 601.8 4 41.5 37 20.34 
350/3 2014 169.5 239 709.2 4 42.4 10 20.34 
350/4 2013 170.0 197 862.9 4 42.5 10 20.34 
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weight of car 




Class 357 'Electrostar' 
357/0 1999 157.6 282 558.9 4 39.4 46 20.43 
357/2 2001 157.6 282 558.9 4 39.4 11 20.43 
357/3 2001 157.6 222 709.9 4 39.4 17 20.43 
Class 360 'Desiro' 
360/0 2002 167.0 281 594.3 4 41.8 21 20.34 
360/2 2002 202.8 331 612.7 5 40.6 5 20.34 
Class 365 'Networker Express' 1994 151.5 264 573.9 4 37.9 40 20.48 
Class 373 'Eurostar' 1992 360.7 375 961.9 10 36.1 24 20.89 
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weight of car 




Class 374 Siemens Velaro 
'e320' 
2012 455.0 448 1,015.6 8 56.9 17 25.41 
Class 375 'Electrostar' 
375/3 2001 123.1 176  699.4  3  41.0  10  20.20  
375/6 1999 173.6 242  717.4  4  43.4  30  20.20  
375/7 2001 158.1 242  653.3  4  39.5  15  20.20  
375/8 2004 162.3 242  670.7  4  40.6  30  20.20  
375/9 2003 161.7 277  583.8  4  40.4  27  20.20  
Class 376 'Electrostar' 2004 192.9 228  846.1  5  38.6  36  20.20  
Class 377 'Electrostar' 
Appendices 
Page 333 











weight of car 




377/1 2002 162.6 234  694.9  4  40.7  64  20.20  
377/2 2003 168.3 246  684.2  4  42.1  15  20.20  
377/3 2001 122.4 176  695.5  3  40.8  29  20.20  
377/4 2004 160.9 241  667.6  4  40.2  74  20.20  
377/5 2008 168.9 241  700.8  4  42.2  23  20.20  
377/6 2012 204.3 300  681.0  5  40.9  26  20.20  
377/7 2013 212.3 300  707.7  5  42.5  8  20.20  
Class 378 'Capitalstar' 
378/1 2009 199.6 192 1,039.6 5 39.9 20 20.30 
378/2 2008 205.7 192 1,071.4 5 41.1 37 20.30 
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weight of car 




Class 379 'Electrostar' 2009 163.9 211 776.8 4 41.0 30 20.20 
Class 380 'Desiro' 
380/0 2009 132.6 208 637.5 3 44.2 22 23.00 
380/1 2009 167.4 282 593.6 4 41.9 16 23.00 
Class 387 
387/1 – Great Northern 2014 174.8 225 776.9 4 43.7 29 20.39 
387/1 - Great Western 
Railway units 
2014 174.8 225 776.9 4 43.7 45 20.39 
387/2 2014 174.8 223 783.9 4 43.7 27 20.39 
387/3 2014 174.8 225 776.9 4 43.7 6 20.39 
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weight of car 




Class 390 'Pendolino' 
390/0 2001 470.1 487 965.3 9 52.2 21 24.35 
390/1 2001 567.9 609 932.5 11 51.6 35 24.35 
Class 395 'Javelin' 2006 276.2 352 784.7 6 46.0 29 20.44 
Class 442 1988 206.1 346  595.66  5  41.2  24  23.08  
Class 444 'Desiro' 2003 221.5 361  613.57  5  44.3  45  23.57  
Class 445 1971 140.0 280 500.0 4 35.0 2 19.87 
Class 446 1972 70.0 136 514.7 2 35.0 1 19.80 
Class 450 'Desiro' 
450/0 2002 172.2 270 637.8 4 43.1 99 20.40 
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weight of car 




450/5 2002 171.9 251 684.9 4 43.0 28 20.40 
Class 455 
455/7 1984 133.4 244 546.7 4 33.4 43 19.88 
455/8 - Southern Units 1982 146.8 310 473.5 4 36.7 46 19.88 
455/8 - South Western 
Railway Units 
1982 131.7 244 539.8 4 32.9 28 19.88 
455/9 1982 131.7 244 539.8 4 32.9 20 19.88 
Class 456 1990 75.6 118 640.7 2 37.8 24 19.83 
Class 458 'Juniper' 1998 199.2 274 727.0 5 39.8 36 20.55 
Class 465 'Networker' 
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weight of car 




465/0 1991 133.6 348 383.9 4 33.4 50 20.48 
465/1 1993 133.6 348 383.9 4 33.4 47 20.48 
465/2 1991 135.8 348 390.2 4 34.0 16 20.48 
465/9 1991 138.2 322 429.2 4 34.6 34 20.48 
Class 466 'Networker' 1993 72.0 168 428.6 2 36.0 43 20.89 
Class 483 1989 54.8 82 668.3 2 27.4 6 16.15 
Class 507 1978 98.0 192 510.4 3 32.7 32 19.86 
Class 508 1979 99.0 192 515.6 3 33.0 27 19.86 
Class 700 'Desiro City' 
700/0 - 8-car units 2014 273.5 433 631.6 8 34.2 60 20.40 
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weight of car 




700/1 - 12-car units 2013 399.6 672 594.6 12 33.3 55 20.40 
Class 707 'Desiro City' 2015 160.3 275 582.9 5 32.1 30 20.08 
Class 710 'Aventra' 
710/2 4-car units 2017 157.8 189 834.9 4  39.5  18 20.72 
Class 717 'Desiro City' 2017 204.5 377 542.4 6  34.1  25 20.00 
Class 801 InterCity Express Programme Electric 





Table 9.10 Database of Diesel Multiple Units 











weight of car 




Class 121 1960 38.0 65 584.6 1 38.0 1 20.45 
Class 139 2007 12.5 21 595.2 1 12.5 2 8.70 
Class 142 'Pacer' 1985 49.5 111 445.9 2 24.8 94 15.55 
Class 143 'Pacer' 1985 49.5 104 476.0 2 24.8 23 15.55 
Class 144 'Pacer' 
144: 3-car 1986 48.5 92 527.2 2 24.3 10 15.29 
144: 2-car 1986 72.0 150 480.0 3 24.0 3 15.29 
Class 150 'Sprinter' 
150/0 1984 105.1 239 439.7 3 35.0 2 20.10 
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weight of car 




150/1 1985 76.4 147  519.7  2  38.2  50  20.12  
150/2 1986 72.3 122  592.6  2  36.2  84  20.12  
Class 153 'Super Sprinter' 1987 41.2 72  572.2  1  41.2  70  23.29  
Class 155 'Super Sprinter' 1988 79.4 140  567.1  2  39.7  7  23.29  
Class 156 'Super Sprinter' 1988 74.7 150  498.0  2  37.4  114  23.03  
Class 158 'Express' 
158/0 2-car 1989 77.0 138 558.0 2 38.5 126 23.20 
158/0 3-car 1989 115.5 206 560.7 3 38.5 9 23.20 
158/8 1989 77.0 125 616.0 2 38.5 11 23.20 
158/9 1989 77.0 142 542.3 2 38.5 10 23.20 
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weight of car 




158/0 - Great Western 1989 115.5 208 555.3 3 38.5 10 23.20 
Class 159 
159/0 1992 115.5 199 580.4 3 38.5 22 23.20 
159/1 1989 115.5 192 601.6 3 38.5 8 23.20 
Class 165 'Network Turbo' 
165/0 2-car 1992 83.6 178  469.7  2  41.8  28  22.85  
165/0 3-car 1992 120.6 284  424.7  3  40.2  11  22.85  
165/1 2-car 1992 77.8 157  495.5  2  38.9  20  22.85  
165/1 3-car 1992 115.9 263  440.7  3  38.6  16  22.85  
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weight of car 




Class 166 'Networker Express 
Turbo' 
1992 120.7 244 494.7 3 40.2 21 22.82 
Class 168 'Clubman' 
168/0 1997 169.6 275 616.7 4 42.4 5 23.62 
168/1 4-car 2000 175.1 275 636.7 4 43.8 2 23.62 
168/1 3-car 2000 132.2 202 654.5 3 44.1 6 23.62 
168/2 2000 177.5 278 638.5 4 44.4 6 23.62 
168/3 2000 91.6 128 715.6 2 45.8 9 23.62 
Class 170 'Turbostar' 
170/1 3-car 1998 132.8 200 664.0 3 44.3 10 23.62 
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weight of car 




170/1 2-car 1998 89.8 120  748.3  2  44.9  7  23.62  
170/2 3-car Greater Anglia 1999 131.9 186  709.1  3  44.0  8  23.62  
170/2 2-car Greater Anglia 2002 91.4 119  768.1  2  45.7  4  23.62  
170/3 ex-Hull Trains units 2004 138.2 193  716.1  3  46.1  4  23.62  
170/3 Cross Country units 2002 134.2 200  671.0  3  44.7  2  23.62  
170/4 ScotRail "express" (1) 1999 132.9 186  714.5  3  44.3  20  23.62  
170/4 ScotRail "express" (2) 2003 137 186  736.6  3  45.7  10  23.62  
170/4 ScotRail & Northern 2004 136.1 198  687.4  3  45.4  12  23.62  
170/4 standard only 2001 132.6 198  669.7  3  44.2  8  23.62  
170/5 1999 91.7 122  751.6  2  45.9  23  23.62  
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weight of car 




170/6 2000 134.1 196 684.2 3 44.7 9 23.62 
Class 171 'Turbostar' 
171/7 1999 95.4 116 822.4 2 47.7 10 23.62 
171/8 2004 180.4 259 696.5 4 45.1 6 23.62 
Class 172 'Turbostar' 
172/0 2009 83.1 137  606.6 2  41.6  8  23.27  
172/1 2009 84.2 145  580.7  2  42.1  4  23.27  
172/2 2010 84.4 139  607.2  2  42.2  12  23.27  
172/3 2010 123.2 219  562.6  3  41.1  15  23.30  
Class 175 'Coradia 1000' 
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weight of car 




175/0 1999 99.5 118 843.2 2 49.8 11 23.03 
175/1 1999 147.7 186 794.1 3 49.2 16 23.01 
Class 180 2000 252.5 268 942.2 5 50.5 14 23.37 
Class 185 'Desiro' 2005 163.0 181 900.6 3 54.3 51 23.76 
Class 220 'Voyager' 2000 194.6 200 973.0 4 48.7 34 23.62 
Class 221 'Super Voyager' 2001 280.7 262 1,071.4 5 56.1 44 23.67 
Class 222 ' Meridian' 
Class 222 7-car units 2004 337.8 342  987.7  7  48.3  7  23.43  
Class 222 5-car units 2003 249 242  1,028.9  5  49.8  17  23.43  
Class 222 4-car units 2005 197.3 181  1,090.1  4  49.3  4  23.43  
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Table 9.11 Database of Bi-Mode Multiple Units 
















Class 755 'Flirt Bi-mode' 
755/3 - 3-car units 2018 138.5 167  829.3  3  46.2  14  20.81  
755/4 - 4-car units 2018 163.5 229  714.0  4  40.9  24  20.81  
Class 800 InterCity Express Programme Bi-Mode 
800/0 5-car Great Western Units 2013 250.5 326 768.4 5 50.1 36 25.23 
800/1 Azuma Bi-mode 9-car 
LNER Units 
2013 429.5 611 703.0 9 47.7 13 25.23 
800/2 Azuma Bi-mode 5-car 
LNER Units 
2018 250.5 302 829.5 5 50.1 10 25.23 
800/3 9-car Great Western Units 2017 429.2 647 663.4 9 47.7 21 25.23 
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Class 802 AT300 
802/0 5-car Great Western Units 2017 252.8 326 775.5 5 50.6 22 25.18 
802/1 Bi-mode 9-car Great 
Western units 
2017 430.3 647 665.1 9 47.8 14 25.18 





This table shows the classes of EMUs split by tranche that are used for the analysis in section 4.4, page 92.  
Table 9.12 Classes of Electric Multiple Units included within each tranche for the analysis in step three 
Tranche 1 
445, 446, 313/0, 313/1, 313/2, 314, 315, 317/1, 317/5, 317/6, 317/7, 317/8, 318, 319/0, 319/2, 319/3, 319/4, 320/3, 
320/4, 321/3, 321/4, 321/9, 322, 507, 508 
Tranche 2 365, 465/0, 465/1, 465/2, 465/9, 466 
Tranche 3 
334, 350/1, 350/2, 350/3, 350/4, 357/0, 357/2, 357/3, 360/0, 360/2, 375/3, 375/6, 375/7, 375/8, 375/9, 376, 377/1, 377/2, 
377/3, 377/4, 377/5, 377/6, 377/7, 378/1, 378/2, 379, 387/1 (Northern), 387/1 (Great Western), 387/2, 387/3, 450/0, 
450/5, 458 




D. Analysis of recent decisions – supporting data 
 
Freedom of Information Request – Thameslink 
 
The following email was sent as a Freedom of Information request on Tuesday 28 
March 2017 to contact@thameslinkprogramme.co.uk  
Dear Sir or Madam 
For my research I would like to see a copy of the Pre-Qualification 
Questionnaire that was used in the tender process for the procurement of the 
thameslink rolling stock and associated services.  
I believe the Pre-Qualification OJEU was issued in April 2008 
I would like also like a copy of the Invitation to Tender which was 
subsequently issues in November 2008. 
These documents were part of the competitive tender process.  
 Yours faithfully, 
Michael King  
 
The following reply was received via email as a pdf attachment on 24 April 2017 
and is copied below.  
Dear Mr King, 
Freedom of Information Act Request – F0014719 
Thank you for your request for information which we received on 30 March 
2017. You requested: 
For my research I would like to see a copy of the Pre-Qualification 
Questionnaire that was used in the tender process for the procurement of the 
Thameslink rolling stock and associated services. I believe the Pre-
Qualification OJEU was issued in April 2008 I would like also like a copy of 
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the Invitation to Tender which was subsequently issued in November 2008. 
These documents were part of the competitive tender process. 
Your request for information has been considered under the Freedom of 
Information (FOI) Act 2000. I am writing to confirm that the Department for 
Transport (DfT) has now completed its search for the information and that we 
hold information that is relevant to your request. 
During the Thameslink rolling stock procurement competition, an OJEU 
Notice was published in April 2008. At OJEU stage, bidders were asked to 
complete an Accreditation Questionnaire in order to qualify to receive an 
Invitation to Tender (ITT) in the next stage of the procurement competition. A 
Pre-Qualification Questionnaire was not completed as the Accredited 
Questionnaire was used to provide a thorough evaluation and accreditation of 
applicants. 
Under section 21 of the Act (the full text of the exemption is attached at Annex 
A) we are not required to provide information which is already reasonably 
accessible to you. 
The Thameslink Rolling Stock project Accreditation Questionnaire, OJEU and 




Please see attached details of DfT’s complaints procedure and your right to 
complain to the Information Commissioner. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mr Craig Welsh 





















































Freedom of Information Request – Crossrail 
 
The following email was sent as a Freedom of Information request on 22 June 2016 
to foi@crossrail.co.uk  
Dear Crossrail Limited, 
For my research I would like to see a copy of the Pre-Qualification 
Questionnaire that was used in the tender process for the procurement of the 
crossrail rolling stock and associated services. 
The OJEU that references this PQQ is 2010/S 148-229137 
This PQQ was the early part of the competitive tender process, which was 




The following reply was received via email on 23 June 2016 and is copied below.  
Dear Mr King, 
Thank you for your request for a copy of the Pre-qualification questionnaire 
for the Crossrail rolling stock and depot procurement process. I am taking 
action now to address your request. However the team responsible for the 
rolling stock procurement was dissolved following the award of the contract so 
it may take some _me to locate this document. In the meantime you may be 
interested in the documents already in the public domain – the invitation to 
tender and the draft Rolling Stock and Depot Provision Agreement. The 















In accordance with the requirement of the Freedom of Information Act I will 
respond to you further within 20 working days. 
Yours sincerely 
Patrick Griffin | Freedom of Information 
 
A further response to my request was sent 18 July 2016 and is copied below.  
Dear Mr King, 
In your message of 22 June 2016 you requested information in accordance 
with the Freedom of Information Act in respect of the Crossrail rolling stock 
procurement process.. You made the following request:  
For my research I would like to see a copy of the Pre-Qualification 
Questionnaire that was used in the tender process for the procurement of the 
Crossrail rolling stock and associated services.  
The OJEU that references this PQQ is 2010/S 148-229137. 
This PQQ was the early part of the competitive tender process, which was 
eventually won by Bombardier. 




Further to my earlier response I now enclose a copy of Part D of the Pre-
qualification pack for the Rolling Stock and Depot Services Contract, the Pre- 
qualification Questionnaire.. 
Please see the information below for details of your right to appeal if you are 
dissatisfied with this response or the way that your request has been handled. 
Yours sincerely 






















































AC Alternating Current 
ANT Actor-Network Theory 
ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies 
BR British Rail 
BRB British Railways Board 
BREL British Rail Engineering Limited 
BRIL British Rail Investments Limited 
BTC British Transport Commission 
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CME Chief Mechanical Engineer 
CSR 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Looks at the role of corporations in addressing social and 
environmental issues. More information at Wikipedia here: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_social_responsibility  
DC Direct Current 
Decision-
laboratory 
A metaphor used in this research to describe the action taking 
place to develop articulate propositions. For strategic decisions 
to produce new trains this decision-laboratory includes the 
procurement process and more.  
DJSI Dow Jones Sustainability Indices 
DMU Diesel Multiple Unit 
EMU Electric Multiple Unit 
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EU European Union 
FOI Freedom of Information 
GB Great Britain 
GNER Great North Eastern Railway 
HLOS High Level Output Specification 
HST High Speed Train 
ITT 
Invitation To Tender. A typical stage in the procurement process 
for large bids. 
ITN 
Invitation To Negotiate. An alternative to ITT (see above) that is 
used in the Crossrail procurement. 
MCA Multi-Criteria Analysis 
MEAT 
Most Economically Advantageous Tender. An acronym used for 
some procurements to summarise the criteria for the winning bid 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation.  
NR Network Rail 
OJEU 
Official Journal of the European Union. A set of directives to 
guide tendering processes across the EU 
OPRAF Office of Passenger Rail Franchising 
ORR Office of the Rail Regulator 
PQQ 
Pre-Qualification Questionnaire. Typically an early stage in the 
tender process for large bids 




Passenger Transport Executive. A local government body 
responsible for public transport within large urban areas.  
REC 
Railway Executive Committee, a government body that operated 
during World War One and Two to coordinate railways in 
support of the war effort. 
ROSCO 
Rolling Stock Operating Companies. Organisations that own and 
maintain railway engines and carriages which are leased to train 
operating companies (TOCs).  
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board 
SIM 
Social Issues in Management 
“…studies the social issues, institutions, interactions, and 
impacts of management.” Source: Academy of Management 
http://aom.org/Divisions-and-Interest-Groups/Social-Issues-in-
Management/Social-Issues-in-Management.aspx  
SoFA Statement of Funds Available 
SRA Strategic Rail Authority 
STS 
Science and Technology Studies.  
“…the study of how social, political, and cultural values affect 
scientific research and technological innovation, and how these, 
in turn, affect society, politics and culture.” Source: Wikipedia 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science,_technology_and_society)  
TOC 
Train Operating Company. An organisation running the 
operational passenger rail service within Great Britain 
UIC 
The International Union of Railways (Union Internationale des 
Chemins de fer) 
 
